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FOREWORD 
This is a book about a remarkable institution. It captures the soul of 
the place and the work of the people who made it what it is today. 
The NASA Ames Research Center has been in business for over 
40 years and during that time a great many important contributions have 
been made by people at Ames to both the aeronautical and space missions of 
NASA. In the early years, the focus of the center’s work was in the area of 
high-speed flight and ultimately led to the creation of the superb fighter air- 
craft that were used toward the end of World War I1 and in the Korean con- 
flict. The continuation of the effort to understand how objects move rapidly 
through the atmosphere resulted in the development of the blunt-body 
atmospheric entry concept, which was used first on military ballistic missiles 
and later on the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo spacecraft. And, continuing 
this tradition, Ames played a large part in the development of the reusable 
thermal protection system of the Space Shuttle. The interest in high-speed 
flight and atmospheric entry created the necessity to understand the 
behavior of high-temperature plasmas; that, in turn, resulted in the first 
Pioneer spacecraft to measure the solar plasma, the later Pioneers to the 
outer solar system, and the Pioneer Venus atmospheric entry experiment. 
Finally, it was recognized very early that high-speed flight stressed the 
human body and that understanding biological mechanisms and human 
physiology was important. This led to the contributions made by people at 
Ames to aviation safety, space medicine, and space biology. The interest in 
biology also stimulated thinking about the origin of life itself and resulted in 
the strong participation of people at Ames in the search for biological 
activity on Mars with the Viking landers. 
These examples of the development of various interests at Ames illus- 
trate the astonishing versatility of the people who have worked there. It  is 
not unusual to find someone mentioned in this book who started a career as 
an aeronautical engineer and completed it with a distinguished reputation in 
a completely different field - for example, geophysics. Fundamental to the 
ability to do this is a clear recognition that it is most important to seek for 
the explanation of things from the most fundamental theoretical viewpoint. 
The people at Ames have always seen to it that the atmosphere conducive to 
fundamental theoretical studies exists. In recent years, this circumstance 
caused the creation at Ames of one of the most advanced computer centers 
in the country. 
Throughout the history of Ames, its people have made important con- 
tributions to national security. It is no accident therefore that the U.S. 
Army’s Aviation Research and Development Laboratory is located at Ames 
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and that this laboratory has been an important factor in the history and 
development of the research center. 
In the last analysis, however, an institution such as Ames is, as it were, 
the “shadow in time” of its creator; and the shadow cast by Smith De 
France, the first director, is long indeed. De France understood, above all 
else, the importance of quality. Important technical work can only be per- 
formed by people of the highest quality. He saw to it that the quality of the 
staff at Ames was maintained at the highest level throughout his years as 
director. This resulted in the elegance and the intellectual integrity that has 
characterized the work of the people at Ames. 
For my own part, I am proud to have had a part in the continuing 
growth and development of the Ames Research Center. I shall always trea- 
sure the memories of the years I spent there. 
Hans Mark 
Deputy Administrator 
April 1983 
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PREFACE 
For those who know Ames, this history of one of the country’s most 
interesting and important research institutions may seem woefully incom- 
plete. In charting the growth and expanding interests of Ames Research 
Center, many of its research contributions have indeed been omitted. 
Instead, I have attempted to sketch a broad outline of Ames’s technological 
achievements within the context of its operational and managerial develop- 
ment. This perspective has produced a narrative covering almost 40 years, in 
which the major changes Ames has experienced are clearly defined, traced 
chronologically, and analyzed for their various effects upon the research 
center. 
There are several reasons for this broad approach. First, the overriding 
aim of this study is to present to the lay reader as complete a picture of 
Ames as is possible, and to portray the research laboratory in all its com- 
plexity as a combination of personalities, management philosophies, and 
research needs, acted upon by the pressures of economics, politics, and 
military necessities. The process, mode, and directions taken in research 
prove as fascinating and worthwhile a subject as the products of research, 
and it was these elements I hoped to capture in a profile of the institution. 
Secondly, the scope and sophistication of the research done at Ames is 
in itself daunting. Had extensive technical detail been included, the resulting 
book would have been double the size of the present manuscript. It would 
also have been, I feel, forbidding in both appearance and style to my 
intended audience, interested readers not necessarily acquainted with Ames 
or involved in its technical fields of expertise. For those needing technical 
details on various research projects mentioned in the book, the NACA’s 
and NASA’s Technical Notes, Memoranda, and Reports provide clearly 
written, technically detailed summaries of Ames’s work, written by those 
who accomplished the research; they surpass any treatment possible within 
the confines of this work. 
During the process of researching and writing the history of Ames, I 
discovered the truth of many of the assumptions people make regarding 
successful research. Success, continued success in pursuing new ideas and 
possible solutions to major technological challenges lies, of course, with the 
calibre of men and women involved in that research. Ames, over the years, 
has been continually lucky in the people who have worked there; they have 
been among the finest in their fields. Beyond that, however, Ames 
researchers impressed me with their lack of confinement to narrow areas of 
expertise. They emphatically did not fit into the stereotypical mold of 
narrowly educated, immediately unintelligible technocrats whom outsiders 
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like to think comprise the engineering professions. On the contrary, I was 
constantly struck, while talking with Ames-connected people, how wide 
their interests spread, and how many fascinating byways they had explored 
in their careers. The research flexibility Ames has displayed throughout its 
history is, I think, a phenomenon closely connected to the intellectual flexi- 
bility of its personnel. New ideas, however unorthodox, have always been 
given serious attention by Ames; alternative solutions to technical puzzles 
have been explored in refreshingly open-minded manners. Frequently it has 
been the unorthodox approach that has provided the answer to major 
hurdles. The most striking example of this was, without doubt, Harvey 
Allen’s blunt body solution to the temperature problem of high-speed flight. 
On the face of it, the idea that a rounded body could not only survive atmo- 
spheric reentry heating but also lessen its effects appears curious, yet Allen’s 
theory developed as a result of his preoccupation with the simplicity of the 
natural world and his ability to escape the dead ends of conventional think- 
ing. This talent, both in research and management, has always blessed Ames. 
Ames personnel also seem to be strikingly self-motivated in their work 
habits. I t  was perhaps easier to be self-motivated in Ames’s earlier decades, 
when much less paperwork and fewer regulations intervened between the 
researchers and the task they were trying to accomplish. But today’s engi- 
neers have educated themselves admirably in the art of plowing past the 
bureaucracy to productivity, and I see this feat as evidence of the high level 
of commitment to research excellence. No manager, however effective, could 
replace the self-motivating factor in research; it inspires as well as fuels the 
search for solutions and answers to research conundrums. 
Finally, studying Ames revealed, in ironic detail, the lack of connection 
between large budgets, heavily structured bureaucratic procedures, and effec- 
tiveness. The budgets under which Ames operated during its early years are 
a literal drop in the bucket compared to present funding. The management 
and research process, a seemingly simple relationship in earlier decades, is 
now monitored at every turn. Large budgets and accompanying bureaucracy 
are probably inescapable in today’s context; our goals have also become far 
more complex and sophisticated than they used to be. It  is useful to remem- 
ber, however, that Ames worked equally as effectively, albeit differently, 
when the modus operandi was what we might now call primitive. Large-scale 
funding and the increasing involvement of bureaucracy in the daily life of 
research are not reasons for Ames’s success; dedication to creative thinking 
is. There is something to be learned from the history of Ames; I believe this 
is it. 
Many people have aided me during this project. Ames management has 
helped me in every possible way. I am grateful to former Ames Director 
Clarence Syvertson and to Director of Administration Louis Brennwald for 
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easing my way on numerous occasions. In Washington, former Ames Direc- 
tor Hans Mark, later Deputy Administrator of NASA, was generous with his 
time and help. 
I owe a great deal to many at Ames who donated their time and pro- 
vided me with information I could not have acquired from printed sources. 
Not only did my interviewees aid in the writing of the book, many of them 
also read portions of the resulting manuscript, offered invaluable suggestions, 
and saved me from miscellaneous errors. John Dusterberry, coordinator of 
the manuscript’s review process at Ames, accomplished a Herculean task 
with grace and good humor. Paul Bennett offered tangible assistance in 
choosing illustrations and in handling the technical production of the book’s 
design. Darryl1 Stroud patiently tracked down a long list of needed photo- 
graphs. Alberta C o x  and her colleagues did a wonderful job typesetting the 
manuscript. Joyce Courtney provided needed details from Ames with profes- 
sional competence. Mildred Macon, who assisted me initially in finding and 
retrieving necessary archival documents, became indispensable as a friend, 
typist, and proofreader. I owe her a great deal. 
The NASA History Office has made my association with NASA a truly 
pleasant one. Monte Wright, former Director of the History Office, edited 
and much improved the original manuscript. Lee Saegesser, the NASA 
History Office archivist, helped with references and documents. Carrie 
Karegeannes coordinated details of the manuscript’s completion. Sylvia 
Fries, present Director of the History Office, has helped greatly in coordinat- 
ing the book’s production. The list of friends and colleagues who helped to 
improve the book is long. I am especially grateful to Susan Cooper, Thomas 
Duesterberg, Edward C. Ezell, Linda N. Ezell, Georgie Gleim, Kenneth A. 
Lockridge, J. W. Mornington, the late Carl Proffer and Ellendea Proffer, Alex 
Roland, George and Deborah Schober, the late Michael Shaw, John Shy, 
Walter Vincenti, and W. E. Weaver. 
E. A. Muenger 
Colorado Springs 
December 1984 
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THE BEGINNINGS, l939-1945 
Among the mementos in the Director’s Office at the Ames Research 
Center is a fragment of canvas covering from the Wright brothers’ Kitty 
Hawk biplane. It was presented in 1948 to the director of Ames, Dr. Smith 
J. De France, on behalf of Orville Wright, who had recently died. Wright had 
been a friend of De France and had wanted him to have a souvenir of the 
1903 flight. Hanging nearby is an equally impressive token from the 1972 
Apollo 16 mission, a small flag carried in the first exploration of the lunar 
highlands. 
The two artifacts, so far removed from each other in terms of the 
visions and technologies they represent, are fitting symbols of the richness of 
Ames’s history. When Ames was founded in 1939, man had been flying for 
only a few decades. The aeronautical pioneers were not only still alive, but 
were for the most part still active in their professions. The leap in aeronauti- 
cal technology had been spectacular since the almost primitive beginnings, 
but the first 40 years of progress were to seem tame compared with the 
second 40 years. Ames was built in the midst of exciting technological chal- 
lenges and a frightening international situation. The state of the aeronautical 
art in 1939 and the urgent need for a second laboratory of the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) provided double impetus for 
the energy and creativity that characterized the new institution. 
THE BACKGROUND 
The second laboratory was conceived as a junior sibling to the Langley 
Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in Virginia. In existence since 1915, the 
NACA had since 1918 operated its research laboratory at Langley Field, an 
Army airbase near Hampton Roads. 
The NACA had made a name for itself in its first 25 years.’ The U.S. 
Congress formed the Committee in recognition of the need for governmental 
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support and coordination of research in aeronautics. In the decade after the 
Kitty Hawk flight, the nation had slipped behind Europe in aeronautical 
progress, a fact that became embarrassingly obvious as soon as World War I 
began. An organized effort to make up for lost time was needed; after trying 
for several years, a small group of aeronautical pioneers succeeded in obtain- 
ing the legislation that created the NACA, appended to the Naval Appropria- 
tions Act of 1915. 
The NACA was simple in structure. A Main Committee acted as a steer- 
ing group and an official voice for the NACA. The most prestigious names in 
aeronautics appeared as members, among them Orville Wright, Dr. William 
Durand, and at a later time Charles Lindbergh. Under the Main Committee, 
technical committees and subcommittees provided liaison between industry 
and the military, beneficiaries of NACA research, and the Langley Aeronau- 
tical Laboratory, the producer of research results. Langley’s early research 
successes had provided much of the foundation of the NACA. 
For both industry and the military, and for young students of aeronau- 
tics, the technical notes, reports, and memoranda written by Langley’s 
engineers were a major source of information in the field. The NACA’s 
reputation for solid contributions to aeronautical knowledge became an 
effective way of recruiting new talent. In the normal course of events, a 
young aeronautical engineer interested in research sought employment with 
the NACA, for it was “in the NACA that the exciting discoveries were being 
made,” as one NACA veteran put it.2 
Industry, at least at that time, offered fewer research opportunities for 
young engineers. The NACA, possessing better research facilities than the 
aircraft industry and with interests ranging over the whole spectrum of aero- 
nautical unknowns, offered far wider horizons. “If you wanted to do 
research, you went where the facilities were, and the NACA had the facili- 
ties,” recalled another veteran whose career with the NACA began in the 
1930s at L a n g l e ~ . ~  The same situation was true a decade later, when Ames 
was recruiting young aeronautical engineers. “I couldn’t see myself chained 
to a drafting board [as I would have been in industry] ,” explained Charles 
Hall, who came to Ames in 1942 after graduating from the University of 
California at B e r k e l e ~ . ~  
Once at Langley, even if one had originally planned to move on to the 
developing aeronautical industry, one was “hooked. Research was exciting.” 
The average age of the staff at Langley in the 1930s was 26, and the labora- 
tory was, by all  accounts, a stimulating, creative, and productive place to 
work, yet relaxed and informal in atmosphere. Perhaps because of the youth 
of both the researchers and the field of aeronautics itself, Langley’s atmo- 
sphere seemed more like a college campus than anything else. It was cer- 
tainly, a former Langley employee recalled, “nothing like a company or a 
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factory.” Aeronautics, the laboratory, and the staff were all in developmen- 
tal stages, and the combination of forces produced exciting  result^.^ 
In a poignant way, Langley’s attraction in the 1930s mirrored the way 
in which the airplane had captured the imagination of Americans with its 
debut in World War I. In the military, the romanticism of the now-vulnerable 
and impractical cavalry had been quickly transferred to the aviators. Postwar 
barnstorming had continued the mystique, as had Lindbergh’s 1927 flight to 
Paris. More prosaically, however, the late 1930s brought growing industrial 
efforts to develop aircraft capabilities and, even more crucial, the conviction 
of both aeronautical experts and military observers that steady progress in 
the field was absolutely necessary for the military security of the United 
States. Visitors to Europe, among them Dr. George Lewis, the NACA’s 
director of aeronautical research, had noted with alarm the spurt of progress 
made there. In its 1937 report to Congress, the NACA concluded, after 
describing its early experimental facilities, 
The possession of such equipment was one of the chief factors 
in enabling the United States to become the recognized leader in 
the technical development of aircraft. Since 1932 this research 
equipment has been reproduced by foreign countries and in some 
cases special research equipment . . . abroad . . . is superior to the 
equipment existing at Langley Field. This condition has impressed 
the Committee with the advisability of providing additional facili- 
ties promptly as needed for the study of problems that are neces- 
sary to be solved, in order that American aircraft development, 
both military and commercial, will not fall behind.6 
As the international tensions increased, a Special Committee on the 
Relations of the NACA to National Defense in Time of War was established 
in 1936. Its chairman was Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, chief of the Army Air 
Corps. The recommendation was that another research laboratory be built, 
since Langley was vulnerable to attack from Europe and was also outgrowing 
both available electric power and land. The laboratory had grown from 
3 employees in 1918 to almost 500 by the end of 1938.’ In late 1938 a 
successor committee on future research facilities recommended to 
Dr. Joseph Ames, the chairman of the NACA Executive Committee, that 
the second aeronautical laboratory be built as quickly as possible. The com- 
mittee recommended a site in Sunnyvale, California, at Moffett Field, then 
operated by the Army Air Corps. The estimated cost would be 
$11,000,000.8 Early in 1939, the request for appropriations went to 
Congress. 
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Meanwhile, Smith De France, the assistant chief of aerodynamics at 
Langley, had been sent to Moffett Field to inspect the proposed site. He 
spoke with Army personnel regarding the project. At the same time Lewis, 
assisted by the NACA’s financial officer, E. H. Chamberlin, made specific 
estimates of both the needed facilities and the required funds.9 
Unexpected difficulties arose in Congress, however. Although appro- 
priations for additional facilities at Langley encountered no opposition, the 
appropriations subcommittees in both House and Senate balked over the 
second research laboratory. lo  After rejection in the second deficiency bill 
for 1939, the funding request was attached to the third deficiency bill, and 
Lewis; Dr. Charles Abbott, vice-chairman of the NACA Executive Commit- 
tee; and Col. Charles Lindbergh, also an NACA member, presented the case 
for the West Coast laboratory. All three men possessed considerable prestige 
and presence and argued the case eloquently. Included in the request were 
additional funds for Langley and for research work at academic and scien- 
tific institutions. Both Lewis and Lindbergh, having recently returned from 
Europe, could attest to the growing threat of German air power. 
At this juncture John Victory, executive secretary of the NACA, sensed 
that it might aid approval of the appropriations request to remove the desig- 
nation of the California site from the bill. Legislators from other geographi- 
cal areas would then, perhaps, see the request less as a plum for California 
than as a justifiable appropriation based on the increasingly grim interna- 
tional situation. Whether the deletion had the intended effect is unknown, 
but on 9 August 1939, the bill providing funds for a second laboratory 
became law. The NACA was to determine a site within a month of the bill’s 
passage, and not surprisingly, Moffett Field was ch0sen.l 
The choice of the site resulted from several considerations. Being on the 
West Coast would at least protect the new laboratory from the possibility of 
European attack, although the threat from Japan was certainly considered 
by the NACA.I2 Other factors, however, offset the vulnerability of the 
coastal site. The report of the Special Research Committee of Future 
Research Facilities in December 1938 had listed criteria for site selection. 
Moffett Field fit the requirements: location on a military base to take advan- 
tage of existing airfield facilities; low-density air traffic and good flying 
weather; adequate and economical electric power, which had been a problem 
at Langley; and accessibility to the western aircraft industry, industrial cen- 
ters, and academic institutions of repute.’ 
Location near the growing aircraft companies was of prime importance. 
By 1939 almost half of the aircraft industry was on the West Coast, and 
those engineers from Langley who met regularly with the western companies 
were well aware of the time and energy travel consumed. A trip from 
Langley to San Diego took four days by train or nearly 30 exhausting hours 
by airplane. Another factor was the competitive relationship that had devel- 
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oped between the NACA and the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at 
the California Institute of Technology. Pasadena was easily accessible to the 
California aircraft industry, but its facilities were strained with industrial 
research requirements. Moffett Field both answered industry’s needs and 
reasserted the NACA’s research preeminence. Though other sites were 
considered, Moffett Field had clearly been the preference from the begin- 
ning, and. as soon as the announcement of the site was made, already laid 
plans were implemented. 
Though officially opened only six years previously, Moffett Field 
already had an interesting history. It had been conceived as a base for the 
Navy’s rigid airships in 1931. At that time, the Navy was building ZRS-4 and 
ZRS-5, later christened the Akron and Macon. The Akron was to be assigned 
to the Lakehurst, New Jersey, base; the Macon was to be based in Sunnyvale. 
Local communities in California had donated 100 acres for the base, and the 
government had bought 750 additional acres. The new base was expected to 
provide needed jobs both in its construction and maintenance, and local 
firms foresaw steady orders for supplies and materials. The Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company proudly announced that the electric load at Sunnyvale 
would be 2200 horsepower, “enough to supply a good-sized town.” Nearby 
inhabitants were awed by circulated sketches of the giant hangar that would 
be built to house the airship. It would be, as one drawing conceived it, able 
to contain San Francisco’s St. Francis Hotel four times over. The hangar’s 
length was the equivalent of four city blocks, its width greater than one 
block, and its height about equal to that of a 16-story building.15 
The giant hangar was finished and in due course the Macon was assigned 
to the base. But in 1933 the Akron crashed off the East Coast, leaving the 
Macon as the country’s only rigid airship. Commanding the Akron when it 
crashed was Rear Adm. William Moffett, who had been influential in both 
the Navy’s commitment to rigid airships and the selection of the Sunnyvale 
site for the Navy’s western base. In his memory the U.S. Naval Air Station, 
Sunnyvale, was renamed Moffett Field. The base was considered completed 
in January 1935, but the next month the Macon crashed off the coast at 
Point Sur, 150 kilometers south of Moffett Field. The crash ended the 
Navy’s involvement with rigid airships and made the base surplus to the 
Navy. In October 1935 it became an Army air training base. Interestingly, 
one of the first Army squadrons sent to Moffett Field was from Langley 
Field. 
In 1939, as Moffett Field was being chosen by the NACA for its labora- 
tory, the Army was busy constructing barracks and mess halls to accommo- 
date a continuing expansion.16 The Navy still held out hope for rigid airships 
in the future and requested that the NACA buildings, should they material- 
ize, be located outside the still-present mooring circles. It was, perhaps, the 
last official documentation regarding Moffett Field’s original purp0se.l 
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In early December, the Army gave the NACA use of 62 acres of land, 
retaining title to the land with the War Department.’ * The NACA purchased 
another 40 acres from local farmers and immediately began surveying build- 
ing locations. 
The southern end of San Francisco Bay today bears no resemblance to 
its appearance in 1939. Instead of a continual stretch of suburbia intermixed 
with industry, small communities interrupted agricultural land in an almost 
rural atmosphere. The land acquired for Moffett Field was completely unde- 
veloped, as was the additional acreage that the NACA bought. Adjoining the 
government property were farms, fruit trees, and dairy cattle; the pastures 
would be concrete in 20 years. Instead of the extensive freeway system that 
now crisscrosses the area, a less intimidating Bayshore Highway took one to 
the main gate of Moffett Field, where the construction going on appeared 
hive-like in its activity. 
Planning was under way at Langley in the fall of 1939 for the facilities 
at the new laboratory. The design group was headed by Smith De France, 
who, it was rightly assumed, would head the new in~tal1ation.l~ Through the 
winter of 1939-1940, however, De France remained at Langley, designing 
the buildings and wind tunnels to be constructed at Moffett Field, and also 
continuing to plan Langley’s own projects. 
Liaison was provided initially by a representative from the NACA 
Washington office, Russell G. Robinson, who had been sent to California to 
inaugurate the NACA’s Western Coordination Office. That office was 
intended to be a partial answer to the problem of distance between the 
western aircraft industry and academia and NACA headquarters. The aim 
was to provide a regular two-way channel of information that would make 
for more efficient research and a greater awareness of mutual needs. 
Robinson, already on the scene, was a logical person to provide on-the-spot 
assistance in practical arrangements with the Army at Moffett Field and to 
deal with any problems that might arise during initial construction. 
At Moffett Field in the last months of 1939, Robinson juggled Western 
Coordination Office planning with construction details at Moffett Field and 
maintained a steady correspondence with Langley over building eccentrici- 
ties caused by Moffett Field’s geography: the high water table and the possi- 
bility of earthquakes. De France requested Robinson to obtain local techni- 
cal articles on earthquake construction, and building specifications were then 
adjusted for maximum protection. Moffett Field military buildings were 
closely examined for cracks that could provide information on construction 
pitfalls.20 
While on the West Coast, Robinson also publicized the new laboratory 
at surrounding universities, with the result that the original roster of Ames 
employees included a fair sampling of local talent. Stanford University, one 
of the few institutions in the country at that time with both a wind tunnel 
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and a widely known body of aeronautical experts, became an important 
source of professional manpower for the laboratory. The Stanford connec- 
tion rose naturally from earlier association with the NACA. Dr. William 
Durand, one of the original members of the Main Committee, was a highly 
respected member of the Stanford faculty. Prof. Elliott Reid, another aero- 
nautical engineer in the Department of Mechanical Engineering (which then 
included aeronautics) had worked at Langley in the early 1920s. The loca- 
tion of the NACA’s second laboratory so close to Stanford was to prove 
important in the dynamics of the laboratory and in the continued growth of 
aeronautics at the university. Indeed, two of the driving forces behind Ames 
in its early years were Stanford graduates who had been working at Langley, 
but who returned to the area as staff for the new laboratory - H. Julian 
Allen and John Parsons. 
This local connection with an academic institution, which Langley did 
not have in its early years, was an advantage that should not be overlooked 
when assessing the distinctive sense of community that seems to have charac- 
terized the new laboratory. As one early Ames employee recalled, “My 
roommate and I took the civil-service test together, graduated together from 
Stanford, and began work at Ames together on the same day.”21 
Another source of local talent, if not quite so close as Stanford, was the 
University of California system. Berkeley provided personnel, as did the 
University of California at Los Angeles and the University of Southern 
California. Active recruiting for Ames tended to confine itself to the West 
Coast, though of course anyone taking the civil service test could ask to be 
put on the roster for potential employment at Ames. Especially during the 
war, however, when Ames recruited directly and the civil service test was 
waived, efforts were focused on hiring engineers from nearby universities. 
De France, writing to an inquiring author in 1945, listed the University of 
California and Stanford as the two schools most heavily represented at 
Ames. In response to a question regarding wartime recruitment of personnel, 
De France named 13 universities where Ames had recruited, the farthest 
afield being Arizona and Washington.22 
Construction continued at the new site, and in April 1940 it was 
announced that the new laboratory would be named after Dr. Joseph S. 
Ames, the recently retired chairman of the NACA. Ames had been influen- 
tial in the conception of the NACA and had been one of the original mem- 
bers of the Main Committee. He was highly respected in physics, which he 
taught at Johns Hopkins University, and revered as an individual. The honor 
was both well deserved and timely; Ames died only a few years later. 
As progress was made at Moffett Field, planning of the future facilities 
for Ames continued at Langley. The NACA, trying to make up for the time 
lost in obtaining congressional sanction for the laboratory, now felt that it 
was more advantageous to keep most of the staff at Langley until the move 
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to California could be made with efficiency. De France, named engineer-in- 
charge in June 1940, thus did not arrive at Ames until August. He had been 
preceded by John Parsons, who had been put in charge of the various con- 
struction projects, and by a few others from the Langley group who would 
eventually form the nucleus of the early Arnes staff. This logistical coordina- 
tion eased the way greatly - planning could continue without the designers 
having to cope with the raw realities of the building site, and those involved 
in the actual construction were kept busy by continuing directives from 
Langley. 
Until De France arrived, the day-to-day administrative details were 
directed by Edward R. Sharp, another Langley man. Even before he arrived 
in California in early 1940, Sharp had been helping with problems encoun- 
tered by Parsons at Moffett Field. One of them was the rerouting of a 
county road that ran through the site of the planned 16-foot wind tunnel. 
The road was on the acreage the NACA had bought and obviously needed to 
be rerouted, but the contract for constructing the tunnel had been let and 
the county had done nothing. Sharp, still at Langley, asked John Victory, 
the executive secretary of the NACA, to help. Victory somehow moved the 
county authorities to action, and they moved the road.23 Construction of 
the 16-foot tunnel, one of the first two wind tunnels built at Ames, began in 
May. By that time Sharp was at Moffett Field acting as De France’s adminis- 
trative officer. The county road is a good example of one of the Washington 
office’s strengths. Correspondence among Sharp, De France, Lewis, and 
Victory during the construction phase attests to the efforts of the Washing- 
ton office to expedite the planning and to lend weight where needed. Also 
striking, however, is the leeway given De France in making decisions and in 
choosing his future staff.24 
Throughout the spring and early summer, a steady stream of corre- 
spondence between Sharp and De France dealt with the many details of 
construction and staffing. Specific persons were requested by Sharp and 
promptly sent by De France in a continuous transfer to Ames as the new 
laboratory was able to absorb per~onnel .~ Travel involved more adventure 
then than now. Even so, H. Julian Allen, who arrived in April, perhaps had 
more than his share: “He burned out a bearing in the middle of the Arizona 
desert but found an old Scotch machinist who turned out a bearing on a 
wobbly old lathe. This enabled him to proceed to Bakersfield where he had 
a brother, and from there he wired New York to send him a new bearing 
airmail. This was a little slow in coming and so he only arrived here after 
driving all night.”26 
Sharp happily reported that the military personnel at Moffett Field 
were most cooperative in all matters. The commanding colonel had provided 
storage space for NACA tools and had promised more space when needed. 
Sharp reported, “Relations with the army are as sweet as you could ask for. 
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I think they have gone far out of their way to receive us well and to assure us 
of their fullest cooperation. . . . I certainly hope we can keep these fine 
relations and never ‘get in their hair.’”27 This was a better start than had 
been made at Langley, where the laboratory’s early years had been colored 
by several misunderstandings with the Army.28 At that time, of course, the 
NACA itself was so young as to be regarded by some in the military as an 
upstart civilian group whose function might better be performed within the 
military organization. 
Back at Langley, De France had his hands full coordinating the various 
design projects. Although Sharp at Moffett Field continued to request more 
staff, De France needed to juggle his personnel into locations where they 
could work most effectively. As he wrote Sharp in late June 1940, “It is 
expected that we will start transferring the remainder of the engineering 
force on July 15, but all of the personnel will not come at the same time. In 
other words, the departure from Langley Field will be staggered so as to 
continue the engineering work and have people familiar with the contracts 
available to  handle any correspondence either from Langley Field or Moffett 
Field.” The problem was complicated because De France’s design staff was 
not only busy with plans for Langley’s new wind tunnels and those at Ames, 
it was also planning the NACA’s new engine research laboratory near 
Cleveland. Indeed, De France intended to continue designing for Cleveland 
after his staff moved to Ames. His closing lines had almost a harried note: 
We are so busy here at Langley Field that we do not know 
which way to turn. The design work. .  . is more than can be 
handled with the present organization. It will be necessary to 
organize this design work in sections and increase the design and 
drafting force. We are planning on doing some of the design for 
the new engine research laboratory at Moffett Field; therefore it is 
evident that the force which we are planning on having at Moffett 
Field by August 1 or shortly thereafter will not be any too large 
for handling the extra design in addition to that at Moffett 
Field. 
The Move to Moffett Field 
By the end of August 1940, however, one could speak of a real staff at 
Ames. De France and 22 others had arrived from Langley. The NACA had 
hired, through the usual civil service procedures, additional junior engineers 
and support staff. The entire contingent assembled at the end of the summer 
for the first Ames staff picture, taken outside the new Flight Research 
Building. Of the 51 people in the group, half had worked with each other at 
Langley. A few of them were Stanford graduates. This academic connection 
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January 1940. The first building erected at  Ames, the construction shack served as head- 
quarters f o r  the engineers and crews fighting California’s winter mud as they laid out and 
built an aeronautical laboratory. 
should not be overemphasized, but it doubtless strengthened ties, both 
organizationally and individually. Both institutions would gain from the rela- 
tionship. One should note, however, that it has, over the years, made for 
a subtle feeling of exclusion among more recent employees who lack such 
academic ties.30 
What of the Langley people now building the new laboratory? Langley 
was, by all accounts, still small enough and informal enough to be tightly 
knit. Camaraderie had been reinforced by its isolated location in rural 
Virginia; closeness had probably been an act of desperation. Despite its 
growth over the years, however, the sense of small community had remained, 
so it must have been a hard decision for those who moved to California. 
Those who did, however, had actively wanted to go, and morale among them 
was high. H. Julian Allen, who was to head the Theoretical Aerodynamics 
Section, had demanded transfer on threat of resignation. At Langley it had 
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August 1940. The Langley contingent arrived and was joined by other newly hired junior 
engineers. The group, still remarkably small, gathered outside the completed Flight 
Research Laboratory for the first staff photo. (1)  Smith De France, (2) Harry Goett, 
(3)  Harvey Allen, and (4) Jack Parsons. 
been “considered a plum” to be chosen by De France as part of the design 
team for the new laboratory, and selection led almost certainly to transfer. 
Those who went were excited by the opportunity to “make a name for your- 
self or fall flat on your face,” as one employee put it.31 The sense of urgency 
to get the laboratory into operation seems to have been common to the 
group. 
If the feelings implied in the phrase the Ames family had positive 
results, there were also negative implications. Previously, whatever competi- 
tiveness had existed at Langley was either self-contained within small groups 
or was directed toward the Army’s research and development laboratory at 
Wright Field in Ohio, or the Guggenheim laboratory in Pasadena, or Head- 
quarters. Now the Langley staff was split, and the California contingent 
reassembled with a new identity. With the creation of the new laboratory 
came a sense of rivalry between those who remained at Langley and those 
who came to Ames, as well as the extremely rapid development of a strong 
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sense of Ames’s own identity. This sense of identity and feeling of commun- 
ity, especially among the first employees, led one later director to refer 
repeatedly to the “Mayflower group” at Ames. Even today, the sense of the 
“inner circle” is strong among the more recent employees, who express a 
certain resignation to what they see as permanent exclusion.32 
The sense of separation from Langley seems to have been almost imme- 
diate. Though Edward R. Sharp, who returned to Langley in the fall of 
1940, referred for a while to Ames as “my other l a b ~ r a t o r y , ” ~ ~  his attention 
too was quickly diverted to planning the new facilities for the Cleveland 
laboratory, which he later headed. But maqy of those involved in Ames’s 
early stages of construction and growth stayed there for the rest of their 
careers. Those who helped build the laboratory identified strongly with it. 
Langley Field and Washington were a continent away. Not only did geog- 
raphy reinforce a sense of separation, but the rivalry inherent in the relation- 
ship between Langley and Ames emphasized the distance between Ames and 
the Washington office of the NACA. If Ames officials felt less hampered by 
Washington’s bureaucracy than their counterparts at Langley, the Ames staff 
was also in a less favorable position to campaign for pet projects and funds. 
In any event, it is clear that among the early characteristics of Ames as an 
institution were a strong sense of community, a competitive aspect to it. 
relationship with the Langley laboratory, and a slightly independent attitude 
with regard to W a ~ h i n g t o n . ~ ~  
Also significant in the formation of a distinctive personality within the 
new institution was its first head. Smith De France had been in charge of the 
early planning for the laboratory and had been sent by Washington to 
inspect the Moffett Field location long before the bill establishing Ames had 
gotten out of congressional subcommittees. George Lewis, the director of 
aeronautical research in the Washington office, probably selected De France. 
His choice seems to have been a wise one. Older employees who worked 
under De France invariably mention his name when describing the sense of 
unity at Ames. During his long career, De France’s character and strict stan- 
dards permeated the laboratory, and if employees stood in awe of his 
uncompromising attitudes toward excellence and frugality, the respect and 
affection they also felt for the man were genuine. 
De France was born in Michigan in 1896. He left college during World 
War I to train as an aviator with the Canadian Flying Corps. When the 
United States entered the war, he flew with the 139th Aero Squadron. Sub- 
sequently, he completed a degree in aeronautical engineering at the Univer- 
sity of Michigan and went to  work for the NACA at Langley. After early 
work with dirigibles, he was assigned the task of designing a full-scale wind 
tunnel capable of testing actual airplanes instead of models. With a test sec- 
tion of 30 by 60 feet, the tunnel became the largest in the world. De France 
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was put in charge of it, and in 1939 held the title of assistant chief of 
aerodynamics. 
He was regarded by those who worked with him at Langley as a fine 
engineer, a hard worker, and a thoroughly professional civil servant. By the 
time he was named engineer-in-charge at Ames, De France already had a 
reputation for making sure the government got its money’s worth. Neither 
manpower nor facilities were ever wasted under his supervision, and if this 
made for a somewhat strict and sober atmosphere at times, it was one 
those associated with him could respect. De France stood by his own stan- 
dards, demanding equal devotion to those standards from others, and appar- 
ently he received it. One Ames veteran has compared him to a strict parent: 
“He demanded obedience to his rules, but you knew what the rules were and 
they were good rules. Since you knew what was expected of you, you 
obeyed the rules.”35 
The Ames family was very much a De France family, held together by 
his idea of what a research laboratory should be, how it should be run, and 
how its employees should perform their duties. An interesting perspective on 
De France’s uncompromising attitude is given by an incident in 1943. Ames 
was running on two shifts for the war effort, paper was in short supply, and 
employee time was, obviously, at a premium. Nevertheless, De France issued 
a memorandum requesting the entire staff of Ames to read an address that 
had recently been given at the Cleveland laboratory by the director of 
research there, because he felt it “applies also to this laboratory.” Since the 
address was lengthy - 23 pages - De France must have felt strongly about 
the material in it.36 
Much of the circulated address was a history of the NACA and referred 
to the planning and building of the Cleveland laboratory. But De France’s 
philosophy was reflected in the address. The best of facilities, the speaker 
remarked, would not produce results without the best in workers: “An 
excellent laboratory staffed by mediocre personnel will yield mediocre 
results. A mediocre laboratory staffed by excellent personnel will give excel- 
lent results.” De France had been adamant about getting the best facilities 
and personnel for the new laboratory. The care he took in planning paid off 
as construction remained remarkably close to  both cost estimates (at least 
initially) and to scheduled operational dates.37 
The same speech also defended regulations: “Rules of procedure and 
regulation are required. . . . If you think they are unnecessary or that they 
hamper you.  . . in your work, discuss the matter with your supervisor or 
with me.” De France’s rules were known to everyone, and they were 
respected. He also demanded from his workers a great deal of self-reliance 
and self-motivation. “Each man is expected to supply the drive to keep his 
project going. Don’t expect either the men who supervise your work or those 
you supervise to supply the push necessary to get your work completed.” 
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The result was a self-disciplined laboratory, and if its organization sometimes 
seemed vague to outsiders, the work did not suffer. 
Another of De France’s traits also helped shape the character of the 
laboratory. In 1924, soon after De France went to Langley Field, he was 
flying a new engineer around the laboratory in a Curtiss Jenny. The new- 
comer, in the copilot’s seat, froze at the controls while De France was begin- 
ning a landing approach. The plane crashed into the marshy land surrounding 
Langley Field, and the young engineer was killed. De France spent a year in 
a Washington hospital; he lost an eye and sustained multiple facial fractures. 
He never flew again, honoring a promise to his wife. Thus the head of one of 
the country’s aeronautical laboratories denied himself the efficiency air 
travel afforded. The significance for Ames, however, was that De France’s 
lack of rapid transportation to the East Coast reinforced any tendency 
toward isolation that location and independent outlook already encouraged. 
A journey from coast to coast in the 1940s was certainly more time- 
consuming by any mode of travel than it is today, but by train it was 
particularly inconvenient. As a result De France did not go east, either to 
Langley or to Washington, often. In April 1942, when he was planning a 
trip, it was remarked that it was the first time he had left the laboratory 
since he arrived in August 1940.38 
Three other original Ames employees were also influential in the forma- 
tion of Ames’s personality. One was John Parsons, a Stanford graduate who 
had gone to Langley shortly after his graduation. He had worked with 
De France in the 30- by 60-foot tunneL3’ Parsons’s health was uncertain, 
and early 1940 correspondence between Parsons at Moffett Field and 
De France back at Langley indicate that Parsons was driving himself almost 
past his physical limits, and that De France was concerned about him. 
Despite his health, Parsons projected such enthusiasm and energy that he 
inspired others. He was tireless in pursuing construction details and in report- 
ing almost daily to De France in long, handwritten letters. In the early years 
Parsons acted as a real catalyst in keeping up constrvction momentum and, 
like De France, in setting uncompromising standards of quality. The example 
of Parsons added greatly to the energy generated at Ames in its early 
period.40 
Another striking influence on Ames was H. Julian Allen, also a Stanford 
graduate and Langley veteran. Allen’s force of personality and ability to 
inspire his co-workers is still spoken of by all who knew him. At Langley, 
Allen had acquired his nickname, “Harvey.” With a nearly total incapacity 
for remembering names, he greeted one and all jovially as “Harvey,” and the 
name stuck, in retuyn, to him. 
Allen had distinguished himself in his early work at Langley, where he 
had been since 1936. He became legendary for his ability to generate excit- 
ing, often brilliant aerodynamic theory. The best-known work from his 
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Langley period was the development of a general theory of subsonic airfoils. 
The ability to calculate the distribution of pressure on airfoils made low-drag 
characteristics easier to obtain. In 1940, Allen requested transfer to the new 
California laboratory, and though Langley was undoubtedly reluctant to lose 
him, he was put in charge of the theoretical aerodynamics research group at 
Ames. This group, though not attached to any of the wind tunnels, was very 
much involved in planning research facilities, carrying out sophisticated aero- 
dynamic and structural design, and supplying calculations and specifications 
to the contractors. 
Allen provided an especially good contrast to De France, balancing 
De France’s sobriety with a hearty enthusiasm that never failed to encourage 
those around him. Where De France provided a steadying paternalistic influ- 
ence, Harvey Allen’s talent lay not only in his own work, but in his gift for 
rallying people to enthusiastic involvement in whatever puzzle lay before 
them. While Ames personnel respected “Smitty ” De France, they loved 
Harvey.41 In getting the laboratory of€ to an energetic start, Allen’s role was 
decisive. In producing sparkling theoretical work spanning both aeronautical 
and astronautical decades, his genius added greatly to Ames’s reputation. 
Harry Goett, who was the first head of the two 7- by 10-foot wind 
tunnels at Ames and later the division chief for the Full-Scale and Flight 
Research Division, had an equally strong influence on Ames’s research atmo- 
sphere. Allen and Goett had been at Langley together, and indeed had lived 
together in bachelor quarters noted for loud classical music and Allen’s 
imaginative cooking. At Ames, the close friends were in frequent competi- 
tion, Allen controlling the high-speed area of research and Goett in charge of 
low-speed  investigation^.^' 
Both men, by all accounts, inspired their subordinates to research excel- 
lence in completely different ways. While Allen nudged and chiwied with 
avuncular good humor, Goett rigorously demanded. Where Allen was effu- 
sive with praise, Goett was restrained and could sometimes be overwhelming, 
especially to young engineers who were cowed by his often brusque manner. 
“1s your brain frozen?” demanded Goett of a newly hired engineer who had 
plotted data without allowing for necessary approximations caused by a 
poor scale system.43 Like Allen, however, Goett was determined to force his 
research team to think creatively. The combination of the two men and the 
competition between them, as Goett’s startled young engineer reflected 
years later, were real elements of strength in Ames’s early years. 
Early Facilities 
The Flight Research Building was put into operation in August 1940, 
only two weeks behind schedule. It housed not only the flight research 
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engineering staff, which was about to resume the deicing research started at 
Langley, but also doubled as an airplane hangar and maintenance shop. 
In the fall of 1940, three wind tunnels were under construction. In May 
work had started on one of two 7- by 10-foot wind tunnels and a l6-foot 
tunnel.* In August, the second 7- by 10-foot tunnel was started. The con- 
struction would take over a year and involve all the technical staff in some 
way or another. For many of the young research engineers, the challenges 
were real and involved problems they had not been trained for. “I was asked 
to go monitor the pouring of the concrete for the flight apron, to make sure 
the contractors were proceeding correctly,” recalled Walter Vincenti, whose 
specialty was theoretical aerodynamics. “I had never been involved in con- 
crete pouring before in my life. But we found ourselves doing all kinds of 
practical, applied engineering which we had no training for. When something 
came up, you did it.” Equally removed from the Theoretical Aerodynamics 
Section’s normal activities were jobs such as stress-analysis of reinforced con- 
.Crete beams used in constructing the laboratory’s buildings. It was a standing 
joke, Vincenti recalled, “for a while we were known as the Reinforced Aero- 
dynamics and Theoretical Concrete Section.”44 If assignments at Ames were 
varied, quick changing, and sometimes unconventional, it was because the 
major concern was to produce working wind tunnels as quickly as possible. 
Through the 1940-1941 winter, construction continued in a quagmire of 
mud with no roads. 
The 7- by 10-foot tunnels45 presented no particular problem - Langley 
had one in use at the time, so the designers at Ames were familiar with the 
construction details and, indeed, had begun working out the specifications 
while still at Langley. The practicality of the Langley 7- by 10-foot wind 
tunnel, at the time in heavy demand for military testing, had made approval 
of two that size at Ames easy to obtain. The 7- by 10-foot tunnels at both 
laboratories were the  workhorse^,^^ highly useful for stability-and-control 
testing, and utilized for both industry and the military. Eight-foot wing-span 
models were used, and tests were run for drag, lift, lateral force, and pitch, 
yaw, and rolling moment. The airspeed in these tunnels was usually 
400-480 km/hr. In April and August 1941, the two new Ames 7- by 10-foot 
wind tunnels were put into operation. 
The l6-foot tunnel was a new design, and to no one’s surprise, the 
designers encountered problems. Sixteen-foot tunnels had been approved for 
both Langley and Ames and were built simultaneously. Their size permitted 
the testing of full-scale aircraft components; the higher speed range was also 
essential as flight speeds continued to increase. Otherwise similar to the 
*Wind tunnels are measured by their test section size. Thus the test section of the 
7- by 10-foot tunnel was a rectangular 7 feet high and 10 feet wide in cross section, while 
that of the 16-foot tunnel was circular, with a l6-foot diameter. 
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tunnel at Langley, the Ames l6-foot tunnel was to be powered by a larger 
motor, which would produce a speed of 1100 km/hr. The tunnel was put 
into operation in October 1941. “At every stage,” an early employee 
recalled, “we were doing things we didn’t know how to do, because the field 
was developing so fast. We were working beyond the limits of our knowl- 
edge;. . . you couldn’t learn it in a uni~ersity.’~~’ Calibration tests on the 
tunnel extended into 1942, and eventually the fan-support struts had to be 
reshaped. Later, the 16-foot tunnel was to prove invaluable in complement- 
ing flight research to investigate the problem of aileron flutter. Oscillating 
shock waves, producing pulsations in the airflow over a wing, were a serious 
problem in high-speed flight. The pulsations caused both a buffeting of the 
aircraft and a buzz, or flutter, of the ailerons. Flight research using the 
Lockheed P-80, one of the earliest jet fighters, showed that the intensity of 
aileron flutter increased with speed; it was feared that if the speed were high 
enough, the wing might fail. The l6-foot tunnel research, in conjunction 
with flight research, produced significant data that eventually resulted in 
effective aircraft rnodif icat ion~.~~ 
While construction and initial tests on the first three wind tunnels pro- 
gressed, De France and his staff were also designing a tunnel similar to the 
one he had built and directed at Langley, a low-speed, full-scale tunnel in 
which an entire airplane could be tested. The 30- by 6O-foot tunnel at 
Langley was the largest in the world, but the new tunnel at Ames was to 
have a test section of 40 by 80 feet. The tunnel, begun in March 1942 and 
completed in June 1944, is still the largest wind tunnel in the world. Its bulk 
on the western boundary of Moffett Field balances that of the equally huge 
rigid-airship hangar on the east. Supporting facilities had also been con- 
structed during the first year, including an electrical substation to supply the 
needed 40,000 horsepower. By autumn 1941, there were also buildings to 
house technical services, utilities, and a science labor at or^.^^ 
Early in 1941 Ames was already being termed “part of the national 
defense system” in local newspapers, and it was obvious that the laboratory 
would quickly be used to  full capacity with defense-related By the 
fall Ames had used up the original appropriation of $10 million, which had 
been, admittedly, $1 million less than the NACA had requested in 1939. 
Though no changes had been made in the original plans for the facilities at 
Ames, construction costs had greatly increased and were fluctuating widely. 
Many companies were reluctant to commit themselves to such a long-term 
project as the 40- by 8O-foot tunnel with the uncertainty of prices.51 The 
lone bid on the tunnel - a staggering $6,164,000 - was made by the 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company; in October it was being considered 
by the NACA’s main office. A request for an additional $6 million was 
approved in October, and the cost of the laboratory rose to $16,200,000. 
By the end of 1945 the cost of facilities at Ames had passed $22 million.52 
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The organization of the Ames staff was beautifully simple. There was 
one division - the Research Division. Subordinate groups were defined as 
facilities became available, following the Langley pattern of organizing 
research groups around the various wind tunnels. As the three tunnels neared 
completion, therefore, a 7- by 10-foot tunnel research section was created, as 
was a 16-foot tunnel group. A third section, Theoretical Aerodynamics 
under Harvey Allen, was designing facilities and the equipment to be used in 
them, while continuing theoretical aerodynamic studies that would even- 
tually generate the need for added facilities. One staff list, probably dating 
from late 1940, showed the majority of personnel as “unassigned to sec- 
t i ~ n . ” ~ ~  In addition to the three research sections, a small flight research 
unit consisted of two test pilots, a research engineer, and a few aircraft main- 
tenance men. 
The improvisations that would be needed during the war were probably 
achieved more easily because of the flexibility of the early Ames organiza- 
tion. If the need arose, men and jobs could be shuffled for maximum effi- 
ciency. As more facilities became operational and yet more planned, the 
organizational structure became increasingly differentiated and complex; but 
in the early years the main division was between theoretical high-speed aero- 
September 1941. After a year of operation, Ames boasted the Flight Research Labora- 
tory (in foreground), two 7- by 10-foot wind tunnels, and behind them, a 16-foot tunnel. 
The field directly behind the center triangular plot would soon become the site of the 40- 
by 80-foot &&scale wind tunnel. 
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dynamics and applied research focused around the growing set of wind 
tunnels. 
As the 40- by 80-foot tunnel began to take shape, the original Research 
Division was split. The new Theoretical and Applied Research Division 
included all the earlier wind tunnels. John Parsons, who had been in control 
of construction at Ames from the very beginning, became head of the new 
Full-scale and Flight Research Division, which encompassed the incomplete 
40- by 80-foot tunnel and the Flight Research Branch, with its test pilots, 
research engineers, and a i r ~ r a f t . ~  This reorganization represented little 
change in operations. Since Parsons was in charge of construction, he had 
always been responsible for the 40- by 80-foot tunnel, and since the tunnel 
was not yet complete, his job remained primarily that of construction engi- 
neer. The intent, however, seems to have been to differentiate between low- 
speed, full-scale research and higher-speed aerodynamic research and testing. 
Interestingly, Harvey Allen, whose specialty was high-speed theoretical aero- 
dynamics, was one of the designers of the huge, low-speed tunnel, a typical 
example of the versatility of both the researchers and the functional struc- 
ture of the laboratory. Organizational charts, even when they existed, did 
not necessarily present a true picture of daily operations. As an early 
employee remembers, “it was all very loosely organized. . . . After the war, 
when the civil service people came out to try to regularize things, [they] 
were driven crazy trying to write job descriptions. They were completely 
baffled [when] they encountered this mad research organization. . . . I don’t 
remember seeing an organization chart the whole time I was at A m e ~ . ” ~  
The War 
The entry of the United States into World War I1 in December 1941 
came as a surprise to very few. Much of the anxiety regarding construction at 
Ames had come from the expectation that demands on defense-connected 
organizations could only increase, whether the United States became 
formally involved in the war or not. The two 7- by 10-foot tunnels were in 
operation when war was declared, and calibration tests were in progress on 
the high-speed 16-foot tunnel, which the military was anxiously awaiting, 
since it would be used in testing of new military aircraft. 
In terms of research being done or contemplated, the war brought one 
immediate change, The basic research through which the NACA had made its 
reputation was virtually phased out as all the laboratories concentrated on 
specific, immediate problems. The aircraft companies and the military asked 
the NACA for information and testing. The Washington office in turn 
assigned these tasks to one or more of the laboratories. 
Deicing research became even more critical. Ice forms on all aircraft 
that enter certain weather conditions. It increases the gross weight of air- 
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craft, puts a burden on propellers and power plants, changes the aerody- 
namic properties of wings, and hampers radio reception and visibility. For 
years commercial operators had canceled or rerouted flights to avoid such 
hazards, to the detriment of their schedules. Bombers, transports, and troop 
carriers operating worldwide would encounter icing conditions somewhere 
every day, and their missions could not so easily be canceled or rerouted. 
The aircraft companies and the Army and Navy were eager to combine 
forces with the NACA to solve the many-faceted p r ~ b l e m . ~  
Research into thermal methods for deicing had been started at Langley 
Field as early as 1927. Early experimentation with steam, piped through the 
leading edge of the wing, had showed that method to be impractical. Direct 
heating with engine exhaust gas had proved more successful, and both 
branches of the military had donated aircraft to be converted to carry 
experimental wing-and-tail systems. 
When construction of facilities was just beginning at Ames, the decision 
was made in Washington to transfer deicing research to the West Coast. The 
principal reason was to be near a sure source of ice-carrying clouds, which 
California’s geography was expected to provide. The Langley engineer who 
had been most heavily involved with the deicing work, Lewis A. Rodert, 
moved west with the initial group from Langley and continued his work with 
the small flight research section - himself and two test pilots. Typical of the 
informality then existing within the organization, Rodert continued his 
research at Ames a year before the official research authorization came 
t h r ~ u g h . ~  
A (2-46 Flying Laboratory, used for  deicing research at Ames. Deicing research at Ames 
during the war resulted in immediately applied aircraft modifications that saved lives and 
airplanes and quickly made the reputation of the new aeronautical laboratory. 
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The electrically heated shoes on the propeller blades of 
the C-46 removed ice as it formed and increased the 
speed of the C-46 by 16 mph. 
By early 1942 the Ames researchers had moved to colder country and 
established what became the Minnesota Ice Research Base for flight testing 
of aircraft equipped with deicing apparatus. The Army contributed two 
bombers, a B-24 Liberator and a B-17 Flying Fortress, and later a C-46 
transport. The Army, the NACA, and the aircraft companies worked closely 
together experimenting with various methods and devices. While Ames was 
involved in testing in flight, the new engine research laboratory at Cleveland 
had built a wind tunnel to be used in deicing research. Research in the 
tunnel, which became operable in 1944, assisted the Minnesota team by 
checking test results under controlled conditions and by adding to the 
general body of information on the subject. The data that were obtained 
made it possible to install deicing equipment on most military aircraft, with 
satisfactory results. But as Edwin P. Hartman noted, the deicing research was 
“not at all representative of NACA research projects. Seldom before had 
21 
NACA’s work been carried so far into the hardware stage or so far in achiev- 
ing a complete and satisfying solution to a major operational 
After the war, the research continued as the NACA sought more precise data 
on the various characteristics of the equipment they had developed. 
For Ames, though, the early success of the deicing research was particu- 
larly welcome. Atypical though it might have been as a research story, the 
very fact that a workable solution to a hardware problem was achieved went 
a long way to impress both industry and the military with the effectiveness 
of the new laboratory. It was a dramatic way to enter the scene, and if far 
removed from the type of research Ames would usually deal with, in terms 
of publicity and acclaim there could not have been a better debut. The coor- 
dination among the NACA, industry, and military personnel, by all accounts, 
was of the best. The wind-tunnel research at the Cleveland laboratory also 
illustrated the way in which the NACA could marshal additional forces when 
necessary. Though the NACA perhaps wished for more exact solutions and 
considered the research still “in progress” even as deicing equipment was 
being built into military aircraft,59 the successful research established Ames 
in the most favorable light with the rest of the aeronautical world. After the 
war, the NACA received the Collier Trophy for its deicing work, impressive 
public recognition of its contribution. 
Though the deicing research done by Ames was perhaps the most dra- 
matic of its early research tasks, the laboratory assisted the war effort in 
other less dramatic ways. The wind tunnels, as soon as they were opera- 
tional, lent themselves to preliminary design testing of aircraft prototypes, a 
process that made it possible to evaluate aerodynamic characteristics and 
handling qualities and to refine designs. Once a model had been produced, 
the wind tunnels were used in “clean-up” jobs requested either by the mili- 
tary or by their industrial contractors. Often wind tunnel research on exist- 
ing aircraft accompanied flight research. The technique was the same as that 
used in the deicing research; wind tunnel testing added detailed measure- 
ments under controlled conditions and investigated alternatives to optimize 
design and improve performance. A constant stream of requests resulted in 
round-the-clock wind-tunnel use, as models were tested, adjusted, and 
retested. Wartime needs carried Ames far from the basic aeronautical 
research for which it had been built, perhaps establishing early a continuing 
dialogue between the institution and the aircraft industry. It is interesting to 
speculate on possible different turns in the relationship established with 
industry, had the wartime tradition not been established. 
Good relations with the military were not an accidental by-product of 
the icing research. Quite early Langley Field had established an Army liaison 
office to ease relations between NACA personnel and the Army. A Langley 
historian has noted that the laboratory’s major hurdle, in its earliest years, 
had been its relations with the military.60 Though time and the liaison office 
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had done much to establish more cordial relations, care was taken to prevent 
any incivility from developing at Ames. When the first tunnels were about to 
go into use, therefore, the Army established a liaison office at Ames, staffed 
with personnel from Wright Field. The liaison office not only opened a regu- 
lar channel for Ames-military communication, but also served as a buffer for 
any problems Ames might have with the Army’s industrial contractors. The 
liaison office, juggling scheduling difficulties, was therefore kept constantly 
aware of commitments and priorities, also removing some of the pressure 
from Ames in dealing with industry’s demands on Ames expertise and 
facilities.6 
Ames enjoyed another institutional aid in external relations. In 1940, 
while the laboratory was materializing, the Washington office had laid plans 
to form a Western Coordination Office to deal with industry and academia 
on the West Coast. This development was perhaps overdue, for the NACA 
had developed the reputation of being “an eastern organization.. . not 
responsive to the needs of western industry.yy62 The Western Coordination 
Office, energetically and perceptively headed by Edwin P. Hartman, became 
an invaluable source of information for the head office in Washington. Very 
often the reports Hartman made to Washington resulted in Ames being 
detailed to a requested research task because of a specific need of the indus- 
try coupled with Hartman’s awareness of what was currently happening at 
the L a b ~ r a t o r y . ~ ~  Ames from the first avoided strains in its relationship 
with industry and the military. 
In April 1942 the Army left Moffett Field and the Navy returned. With 
responsibility for Pacific coast security, the Navy planned to patrol the coast 
using nonrigid airships, or blimps. The Moffett Field hangar was the logical 
place to moor them. The transfer was accomplished routinely, and relations 
with the Navy proceeded as cordially as had those with the Army. 
Aside from influencing the direction that early investigations took, the 
war very visibly affected Ames in other ways. Clothed in blackout window 
shades ordered early in 1942,64 Ames continued its mushroom growth in 
facilities and personnel. From the original 51 people at work in September 
1940, the laboratory had grown by February 1943 to 341. In August 1945 
the wartime high of 844 people was reached.65 
In atmosphere, however, the laboratory remained almost as informal as 
it was the day Charles Hall first reported for work in 1942: 
The day I showed up, I went down to personnel to sign forms. 
Helen Davies was head of personnel, and the ad building in those 
days was in the old hangar. As Helen was about to take Brad Wick 
and me out to the 7- by 10- and the l6-foot wind tunnels, 
De France walked by and said hello. Davks introduced us, and 
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said she was taking us over to the tunnels. He said [he’d take us] 
so he [did] and gave us a tour of each wind tunnel. He [dropped] 
Brad off at the 7- by 10- and took me over to the l6-foot. When I 
got to know the people better a year or two later [I found out] 
they thought I’d really had an in and was a good friend of 
De France. . . .66 
Selective service also came to Ames, as to all NACA laboratorie~.~‘ The 
NACA had been designated an “essential industry” before the war began. 
This implied that deferments for the staff would be almost routine. In the 
early days of the war, Langley had also fought to retain some of their young 
model-makers, who lacked the professional legitimacy of engineering degrees 
but who were increasingly irreplaceable.68 Indeed, most of the staff of both 
laboratories remained at their jobs under “essential occupation” status for 
some time. In February 1944, however, state control of deferments was 
ended. California’s Selective Service Board had been extremely cooperative 
in granting continued deferments to the Ames staff, and the NACA Washing- 
ton office had been helpful, providing conservative timetables showing when 
particular staff members would be available for the draft. In 1943, for 
example, the executive secretary of the NACA proposed to the state board 
that only 16 out of 97 eligible men be released over the next year.69 Ames 
had been,until 1944, more successful than the other laboratories in getting 
deferments from the board.” 
In the end most laboratory personnel were inducted into military ser- 
vice and continued in the same jobs. Those at Langley and Cleveland joined 
the Army; but because Ames was on a Navy base, Ames personnel joined the 
Navy. There were some complications. Civilian superiors at times became 
military subordinates, and reports one had written in one’s civilian identity 
were sometimes too confidential to be read in one’s military identity. The 
Ames staff, one veteran admitted, made life as difficult for the Navy as the 
Navy made it for them. Ames’s nonchalance in the face of military regula- 
tions and protocol became a source of frustration to the Navy.71 The Selec- 
tive Service Board’s solution, however, was the best alternative under the 
circumstances. In the event that there was an immediate emergency, the 
Ames staff, which had received basic training, could have been of use at 
Moffett Field. Also, Navy morale was undoubtedly a consideration - the 
position of Moffett Field and the role of the Navy in protecting the Pacific 
shores would have made it difficult to justify continued civilian status for 
those at Ames. 
To help ease the manpower shortage at Ames, the Navy assigned some 
200 men, from machinist mates who had seen combat to engineering 
students from the Navy’s V-12 college programs, to the laboratory. Alfred 
J. Eggers was one of the V-12 Navy men. Years later he remembered his 
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dawn arrival at Moffett Field as part of the “Ames detachment,” still slightly 
puzzled about his assignment. His introductory tour of the wind tunnels by 
Harvey Allen opened a new “wild Buck Rogers world”; he was to remain at 
Ames almost 20 years as one of its most imaginative and productive 
 researcher^.^^ 
The pressure to build a laboratory quickly in wartime and its distance 
from Washington were potential areas of tension in the relationship that 
developed between Ames and the Washington office. Quite early one detects 
an impatient note running through correspondence. Whether this impatience 
was shared by the other laboratories is difficult to know, but within the 
Ames staff, it is marked. 
A specific issue that created sharp and vocal annoyance was small- 
purchase authorizations, which had to be cleared by the Washington office. 
Ames personnel argued that the delay in obtaining authorization from 
Washington was handicapping them in obtaining materials. In July 1941 
Ames received a very conservatively couched permission to make emergency 
purchases where it was impossible to take the time to receive authorization 
from W a ~ h i n g t o n . ~ ~  This was the result of a sternly phrased letter from 
Ames to Washington pointing out the handicap under which they 
operated. 74 
Later in the year, after what was evidently a reprimand from Washing- 
ton for Ames’s indulgent use of that emergency authorization, one adminis- 
trative assistant at Ames wrote a heated memorandum on behalf of his 
superior berating the Washington office. The reprimand from Headquarters, 
he maintained, was based on “procedure standpoint,” not “supplies and 
results.” It must be “thoroughly understood,” he went on to say, that 
“neither I nor any member of the purchase section can be held responsible 
for our failure to obtain items needed by the various sections of the Labora- 
tory, under our present purchase procedure.” That they had overstepped 
their authorization he was prepared to admit, but only “to get results. . . . 
We are in a better position to know what the Laboratory needs and what are 
fair In 1944 the Washington office granted authority to all labora- 
tories to make routine purchases for amounts up to $500. Any repair or 
alteration cost, however, still had to be cleared through the Washington 
office, and the paperwork for even the self-authorized purchases was 
extensive. 
Another example, probably from the immediate postwar period, con- 
cerned the issue of pay and travel vouchers. Originally these had been pro- 
cessed in Washington, but Headquarters had decided to delegate at least part 
of the work load to the laboratories. Ames objected, though it expressed 
willingness to cooperate in the plan. “The Committee,” an Ames reply 
pointed out, “will be operated more efficiently if the final actions of certain 
functions and procedures are centralized. ” Ames, it seems evident, felt that 
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its function as a research laboratory was being undermined by bureaucracy, 
from which it wanted protection by the Washington staff. Even more evident 
in this memorandum, however, was the subtly expressed conviction that 
Ames was unique and that Washington did not understand that uniqueness. 
There was a slight tone of aggrieved isolationism in the conclusion of the 
memorandum: 
Uniformity in these matters can be satisfactorily obtained only 
by having someone in the Washington office work with and study 
thoroughly the problems at each laboratory and to then set up a 
procedure that is workable for all. It cannot be obtained by taking 
the ideas of one laboratory and attempting to apply them to the 
other two without first studying the problems of all three. It 
cannot be obtained by someone in Washington arbitrarily deter- 
mining the policy without visiting each laboratory and carefully 
studying the problems of each l a b ~ r a t o r y . ~ ~  
The problems of bureaucracy, of course, are always present and the 
NACA was certainly no worse than any other government agency. It was 
probably better than most. But what is striking is that Ames, early in its 
history, seems to have asserted its distance, differences, and self- 
determination. Whether Ames was truly burdened by the Washington office 
is moot; it seems to have believed itself so. 
The end of the war saw Ames with five wind tunnels. Both the huge 
40- by 80-foot tunnel and the high-speed 1- by 3.5-foot tunnel were com- 
pleted in 1944. At the opening of the 40- by 80-foot tunnel in June 1944, 
a formal dedication of the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory was held. In a 
way the late dedication was symbolic of the very conditions and circum- 
stances through which the laboratory had come into existence; the energy 
demanded in establishing Ames and in dealing with the crisis of almost 
immediate war had left little time or concern for traditional formalities. 
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THE POSTWAR PERIOD, 1945-1952 
In November 1944, when it was becoming obvious that the war would 
soon be over, President Roosevelt asked Vannevar Bush, director of the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), to recommend 
policies that would ensure continuing governmental encouragement of and 
financial aid to scientific research. The war, Roosevelt observed, had been 
responsible for a great mobilizing of the scientific and technological 
resources of the country. Bush’s OSRD, a wartime innovation, represented 
“a unique experiment of team-work and cooperation in coordinating scien- 
tific research and in applying existing scientific knowledge to the solutions 
of the technical problems paramount in war.”’ Roosevelt intended that 
lessons learned in managing research during the war not be forgotten during 
peace. 
Roosevelt asked the right person, for Bush’s career had involved just 
such relationships of research and management. A New Englander, Bush had 
engineering degrees from Tufts University. During World War I, he had been 
a junior faculty member at Tufts and had done submarine-related research 
for the Navy. In the next decade he attained prominence at the Massachu- 
setts Institute of Technology. In 1938 he was appointed to the NACA, and 
in late 1939 succeeded Joseph Ames as its chairman. 
In June 1940 Bush had obtained Roosevelt’s approval to form the 
National Defense Research Committee, a civilian organization involved in the 
development of new weapons. A year later the committee was absorbed into 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and Bush resigned his 
chairmanship of the NACA to devote himself to the OSRD. The OSRD 
reported directly to the President and had its own funds to work With.2 
Such assets produced remarkable technological results: workable radar, the 
proximity fuse, fire-control mechanisms, amphibious vehicles, and, of 
course, the atomic bomb. 
In his varied capacities, then, Bush had been on both sides of 
government-sponsored research. A renowned engineer and scientist himself, 
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Bush was sensitive to the problems of research and the difficulties in bureau- 
cratizing the process of scientific work. As a director of research organiza- 
tions - the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the NACA, and the OSRD - 
he experienced the opposite side of the coin in confronting the need to form 
broad organizational policies to govern research. 
With the aim of perpetuating the wartime achievements in scientific 
and technological research, the President asked Bush to turn his attention to 
four major questions: 
1. What could be done to publicize, for the public good, the contribu- 
tions to scientific knowledge made during the war? 
2. How could the government aid a continuing effort in the war against 
disease? 
3. How could the government aid research by public and private 
organizations? 
4. What could be done to discover, encourage, and develop scientific 
talent in the younger generation to assure that scientific research 
would continue to progress at the same level it had during the war?3 
The questions Roosevelt placed before Bush had a certain refreshing 
simplicity to them, but they were timely, and timeless, questions. They 
embraced many facets of national concern: national security, health, the 
issue of government aid to private institutions, the relationship between 
public and private research organizations, and federal support for the devel- 
opment of scientific talent. 
That Roosevelt addressed himself to such questions in the closing days 
of the war, even before peace had brought time for reflection, is testament 
to his wisdom. The answers that Vannevar Bush and his committee framed in 
June 1945 for President Truman reflect both sound judgment and the con- 
text of the times. Science, properly funded and inspired, could solve the 
problems and insecurities of the coming decades. It was indeed an “endless 
frontier,” as Bush was to call it. The policies that grew out of the report 
Bush submitted formed much of the federal attitude toward research and 
development for the next 20 years, and the history of Ames during that 
period reflects this. 
Bush’s recommendations were plainly worded and pragmatic. First, 
science is a proper concern of government, and the government should take 
steps to nurture science in the best possible environment. The government 
should support the universities generally, as well as those scientific areas 
where large outlays of funds were crucial. The wartime advances against dis- 
ease were possible because of “a large backlog of scientific data accumulated 
through basic research in many scientific fields in the years before the 
war.”4 The key to continued scientific progress was a strong foundation in 
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basic research that was helped, not hampered, by federal intervention. Guid- 
ing policies were necessary: to ensure support where needed, to encourage 
the current generation in scientific directions, to develop programs at univer- 
sities not necessarily geared toward specific problem-solving, but toward 
building strong foundations in basic research. Medical schools should be 
heavily supported, the continued scientific education of those who had just 
served in the war should be financed, and measures should be taken by a 
civilian-military advisory board to  disperse the results of wartime research 
that were no longer crucial to national security. Better liaison among the 
military, universities, industry, and the government should be developed to 
coordinate research and to promote mutual awareness of both needs and 
accomplishments. 
Bush’s final recommendation was for the formation of an agency with a 
broad base of power and intellect and stable funding to further basic 
research in sciences. Five years later the agency Bush had envisioned, the 
National Science Foundation, was formed, underlining the national commit- 
ment to support science. It was in this postwar period of faith in the poten- 
tial of basic research and the government’s dedication to the solid advance- 
ment of science that Ames reached maturity as a research laboratory. 
The issues of advance planning, efficient management, dedication to 
basic research, proper liaison among concerned groups, coordination of 
research efforts, encouragement of supporting institutions, and continual 
attraction of new talent are themes running through the postwar period at 
Ames. The first years of its existence had been highly colored by the circum- 
stances of its inception and the abnormal conditions caused by World War 11. 
As the war drew to a close, the Ames staff was turning toward new concerns, 
HIGH-SPEED RESEARCH 
At the somewhat tardy dedication ceremony in 1944, Ames had five 
wind tunnels - the 7- by 10-foot tunnels, the 16-foot tunnel, the 40- by 
80-foot tunnel, and the high-speed 1- by 3.5-foot tunnel. The last two were 
the newest and represented, in a sense, the two diverging directions of 
research undertaken at Ames. The 40- by 80-foot tunnel proved highly 
useful for testing full-scale aircraft during the last year of the war. One of the 
first aircraft tested in it was the Ryan XFR-1, which was powered by a recip- 
rocating engine and an auxiliary jet engine. The first U.S. aircraft with a jet 
engine, the Navy fighter lacked stability and control under certain condi- 
tions, and as such was unusable. Testing in the 40- by 80-foot tunnel and in 
flight identified the flaws and led to modifications that corrected them, to 
the delight of the Ryan company and the Navy.’ 
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1. Electrical Substation 8. 12-Foot Pressure Wind Tunnel 
2. 16-Foot Wind Tunnel 
3. 1- by 3.5-Foot Wind Tunnel 
4. 7- by 10-Foot Wind Tunnel No. 2 
5. PaintShop 12. Science Building 
6. 7- by 10-Foot Wind Tunnel No. 1 
7. Utilities Building 
9. Flight Research Laboratory 
10. 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel 
11. Technical Service Building 
13. Auditorium and Cafeteria 
14. Administration Building 
1943. Ames continued to construct wind tunnels even as it ran triple shifts to keep up 
with wartime demands for aircraft testing. The 40- by 80-foot tunnel was completed in 
1944, and the 12-foot pressure tunnel was completed in 1946. 
It had been planned, however, that Ames would concentrate on high- 
speed problems, and it was toward those questions that aeronautics was 
turning. One of the major projects at prewar Langley had been the develop- 
ment of airfoil shapes that would allow airflow close to the wing surface, 
the so-called boundary layer, to remain laminar, or streamlined, over the 
entire wing. This became especially critical at high speeds. In the late 1930s 
a Langley research group had also experimented with various airfoil shapes 
to reduce as far as possible the detrimental compressibility effect of shock 
waves forming adjacent to the wing surface at transonic speeds. (The tran- 
sonic region is usually defined as flight speeds between roughly 0.8 and 
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1943. The g imt  entrance cone of the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel under construction. For 
almost 40 years a closed-system tunnel, a 1979-1982 expansion created an additional 
80- by 120-foot test section with an open-intake air system. The wind tunnel remains the 
largest in the world. 
1.2 times the speed of sound, which itself varies, according to altitude and 
temperature, from 960 to 1230 km/hr.) As it turned out, the method for 
calculating airfoil shapes for laminar flow was also applicable for delaying 
the formation of shock waves on wings at transonic speeds. However, these 
research questions were for the most part shelved during the war as both 
laboratories dealt with the day-to-day clean-up work on aircraft.6 
That basic research on high-speed problems was about to become 
crucial was made increasingly obvious by another major development in 
aeronautics. The jet engine, which was still in the experimental stage in 
Britain and Germany when war broke out, operated most efficiently at 
higher speeds. Therefore, if jet engines were to achieve their highest poten- 
tial, aircraft that could operate at much higher speeds would have to be 
developed as well. Both the development of the jet engine and the accom- 
panying problems of high-speed flight were issues that the NACA, involved 
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as it had been in the increasingly frantic requests for new aircraft designs by 
the military, felt it could not devote itself to wholeheartedly. In March 
1941, however, a special committee on jet propulsion had been appointed 
by the NACA’s Main Committee. Stanford’s Dr. William Durand was named 
chairman. At 82, he had come out of retirement and rejoined the NACA at 
the request of Vannevar Bush. 
Under the aegis of the special committee, investigation of current jet 
propulsion research led NACA to sponsor specific projects. In 1943 a testing 
facility went into operation at the Engine Research Laboratory in Cleveland. 
Research was closely guarded and only those directly involved in the work 
knew any details. By 1945, however, jet-propulsion research had become a 
major activity at Cleveland. Aerodynamic and thermodynamic problems 
related to the higher speeds were being attacked simultaneously at both 
Langley and Ames. 
The NACA has been condemned for its laggard development of the jet 
engine. Especially after the war, when German progress had become known, 
the NACA was criticized for not throwing all its resources into producing a 
workable jet airplane for the war.7 Though there is an element of truth in 
the contention that the NACA “missed the boat,’’ in the prewar context of 
the late 1930s, exploration of jet propulsion may have seemed a luxury 
those preparing for the expected crisis could not afford. It was, perhaps, less 
a question of stodginess in outlook than a decision to work in directions that 
might be more immediately productive. In beginning research in new areas, 
there is, of course, no way to predict how long it will take to produce useful 
results, and myriad problems remained to be solved in the field of propeller- 
powered aircraft. In 1939 the NACA’s facilities at Langley were stretched 
almost to capacity, and even though the two new laboratories, Ames and the 
Cleveland engine laboratory, would in time relieve pressure on Langley, their 
planning created new demands on the NACA. 
In the Langley aerodynamics group, Eastman Jacobs had done early 
research on a multistage axial-flow compressor that would be more efficient 
than a centrifugal compressor, the path being followed by the British in jet 
propulsion. Jacobs was working on a somewhat unofficial basis, and his early 
leads were not pursued by the NACA. With the war, however, and the 
mobilization for action by the Durand Committee, the NACA attempted to 
catch up with the British. After the war, in the opinion of one NACA offi- 
cial, the Washington office of the NACA felt “a little sensitive about it, in 
light of the British example. There was a wish that the NACA had worked 
continuously on the axial-flow jet-engine concept.”’ The NACA should not 
be held solely responsible for the late start on jet-engine research in this 
country. Neither the military nor the aircraft engine companies had urged 
continued investigation of jet propulsion. 
In any event, with the field developing as it did toward the end of the 
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war, jet propulsion and high-speed aerodynamics were the major concerns of 
those involved in aeronautical research in the postwar p e r i ~ d . ~  As one Ames 
employee observed, though propulsion had not been within his laboratory’s 
field of research, the staff regretted that the NACA had not been at the fore- 
front of research in that area.1° High-speed research, however, was specifi- 
cally one of Ames’s specialties, and it was important, as the demands of 
wartime clean-up work receded, to move in that direction. There was a sense 
of urgency, both within the NACA as a whole, and specifically at Ames, as 
other research groups were beginning to explore the problems of supersonic 
flight. At the Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Army was organizing a ballistics 
research group to investigate supersonic phenomena; work had begun on the 
study of airflow over projectiles at supersonic speed. An engineer at 
the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory (at the California Institute of 
Technology (Cal Tech)) had built a small supersonic tunnel to provide data 
upon which to base the design of a larger tunnel at Aberdeen. The Ames 
staff was anxious to waste no time in assembling the necessary facilities to 
proceed with transonic and supersonic research. 
POSTWAR FACILITIES 
The original plans for facilities at Ames had included a supersonic wind 
tunnel,’ but the increasing cost of construction coupled with the other 
demands of war had delayed it. Toward the end of the war, however, as it 
became obvious that supersonic tunnels would be needed in the near future, 
Ames engineers began designing what would eventually materialize as two 
1- by .%foot supersonic wind tunnels. As was true of so much of the NACA’s 
prudent financing, economy played a large role in the construction plans. 
One of the new tunnels was designed to use compressed air being discharged 
from the adjacent 12-foot pressure tunnel. In this way two supersonic 
tunnels were built - one a continuous-flow tunnel and the other an inter- 
mittent blow-down tunnel attached to an existing tunnel - one relatively 
cheaply. The cost for both was $1,250,000, most of which was spent on the 
continuous-flow tunnel. ’ Because of the high pressure drop available from 
the 12-foot pressure tunnel, the blow-down tunnel could achieve higher 
Mach numbers than could the continuous-flow tunnel. 
Even before the tunnels were approved, however, Ames was planning 
for them in a typically enterprising way. It was the kind of foresight that 
Vannevar Bush would have subscribed to, for it looked to the future with 
imagination and energy. Harvey Allen, then head of the Theoretical Aerody- 
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namics Section, was largely responsible for the advance planning of the new 
supersonic tunnels. As one of his subordinates recalled, 
We needed information on supersonic flow through nozzles. 
We also needed information on the pressure drop required across a 
nozzle to establish the supersonic flow through it. This informa- 
tion was essential to determine the horsepower needed, so that we 
could then choose the proper compressors and drive motors.. . . 
So Allen put a couple of young engineers to work on the job of 
making a small model converging-diverging nozzle, running some 
experiments and getting some data, and the only place where there 
was a supply of compressed air was in the Technical Service Build- 
ing where . . . compressed air [was used] to drive pneumatic tools. 
So they designed the equipment in an ad hoc, hurry-up way and 
set it up next to the compressed-air tank in the boiler room.. . . 
But since they could only have use of the air when it wasn’t being 
used for the shops, they had to  come in after midnight - the 
shops at that time were running on two shifts - and run their 
tests, which had to be designed to use the little bit of space left 
between the boiler and the wall. . . . It was strictly a bootlegged 
kind of operation. I’m not sure if Allen even had official approval 
from Washington to do it, but it was something that had to be 
done so we did it.13 
With the information so gained, Ames was ready with specifications as 
soon as the two supersonic tunnels were approved. Construction began in 
February 1945 and was finished by September, De France playing a strong 
role in holding construction to its deadlines. Again foresighted, Ames engi- 
neers and the construction contractors had provided for possible difficulties 
in the flexible-throat apparatus of both tunnels. The flexible throat made it 
possible to vary the configuration and curvature of the throat to change the 
test Mach number. Because the flexible throats were difficult to build and 
make function properly, the design contractor had been asked to furnish two 
fixed throats, each designed for a different Mach number, so that the tunnels 
could function on schedule. As it happened, problems with the flexible 
throat did arise; but the fixed throats allowed the tunnels to operate on 
schedule at two supersonic speeds.I4 
With equal foresight, the continuous-flow tunnel had also been pressur- 
ized. Allen felt that the Reynolds-number effect, which made pressurization 
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necessary to obtain accurate test results on models at subsonic speeds, would 
continue to be important at higher speeds. This opinion contradicted that of 
the influential Theodore von Kirmin of California Institute of Technology’s 
Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, but. as it turned out, Allen was 
correct. This lucky hunch saved much trouble later, and probably consider- 
able expense. Intuition was significant in the history of aeronautics and the 
NACA - and the very necessity of occasionally resorting to the informed 
guess kept the work exciting to young researchers. As a section head of the 
1- by %foot tunnels commented, “AS I look back on it, the way we went 
ahead and designed things and spent for those times fairly sizable sums of 
money on the basis of such rudimentary knowledge is sort of staggering. It  
was only because of everybody’s ignorance that we went ahead and did some 
of the things we did. You simply didn’t know what the problems were, and 
you found out as you went along.15 
While the small 1- by .%foot tunnels were being planned and built, 
Ames engineers were also planning another supersonic tunnel, this one a 
larger facility. Ames had submitted plans for it to Lewis in the Washington 
office in 1944, but the war was still in progress and the cost of the projected 
tunnel was quite high, over $4 million. The plans, legend has it, disappeared 
into Lewis’s desk drawer. Months later, the chief of the Navy’s Bureau of 
Aeronautics came to see Lewis to discuss projected research facilities for the 
NACA. The Navy’s position was that a large supersonic facility was needed; 
had the NACA given any thought to this? Lewis rummaged through his desk 
and produced the Ames plans, no doubt impressing his Navy colleague with 
the NACA’s foresight. Lewis explained that they had not proceeded because 
of the prohibitive cost, at which point the admiral said the Navy could pay 
for the tunnel. In January 1945 the NACA received the funds from the 
Navy, and by May construction of a 6- by 6-foot supersonic tunnel had 
begun at Ames. The somewhat accidental - in timing at least - conjunction 
of interests produced a needed research tool. 
This example of civilian-military cooperation illustrates the personal 
role that was often necessary for such transactions to occur. Throughout his 
career in the NACA, George Lewis often obtained approval and funding for 
new facilities on the strength of his solid reputation for conscientious 
management and wise forecasting. Lewis made a point of visiting the Langley 
and Cleveland laboratories once a week to keep abreast of progress on 
various projects, as well as to be aware of their future needs. Although he 
was not able to take such a direct role in the day-to-day activities of Ames, 
the case of the 6- by 6-foot tunnel - “hip-pocket” administration at its 
best - indicates that he did not neglect Ames. That the NACA had the 
desired plans already at hand must have contributed to continued good rela- 
tions with the Navy. 
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
Official relations between Ames and the Navy remained extremely 
pleasant and cooperative throughout the years, possibly because the Navy - 
despite its own Bureau of Aeronautics - was never a direct competitor with 
the NACA. With the Army, the situation was different. It had not only its 
Air Corps to sponsor, but also its own experimental laboratory at Wright 
Field. From the inception of the NACA, Army Air Corps concerns and 
research interests and those of the NACA sometimes collided, causing a 
real difference in tone between Army-Ames and Navy-Ames relations." 
Another aspect of the Navy-Ames cordiality was the marked lack of 
tension that always. accompanied the sharing of Moffett Field. Ames was 
barely two years old, and still very much in the developing stage, when the 
Navy returned to Moffett Field. De France, and before him Edward Sharp, 
had taken great pains to cultivate frequent, pleasant exchanges between 
Ames and the military," and De France continued to display great tact in 
dealing with the Navy. Correspondence between Ames and the Navy con- 
cerning items of mutual interest is complimentary to both De France and the 
successive  commandant^.'^ In 1948 Ames transferred its first building, the 
wooden shack used in 1940 to house equipment and personnel, to the Navy, 
and moved it just outside the main gate of Moffett Field, where it became 
the Chief Petty Officers' Club. Ames also arranged the arrivals of its indus- 
trial and military clients so as not to conflict with the Navy's take-off and 
landing schedules, a courtesy that did not go unappreciated. Another 
exchange of letters arranged for Ames to procure dry ice for the Navy; the 
laboratory was the bigger consumer and dealt daily with the dry-ice supplier. 
The Navy returned such favors in a number of ways that made life 
easier for Ames. In the early years the Navy newspaper gave the laboratory a 
substantial column in the Moffett News.2o More important, the Navy con- 
tinued the Army practice of providing Ames with aviation fuel. Two 
25,000-gallon tanks were reserved at the naval air station for the use of the 
NACA. This made it unnecessary for Ames either to construct storage tanks 
or to order fuel.2 
When Ames needed an air compressor in 1948, it borrowed one from 
the Navy. The loan was to run for six months, but Ames kept the compres- 
sor for almost three years before the Navy really insisted on its return. The 
same civility accompanied the loan of a naval crane. Its transportation from 
the Alameda Navy Shipyard necessitated considerable inconvenience to the 
Navy. Eventually, the crane too was recalled, but not before it had been used 
for some time by Ames.22 That these loans of equipment were accomplished 
so agreeably speaks for the courtesy of individuals on both sides and for the 
larger context of the Navy-NACA relationship. 
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During the war, there was some concern that the NACA was being too 
helpful to the military, at the expense of its own affairs. In 1942 George 
Mead, vice-chairman of the NACA and a former vice-president for engineer- 
ing of United Aircraft Corporation, wrote J. C. Hunsaker, the committee’s 
chairman: 
I am rather afraid that most of our facilities are tied up in what 
you might call “service” engineering jobs on current models. I t  is a 
shame the industry hasn’t its own aerodynamic tools, in order to 
free ours for forward-looking work. It  will be just too bad if some 
other country has been able to do this, as there seems plenty of 
opportunity of developing ways and means of improving perfor- 
mance of more or less orthodox equipment which could be 
utilized during this war.23 
Toward the end of the war, Mead again voiced the same worry to 
Hunsaker: 
I feel strongly that NACA should confine its work to research 
of a fundamental nature in both planes and engines. . . . Our 
national safety, as well as commercial leadership in the air, 
depends upon straight thinking on research and carrying forward a 
constructive program at all times. You haven’t had much oppor- 
tunity of doing this as NACA’s forehandedness had provided the 
vital equipment needed to perfect designs that neither the services 
nor the manufacturers had had the wisdom to make available for 
the job.24 
The end of the war brought relief from the feeling that the NACA existed 
to solve specific military problems. At the same time the NACA needed to 
redefine its goals. 
In 1946 the NACA initiated discussion within the government for a 
policy that would delineate the areas of responsibility of the various aero- 
nautical factions. Obviously the NACA was most concerned about its role 
vis-&vis the military. There was rancor on both sides. The Army Air Forces 
felt let down by NACA’s failure to develop the jet engine in time for use 
during the war, and the NACA felt it had neglected just that type of basic 
research because it had been overwhelmed doing testing and clean-up for the 
military. The attempt to clarify positions was only partially successful. As 
might have been expected, and as the NACA had desired, its main province 
was defined as “fundamental research”; the military would explore and 
develop for military use the results of such research. Where, exactly, the line 
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was to be drawn was still moot. In July 1947 the Army Air Forces became a 
separate service as the United States Air Force, and thereafter was the 
NACA’s main competitor. 
An Ames historian has remarked that two of the notable features of the 
Ames staff in 1946 were “a nucleus of extremely competent men and . .  . 
the general lack of knowledge about transonic and supersonic aerodynam- 
i c ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~  If there is truth in the statement, it is also true that Ames had no 
monopoly on ignorance. Research opportunities beckoned. The challenge 
was to begin and to lead the field. Ames was in a position to follow new 
directions and exploit the opportunities. 
In July 1945 the importance of high-speed research was recognized at 
Ames by reorganization. Harvey Allen, who had been head of the Theoreti- 
cal Aerodynamics Section, became head of the new High-speed Research 
Division and responsible for the work done in the 1- by 3.5-foot tunnel 
(called “high-speed” when built but subsonic nevertheless), the about-to-be- 
completed 1- by %foot supersonic tunnels, and the 6- by 6-foot supersonic 
tunnel. There were now three research divisions, the other two being the 
Theoretical and Applied Research Division and the Full-scale and Flight 
Research Division. The divisions were still organized around existing and 
planned facilities, but the organization was becoming more complex. The 
more formalized organizational structures really began with the end of the 
war, with attempts to “normalize” operational practices. For Ames, which 
had known nothing but abnormal conditions, the transition from war to 
peace also brought adjustments in procedure that involved both increasing 
size and complexity and increased documentation and justification both 
locally and in Washington. This was accompanied, not just at Ames but 
throughout the aeronautical profession, by a general taking-stock as to 
where things stood in research, what could be learned from Europe, and 
where the first priorities lay. 
As Vannevar Bush had noted, one of the great needs in science and 
technology was the rapid dissemination of research results to those who 
might make use of them.z6 On an international level, this concern for knowl- 
edge of the latest aeronautical developments had naturally been focused on 
Germany, where aeronautical engineers rivaled those in the United States. 
As the war ended, the Alsos mission of American scientists and engineers 
had been sent to study German laboratories and to retrieve useful research 
results. ” 
One discovery of the mission was that the Germans had made little 
progress in transonic research. Though the Allies had little to gain from 
German research in this respect, it was comforting to know that the same 
difficulties the Americans and the British had encountered in this field had 
been experienced also by the Germans. Another product of the Alsos 
mission was information on the revolutionary German swept-wing research. 
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Illustrative of the concept of coordination and dissemination urged by Bush, 
the models and test results on swept wings in Germany enabled the Boeing 
Aircraft Company to proceed quickly with a swept-wing bomber. A Boeing 
engineer was a member of one of the groups surveying German develop- 
ments, and he relayed the information back to his company, which gambled, 
with happy results, and produced the B-47 .28 
But, interestingly, the German research on the swept wing had been 
paralleled in the United States. A NACA researcher, R. T. Jones, who at the 
time worked at the Langley laboratory, had been doing theoretical research 
on the swept wing for transonic flight. The concept was not new; in 
Germany, Adolph Busemann had proposed a swept wing in 1935.29 How- 
ever, as Jones later noted in a letter explaining his contribution, Busemann 
“did not make the point that a subsonic type of flow would appear if the 
wing were swept behind the Mach lines” - i.e., more obliquely.30 
Thinking back to a NACA paper written by Max Munk in 1924 (“The 
Relative Effects of the Dihedral and the Sweepback of Airplane Wings,” 
TN-177), Jones took the idea further: “I remembered Munk’s paper and 
wondered if it would also apply to compressible flow, and I saw no reason 
why it didn’t. Other people seemed to think compressible flow much more 
complicated than that.”31 The ramifications of sweeping the wings behind 
the Mach lines were crucial; sweepback could delay the compressibility 
phenomenon that was such a problem at transonic speeds. 
Jones and his colleagues were of course unaware of the work that had 
been going on in Germany at the same time.32 The Messerschmitt 163, with 
swept wings, did not reach production before the end of the war.33 Working 
at Langley, Jones developed the theoretical principles for sweepback in 
February 1945; they were tested experimentally in Langley wind tunnels in 
March. Jones recalled the first tests: “It seemed to suggest what I was pre- 
dicting, but it was pretty crude.” Robert Gilruth, later head of Langley’s 
Space Task Group and the Apollo program but in 1945 a research engineer, 
did more decisive tests. He attached model wings to the upper surface of the 
wing of the P-51 and got more satisfactory results. “When I went over to 
find out what the results were, they said something was wrong with the 
balances,” Jones remembered. “About the third try they began to believe 
the results - the drag was much lower than they would believe!”34 When 
von KArmAn’s Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Group was in Europe 
investigating German aeronautical research a short time later, they ques- 
tioned Busemann on Jones’s research, which had been the topic of conversa- 
tion during the long flight to Europe. Busemann corroborated Jones’s 
findings. It was, as one member of the Alsos mission recalled, “a scientific 
coincidence. . . . Another example of the case where a background of com- 
mon knowledge may lead to identical, important theories pursued inde- 
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pendently and simultaneously by warring centers - the United States and 
Germany - even though isolated from each other in the intervening six years 
by security clas~ification.”~ 
For Ames, the sense of being on the verge of a new era became even 
sharper when Jones transferred there from Langley in July 1946. After John 
Stack and others at Langley devised the slotted-throat tunnel, making the 
first truly transonic wind tunnel possible, the Ames 1- by 3.5-foot tunnel 
was quickly converted for transonic testing by the expedient of drilling holes 
in the walls. At almost the same time, the NACA proposed to carry transonic 
research into the upper atmosphere with the Bell X-1 and the Douglas 
D-558.36 
Not only was aeronautics more exciting, but the role of an aeronautical 
research laboratory had become more complicated. Ames had to deal with 
more agencies, and more closely, than during the war. Some way had to be 
found to meet the legitimate needs of the military, industry, the universities, 
and the NACA with minimum duplication. The solution was the Unitary 
Plan written by a committee under Dr. Jerome Hunsaker, the chairman of 
the NACA. After considering the needs of aeronautics as a whole and the 
desires of the various groups, the committee produced a scheme for research 
and development facilities for the Air Force, the NACA, and the universities. 
The appropriations, when finally passed in 1950, gave the NACA $75 million 
for facilities at each of its three research laboratories. 
For Ames, the Unitary Plan produced not the &foot, Mach 0.7-3.5 
tunnel originally planned, but a giant complex that linked three tunnels, one 
transonic and two supersonic, to an impressive power plant that could gener- 
ate 240,000 hp. Begun in 1950, the complex took over three years to con- 
struct and, as E. P. Hartman noted, “represented perhaps the end of the line 
in large, continuous-flow wind-tunnel construction.’’ The cost was over 
$27 million, a leap from the $7.2 million spent in 1944 on the 40- by 
80-foot tunnel. The difference in cost reflects not only the general difference 
in prices and complexity of equipment over the eight years, but also a real 
change in attitude regarding the necessity for major financial commitment, 
on the part of the government, to basic research.37 
By 1950 more than 1200 persons were employed at A m e ~ . ~ ~  Unavoid- 
ably, the close-knit atmosphere of the early war years had changed, reflect- 
ing not only the larger population, the greater range of facilities, and the 
implied specialization, but also the increased bureaucracy that accompanied 
that growth. Albeit with difficulty, some of the spirit of a small community 
remained, where persons felt bound to common goals and loyalties. Many 
ideas were discussed and perhaps even decisions made on them, as one 
veteran remembers, “in the cafeteria line.”39 Employees felt drawn not only 
to their own particular jobs, but to the institution as a whole. The standards 
of Ames were still very much those of Smith De France, who while wielding 
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an iron hand as the engineer-in-charge also commanded great personal 
loyalty. De France was committed to excellence and periodically circulated 
memoranda that recognized achievement. Especially when outsiders compli- 
mented the NACA or Ames, De France let the staff know, so that ‘‘you will 
take great pride in knowing how much this work is appre~iated.”~’ Thus 
from an internal standpoint, Ames continued to display the early character- 
istics that had made it such a desirable and exciting place to work. 
AMES AND HEADQUARTERS 
In its relations with the Washington office, however, Ames was not 
completely comfortable. The problem of distanke was multiplied by the 
increasing complexity of both the laboratory and the NACA itself. Another 
problem came from the inevitable clash of personality that accompanied 
many dealings with the secretary of the NACA, John Victory. For Ames, 
Victory personified the worst of bureaucracy and pomposity. From the West 
Coast the very real services he performed for the NACA were not so appar- 
ent. Instead, Victory announced himself in a series of terse bulletins that 
tended toward petty detail and general complications for the recipient. He 
was cordially disliked at Ames, and most administrative communications 
from Washington came over his signature. A typical Victory directive 
informed Ames that the NACA now had a “lighting consultant,” attached to 
the Cleveland Laboratory, who should be consulted on any proposed lighting 
installations. An attached Ames comment observed, “Don’t like to  see this, 
but guess we will have to like it. Pretty soon we may be like some of the 
large industrial companies and be afraid to make a move unless we consult 
the home office first.”41 When Victory’s official title changed from secretary 
to executive secretary, defined as “the assistant head of the agency, supervis- 
ing and directing its administrative work,” the memorandum was greeted at 
Ames by a penciled ccwow!” and “not that!”42 
In addition to the personal annoyance embodied by Victory, Ames in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s suffered the effects of a general tendency on 
the part of government agencies to encourage greater efficiency - or at least 
to document efforts toward that end. In late 1949 Ames was instructed to 
name a “Policy and Procedure Officer,” to be “charged with the responsibil- 
ity of continuously studying policies and procedures and collecting informa- 
tion in an orderly manner for discussion from time to time with representa- 
tives of the other laboratories and of the Headquarters Office.” Evidently 
Ames did not respond favorably to this, for a second letter from Washington 
observed: 
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It appears that there is still some lack of clarity in our letters 
attempting to convey to you the objective and modus operandi 
of our policy and procedures group. Uniform functioning of all 
branches of NACA is really secondary. Improvement of the effi- 
ciency of the organization is the primary objective. . . . I don’t 
believe that personnel at Ames is any more susceptible to confu- 
sion than is the personnel in other parts of the organization. We 
have a job to do. Let’s get along with it.. . . Please submit the 
name of the individual you recommend for designation as Policy 
and Procedure Officer of the L a b ~ r a t o r y . ~ ~  
Of the same era is the Headquarters-instituted Management Improve- 
ment Program, which attempted through periodic reports and conferences 
to cut inefficiency and costs and to save time and equipment. Reading the 
reports now, one cannot help but feel they were headaches that the Ames 
staff dispensed with as summarily as possible. The detail illustrates the grow- 
ing amount of paperwork and the increasing man-hours spent in management 
analysis. One conclusion to such a report announced, “Following a detailed 
analysis of the report on Langley’s survey, Ames and Lewis agree to under- 
take a study at the time of preparing the Annual Motor Vehicle Report and 
to forward information copies of their reports to all offices.”44 
An interesting contrast to the Management Improvement Program is a 
memorandum from a group of Ames engineers to De France. They were con- 
cerned that they had insufficient knowledge of industry’s wider needs and 
concerns. They worried about “the necessity for the research aerodynami- 
cists of the NACA becoming acquainted with the complex interrelationship 
of problems that the aircraft designers must face.” As the Ames researchers 
pointed out, their specialization, as those concerned with intricate aspects of 
aerodynamic problems, often made it unlikely ,that they had the larger 
design perspective fully in view. The situation existing in previous years, they 
pointed out, had reversed itself - no longer was information dispersal solely 
a NACA function. Now the NACA researchers also needed to know indus- 
try’s needs i r  a very specific manner. 
A lecture series was suggested. Company engineers would be invited to 
brief Ames, in a technically detailed manner, on larger aspects of their aero- 
nautical projects. The memorandum was sent by Harvey Allen to De France, 
to be followed up three months later by another even more specific letter by 
one of the concerned engineers.45 Thus, in a very real way, a part of the staff 
tried to cope with the laboraiory’s growing size and complexity, as well as 
the complexity of the research field. But the request for the lecture series 
was not granted. 
As Ames entered the 1950s and the United States faced another war, 
the changes that had occurred since the end of World War I1 were visible to 
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all. The Ames staff had doubled in six years, the number of facilities had also 
doubled. Aeronautical research now dealt with speeds that had increased 
substantially since 1945. Unavoidably, and unsurprisingly, the daily routine 
at the laboratory had increased in complexity also. Ames was no longer the 
new, developing institution it had been during the war, and the field of aero- 
nautics, having reached a stage of maturity, was burgeoning into new 
sophistication. 
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THE LEAN YEARS, 1952-1957 
Until 1958, budget limits necessitated careful and frustrating choices 
both at Ames and in the NACA as a whole. Research alternatives, facility 
utilization, and priorities of time and financing had to be weighed and 
compromises effected. Though the government had made a commitment to 
sponsor and coordinate scientific research, appropriations were not unlim- 
ited and salaries of civil-servant researchers were not competitive with 
industry. The financial realities encouraged a conservative approach to 
planning on the part of the NACA. At the same time, however, the budget- 
ing process for the individual laboratories remained simple enough to make it 
easy to reallocate funds between projects. 
By the early 1950s facilities at Ames had increased substantially, but 
the laboratory remained small enough to be relatively free of bureaucratic 
complexity. Operational limitations resulted primarily from an overload of 
obligations compared to personnel strength. This no doubt hampered the 
staff in conducting Ames-originated research. Even more, it delayed develop- 
mental tests requested by the aircraft companies. John Dusterberry, who had 
come to Ames in 1943 with a degree in electrical engineering, remembered 
the early 1950s as a period of “doldrums” for those involved in the design of 
new facilities. “Nobody seemed to have any money to do anything, and as a 
result, I think people . . . lost motivation and spirit to do things.”’ 
Lack of money meant the inability to hire the manpower needed to 
operate the wind tunnels at maximum use. As Harry Goett explained it, 
You spent men and time. . . . Washington said, “Now look, 
Smitty, we’ll give you 1500 people for next year; now how many 
people will it take you to run your wind tunnels?” Then 
[De France] would come back and talk to Ferrill Nickle, the 
budget officer, and they’d make the first cuts, and then they’d call 
in Harvey Allen and myself, the major contenders. Harv had more 
facilities planned and would get more people, and I’d fight.2 
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Lack of “tunnel time” often created a backup of work and potential 
tension with industry. That this tension seldom developed is noteworthy. 
Harvey Allen, head of the high-speed division, put the problem clearly to 
NACA headquarters when describing a proposal made by North American 
Aviation. Allen supported the proposed research, but admitted: “Of course, 
the addition of the investigation of this missile to the 1- by %foot tunnel 
program will further overload this facility. This wind tunnel section is not up 
to full complement at present so that only single-shift operation is possible, 
hence there is no hope of speeding up the tunnel program unless the staff 
can be brought up to that commensurate with two-shift ~pera t ion .”~  Allen 
added that the company had volunteered its own employees to build and 
maintain the model during testing. 
The same staffing problem was mentioned by De France to a visiting 
congressman over a year later. In a typically polished way, De France 
explained that the situation at Ames was common throughout government- 
sponsored research. 
I pointed out to him that we have in operation at present and 
will have, in the additional equipment to be constructed under the 
Unitary Plan, the best facilities for high-speed research that can be 
found any place in the world. I explained, however, that it was 
difficult to operate these facilities to their full capacity with the 
manpower made available to us, and that if we needed anything, it 
was a greater appropriation for personnel. Congressman Crawford 
asked if the industry was proselyting our trained technicians. I 
told him that they did to a certain extent and cited one case which 
had occurred within the past week in which a GS-14 of the 
Laboratory had been offered a position at $15,000 a year with the 
Northrop Aircraft Company to take charge of their guided missile 
work. I told him that we had had other similar cases but that in 
most instances, because of the interest of the men in the work of 
the Laboratory, we were able to keep them from taking positions 
with the i n d u ~ t r y . ~  
The attraction of the research at Ames was a very real advantage in keeping 
the staff surprisingly stable. “At the beginning,” as one veteran put it, 
“Ames had a little edge in salary, but by 1950-1952, a person had to ask 
himself if it was worth 25% in salary.yy5 
Part of Ames’s success in keeping researchers lay in the continuing 
postwar approbation enjoyed by aeronautics. Aeronautical research had 
reached enviable stature during World War 11. Its worth was firmly estab- 
lished in the public mind, and the very obvious advantage of continuous, 
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conscientious research had endowed the aeronautical laboratories with a cer- 
tain prestige. During the supersonic decade that followed the war, it was 
easy to be excited by the possibilities for continuing progress and discovery. 
Harry Goett described the 1950s as a “continuing technological revolution,” 
as aeronautics moved to the problems of transonic and supersonic flight and 
on to a new challenge - automatic control of aircraft. Challenge and compe- 
tition kept Ames full of vitality. 
[Langley was] doing somewhat the same kind of stuff. That 
kept us on our toes. We’d go back and meet not only our counter- 
parts at Langley, but the Air Force people, and the people from 
industry. We would present to these outsiders our own programs, 
and [it was] rewarding . . . to find that [we weren’t] in a vacuum, 
that there [was an] outside use for our projects. 
[We’d get] 50% of the top people in the field around a table 
talking - it was very stimulating! [We’d] take back the list, circu- 
late it [and develop] a program that was going to be helpful to 
them. . . .6 
For those actively involved in the research process, belief in the NACA as a 
nonpartisan pursuer of research excellence and a crucial troubleshooter for 
the aircraft industry evidently kept many of the Ames staff from being 
tempted by higher salaries offered by private companies. 
This enthusiasm was perhaps not surprising among the research staff 
itself, but it also seems to have been a part of the auxiliary services at Ames, 
from the administrative staff to the clerical workers. A partial explanation is 
surely found in the smallness of the original group that established the labo- 
ratory. Because of the academic ties among Ames personnel, and the 
imported camaraderie contributed by the people from Langley, the initial 
atmosphere of high motivation in an extended-family context seems to have 
continued as Ames grew. By example, older employees initiated new person- 
nel into high levels of job-involvement. Equally important, however, was the 
habit of strict discipline set by De France. Because all knew De France 
would not tolerate negligence or sloppiness, professionalism at all levels was 
high. Pride in one’s work was a real part of the Ames personality. As one 
employee put it, “We knew we’d hear about it from De France himself if 
our work wasn’t satisfactory. So we learned to pay attention. And we were 
proud of the fact that we were required to meet [his]  standard^."^ 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
Another factor in the spirit of the institution in the early 1950s was the 
relative simplicity with which Ames was organized and the lack of bureau- 
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cracy with which it ran. In 1947 De France’s title changed from engineer-in- 
charge to director. The change was symbolic, connoting the finished labora- 
tory rather than a project under construction. In one sense this was certainly 
true. Ames was one of the most versatile aeronautical research facilities in 
the world, and it had settled into the research routine for which it had been 
designed. But it is also true that Ames was far from finished. A backward 
look at the organization of the laboratory in the early 1950s reveals a model 
of simplicity that appears almost unbelievable today. 
From the earliest days at Ames, De France’s right-hand man had been 
Jack Parsons, who initially was in charge of construction. The two men 
worked well together, and De France moved Parsons into a variety of jobs 
with confidence that he could manage a number of major functions simul- 
taneously. During the time Parsons was still head of the construction division 
in the mid-194.0~~ he was also head of the Full-Scale and Flight Research 
Division, supervising all work done in the busy 40- by 80-foot tunnel. In 
Parsons De France had an informal assistant who kept him informed in a 
number of realms. Reporting daily to De France, Parsons served as liaison 
between the director and the rest of the laboratory. Parsons was, by all 
accounts, an inspiration in dedication, hard work, and quiet competence. 
The devotion told on his health, however. In 1947, after a leave of absence 
because of sickness, De France made him an assistant to the director, with 
Carlton Bioletti, another Langley transferee, in a parallel position. These two 
men relieved De France of some of the burden of research supervision; but 
the positions represented, in a sense, the beginnings of insulation between 
the director and his laboratory. The situation was mitigated by the strong 
hand with which De France governed the laboratory, which made his con- 
stant involvement with the daily issues and problems a certainty. 
In 1949 Parsons became responsible for coordination of the Unitary 
Plan wind tunnels that the NACA expected to build at Ames, Langley, and 
Lewis. This position took him out of the post of assistant to the director, 
but in 1952 De France appointed him associate director. For the rest of his 
career at Ames, Parsons was second in command, continuing to facilitate 
communications between research and administration within the laboratory. 
He remained the coordinator of wind-tunnel construction under the Unitary 
Plan until 1956 when those facilities were completed.’ 
In 1950 Carlton Bioletti’s title of assistant to the director evolved into 
that of assistant director. Russell Robinson was also appointed to a parallel 
position. Robinson, who had broken ground for the first construction at 
Ames in 1939, had been in a technical management position at the NACA’s 
Washington office since 1940. His transfer to Ames in 1950 fulfilled a 
promise made him during the war by George Lewis, the NACA’s director of 
aeronautical research. “Exciting things were happening out there and I 
wanted to be in on them,” said Robinson, “to be involved with research and 
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research people more directly.”’ Robinson was not only rejoining old 
Langley colleagues, but also reestablishing relationships as a Stanford alum- 
nus. His return illustrated the network of personal and professional ties that 
was so common among the Ames staff. 
As assistant directors, Bioletti and Robinson managed current and pro- 
jected research at the laboratory. Both men played a crucial role in consider- 
ing the advantages and disadvantages of particular research programs, 
consulting with the research divisions and NACA headquarters as to the 
feasibility of various projects. In this way De France was able to make deci- 
sions for the laboratory after Robinson and Bioletti had studied the options 
and presented their recommendations. Supposedly, a distinction was made 
between planning and operations in the two posts, but in reality the distinc- 
tion was not observed. As Robinson recalled, it would have been difficult to 
draw a clear dividing line between the jobs. It was equally unclear whether 
the two positions were line or staff appointments, and it would seem that 
they were a little of both, and an effective liaison between line and staff.’O 
Robinson had the additional task of reviewing and editing much of the pub- 
lished material emanating from Ames research, an important detail 
De France felt needed constant attention. 
Thus the assistant directors, and after 1952 the associate director, pro- 
vided high-level assessment and filtering of information for the director. 
As buffers, they made it possible for De France to avoid becoming bogged 
down in much of the day-to-day detail, while at the same time they provided 
the information he needed to make informed decisions. 
When Ames was formed, Donald Wood had the all-inclusive title of 
director of research. By 1943, however, the volume of research and its 
differentiation made two research divisions desirable: the Theoretical and 
Applied Research Division under Wood and the Full-Scale and Flight 
Research Division under Parsons. Wood’s early responsibilities as director of 
all research had probably been less complicated than his later duties as divi- 
sion chief because of the new laboratory’s limitations. As chief of the 
Theoretical and Applied Research Division in 1950, Wood was responsible 
for the 7- by 10-foot tunnels, the 12-foot tunnel, the l6-foot tunnel, and the 
Theoretical Aerodynamics Section. In 1943 that division represented the 
main thrust of Ames’s planned specialty - high-speed research and theoreti- 
cal aerodynamics. The focus of activities within the divisions was to change 
over the years, as was their proportional importance in terms of the labora- 
tory’s total research. 
During the war the Full-scale and Flight Research Division had concen- 
trated on the deicing problem and on solutions to various performance prob- 
lems in fighter aircraft. In addition to that, the division was responsible for 
planning the 40- by 80-foot tunnel and the full-scale research that it would 
make possible. The division dealt with the most crucial demands that were 
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laid on Ames - problems in actual aircraft operations. The late 1940s saw 
significant work on wing research, as well as the load and stability studies 
and flight-testing of the F-86. In the 1950s, however, low-speed research and 
the Full-Scale and Flight Research Division lost that preeminent position. 
Perhaps it was not unusual that this occurred, since Ames, despite its capac- 
ity for full-scale research, had been originally conceived as more of a high- 
speed laboratory. In high-speed aeronautics, with theories still being ham- 
mered out, applications to structures had not yet become as important as in 
low-speed aeronautics. Many thought, as Hugh Dryden did, that Ames was 
“a little more purely scientific. . . . Langley aerodynamic studies were always 
done with an eye to the structural problems in mind, whereas Ames took it 
as a purely aerodynamic problem.. . and let other people worry about the 
structures.”’ ’ 
Harry Goett, who succeeded Jack Parsons as chief of the division, was 
not about to let the Full-scale and Flight Research Division wither on the 
vine. He organized flight engineering, flight operation, flight research, and 
the 40- by 8O-foot tunnel into interlocking sections. Goett’s abrupt style 
contrasted greatly with that of Harvey Allen, yet Goett too is remembered 
for his ability to keep his sections running smoothly while also encouraging 
the spontaneity that must be a part of successful research. Like Allen, Goett 
had come from Langley, where he had worked under De France. 
The third research division was formed in 1945: the High-speed 
Research Division under Allen. By 1950 the division, with six transonic or 
supersonic wind tunnels, could claim the most exciting frontiers of research 
for its own. This division had grown out of the Theoretical Aerodynamics 
section of Wood’s division. As high-speed flight moved from theory to 
actuality and the possibilities for experimental testing expanded, the need to 
redefine the field and organize its facilities had resulted in the creation of the 
new division. The breakthroughs that made transonic flight possible - the jet 
engine and the swept wing - rapidly elevated the division to a position of 
prominence in the laboratory. In addition, of course, the personality of 
Harvey Allen kept the sections under his control lively. The division included 
sections organized around the 1- by %foot supersonic tunnels, the 1- by 
3.5-foot transonic tunnel, the 6- by 6-foot supersonic tunnel, the 10- by 
14-inch hypersonic tunnel, and the supersonic free-flight tunnel. 
Other divisions provided both administrative services and auxiliary 
expertise to keep the research facilities running smoothly. The available 
records, including some unofficial organization charts, suggest that the 
administrative division included clerical, financial, personnel, purchase, ware- 
house, and library sections. A construction division handled the continuing 
building, a technical services division ran the mechanics shops and serviced 
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aircraft, and the research instrumentation and engineering services division 
dealt with engineering design, instrumentation development, photography, 
electronics, and illustrations for reports and publications. 
Although the administrative division had a financial section, the budget 
officer for Ames was not a part of this section. Instead, the financial section 
supported the budget officer, who reported directly to De France. As one 
Ames employee has described it, Ferrill Nickle, the budget officer, kept 
track of Ames’s financial standing for the year by the “scratchpad” method. 
At any time, De France could find out exactly how much money the labosa- 
tory had left for the year and could reallocate money originally earmarked 
for a project that was proving less expensive than expected. Decisions in the 
financial management of the laboratory, once the funding had been 
approved for the year, were very much the director’s, and little bureaucracy 
intervened between Ames and the NACA Washington office. It was, indeed, 
a period when the main office trusted their directors and left many major 
decisions in their hands.’ As one scholar observed, “The laboratory director 
[had] almost complete freedom in deciding how the job [would] be done 
and when it [would] be done.”14 
The organization at Ames was certainly clear enough to those within 
the laboratory at the time. Difficulties arose, however, in outside assessment 
of organization and decision-making processes. In 1950 a student submitted 
a major paper to the Stanford Business School on management and proce- 
dural practices in the NACA.15 For convenience he concentrated much of 
his study on Ames. When he attempted to obtain organizational charts from 
the Washington office of the NACA, he found that none existed, though he 
was referred to several “unofficial” organizational charts constructed by 
other sources. The same situation existed at Ames, and the scholar was 
forced to draw his own diagram of the lines of authority there. Greatly 
bothered by the lack, he recommended that the situation be immediately 
remedied and charts drawn up, both at the laboratory level and in the head 
office. 
The reason for no published charts seems to lie primarily in the admin- 
istrative philosophy of George Lewis, the NACA’s director of aeronautical 
research from 1924 to 1947. According to a colleague, Lewis disliked 
organizational charts because he did not wish to encourage contacts from the 
outside directly with organizational subdivisions or specialists. Lewis pre- 
ferred to be the sole route by which the NACA could be approached. He 
wanted to remain aware of all aspects of NACA concerns, and as he saw it, 
organization charts unnecessarily complicated matters.16 Though Lewis 
retired in 1947, his style of management, in this regard at least, was passed 
on to the laboratories and outlasted his tenure. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS 
Ames almost certainly inherited Lewis’s disdain for organizational 
formality through De France, who had worked almost his entire career under 
Lewis. As the laboratory grew in size and complexity, De France’s solution 
was to create the posts of assistants to the director, occupied originally by 
Bioletti and Parsons, and later the position of associate director. In delegat- 
ing responsibility, however, De France did not relinquish final authority for 
major decisions, nor did he create a chain of command that would hinder his 
going directly to the divisions or sections and bypassing his immediate sub- 
ordinates. In this way De France, like Lewis in Washington, was able to 
maintain informed control even after the laboratory’s activities became far 
more diverse. The lack of clearly defined organizational functions and lines 
of command, at least at certain levels, was probably quite conscious on the 
part of De France.” It did not bother those on the staff nearly so much as it 
did an outsider attempting to analyze the workings of Ames. As the Stanford 
scholar rather plaintively noted, 
The exact status of the assistants to the Director is not clear to 
me. . . . the organizational structure appears to be highly unortho- 
dox. I have had the distinction between the duties of these posi- 
tions explained to me at some length, yet this distinction is still 
not clear to me. There are borderline cases wherein it is difficult 
for me to judge which position has the responsibility.18 
But lack of clear organizational definition did not hamper the effi- 
ciency of the l ab~ra to ry , ’~  as the scholar admitted: “it is not readily appar- 
ent that the lack of organization charts had hindered managerial rela- 
tions.”20 On the section and division levels, one obviously took problems to 
one’s immediate superior, who himself might suggest a higher-level consulta- 
tion. At times, one suspects, the relative smallness and informality of Ames 
would find issues being hashed out among various echelons of staff and line, 
a fine disregard for hierarchy being displayed. 
By contemporary lights, Ames in the early 1950s appears to have been 
almost haphazardly organized and run. The outward appearances, however, 
are deceiving, for the laboratory had the advantage of a strong and con- 
scientious director whose control was both constant and informed. Formal 
organization and the checks and balances of bureaucracy were less needed 
because of De France’s reputation as an uncompromisingly honest, hard- 
working, and sensible manager and because the times themselves were 
simpler. The staff fluctuated between 1200 and 1350 in 1950-1955. By 
1957 it had reached approximately 1450, but the gradual increase seems to 
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have diluted staff familiarity only slightly. Operating costs for the laboratory 
climbed gradually also, from approximately $3 million in 1945 to $10 mil- 
lion in 1955.21 Harry Goett recalled an episode from the postwar period that 
illustrates De France’s management philosophy. Its similarity to Lewis’s 
attitude toward organization charts is striking: 
The NACA had a pretty good reputation for managing its 
money, so the [Office of Management and Budget] sent some men 
out here to find out how we [worked]. One of them came to see 
me, and I [explained] how decisions were made to undertake 
research. . . . Decisions obviously involved cost decisions, but the 
decision to do a test in the 7 X 10 or the 40 X 80 was made on the 
basis of which tunnel you decided better fit  the problem, not on 
the money it would cost. When De France found out I’d told the 
OMB man all this he hit the ceiling: “YOU told them how we 
work! I’m never going to let you talk to the budget people again!” 
Boy, he was mad!22 
Another factor making for relatively simple, informal operations was 
constant discussion and feedback among all levels of employees. Though 
difficult to document, the low turnover rate of the staff and the various 
long-standing relationships deriving from old Langley employment, univer- 
sity experiences, and friendships built through the early years at Ames all 
contributed to the laboratory’s ability to function with a minimum of 
organizational formality and bureaucracy. It  was a joke among Ames 
employees that “once at Ames, always at A m e ~ . ” ~ ~  
The flexibility displayed in the administration of Ames is interesting for 
several reasons. First, while the casual attitude regarding bureaucracy and 
formality dated from the original wartime context in which the laboratory 
was established, it continued after the war. Second, this “family” attitude 
toward administration seems to have been as much a product of De France’s 
personality and management philosophy as it was a result of Ames’s early 
years. Last, it must be admitted that even for 1950, when rigid chains of 
command, bureaucracy, and paralyzing paperwork were not so developed as 
today, Ames was atypical. The Stanford scholar was hard pressed to contain 
his disbelief at the lack of clearly defined administrative channels and regu- 
larized procedures he discovered at Ames. 
The De France method of administration worked extremely well during 
its time. Perhaps, too, the nature of research contributed to the success of 
the system. The thought processes upon which inspired research depend 
need a certain leeway and protection from rigid definition and pigeonholing. 
To escape losing impetus in a forest of nonessential detail, a researcher needs 
to be free to discuss, consult, and make decisions relatively easily and 
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quickly. This was possible at Ames partially because of the lack of black-and- 
white distinctions and job definitions, and because of the pervasiveness of 
informal discussion. 
GENERATING RESEARCH 
In the early 1950s aeronautics enjoyed high status as a field of research. 
Visible advances were being made all the time, and there was a general aware- 
ness of the research frontier. Aeronautics was a field of endeavor one could 
believe in - it was free of the moral ambiguities that attached to most 
military-connected research. The technology of the ever-faster-and-higher air- 
plane was seen as, and for the most part was, a “clean” technology, so it was 
easy to remain enthusiastic about one’s work. The happy climate at Ames in 
the early 1950s, therefore, must be seen not only in terms of personnel and 
management, but also in the context of the nature of its research and the 
prevailing atmosphere of the time. 
To analyze life at Ames, one must consider how research projects 
originated and were accomplished. The means by which Ames became 
involved in a research effort varied as widely as the projects themselves. An 
outstanding characteristic, however, was a flexibility that made it possible 
for research to originate from any of a number of sources. Only sometimes 
did work derive from a dictum of the Washington office. Just as frequently 
Ames itself initiated the process by which a research authorization was even- 
tually issued. An idea that evolved into an extensive investigation might 
begin with a single engineer or a group discussing a persistent problem. Con- 
versely, the suggestion for a specific investigation might come from one of 
the special subcommittees of the NACA, to be assigned to a laboratory 
depending upon work under way there at the time or upon areas of spe- 
cialty. Between these two extremes was a spectrum of possible origins for 
projects, some within the laboratory itself, some outside. 
The investigations undertaken by Ames, and indeed by most aeronauti- 
cal laboratories, fell into two broad categories. The NACA and its facilities 
were primarily designed for basic research in aeronautics; that is to say, the 
pursuit of answers to broad questions within the discipline. Examples of this 
type of research were the various efforts to minimize the compressibility 
effects of transonic flight and research into the characteristics of different 
wing shapes. Basic research might also deal with problems of experimenta- 
tion itself, like the work at Langley that led to the slotted-throat solution to 
transonic choking. A research idea along broad lines such as these might 
originate anywhere. After conceptualization and discussion at various levels, 
the Washington office issued a research authorization, which was formal 
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approval for work to begin.24 Sometimes the actual work began before 
formal approval was issued. This had been true, for example, in the case of 
the deicing work done at Ames by L. A. Rodert and his flight research sec- 
tion; Rodert simply continued, before the research authorization came 
through, work he had started while at Langley (p. 20). 
Sometimes research elsewhere that had come to the attention of a 
NACA researcher provoked a memorandum or proposal for further investiga- 
tion. This was true in the case of a very long-lived research authorization that 
a young Langley engineer originated in 1926.25 Having read a NACA techni- 
cal memorandum on boundary-layer-control research being done in 
Germany, he proposed to the enginer-in-charge at Langley that the various 
methods for delaying boundary-layer turbulence be investigated further. The 
idea moved from Langley to the Washington office, where George Lewis, 
director of aeronautical research, wrote a research authorization. 
Other projects grew out of barriers encountered by research. The ballis- 
tics work undertaken by Ames in the immediate postwar period was a 
response to the inherent limitations of wind-tunnel research at transonic 
speeds. It was one of the logical directions to proceed, at least until the 
choking problem in the tunnels could be solved. 
The various technical subcommittees of the NACA were sources for 
research directives. Either through their own expertise or through the con- 
cern of an outside interest - industry or the military - the committees iden- 
tified areas where work was needed, and the appropriate laboratory was 
consulted and eventually detailed to handle the research. The technical 
committees and subcommittees served both as sources for research ideas and 
as reference authorities when proposals were advanced by one of the 
laboratories. 
Occasionally a new project grew out of meetings of the interlaboratory 
panels. Beginning in 1944 and continuing into the 1950s, both the High- 
Speed Panel and the Research Airplane Projects Panel met at one or another 
of the laboratories to exchange ideas. Often research was informally appor- 
tioned by the researchers themselves and plans were made to seek formal 
authorization to continue along the directions discussed. In 1944 the High- 
Speed Panel was composed of Russell Robinson from the Washington 
office, Harvey Allen, John Stack, and Eastman Jacobs. The airplane panel 
was active from 1948 to 1957, with a membership that remained approxi- 
mately the same throughout the years, including representatives from all 
major NACA installations. The panel reviewed the work done in flight 
research, discussed new undertakings, and hashed over problems. Decisions 
reached at the meetings went directly to the main office for final approval.26 
Another source of research ideas was the individual whose current work 
sparked a spinoff. If an engineer was able to convince his section head and 
then the division chief that the idea was worthwhile, the proposal would be 
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taken up the administrative ladder. The division chief reviewed the research 
plan and consulted with one of the assistant directors. De France then 
received the recommendations of the assistant directors, and the plan was 
submitted to Washington with the hope of receiving a research authorization. 
The assistant directors at Ames also played an important role in providing 
informed technical liaison between the laboratory and the NACA technical 
committees that reviewed the proposals. 
If the originator of the idea was someone like Harvey Allen, who an 
associate said “could keep us supplied with research projects i nde f in i t e l~ , ”~~  
the approval process could be automatic and informal. As division chief, 
Allen could do a certain amount of work on a new idea, sometimes even 
delegating a preliminary investigation to one of his subordinate sections, 
without getting official approval. Again, being able to pursue an idea without 
step-by-step authorization from above was probably of great benefit to the 
research process. The leeway granted by De France was an extension of the 
leeway granted to  De France, and it created a fertile atmosphere in which 
new ideas could be tried without prior commitment to their long-term 
support. Barren leads could be abandoned without embarrassment. When 
initial work proved promising, then the formalities leading to a research 
authorization were begun.2 
Applied research, that is, research directed more specifically at a prac- 
tical need or problem, could also begin almost anywhere. Applied research 
projects most often resulted from a need of the military or the aircraft 
industry. The route taken by the idea before the research authorization 
appeared varied widely. In the case of the military, the need was usually 
expressed at the top first - the problem was brought to the attention of the 
Washington office. When George Lewis was the NACA’s director of aeronau- 
tical research, his close ties with the armed forces usually meant that a mili- 
tary official came to him with a written request. Lewis then consulted one or 
more laboratories and issued the research authorization. Hugh Dryden, who 
succeeded Lewis in 1947, depended heavily on the technical bureaucracy of 
the NACA to aid in decision-making. Dryden renovated the technical com- 
mittees and subcommittees, equipping them to take a much more active role 
than they had previously e~ercised.~’ 
With the aircraft industry playing an increasingly important role on the 
technical subcommittees, it is also likely that many industrial problems were 
initially aired there, either directly or indirectly. The ethics of membership 
on one of the technical committees by a company officer supposedly pre- 
vented lobbying for specific, company-concerned interests, but certainly the 
NACA became more aware of industrial concerns after the war. Often 
industry made formal application for specific work. The problem was then 
referred to a subcommittee for consideration, and the research, if approved, 
was delegated to the most appropriate laboratory. The procedure served the 
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eastern companies well, but the western companies depended heavily on the 
NACA’s Western Coordination Office for relaying research results to the 
main office. 
Geography and the timing of Ames’s establishment helped to forge 
close links between the Western Coordination Office, Ames, and the aircraft 
companies on the West Coast. At the same time the laboratory was being 
planned, the Western Coordination Office was established; its head, Edwin 
Hartman, had been at Langley along with many of the new Ames staff. 
Hartman and De France were friends, and both men wanted to establish 
strong ties among Ames, the WCO, and industry. 
Officially Hartman served as the liaison between western industry and 
the NACA. Even here, however, personal relationships and geography helped 
to keep Ames immediately abreast of developments in the field and of any 
issues or problems that might become of interest. Hartman visited the 
various companies frequently to confer with company officials and 
researchers, and then reported to the NACA what he had learned. He sent 
copies of his reports to Ames also, so that the local laboratory was always 
aware of his findings as soon as the main office was, if not before.30 Ames 
had a slight advantage in dealing with western industry, in that the informal 
communication network worked extremely well and that the laboratory was 
on the spot and usually eager to help. When industry made formal requests 
to the NACA, therefore, Ames could sometimes lend additional weight to 
the request, because of prior knowledge of and interest in the company’s 
problem. This was true, for instance, in the case of the missile testing that 
Harvey Allen became interested in (p. 52). Although taking on the work for 
North American would further overload his staff, Allen was obviously 
excited by the research po~sibilities.~’ 
After one of the laboratories was launched on a new research project, it 
was important that the others be kept informed of results. To a certain 
extent, communication among the laboratories was constant and informal. 
On a more formal level were conferences, such as meetings of the Research 
Airplane Projects Panel, to discuss successes, failures, and new directions for 
investigation. On an intermediate level, however, the research divisions of the 
laboratories submitted quarterly reports to their own laboratory directors, 
advising them on the status of current research. These detailed reports also 
went to the other laboratories for the benefit of researchers working in 
related areas. In the Ames files are years of Langley and Lewis reports, with 
copies for the laboratory’s main files and for the individuals at Ames most 
closely connected with such research.32 
Though for the most part communication among the research labora- 
tories and the Western Coordination Office appears to have been quite good, 
sometimes information was less effectively dispersed than it might have 
been. In 1953 J. W. Crowley, Dryden’s deputy, asked all the laboratories to 
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send the Western Coordination Office “progress reports prepared at the labo- 
ratory for the various NACA subcommittees, . . . memorandums covering 
visits of people west of the Mississippi to the laboratory, . . . and official 
announcements dealing with changes in personnel and ~rganiza t ion .”~~ He 
went on to remind the laboratories what the WCO could do for them in the 
way of obtaining West Coast information and military clearance for visiting 
NACA personnel. Crowley ’s memorandum indicates that cooperation among 
the NACA’s subordinate units needed some attention. 
A similar complaint was voiced a year later by an Ames engineer whose 
Langley counterpart had not received some Ames data of mutual interest. 
The Ames engineer had transmitted the test data to headquarters, as was 
standard procedure, but NACA apparently had dropped the ball. De France 
took the matter up with Crowley and received permission to send research 
data to the other laboratories and the head office simultaneously. But head- 
quarters did not surrender its perquisites absolutely. The liberal procedure 
was “not to be used except in special cases.’y34 
Research at Ames during the last years of the NACA emphasized funda- 
mental investigations, although the relationship of the laboratory to industry 
became much more complex during this period. With the completion of the 
three Unitary Plan wind tunnels in 1952, industry was able to buy testing 
time in the tunnels on a regular basis. The obligations implied in the plan 
guaranteed that Ames would do applied research for outside concerns. 
Nevertheless Hugh Dryden* continued to stress, in his many articles and 
speeches of the early 1950s’ the absolute necessity of keeping the NACA 
strong in fundamental research, warning that “the trend toward short-term 
specific investigations must not occur again to the same degree as during 
World War II.”35 And the problems posed by transonic and supersonic 
flight continued to provide Ames with impetus for work in fundamental 
research. 36 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
As transonic and supersonic flight became practicable, investigators 
found it desirable to reconsider the shape of aircraft. Wing and fuselage 
shapes had to be revised in light of new phenomena discovered at the higher 
speeds. The general shape of the wing came under investigation with regard 
*Lewis retired in 1947. J. W. Crowley was acting director of aeronautical research until Sep- 
tember, when Dryden took the job. Crowley continued as associate director, undoubtedly easing 
Dryden’s way. 
64 
to drag and lift, and the wing’s placement on the fuselage was also crucial to 
performance. The shape of the fuselage underwent much rethinking, as 
researchers sought ways to minimize drag at both transonic and supersonic 
speeds. Langley’s Richard Whitcomb had been responsible for the experi- 
mental development of a transonic area rule - the “coke-bottle” shape - 
that reduced the cross-sectional area of the fuselage where the wings and 
engine components began, thereby decreasing drag.37 At Ames, R. T. Jones 
extended Whitcomb’s ideas by devising a theoretical supersonic area rule. 
The area rules led to continued refinements in aircraft configurations, as 
researchers attempted to increase efficiency of operation and handling 
qualities. 
In flight research, as in aerodynamic theory, high speed opened new 
areas where information was lacking and sorely needed. Speed itself made 
for control problems that had not been present in slower aircraft. In addi- 
tion, the new shapes of aircraft created unusual control and stability char- 
acteristics that had to be investigated. The complex ways that component 
shapes affect maneuverability and control is a classic example of the often 
simultaneous sets of questions with which theory and actual flight are 
involved. The swept wing, for example, delayed or reduced shock waves 
occurring during transonic flight, but it also created stalling problems in 
low-speed flight. Flight research on these problems was necessary, and Ames 
aerodynamicists and pilots worked together on various pos~ibi l i t ies .~~ In the 
same period, stability and control concerns resulted in much work being 
done on high-speed tracking methods, the means by which an aircraft keeps 
its weapons trained on a moving target. At Ames in the early 1950s, tests on 
the tracking qualities of various aircraft led to refinements not only in the 
aircraft, but also in the methods used for tracking. 
With regard to both aircraft stability experimentation and performance 
aspects of flight such as tracking ability, the 1952-1957 period saw the 
introduction of a new element into aerodynamic research. The computer was 
slowly coming to be used as an auxiliary method of theoretical and flight 
research and as a tool in the operation of aircraft. By computer-based 
studies, countless combinations of component shapes and associated flight 
characteristics could be analyzed. Tracking equipment using automatic, 
computer-directed responses was developed. In the area of flight research, 
the first automatic control devices began to be used. Remote control of 
experimental aircraft lessened dangers to test pilots and also canceled out the 
human factor in tests, creating another means by which information could 
be obtained, analyzed, and evaluated. The advent of the computer in the 
various areas of aeronautical research was accompanied by its spreading use 
in administration, a development that eventually was to change the running 
of the labor at or^.^' 
65 
Two other major areas of research during the period would later be of 
major significance for Ames. One was vertical and short take-off and landing 
(V/STOL). In the light of the increasing commitment Arnes was to make to 
V/STOL studies, the first attempts now appear to have been primitive in the 
extreme,40 but the early recognition of the potential use of V/STOL aircraft 
placed Ames securely in the vanguard of this new branch of aeronautics. 
The second and dramatic set of investigations and discoveries grew out 
of the developing importance of ballistic missile research. To launch and 
direct a heavy ballistic warhead, sending it at high speed into the upper 
atmosphere, presented several challenges. Control was a problem, but even 
more worrisome was aerodynamic heating upon reentry. Problems in aero- 
dynamic heating were by no means confined to missiles, but were most 
1957. Harvey Allen explains his 1952 blunt-body theory. Allen’s calculations showed that 
the bow-shock wave created by the movement of  the blunt body through the atmosphere 
served to  dissipate much of the aerodynamic heat away fiom the body itself. Allen’s 
discovery solved the problem of aerodynamic heating during a spacecraft’s reentry into 
the atmosphere. The shape o f  the Mercury space capsules reflected the blunt-body theory 
at  work. 
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critical in missiles because nothing else approached such speeds. In the early 
1950s Harvey Allen turned his attention to ballistics reentry. His thinking 
completely changed the approach to the reentry heating problem. Previously 
researchers had taken as a given fact the slender needle-nosed shape of the 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The engineering problems asso- 
ciated with cooling such a slender body seemed insurmountable. Allen, 
discussing the problem informally, observed that “meteors get through the 
atmosphere, [so] the problem can be solved.”41 
The key to the puzzle came from an equation Allen developed; the 
solution was a blunt-shaped entry body. A blunt body moving at extreme 
speed generates a bow shock wave, which dissipates heat to the air. Only a 
small portion of the total heat remains in the boundary layer near the body. 
Allen subjected the idea to professional scrutiny among his colleagues; it was 
accepted as an ingenious solution to a problem that had stumped the aero- 
1959. Allen’s principle illustrated. A shadowgaph of the Project Mercury reentry capsule, 
showing the bow-shock wave in f ront  of it and the f low fields behind the capsule. At  
reentry speeds, radiative heat became a serious problem, leading researchers t o  explore 
also the process of ablation, the means by  which a body absorbs heat b y  melting, evapora- 
tion, and sublimation. Ablation experiments were done in the  Ames  Atmospheric Entry 
Simulator. 
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nautical research community. The blunt-nose principle was crucial not only 
for missile design, but later became even more well known when combined 
with ablation for heat shields. The design of essentially all reentry vehicles - 
ICBMs, the early manned spacecraft, the Space Shuttle - has been signifi- 
cantly influenced by the blunt-body concept.42 
In a way, the early V/STOL research and the blunt-nose principle illus- 
trate both ends of the spectrum of Ames’s research strengths. Allen’s dis- 
covery, being revolutionary, practical, and readily comprehensible, at least 
on a superficial level, to the layman, elevated him to national prominence. 
The V/STOL research of the period represented the quieter, less recognized, 
less immediately profitable research that remains the backbone of a good 
research laboratory. V/STOL was to become a major research field for Ames 
and a means by which aeronautics remained exciting in the age of astronau- 
tics. Both types of research were necessary - the full-blown output of indi- 
vidual imagination and the slower, more tentative steps taken by teams of 
research workers. That the laboratory supported both types of work 
strengthened its reputation and the morale of its personnel. 
In 1947 J. C. Hunsaker, the chairman of the NACA, had been ques- 
tioned about the results of a national poll that had just been taken. He 
expressed astonishment that 26% of the respondees expected orbital and 
interplanetary adventures within 10 years and observed rather drily that 
“this . . . poll indicates that people who know about rockets like them. The 
same is no doubt true with regard to helicopters, alcoholic drinks, and 
chamber music.”43 But of course, exactly 10 years later Sputnik was in 
orbit. The Russian satellite was the visible goad that brought radical changes 
to the United States scientific and engineering programs, and especially 
to astronautics. 
The furor created by the Soviet Union’s surprise of October 1957, 
however, invites the conclusion that the American space program was only a 
response to Russian pressure. As Ames’s work in the early 1950s illustrates, 
this was not true, although it is certainly accurate to say that a response to 
the Soviet achievement was a major investment of American energy, person- 
nel, and funds in the following years. A realistic survey of American space 
history begins earlier and deals with the research laboratories of the NACA. 
The space frontier was approached less by a series of leaps than by a continu- 
ing effort in basic research that included the technological ingredients 
necessary for the push into space. The foundations of knowledge for satel- 
lites and manned spaceflight were being laid in the early 1950s. During that 
period, despite the hostilities of the Korean conflict and the Cold War with 
the Soviet Union, the space frontier was still a scientific frontier, an intellec- 
tual and technological challenge. Ames was moving toward that frontier - if 
at a pace that subsequently seemed too slow. 
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4 
THE FORMATION OF NASA, 1958 
The period 1957-1959 was a transition in American aeronautics. Ames 
was very much affected by the events that propelled the country into the 
space age, though at the time technical and administrative developments 
seemed to produce little change in the work or atmosphere of the labora- 
tory. For those who had been employed there since its beginnings, however, 
Ames had become very different. 
AMES IN 1957 
By 1957 Ames had grown immensely, was much more complex organi- 
zationally, and in a way was perhaps not as exciting as it had once been. The 
mid-1950s were a quiescent time before the advent of major changes that 
would transform the institution in the 1960s. Researchers who left Ames in 
the 1950s perhaps left because they found the challenges less exciting than 
during the war or in the immediate postwar period, when transonic problems 
were confronted. Another problem was comparable pay; industry succeeded 
in luring some engineers away from the NACA. 
Though still a stimulating place to work, Ames in 1956-1958 was 
almost too established. In some respects its very successes created a certain 
complacency often characteristic of a mature research organization.’ Its 
reputation established early and its niche in the NACR hierarchy secure, 
Ames continued, under the firm hand of De France, to run smoothly. The 
growth of personnel was slow, the addition of more sophisticated facilities 
was steady, and the laboratory functioned efficiently with little red tape. As 
one former administrator at Ames recalled, “Smitty used to like to keep as 
few men at the top as possible, to save most of his forces for creative 
research. y y 2  Though the research challenges had shifted and size had brought 
unavoidable administrative complexities, Ames continued to produce excel- 
lent research contributions with completely in-house personnel and little 
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bureaucracy. Those who had watched the laboratory change over its first 
15 years of existence would be astonished at what the next 15 would bring. 
The organization of the laboratory illustrates the degree to which it 
had expanded since the 1940s. De France, as director, still retained direct 
control, aided by Jack Parsons, the associate director. In 1957 there was 
only one assistant director, but he was aided by two technical assistants. 
Parsons also had a technical assistant. The assistants, while taking some of 
the research expertise burdens from the associate and assistant directors, also 
represented another level of bureaucracy between the researchers and the 
administrative decision-making of De France. 
Reporting directly to De France was the budget officer, as had always 
been the case. The administrative, instrument, research, technical services, 
and engineering services divisions also reported directly to Parsons or 
De France. De France had acquired the beginnings of what would become a 
public affairs office, though in 1957 it consisted of only one man, called the 
infmmation specialist. Hired from Langley, he provided requested informa- 
tion on Ames to outside organizations and the surrounding community. It is 
easy to imagine that De France recognized the beginnings of public relations 
as a necessary evil. Reputedly, the new man was refused a secretary when he 
first arrived, on the grounds that he didn’t need one. Once the outgoing 
correspondence on his desk piled up to eye level, De France took the hint 
and a secretary was p r ~ v i d e d . ~  De France was thrifty with public funds. 
The nonresearch divisions had increased their branches and complexi- 
ties as Ames grew, and the same was true of the research divisions. The 
research divisions, reporting to the Assistant Director Russell Robinson, 
reflected changes within the field of aeronautics as well as intricate relations 
with industry and the armed forces. The Theoretical and Applied Research 
Division, still under Donald Wood, had by 1957 added a machine computing 
branch. Primitive computers had been used at Ames from the very beginning, 
but by the end of the 1950s the glorified adding machines were being super- 
ceded by computers that could undertake much more complicated tasks. 
The machines were to bring with them greater organizational complexity, 
since their increased sophistication invited more elaborate record keeping 
and finer breakdowns in financial planning! 
In the Full-scale and Flight Research Division, under the direction of 
Harry Goett, the flight operations, flight research, and 40- by 80-foot tunnel 
branches had been joined by three others: low-density tunnel, heat-transfer 
tunnel, and dynamics analysis. The new tunnels had been needed to deal 
with the new aspects of flight at high altitude and supersonic speed. Both 
were useful in investigating heat transfer to flight vehicles from laminar or 
turbulent boundary layers, the effects of heat transfer to the vehicle, and the 
effect of boundary-layer heating on skin friction. Earlier tunnels having 
proved too small and limited in scope, funds had been obtained in 1951 to 
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build two new tunnels - an 8-inch low-density tunnel and a 10- by 10-inch 
heat-transfer tunnel. The tunnels were housed in a new building adjacent to 
the 12-foot pressure tunnel, enabling the borrowing of supplementary air 
power from existing  compressor^.^ When the new tunnels were completed 
in 1954, the old ones were shut down. Eventually, formal ownership of the 
old heat-transfer tunnel passed to the University of California at Berkeley. 
The 1- by 3.5-foot tunnel was deactivated and eventually dismantled and the 
7- by 10-foot tunnels, seldom used, were operated by the 40- by 8O-foot 
tunnel section. The new low-density and heat-transfer tunnels became ever 
more important as research grew in the areas of boundary-layer studies, 
skin friction, and aerodynamic heating. 
The dynamics analysis branch, the other new addition to the Full-scale 
and Flight Research Division, held the components of important future 
Ames research. Using newly procured analog computers, the branch marked 
the beginning of Ames’s research in ground-based flight simulators. Crude 
early studies left much to be desired, but by 1957-1958, Harry Goett was 
encouraging his dynamics analysts to plan more sophisticated simulators. 
This natural extension of high-speed flight research, which studied the han- 
dling of qualities of aircraft under specified conditions and pilot responses to 
flight conditions, was to dovetail easily into simulation studies as high-speed 
flight became flight into space and pilots became astronauts. It is argued that 
the United States did not enter the space race until it had begun; but studies 
undertaken in the years immediately preceding Sputnik and the formation of 
NASA would be directly applicable to research needs once that race was in 
progress. The NACA may be criticized for its lack of dynamism in pushing 
for more space research funding, but it cannot be faulted for failing to move 
in the right directions in its last years. 
The High-speed Research Division under Harvey Allen had also gained 
new branches by 1957. In addition to the earlier facilities, the division had 
acquired the 2- by 2-foot transonic tunnel, which replaced the dismantled 
1- by 3.5-foot transonic tunnel. It had also added a hypervelocity ballistic 
range branch, which had evolved from a growing concern with aerothermo- 
dynamic research. As research in the heat-transfer tunnel was a product of 
concern with the heating of vehicles at higher altitudes and speeds, so too 
was ballistics research, which was useful in stability studies. (Aerodynamic 
stability could not easily be studied in wind tunnels, since models were 
by necessity firmly fixed in place. An exception was the supersonic free 
flight tunnel.) The hypersonic ballistics range was made possible by the light- 
gas gun, developed by a group of researchers working under Alex Charters, 
who had come to Ames from the Aberdeen Proving Ground’s ballistics 
ranges. The gun launched a test model on a charge of highly compressed 
helium. Gunpowder-powered rifles generally could not launch models faster 
than 2,135 m/sec, whereas Charters’s early helium and gunpowder combina- 
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tion attained speeds of 3,965 m/sec. (Subsequent light-gas guns produced 
speeds up to 9,150 mlsec.) The light-gas gun was first tested in Ames’s Janus 
range, a gas-filled cylinder only 21  f t  long, built in the first stages of ballistics 
research.* The NACA then approved a much larger range for the light-gas 
gun, to be located near the Janus range in a new building on territory origi- 
nally reserved for a seaplane towing basin. Such a research tool was no longer 
much in demand, and in any event, Langley already had one. The new range 
was in use by 1957.6 
A fourth major research division had been added by 1957. This division 
managed the wind tunnels constructed under the unitary plan: the 8- by 
7-foot supersonic tunnel, the 9- by 7-fOOt supersonic tunnel, and the 11-foot 
transonic tunnel. An operations branch coordinated the running of the 
tunnels and scheduled tests for the military, industry, and universities. The 
unitary plan tunnels were much in demand, and placing them in a separate 
division was an administrative necessity. 
Although a fourth research division had been added, the range of 
research had also greatly expanded and many areas of research still over- 
lapped between divisions. The problems that could have resulted were 
avoided, or at least alleviated, by routine and informal exchange of informa- 
tion between divisions. To the extent that all the research engineers were 
aware of their colleagues’ projects, all research benefitted.’ 
The last NACA inspection was in 1958, when a big space effort was 
about to  be mounted. N o  one should be surprised that Ames emphasized to 
its distinguished visitors the work that was most obviously related to prob- 
lems of spaceflight. The booklet presented to attendees described high- 
temperature shock tubes, used to duplicate the high temperatures encoun- 
tered by a satellite on reentering the Earth’s atmosphere. Attention was 
given to particle accelerators, which directed oxygen and nitrogen particles 
traveling at speeds of 9,300 km/hr at various metal surfaces. The purpose 
was to study the erosion effects, or surface pitting. Ames also emphasized its 
studies on stability control for satellites and its investigations of satellite 
equipment that would perform tasks of measurement, observation, and 
directional control. Space vehicles, the various methods of propulsion, 
reentry problems, and landing problems were named as projects under study. 
The heating problems of high-speed, high-altitude flight were narrated, and 
attention was drawn to the hypervelocity ballistic range and the atmosphere- 
entry simulator. The new pebble-bed heaters, which made possible the study 
of aerodynamic heating on larger models, were proudly described.8 
It is interesting to compare the inspection booklet of 1958 with the 
more balanced treatment accorded Ames research of the period by Edwin 
*The Janus range had been named after Charters’s light-gas gun, which ejected a reaction 
piston from the rear of the driving tube as the compressed helium, bursting into the launch tube, fired 
the model. 
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Hartman’s history of the laboratory. While the inspection sought to empha- 
size the space-oriented direction of Ames research - indeed, that of the 
entire NACA - Hartman makes clear that the space-connected research was 
part of a continuum that had logically followed the increase in speed and 
altitude. Equally important was research into problems of lower speeds and 
altitudes. While the NACA was insisting on its ability to lead the new space 
agency and was therefore underlining its many contributions in space- 
related research, Ames and the other NACA laboratories were also pursuing 
less dramatic projects, such as the V/STOL studies, which would be of 
importance long into the space age. 
Two research projects of 1956-1958 deserve particular attention. The 
first was the Air Force’s Dynasoar project, an intriguing and farsighted 
design to put man into space. It illustrates the combination of research ideas, 
some from the military, some from the NACA, in the search for solutions to 
the problems of upper-atmosphere flight. As the next step beyond the X-15 
research airplane, Dynasoar was to have been rocket-launched and powered 
to the upper limits of the atmosphere. Then it would glide, being equipped 
also with wings - hence the designation boost-glide vehicle. 
At Ames, Harvey Allen, Alvin Seiff, and Alfred Eggers were involved 
in some of the many advisory groups that worked with the Air Force, inves- 
tigating the possibilities of the idea. Allen’s earlier ballistics work had inter- 
ested him in the boost stage of the project, while his blunt-body work had 
also involved consideration of reentry. 
Ames had already produced, in 1955-1956, a study on the alternatives 
under consideration for high-speed, high-altitude, manned flight.9 Three 
general directions seemed feasible: a ballistic missile combined with a 
nonlifting reentry body; a boost-glide vehicle, such as Dynasoar; or a super- 
sonic airplane with greater speed than had yet been produced. The Ames 
study, which influenced Air Force commitment to the Dynasoar project, 
suggested many advantages for the boost-glide idea. Compared to a ballistic 
vehicle, boost-glide gave greater lifting ability and a high lift-drag ratio. This 
would allow it to achieve greater range for a given initial boost velocity. 
Being able to control its angle of attack gave control over the rate at which 
the vehicle would heat, while maneuverability was an advantage in landing 
the vehicle. The boost-glide vehicle could be kept in the atmosphere or 
boosted beyond it, opening further possibilities for variation in the concept. 
The study participants visualized a vehicle with blunt, highly swept wings, 
hoping to control the reentry heating problem by controlling the rate of 
descent.’ O 
In 1957 the Air Force initiated Project Dynasoar, and Ames personnel 
were to remain involved until the project was abandoned in 1963, when 
attention turned instead to a manned orbiting laboratory. Dynasoar illus- 
trates a very successful civilian-military collaboration that used the results of 
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research already initiated to provide a possible answer to very practical prob- 
lems posed by military needs. Though the project itself was eventually 
dropped, the boost-glide concept was important to future research. 
At the same time, Ames engineers began their own research on lifting 
bodies. This work grew out of the old problem of reentry heating, combined 
with the additional problems that accompanied manned flight. It was neces- 
sary to control, by some method, the hurtle through the atmosphere that 
produced such tremendous heat acting upon the flight vehicle. As one of the 
main researchers explained, “the idea really was to get enough drag ratio into 
the entry body to permit it to move laterally.”” This characteristic would 
control the rate of deceleration during reentry. Clarence Syvertson, one of 
the earliest researchers involved, described the evolution of the lifting-body 
research that eventually resulted in the M2F2 reentry vehicle: 
The Dynasoar . . . was conceived to be a manned vehicle. But 
the experience that AI [Eggers] , Harvey [Allen], and others had 
gained in the study of ballistic missiles indicated . . . that there 
1962. Model of an M-2 lifting body being tested in the Ames Atmospheric Entry Simu- 
lator. Obviously, reentry heating would be a problem for the M-2; the tests illustrated the 
areas of most intense heat and the airflow patterns around the lifting body. 
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would be advantages of having a manned vehicle that didn’t have 
wings, that didn’t have a lot of surface area you had to protect 
from entry heating. . . . if you could find a way to combine . . . lift 
and high drag, lift to reduce the decelerations under reentry,. . . 
and bluntness to keep the heating problem under control,. . . 
you’d have something that would be fairly attractive.12 
Early studies produced the M-1 shape, considered but not chosen for 
the Apollo vehicle. Work on the M-1 and Dynasoar led to development of 
the M-2 lifting body, a shape that had been studied for some time before 
NASA was created. As Syvertson remembered, “at the first meeting of the 
Center directors that we had, we prepared a demonstration model and a 
little pitch for Smitty [De France] to use when he went to it. I t  was based 
on the M-2 and we were pretty well along.”13 
In designing the M-2, the researchers first determined the lift-drag ratio 
necessary to permit the body to move laterally between two paths. Having 
arrived at that, a shape was calculat-ed that would produce that ratio. The 
original shape was subsequently modified to make the lifting body landable. 
The shapes that were produced were imaginatively named: 
One they called the African Queen . . . because it had a retractable 
wing that popped [out] on the back end and when it was up it 
looked like the boat.  . . that Humphrey Bogart and Katharine 
1969. A n  M-2 F-2 lifting body in flight at Edwards Air Force Base, with an F-104 in 
chase. The lifting body remained an attractive concept in the assortment of spaceflight 
possibilities for a number of years. 
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Hepburn had used in that movie.. . . Finally, they came up 
with. . . boat-tailing the back end of the body, making the top 
surface shape somewhat like an airfoil and putting the vertical fins 
on as end plates. That was known as the Cadillac version because it 
looked like the tail fins on a Cadillac at that time. From that 
evolved the M-2.’ 
Ames was an early proponent of the lifting-body idea for use in space- 
craft. As space ventures became more complex, after the formation of NASA 
and the first efforts in space, the idea became ever more attractive. A major 
advantage was that it permitted a wider entry corridor, thereby simplifying 
the navigation task. Providing control over heating and acceleration, it would 
also widen choices for landing sites, making possible a solid-earth landing. 
Ten years after the first work on lifting bodies began, Ames collaborated in 
the building of a low-speed prototype.’5 
Both Dynasoar and the lifting bodies illustrate the cross-fertilization 
that often occurs in research, when ideas or findings from one investigation 
are successfully applied in another. The involvement of Ames engineers in 
Dynasoar influenced Ames’s own work on lifting bodies. The lifting-body 
research was a logical progression of building upon past knowledge, and 
though not specifically mission-oriented at the time, was undoubtedly part 
of the 29% of Ames’s research that the NACA categorized in 1957 as 
“space-related. ”’ 
The thin line drawn between space-related and non-space-related 
aeronautics is similar to that drawn between civilian and military concerns in 
the field. Though the NACA had always stressed its civilian purpose and 
character, its inception (as later that of Ames) coincided with a military 
crisis. Because the line was a thin one, Ames was often brought into the news 
in connection with military matters. 
Though the NACA had always been noted as a government agency that 
did a lot with a small budget, money was a real problem until the advent of 
NASA. At times the money issue was taken up as a political refrain, such as 
in 1952 during the Korean conflict, when a congressional candidate used 
Ames as the focus of a patriotic campaign speech: 
In [this laboratory] may be found the solution to the problem 
which faces every mother and father within the sound of my voice 
who has a boy in Korea or one who may eventually land in Korea. 
Tyranny must be suppressed and all that we hold dear in life is at 
stake in our efforts to stem the rising tide of communism. . . . As I 
walked through those laboratories and saw those scientists at work 
on intricate model parts, I thought to myself, that man at that 
bench may be the one who will save my two older boys, now 
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approaching draft age, from the fate so many boys are meeting in 
Korea. If so, the $25,000,000 currently being spent for a new 
laboratory out there will be a small price to pay and I as a tax- 
payer will gladly meet that expense.17 
The unitary-plan wind tunnels, to which the speaker referred, had 
greatly increased the capacity for testing at Ames. But Ames faced, in 1956- 
1958, another paralyzing problem. Manpower was lacking and had been ever 
since Ames had existed. By 1956 the laboratory was truly suffering from its 
inability to keep pace with industrial salaries, and it had lost a number of 
important research minds in the mid-1950s as a result.18 The military suf- 
fered much less, for most of its aeronautical research was done by contract- 
ing with the private sector, and funds were available for contracting. In early 
1956, Representative Charles Gubser brought up the problem on the floor of 
the House of Representatives. Though campaigning for funds for the entire 
NACA, he used Ames as an example, since the laboratory lay within his 
district. During his speech, he quoted extensively from a letter he had solic- 
ited from De France.Ig 
De France focused on the government pay scale and how it affected 
both the obtaining and the retaining of high-quality professional personnel 
at Ames. At a time when scientific and engineering graduates were in short 
supply, industry was outbidding the government, “making it increasingly 
difficult for us to recruit college graduates and virtually impossible to recruit 
the outstanding graduates.” In 1955 Ames had been able to recruit only 
33 professional graduates, none of them in the upper portion of their classes. 
The reason, he held, was the disparity between the starting salaries that 
industry offered and the government pay scale. Ames could not even com- 
pete with the pay scales of state and local government.* 
De France then took up the problem of retaining professionals. After 
citing specific offers from industry to Ames personnel in 1956, he observed 
that the offers had averaged a 50% increase. During the year Ames had lost 
13 engineers to industry. Although losses had as yet been light, he thought 
they would increase. As De France saw it, the major advantage that the 
NACA had traditionally offered professionals had been the environment in 
which they worked. Not only were the NACA’s research facilities unparal- 
leled, but researchers had enjoyed colleagues of eminence and an easy asso- 
ciation with nearby universities. In the case of Ames, Stanford’s proximity 
had been a real factor in the laboratory’s ability to retain its research 
complement in the face of more lucrative offers from industry. 
“While the government offered $4,345 and a GS-5 grade to graduates with bachelor’s degrees, 
industry was offering roughly $4,860. For outstanding graduates, competitive bidding among indus- 
trial firms pushed the starting salaries to $5,700. 
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The director of Ames foresaw a gloomy future, however, predicting 
that once the salary discrepancy became too wide to ignore, even the most 
loyal of his staff would resign. He urged that the crisis be “forcibly” brought 
to the attention of Congress, reminding members that the same conclusions 
had already been drawn by one of their own commissions.20 
By 1957, Smith De France (seated) could well be proud of the laboratory he had built 
and shaped. In an almost jovial mood, he examines an award marking his 35 years with 
the NACA, while Associate Director Jack Parsons looks on. Meanwhile, Ames continued 
with high-speed aerodynamic research that eased America’s entry into the space age. 
Any picture of Ames in the immediate pre-NASA period contains con- 
trasts. On the one hand, much research that was to be essential to the early 
space projects was being produced at the laboratory by a band of scientists 
and engineers who had obviously remained actively and enthusiastically 
involved in their work. On the other hand, some researchers had left the 
laboratory for greener pastures, and it was expected that more would go. For 
a 15-year-old institution, Ames was still relatively free from the bureaucratic 
arteriosclerosis that often appears after the first years of growth are over. 
Ames had, however, become considerably more complicated than in its 
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earlier years, and this had perhaps been an element in the resignations of 
some of the original Ames employees, men who remembered the first days 
of excitement and unstructured but effective management. Ames faced 
serious challenges in 1957, but also had many strengths, both in the quality 
and range of its research facilities and in its personnel. 
THE NACA IN 1957 
The NACA as a whole faced many of the problems that Ames had to 
deal with on a smaller scale. One was money. In his 1957 report to Congress, 
Chairman James H. Doolittle observed: 
Modest increases in appropriations for research have been 
largely offset by rising costs, so that the amount of research 
accomplished relative to that required has been diminishing when 
it should be increasing. In addition, the current pay structure, 
fixed by law, makes it more and more difficult to retain irreplace- 
able top rank research scientists and engineers. . . . The general 
level of the NACA research effort compared to that of the Soviets 
[has] lessened when it should be increasing. Thus, America’s rela- 
tive position in aeronautical science has been deteriorating. There 
is an urgent need at this time for a genuine increase in the level of 
research effort.21 
The NACA had reason to complain. The preceding decade has seen 
major changes in the way aeronautical research was conducted. Before 
World War 11, the NACA had been the major institution involved in basic 
research in the field. The war had temporarily deflected its research labora- 
tories into specific problem-solving connected to wartime demands. After 
the war, the NACA intended to return to basic research, but the environ- 
ment had changed. Industry and the military, especially the newly created 
Air Force, also began major research efforts. Where once only the NACA 
owned truly sophisticated facilities that could be used on a wide range of 
problems, now aircraft companies and military research establishments 
(particularly the Air Force’s Tullahoma facility) could conduct research 
along the same lines as the NACA. Cooperation and collaboration certainly 
existed among the various groups on a practical level, but the NACA had 
become only one of several aeronautical research groups. All factions felt the 
urgent need to mount a national space effort and an equally urgent desire to 
be in the forefront of that effort. Competition naturally existed, especially 
between the NACA and the Air Force, each attempting, especially during 
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1956-1957, to achieve leadership in the race for speed and altitude. The Air 
Force’s Dynasoar project and the Ames work on lifting bodies were different 
approaches to the problem. 
In the period immediately preceding the launch of Sputnik in 1957, 
one of the NACA’s strengths was its low-key reputation and its history of 
steady contributions to aeronautics. In the civilian arena, it had been pre- 
eminent for over 40 yeam De France was a fitting representative of the 
agency - serious and professional, perhaps conservative, but undeniably 
effective. 
The NACA had been planned as an “independent federal agency.” The 
original members of the Committee (from the War Department, the Navy 
Department, the Smithsonian Institution, the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of 
Standards, and some from outside the government) were appointed by the 
President on the basis of their aeronautical interest or expertise. Unpaid and 
reporting directly to the President, the Committee elected its own chairman 
and appointed an executive committee, which managed day-to-day activities. 
Technical committees and subcommittees kept abreast of needs and develop- 
ments in the various areas of aeronautics and advised where the NACA’s 
modest budget might best be spent. Shortly after its formation, the Com- 
mittee had appointed a paid director for research. As such, George Lewis had 
run the NACA almost singlehandedly over 20 years. He had been succeeded 
in 1947 by Hugh Dryden, who had attained scientific prominence at the 
Bureau of Standards. Lewis’s style had been direct and effective. His hand 
always on the tiller of the smaller organization and operating in less compli- 
cated times, he had remained directly involved in all aspects of the NACA, 
from research to congressional lobbying. Hugh Dryden was very different, 
and the tone of the NACA changed when he became director. Teamed with 
Jerome Hunsaker, the chairman of the NACA until 1956, Dryden had sought 
to revitalize the organization in order to meet the many postwar challenges. 
Administratively, Dryden’s assumption of command meant the regulariza- 
tion of many procedures that had been as highly irregular as those at Ames. 
Where Lewis had been singlehanded and forceful, Dry den was bureaucratic 
and methodical. His improvements were many, but his image was decidedly 
undynamic.22 
The NACA had experienced other changes that eroded its prewar image 
of disinterested professionalism. By 195 7 industry’s influence on the techni- 
cal committees and subcommittees had blurred the NACA’s nonpartisan 
reputation, though in fact evidence of conflicts of interest were lacking. In 
1957 the Army was admitted to the Main Committee of the NACA over stiff 
opposition by some members.23 At the end industry and the military were 
filling nearly 70% of the technical committee and subcommittee member- 
ships, a far cry from their minimal representation of earlier years.24 
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Though the NACA had been stressing the need, since the end of World 
War 11, to return to basic research, this aim seems to have been impractical. 
As industry and the military exerted more influence over the NACA and 
undertook active research projects of their own, the NACA became involved 
in a series of investigations stemming from industrial and military sources. 
By the late 1950s over half its work was generated by specific military 
and industrial requests were not insignificant. Thus by 1957 the 
NACA was in many ways a service institution. Though its research contribu- 
tions had been many, it was less independent than formerly - and perhaps 
less farsighted because of its lessened independence. 
The statistics were impressive, however. With a budget of over 
$100 million and 8,000 employees, the NACA had, aside from its headquar- 
ters organization, five research installations. Besides Langley, Ames, and 
Lewis laboratories, it also maintained the High-speed Flight Research Sta- 
tion at Edwards Air Force Base and the pilotless aircraft research station at 
Wallops Island, Virginia. The NACA would be a strong contender for a lead- 
ing role in the national space program, even though its unique position was 
less clear-cut than it had been in its earlier years. 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SPACE PROGRAM 
The International Geophysical Year, a cooperative endeavor proclaimed 
for 1957-1958, demonstrated the competitive aspects of space-related 
research. As the IGY was being planned in 1954, Wernher von Braun, of the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency, had proposed a satellite project. He argued 
convincingly that such a project was feasible, and a joint Army-Navy effort, 
Project Orbiter, was initiated. The Air Force too had developed a satellite 
proposal, and by the end of 1954 a three-way rivalry among Army, Navy, 
and Air Force was under way. The endorsement of a satellite by the inter- 
national committee for IGY in late 1954 only reinforced the conviction, 
shared by both military and civilian scientists alike, that launching an artifi- 
cial satellite was both possible and necessary.26 
When the plans of the three military branches were reviewed, the Navy 
plan, which used a Viking rocket with two additional stages, was favored. 
The Air Force plan had been eliminated because it could interfere with 
ICBM development, an early example of the clash between science and mili- 
tary necessity in the U.S. space program. Over Army objections, the Navy 
plan was approved in September 1955 and Project Vanguard was authorized. 
From the beginning Vanguard suffered from the Eisenhower adminis- 
tration’s commitment to economy and the determination of the Department 
of Defense to give first priority to the development of military technology. 
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The Army, though it had lost support for the Project Orbiter plan, did not 
abandon its Redstone booster. By the summer of 1957, the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency had used a Redstone-Jupiter C missile in a launch that clearly 
demonstrated the feasibility of orbiting a satellite. As the Navy’s Vanguard 
continued to falter, the Army pressed for authorization to begin a crash 
satellite program of its own. The DOD, determined to consider the satellite 
purely scientific, refused to approve Army involvement, since it would be 
using military-mission hardware. Lt. Gen. James Gavin, the deputy chief of 
the Army Office of Research and Development, had his knuckles rapped 
several times for continuing the ~ampaign.~‘ 
The administration continued to give the satellite program low priority 
and to maintain that the United States was not in a race with the Soviet 
Union for the first launch. As the summer progressed, there were numerous 
hints that a Soviet attempt was imminent. On 4 October 1957 Sputnik was 
successfully launched into orbit, and the administration began a months- 
long attempt to minimize its significance. 
The reaction of the American public put the Republican administration 
in an awkward position. Public opinion saw Sputnik as a political and mili- 
tary victory for the U.S.S.R. and questioned why the United States had 
allowed itself to be beaten. The administration temporarily denied the mili- 
tary significance of Sputnik and repeated that the United States was not in a 
race. Eisenhower maintained that his national security apprehensions had 
not been raised “one iota.”28 
Though Eisenhower and his administration kept a calm front for some 
months, it was clear that a major effort in space had to be mounted. Order- 
ing a stepped-up missile program, the administration consulted a number of 
advisers on the best course to take. As one scholar has observed, “Sputnik 
signaled the reappearance of the scientists as important members of the 
national political system, but with uncertain  objective^."^^ Two competing 
approaches were available. One assumed that the importance of space lay in 
the military superiority it might give to those who could operate there. The 
other saw major scientific significance in space exploration, viewing the chal- 
lenge as technological rather than military. Several organizations contended 
for management of the new space program. 
Needless to say, the DOD considered itself the prime candidate for 
leadership, and in February 1958 the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
announced the formation of a new agency to direct and coordinate “certain 
advanced Research and Development projects”; the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency had the explicit mission of developing space projects.30 
ARPA was an interim arrangement to handle space projects until the admin- 
istration had decided upon the final form the national space program would 
take. As might have been expected, the DOD continued to argue against the 
wisdom of a civilian agency’s controlling the space program. 
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DOD was not, however, a monolithic institution. The services, retaining 
their distinctive interests on the issue of space exploration, presented three 
solutions to the que~t ion .~ '  The Navy was embarrassed and discouraged 
about the Vanguard project, which had experienced two launch failures and 
numerous setbacks before a successful launch in March 1958. Not seeing 
space as either militarily essential or a naval preserve, the Navy seemed quite 
content to maintain a low interest in space research. The Project Vanguard 
director stressed the need for a centralized space effort, whether within 
DOD or not. 
The Army favored a centralized military agency - ARPA. If space 
research were spread out among the services, the Army believed the Air 
Force would remain most influential, even though the Army's launch of 
Explorer 1, the first American satellite, gave the Army real standing in the 
contest. 
Among the services, the Air Force had the strongest claim for leader- 
ship: space was only an extension of the Earth's atmosphere, its traditional 
domain. Also, the Air Force had been involved in space research for 
20 years, though most of the work had been classified and was therefore not 
publicly known. With what seemed a clear prerogative in space, the Air 
Force was unwilling to surrender its interest to ARPA. From the beginning, 
therefore, ARPA was only one contender among many. 
Meanwhile the administration had been bombarded with proposals by 
civilian groups. One of the major ones was submitted jointly by the Ameri- 
can Rocket Society and the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel, a pres- 
tigious group of scientists and engineers from inside and outside the govern- 
ment. The panel, at the time headed by Dr. James Van Allen, had been 
involved in rocket research since the late 1 9 4 0 ~ ~ ~  The proposal supported a 
civilian National Space Establishment for research and exploration, separate 
from DOD but to be supported by all three services. DOD should have 
complete control of all military space matters. The assumption that the 
civilian and military aspects of space could be easily separated proved to be 
too optimistic. 
As might have been expected, the NACA had also been much involved 
in the question of the national space effort. Though the NACA's reputation 
had been made in aeronautics, and though the NACA retained a commit- 
ment to research in low-speed, low-altitude aeronautics, its involvement in 
space research, whether independently or as part of cooperative ventures 
with the military, had been growing steadily. If the NACA had no part in the 
emerging space program, it would lose importance; but leadership of the new 
program, which promised to be massive, would change the institution drasti- 
cally. As a small, committee-run agency with a dubious organizational struc- 
ture, the NACA was not administratively equipped to assume leadership of 
the space program. Dryden knew this and polled many of the younger 
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NACA personnel, soliciting advice concerning the NACA’s future.34 They 
were strongly in favor of the NACA pressing on for a strong role in the space 
program. 
The result was a proposal of 14 January 1958, the “Dryden Plan” as it 
came to be called. The director of the NACA called for a cooperative space 
effort involving DOD, the National Academy of Science, the National 
Science Foundation, and a greatly expanded NACA. The NACA Main Com- 
mittee, enlarging on Dryden’s proposal, called for a doubling of the NACA 
staff over three years, as well as a doubling of its yearly budget.35 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NASA 
The NACA was supported in its proposal by two other groups. One was 
the President’s Science Advisory Council, which had already decided that a 
civilian agency must control the space program, lest scientific objectives be 
subordinated. One of the members of the council, and undoubtedly influen- 
tial in its recommendations, was James Doolittle, the NACA chairman. The 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) saw enlarging an existing institution as cheaper 
than creating a new one to manage space activities. Another factor in BOB 
support was probably the NACA’s reputation as a relatively low-budget, 
high-productivity o rgan i~a t ion .~~  
By March 1958 the administration was drafting legislation to create a 
civilian space agency based on the NACA as the nucleus. In April, as the 
legislation that would create NASA went before Congress, the NACA and 
DOD discussed the reassignment of some military space projects to the new 
civilian agen~y.~‘  The projects under the sponsorship of the newly created 
ARPA were transferred to the civilian agency, including Project Vanguard, 
which had been wrested from the Navy, and various plans for lunar probes. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Act passed both houses of Con- 
gress on 29 July 1958. As with most legislation, the end product was a com- 
promise that attempted to answer objections voiced in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. The House had been skeptical about the 
NACA’s ability to  function as the base for the new agency, because of the 
NACA’s conservative character and close involvement with past military 
projects. The Senate, on the other hand, feared that the new agency would 
usurp the military exploitation of space and wanted a clearly delineated dis- 
tinction of a~thor i ty .~’  Influential in the Senate position was Majority 
Leader Lyndon Johnson, who had led the Democratic attack on the 
Eisenhower administration for failure to anticipate Sputnik with a more 
dynamic space policy. In the end the Act contained clauses that asserted 
DOD supremacy in military space matters and provided for a National Aero- 
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nautics and Space Council to coordinate aeronautical and space activities 
among all agencies of the government. The council would contain govern- 
ment administrators, military advisers, and private citizens. Thus Congress 
hoped to provide for space activities in both civilian and military arenas, 
while reducing duplication of effort. 
Before the Act went into effect on 1 October 1958, an administrator 
had to be chosen for NASA. Though many had assumed that Hugh Dryden 
as director of the NACA would automatically head the new agency, he evi- 
dently appeared too conservative for Congre~s.~’ The nomination went to 
T. Keith Glennan, at the time president of Case Institute of Technology. 
Dryden was named deputy administrator, a crucial position dependent on 
technical expertise. Both men were sworn in in mid-August. The appoint- 
ment of the outsider Glennan was to be a factor in the transition of the 
NACA into NASA, and in the acceptance of the new regime by NACA 
personneL4’ 
On the face of things, the transition was smoothly accomplished. NASA 
acquired not only the ARF’A projects, but lunar probes and satellite projects 
originally begun by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). The Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory at Cal Tech, part of the Army’s missile development 
program, was transferred to NASA in late 1958, when NASA also gained 
access to ABMA’s Development and Operations Division, von Braun’s 
talented team, without prior Pentagon approval. With Project Vanguard, 
NASA also acquired the personnel from the Naval Research Laboratory who 
were attached to the project. By the end of 1958, NASA personnel num- 
bered 8,420.41 
At Ames the 1 October conversion was accomplished without fanfare. 
De France issued a typically restrained memorandum documenting the tran- 
sition from NACA to NASA, from Ames Aeronautical Laboratory to Ames 
Research Center. When NASA’s first organizational chart was issued in 
January 1959, Ames found itself, along with Langley, Lewis, and the High- 
Speed Flight Station, under the authority of the associate administrator for 
aeronautical and space research. 
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5 
THE LIFE SCIENCES DIRECTORATE 
The establishment of NASA ultimately transformed the character of 
Ames. Some of the changes came slowly and surreptitiously; only over a 
period of years would older NACA personnel realize how the laboratory had 
changed as they noted, for example, the differences between long-duration 
topical research and the new, mission-oriented projects. Project manage- 
ment - goal-oriented and time-limited - was a product of NASA’s mission 
to assure American supremacy in the space race and, after 1961, to put a 
man on the moon before the end of the decade. Project work was also the 
result of the political constraints placed upon the agency. Not only did 
announced goals need to be met, but NASA had to justify itself as it pro- 
ceeded toward them. The political overtones and the pressure to perform on 
a strict time schedule made project work quite different from the older kinds 
of research, which had been at least potentially open-ended and less con- 
strained by hard and fast deadlines. 
Other changes noticed at Ames resulted more directly from the higher 
budgets and larger physical size of the center, which were accompanied by 
several new complexities. NASA Headquarters originally did not differ much 
from the old NACA scheme of things. A few more personnel were inter- 
spersed in the line of command, perhaps, but since in the early months of 
NASA many old hands remained in still-recognizable positions, the transition 
began smoothly. But administrative and organizational changes in the early 
years soon redefined Ames’s relationship with Headquarters, creating more 
labyrinthine routes to any final implementation of decisions. This was not so 
much a specific NASA problem as it was the problem of any new, large, and 
rich organization that was responsible to elected representatives of a reason- 
ably sophisticated population. In short, it is hard to conceive how NASA 
could have embarked upon its gargantuan task without a great increase in 
bureaucratic complexity. 
Ames was perhaps a passive recipient of some of the change that NASA 
bestowed. There was no way to avoid either increased administrative 
entanglements or task-oriented research. The research center adjusted to 
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such changes gradually, in some cases with grace, in some cases awkwardly. 
But in other instances Ames management actively attempted to reshape the 
center according to the new demands and interests. In establishing the Life 
Sciences Directorate, it is very evident that top Ames management saw the 
addition as a potential transfusion, endowing Ames with another resource to 
bolster its faltering aeronautical investment. The Life Sciences Directorate 
represented a positive response on the part of De France to a changed envi- 
ronment, and though its grafting onto the existing institution was a difficult 
process, life sciences seems to have been a much-wanted addition to Ames, at 
least on the part of the Ames administration.* 
LIFE SCIENCES COMES TO NASA 
In July 1959 NASA Administrator Glennan appointed Dr. Clark Randt, 
a former colleague at Case Western Reserve University, as his adviser for life 
sciences. Space presented both a new medium for bioscientific research and a 
new set of physical demands on human trespassers. In the early stages of 
Project Mercury, the first U.S. manned space project, NASA cooperation 
with DOD left responsibility for human factors with the Air Force, but 
Glennan felt it was important to define NASA’s own long-term interests in 
the life sciences. 
Drawing further on the academic community, Glennan formed a Bio- 
sciences Advisory Committee, on which Randt sat as NASA’s representative, 
to advise on NASA’s life-science needs and possible ways to meet them 
within the framework of the agency. Over the next six months, under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Seymour Kety, the committee studied the existing rela- 
tionship between NASA and DOD, evaluated the demands that space opera- 
tions would place on NASA in the life sciences, and composed a report with 
very specific recommendations for a course of action. 
The January 1960 Kety Committee report deserves examination, 
because many who were drawn into NASA’s life-sciences efforts regarded it 
as a solid document for future planning, agreed with its basic assumptions, 
and believed that its recommendations needed to be acted upon. First, the 
committee identified three major areas in which work was needed: 
*Although heads of the major research groups were called Assistant Directors, and had been 
since the early 1950s, the term “directorate” did not appear on organization charts until the mid- 
1960s. Whereas Harold Klein was originally called Assistant Director for Life Sciences, he later 
became, in the same job, Head of the Life Sciences Directorate. For simplicity, I use the term some- 
what anachronistically. 
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1. Basic biologic effects of extraterrestrial environments . . . 
and identification of complex organic or other molecules in 
planetary atmospheres which might be precursors or evidence of 
extraterrestrial life; 
2. Medical and behavioral aspects of medicine and biology as 
related to manned space flight; and 
3. Medical and behavioral scientific problems concerned with 
more fundamental investigation of metabolism, nutrition, etc., 
in space equivalent situations. 
As is evident from the distinctions drawn in the report, the committee 
believed NASA needed far more from life sciences than simply operational 
support for manned spaceflight. The first category dealt with bioscientific 
questions that were not necessarily human-related, and the third category, 
though dealing with human responses to space, defined medical, phycho- 
logical, and behavioral issues in a much more general manner. As the com- 
mittee saw it, NASA had the opportunity to involve itself deeply in the 
larger questions of life-science research in a space environment. In the same 
vein, the committee urged the establishment of a central facility to guide and 
carry out research in the three areas of inquiry. Both Goddard Space Flight 
Center and the National Institutes of Health were named as possible sites for 
such a facility. 
Administratively the Kety Committee made equally specific recommen- 
dations. NASA was urged to establish a Life Sciences Programs Office report- 
ing to NASA’s head administrators and not subordinate to the existing 
program offices (the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs, the Office of Space 
Flight Programs, and the Office of Advanced Research Programs), which 
were under the direct control of the associate administrator. The Kety Com- 
mittee believed that as a program office itself, life sciences would contribute 
to and cooperate with the other three program offices as an equal partner. 
The internal organization of the life-sciences program was to be 
arranged according to the three areas of investigation that had been defined. 
Interestingly, the Kety Committee specified intramural and extramural sec- 
tions of the office, the extramural section being that concerned with outside 
contract research. A clear distinction was thereby postulated between 
in-house research and contract research, though as life sciences evolved, espe- 
cially at Ames, this distinction would not hold. The program, as the commit- 
tee saw it, would be weighted heavily toward in-house work. Advisory com- 
mittees drawn from outside NASA would guide the intramural program, and 
maximum integration with universities and academic colleagues would be 
sought. 
The Kety Committee’s firm belief in a broad program with authority 
and resources to deal with both present needs and future demands was 
93 
clearly stated even as it paid lip service t o  NASA’s immediate space effort, 
Project Mercury. In concluding its comments concerning the intramural 
activities of the life-sciences program office, the committee stated: “The 
present research effort . . . within NASA appears to  be concentrated upon a 
single specific goal, exemplified by Project Mercury, at the possible expense 
of broader, more remote, but fundamental aims. It is important that the bio- 
medical aspects of the Project be placed squarely under the jurisdiction of 
the Office of Life Sciences and that it be coordinated with other aspects of 
the Life Sciences Program.”’ The report concluded with budget estimations 
and the plea that NASA commit itself to holding its own against life-science 
activities in the armed forces, especially the Air Force, already linked with 
Project Mercury. Money could not be used skimpily; the initial effort must 
be undertaken with an eye to  a sturdy foundation. 
The Kety Committee made several truly wise observations. First, the 
three areas of recommended investigation paid due recognition to  imme- 
diate, short-range needs, while clearly naming long-range necessities. Second, 
juggesiing program staius for Me sciences, they sought to  avoid the compe- 
tition for control of life sciences that later ensued among the original pro- 
gram offices, competition that created administrative chaos and weakened 
the program as a whole. Finally, by drawing a clear line between in-house 
and contract domains, the committee made it potentially easier to  create a 
solid base of research that was the agency’s own. 
Administrator Glennan accepted the committee’s report in late January 
1960 and seemed to endorse the recommendations. As Congress was proving 
sticky in authorizing certain of NASA’s funds for FY 1961, Glennan post- 
poned announcing the establishment of the Life Sciences Programs Office 
until after the House of Representatives had completed its hearings. Funding 
was diverted from research money already authorized, and with little con- 
gressional cross-examination, the new office was added to NASA’s three 
existing program offices.* Not surprisingly, Clark Randt was named head of 
the office. As one Ames life scientist put it, “Life sciences was grafted onto 
NASA as a whole, almost as an a f te r th~ught .”~  
Almost from the beginning, the Office of Life Sciences Programs ran 
into difficuIties. Randt found Glennan reluctant to commit the funding and 
staffing originally promised. Selecting the site for the life-sciences research 
facility involved endless wrangling. Perhaps even more maddening was the 
slow erosion of authority within his own office. When Randt sought involve- 
ment in Project Mercury’s biomedical aspects, as the Kety Committee had 
recommended, he ran into firm opposition from top NASA administration 
and from the Office of Space Flight Programs, which controlled Project 
Mercury. Randt’s campaign for biomedical responsibility in post-Mercury 
programs had a similar result. It was obvious that Randt and his office were 
regarded as trespassers in territory already claimed by other program offices. 
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Thwarted in his attempts to implement what he had considered a clear man- 
date from Glennan, knowing he was unsupported by Deputy Administrator 
Dryden, and unable to gain the ear of the new NASA administrator, James 
Webb, Randt resigned a year after he had become the head of the Life 
Sciences Programs Office. The office itself lasted only five months longer. 
LIFE SCIENCES COMES TO AMES 
During the first years of NASA’s existence, all three former NACA 
laboratories attempted to revise their facilities, expertise, and - perhaps - 
images to better compete in the new environment. Though continual lip 
service was paid to NASA’s being built on the foundations of the NACA, 
managers at the laboratories must have felt a bit overwhelmed by the 
dramatic changes to what had been a low-key operation. NASA in rapid 
succession acquired Vanguard,” the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena, 
and von Braun’s missile group at Huntsville. The new Goddard Space Flight 
Center grew like a mushroom. Even those among the old hands who whole- 
heartedly embraced the new circumstances must have been struck by the size 
and diversity of the new agency. Harry Goett, who left Ames in 1959 to 
become Goddard’s first director, recalled, “That was one of the biggest 
changes I had to get used to, from [having] 150 guys working under me, 
[making deals that involved] $100,000 to [closing] a $10 million . . . deal in 
an afternoon . . . at Goddard. The difference was that Goddard had a 
$400 million budget, and Ames [under NACA] didn’t.’’4 
The centers responded in varying ways. Lewis Research Center entered 
space-age engine research immediately, making a relatively smooth transition 
from old demands to new.5 Langley’s Space Task Group, which had been 
formed under the NACA, quickly assumed a position of prominence as the 
developer of Project Mercury, NASA’s first major effort. Though the Space 
Task Group was later transferred jurisdictionally to Goddard and then 
physically to Houston, its Langley origins aided that center’s shift to space- 
related work. 
At Ames, the old awareness of geographical separation from NASA 
Headquarters may have recurred. The period of adjustment is still remem- 
bered as awkward by those who had to make major career shifts or risk 
seeing their areas of expertise become, at least temporarily, backwaters. One 
Ames research engineer said that the transition 
*Vanguard was transferred from the Navy to ARPA (DOD) in May 1958, a holding action 
pending the formation of NASA, which absorbed Vanguard at the outset in October 1958. 
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did bother some of us who weren’t interested in getting into space 
work. As soon as the 1958 change was made, everybody was sup- 
posed to focus on space; people in the Flight Research Branch 
were asked to list ten items of space-research potential, and if you 
didn’t, you were not well received. Some of us felt that although it 
was great to move into space, what about aeronautics? It  shouldn’t 
stop; there were still plenty of things to do, and we were still inter- 
ested in doing aeronautics. That transition was hard for some of 
us. We were being pushed, by higher forces, to make space 
contributions.6 
Harry Goett, who had gone from low-speed aeronautical research into early 
flight simulation work - which would become space-connected - was one of 
those who urged Ames management to get a piece of the space action. Years 
later he remembered sympathetically how the change had demoralized some 
aeronautical engineers who saw themselves upstaged by the heavily publi- 
cized space projects: “I used to tell them myself, ‘Look, the fundamental 
boundary-layer stuff you’ve been working on, or this or that, is still just as 
important as it ever was, but you’re not top dog anymore.’ ’” 
Eventually aeronautics at Ames would reestablish itself successfully, 
partly through the continuing work done on V/STOL aircraft, partly 
through the questions raised in the late 1960s regarding the feasibility of the 
supersonic transport. In the early 1960s, however, flight research using simu- 
lators kept the Full-scale and Flight Research Division from sinking into 
complete disfavor while providing a link between aeronautics and astronau- 
tics by focusing on the human factor in both. Flight simulation research, 
with increasingly sophisticated equipment and subtlety of investigation, was 
one Ames response to the new demands for space-oriented research. 
Another area in which existing work helped ease Ames into space 
research was the automatic guidance and control of aircraft. As Ames 
researchers became more deeply involved in the electronics of automatic 
control, their research became increasingly applicable to the control of satel- 
lites. This expertise would help Ames acquire both the Biosatellite and 
Pioneer Projects. Familiarity with automatic control problems gave some 
Ames engineers greater flexibility in meeting the new research demands. It 
was probably a factor in the selection of Goett to be director of Goddard.* 
Though the ability of the center to bend its ongoing research toward 
space applications helped its standing at Headquarters in the early NASA 
years, the overwhelming impression at Ames was that NASA was an eastern 
operation, with most of the exciting activity taking place in the East. Ames 
needed some singular element that might inject new vitality into the center 
and distinguish it from other NASA installations. De France was well aware 
that Ames needed to move with the times, and in early 1960 he began an 
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active campaign to convince NASA Headquarters that his center was the best 
place for a new life-sciences research facility. In this, as Jack Boyd, later 
associate director of Ames, theorized, he was probably encouraged by 
Harvey Allen: 
Harvey knew we couldn’t stay as narrow as we had been, and I 
think he wanted to give us a broader base, in whatever direction 
we could go, and I think he saw that life sciences was going to be 
important. . . . we had [already] gotten into simulation, and simu- 
lation became an important part of life sciences. If Allen hadn’t 
supported it, I don’t think it would have happened as fasts9 
Far from being thrust upon Ames, life sciences was actively sought by 
De France, which should be remembered when considering the many prob- 
lems life sciences subsequently created there. 
De France lost no time in establishing his claim to the facility recom- 
mended by the Kety Committee. The week after Glennan established the 
Life Sciences Programs Office in March 1960, he traveled to the West Coast 
to meet with De France and tour Ames. The new life-sciences program crept 
into the conversation. De France immediately busied his staff, preparing an 
unsolicited report pointing out the “many advantages present in our area on 
which the program might draw.”’* On 11 March, he sent the finished report 
to Glennan. 
The lengthy report makes very clear how badly De France wanted the 
research facility. While most of the correspondence out of Ames under 
De France’s leadership was dry, to the point, even understated, this report 
was at times almost florid in praising the unique set of facilities and talents 
that might be useful to NASA’s life-science needs. The report named 
researchers at local universities and laboratories who were working in areas 
of general interest to NASA. Institutions mentioned included Stanford Uni- 
versity, the University of California at Berkeley, the Palo Alto Medical 
Center, San Jose State University, and the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. 
While much of the research carried on under the auspices of these institu- 
tions would certainly dovetail well with NASA’s needs, a retrospective read- 
ing of the Ames report leads one to question whether any area with several 
respected universities and some miscellaneous research facilities could not 
have produced a similar list. 
In arguing the relevance of its own facilities and work, the Ames report 
made a much stronger case. Weightlessness experiments had begun. A series 
of preliminary studies on pilot behavior and restraint systems had been com- 
pleted. Simulation studies on stress experienced during flight had been 
undertaken in cooperation with the Navy, and the report suggested that the 
simulators could also be used in time-cycle-change research. The Physics 
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Branch might help with radiation studies, and the Instrumentation Division 
would prove generally useful in life-sciences research. The concluding argu- 
ments stressed the economics of using available land and buildings at Ames, 
the lure of neighboring industry, and the lovely climate. A copy of the 
report found its way to Clark Randt’s desk. 
The arguments that Ames pressed were all perfectly valid reasons for 
locating a life-sciences facility at the center, but it seems clear that the report 
was composed hurriedly. While attempting an objective delineation of what 
was available at Ames and in the surrounding area, the report did “protest 
too much.” 
In April Russell Robinson discussed Ames’s case with Clark Randt in 
Washington. Randt told Robinson that 6 4 ~ n l y  one NASA center will cover 
this area joining life sciences and the physical sciences, and that Ames is in 
the best position to acquire the responsibility.” Calling Ames work in simu- 
lation and centrifuge studies biotechnics, Randt asked that proposals for a 
research program in biotechnics be sent to him. Robinson came away 
cautiously hopeful that Ames would be the choice for the facility.’ 
By summer 1960 the competition for the facility had narrowed to 
Ames and Goddard. Glennan was reputed to favor Ames, perhaps because of 
his earlier idea to turn Ames into the manned spaceflight center. There was a 
political hitch, however; the life-sciences laboratory was generally expected 
to be located close to the manned spaceflight center. That location had not 
yet been chosen, and there seemed to be strong congressional objections to 
placing it in California. This difficulty put the choice of Ames into 
jeopardy.12 In addition, there was still the idea, mentioned by Randt to 
Robinson in the spring, that the main life-sciences research facility should be 
near Washington, to keep close ties with the Office of Life Sciences 
Programs. 
By fall Ames seemed to have been bypassed in favor of Goddard. 
De France could not have been happy when he received a copy of the pro- 
posed Life Sciences Ten Year Plan. Ames was not mentioned in it. Instead 
the plan urged construction of “a Life Sciences Research Facility for inte- 
grated life science activities within the Goddard Space Flight Center.”14 
Headquarters seemed to have chosen the eastern option. 
What occurred between September and November is unclear, but once 
again the tables turned. In early November, Clark Randt came to Ames and 
announced that the life-sciences research facility would be built there. It had 
been decided “not to await or depend on the final location of the manned 
spaceflight activity that will evolve from the present Space Task Group.”l 
With the good news, Randt also explained some intricacies that would 
haunt the new directorate. As a memorandum summarized the discussion: 
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Dr. Randt pictured the various phases of life science work as 
shown below, indicating overlapping areas, and by the dotted 
line, a natural boundary between research effort and development 
effort. As will be noted, research effort is to be carried out at 
Ames and the development effort at Space Task Group or its 
successors.1 
As everyone concerned was to find out, where overlap began and ended was 
moot. In addition to the grey area which conceivably both Ames and the 
Space Task Group could claim, there was another potential difficulty. 
Obviously, the STG would be more immediately interested in directed 
research than in basic research. Would that create tension between the two 
groups? Other elements of the memorandum appeared problematic, and in 
a way they actually foreshadowed some of the major difficulties Ames 
would face in the next several years. 
AT SPACE TASK GROUP I I AT AMES 
OPE RAT1 ONS 
The relationship of the Ames life-sciences group to the rest of Ames 
and to NASA Headquarters was not to be straightforward. Headquarters 
cautioned that “no firm commitments on integration with Ames be made at 
this stage,” but suggested that the head of the life-sciences group there be 
responsible to De France for operational matters and to the Office of Life 
Science Programs for direction and management of research programs. Thus 
from the beginning it was foreseeable that life sciences might not fit 
smoothly into the life of the center. One of the members of Randt’s visiting 
group, stressing the “importance research biologists placed on an academic 
atmosphere, ” underlined the difference between “the superficial appearanee 
of an academic atmosphere and the actual attainment of an atmosphere of 
considerable freedom. ”l Here was another indication that life sciences 
might become something very different from the older research organiza- 
tions at Ames. 
With this somewhat tentative and cautious beginning, the Ames Life 
Sciences Directorate came into being. 
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STUDYING THE PROBLEM TO DEATH 
In early 1961 Congress approved funds for the life-sciences facility at 
Ames, and in July Dr. Webb Haymaker, a noted neuropathologist at the 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, was chosen to head the facility. 
Haymaker did not arrive at Ames until late 1961, and in the meantime the 
Office of Life Sciences Programs had been abolished. By the time Haymaker 
took charge at Ames, NASA’s life sciences had been divided among the 
Office of Space Sciences (OSS), the Office of Advanced Research and Tech- 
nology (OART), and the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF). The same 
November 196 1 reorganization placed all the NASA centers under Associate 
Administrator Seamans. 
NASA’s problems in initiating an efficient life-sciences program 
stemmed from a number of factors - competition among the program 
offices for control of life sciences within their own spheres, the difficulty in 
convincing Congress that a major effort in basic life-sciences research was 
needed, the different outlooks on the issue by senior NASA officials, and the 
academic tone of the advice given by the Kety Committee and Randt. While 
that advice may have been sound, implementing it within the existing frame- 
work of NASA proved almost impossible. There was no obvious place to 
graft life sciences onto the existing NASA tree. Over the next few years, 
study groups and individual consultants would analyze the snags in the 
organization and attempt to develop real solutions to end the turmoil. 
In March 1962 Bernard Maggin of the NASA Office of Programs 
chaired a life-sciences working group that produced a lengthy report on the 
ills of the program. The recommendation was to place life sciences “pro- 
gramming capability at the Headquarters level to make possible real coordi- 
nation among the life science elements controlled by the three program 
offices.” OART was named as a likely office to take responsibility for that 
coordination. The group also recommended that “reasonable technical capa- 
bility in the field” was to be centered at Ames and NASA should proceed 
with the construction of the life-science laboratory, making it possible for 
Ames to double that staff, from 81  to 160, between 1962 and 1963.l’ 
Though NASA acted on some of the recommendations, it did not allow 
OART to coordinate work in other program offices, and lack of direction 
continued to plague the whole program. 
In early 1963 Dr. R. W. Gerard, from the University of Michigan, was 
asked to evaluate the Ames life-science program. In the course of his evalua- 
tion (see below), he criticized the whole NASA life-sciences program, making 
many of the same points that his predecessors had. Later in the year 
Dr. Eugene Konecci, head of the Biotechnology and Human Research Divi- 
sion within OART, conducted yet another study of life sciences at Ames. 
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Understandably, Konecci was most concerned with what he saw as inade- 
quate attcntion to applied research that i.t.oil!d directly support iimimcd 
spaceflight. The failures Konecci identified at Ames, however, reflected 
Washington’s continued failure to  provide clear directions in research, as well 
as the center’s resistance to  pressure from outside sources - including NASA 
Headquarters.’ 
Konecci’s criticisms, while partially valid, reflected also the continuing 
struggle within Headquarters to  define exactly what NASA required from 
life sciences, t o  decide who was to do what, and to set priorities. Just as 
Konecci was concerned with human factors, so managers of OSS might argue 
that NASA was not devoting enough effort to space biology and exobiol- 
The next year, still another survey of the program produced the Life 
Sciences Directors Group, headed by the director of space medicine under 
OMSF, Dr. W. Randolph Lovelace. As had been true with past attempts at 
workable solutions, true coordination remained out of reach; competition 
continued to  create confusion. 
In 1969-1970, having received sets of similar recommendations for 
almost 10 years, NASA made yet another try. The most important measure 
was the appointment of a single life-sciences director, responsible for coordi- 
nation of the entire program. Most life-science elements would be under his 
direction; those located under other NASA groups would be under his review 
for coordination within the entire program.2 The change was intended to 
improve communications between life sciences and the NASA administra- 
tion, as well as the outside scientific community. 
The man picked for the director’s position was Dr. Charles Berry, who 
had been in charge of the medical program for Gemini and Apollo. Highly 
successful in this position, he was well known in NASA’s upper echelons. 
Although Berry would have his difficulties, his access to  top officials would 
be helpful. Though his own interests were in the manned aspects of Apollo, 
at least some of the life scientists in the other areas believed his appointment 
was, on the whole, advantageous.22 
Under OMSF in 1970, the life-sciences office was transferred to  OSS in 
1975. Although no change in program content was intended, it is not 
surprising that biomedical problems received a lower priority in OSS than 
they had enjoyed in OMSF. 
EARLY PROBLEMS AT AMES 
In the early 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  an observer might well have concluded that life 
sciences and Ames were not ready for each other. The difficulties were dif- 
fuse, some stemming from tangible problems of logistics, some much more 
subtle. The result was multiple tensions. 
101 
From the beginning, the problems that beset life sciences at Headquar- 
ters were reflected at Ames. One of these was lack of leadership. Webb 
Haymaker, though appointed in July 1961 to head the new life-sciences 
facility, did not arrive at Ames until near the end of the year. Therefore it 
was not until the beginning of 1962 that he was really familiar with the job. 
With a program barely defined and with vigorous competition among the 
interested parties in Headquarters, any director would have found the task 
formidable, but Haymaker proved an unlucky choice. A strong administrator 
was needed to shape the Ames program, build a strong relationship with 
De France and the rest of Ames, and bargain with Headquarters for an 
important place in the overall scheme of things. Haymaker was unsuited for 
the role. 
The new director, a research-oriented academic, was determined to 
continue with his own work, studying the effects of cosmic rays on the 
brain. Flying primates on balloons, Haymaker was often absent from Ames 
retrieving his experiments or involved in the time-consuming work of brain- 
tissue analysis. In a situation that called for a leader with an overview of the 
whole directorate, Haymaker built a strong research team in the neuro- 
sciences, his own field, but left his subordinates to manage other areas. 
Strong-willed and determined to go his own way, he soon ran afoul of 
De France, equally strong-willed. As a colleague expressed it retrospectively, 
“De France was really intolerant of managers who didn’t manage. y y 2  The 
absences of Haymaker and the more orthodox style of his immediate subor- 
dinate, Dale Smith, tended to create a dichotomy of administration that 
newly hired researchers found maddening. Less than two years after he was 
appointed, Haymaker stepped down from the directorship, though he 
remained at Ames as a research scientist. After a search of several months, 
Dr. Harold Klein, then head of the Exobiology Division, agreed to become 
the new director in January 1964. 
Klein proved an effective head of the ailing program. Formerly head of 
the biology department at Brandeis University, he had originally joined the 
Ames staff while on sabbatical from his academic post. The challenge of 
building a smoothly running, well equipped, and productive organization 
from scratch was not new to him, since Brandeis itself was barely 14 years 
old. As department head, Klein had been heavily involved with planning 
facilities, recruiting staff, and raising funds. Realizing that new directorates, 
like new departments, do not run themselves, Klein attended to day-to-day 
responsibilities. 
Another problem was the set of expectations with which many life 
scientists arrived at Ames. As originally envisioned by the Kety Committee, 
NASA’s life sciences was to be strongly rooted in the academic community. 
The appointment of Haymaker, an academic, and. the subsequent hiring of 
the Ames life-sciences staff produced a group of researchers largely drawn 
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from universities. Haymaker and his staff believed that the atmosphere in 
the directorate would be much the same as at the universities they had left. 
This was not true, and the differences manifested themselves in numer- 
ous frustrating ways. Freedom to select one’s own research problems is a 
great attraction of academia, and the biologists, chemists, and physicists who 
arrived at Ames expecting to pursue their own interests exclusively soon 
found that NASA’s needs did not necessarily correspond with their own 
interests; schedules sometimes forced them to curtail unfinished research and 
move on to other topics. The civil servant’s time clock was an irritant. Aca- 
demics are noted for irregular working habits and hours, but the research 
center began the day promptly at 8 and ended it at 5. De France, used to the 
regulated hours and work habits of a career civil servant, balked at keeping 
the new life-sciences library open on weekends. He disliked professional 
seminars during working hours for what he regarded as extracurricular 
self-improvement. 
Another handicap was the lack of centralized facilities, important both 
for work and for constant interaction with colleagues. Universities routinely 
locate laboratories and offices close together. Ames management, remember- 
ing the laboratory built in the midst of a national emergency and the shoe- 
string budgets on which it had long operated, regarded such niceties as less 
than essential. Harold Klein spoke of the early difficulties: 
One of the things I wanted to do first was to get my motley 
crew into one location - they were spread out all over the place. 
Eventually there was to be a central research laboratory, but I 
didn’t want to wait. So we did a very unorthodox thing - we . . . 
rented a building on Charleston Road and built some beautiful 
laboratories. We were down there a couple of years. I had to argue 
with De France to do it. . . . Later, [after I became head of the 
directorate] we got our central building, [and] I wanted to have a 
library in it. De France was adamant - we weren’t going to have a 
library because Ames already had one. Over the library I threat- 
ened to quit. De France finally gave in and we got the library.24 
The newcomers encountered other obstacles to easy integration with 
Ames. The lack of direction in the life-sciences program left the boundaries 
of the original three divisions, exobiology, environmental biology, and bio- 
technology, unclear. Life-sciences funding came from two program offices 
in Headquarters; this caused a certain inflexibility in transferring money 
within the directorate, a handicap other Ames directorates did not have.25 
To add to the tension, the 1963 attempt by E. B. Konecci, as head of 
OART’s Biotechnology and Human Research Division, to concentrate on 
applied research in support of space operations left the space scientists 
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1964. Dr. Harold P.  Klein, 
Director of Life Sciences, 
explains a fine point to a visit- 
ing congressman. Klein, who 
headed the directorate for 
20 years, built Life Sciences 
into one of Ames’s strongest 
research areas. 
feeling abandoned by Headquarters. In the early years interaction between 
life sciences and the astronautical and aeronautical directorates remained 
minimal, reinforcing both the life scientists’ sense of isolation and the 
puzzlement of most everyone else as to what “they,” in the white coats, 
were doing. 
The 1963 Gerard report, which De France dismissed angrily as the 
product of Gerard’s wounded feelings at being left out of Biosatellite discus- 
sions, appears to have been a sound analysis of the general malaise of the 
life-sciences program, both within NASA as a whole and specifically at 
Ames.’ Proceeding from the general to the embarrassingly specific, the 
report probably did not reveal much that the life scientists did not already 
know firsthand. 
Gerard’s findings only underlined the larger unsolved questions within 
NASA Headquarters regarding life sciences. On the question of basic research 
versus applied research, Gerard urged, as had other academic critics, that 
NASA build an in-house capability that went beyond immediate needs. On 
the delicate balance between research “anarchy” and set-problem solving, he 
seemed to address De France: “The Life Sciences Directorate of Ames 
Research Center, presumably the entire Center, is not intended to be a 
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university-like mosaic of independent scholars and investigators, each pursu- 
ing his own intellectual interests; but neither is it intended to be an 
assembly-line problem-solving factory.’y27 
Gerard differentiated between independent and task-oriented research, 
calling for more specific guidelines on who was to be detailed to what proj- 
ects. He placed the blame for vagueness just as much on Washington as on 
Ames higher management. Reviewing project by project the research being 
supported at Ames, Gerard’s general impression was that much of the work 
was either too imprecisely defined or was not immediately recognizable as 
sufficiently valuable to merit further support. The program was floundering, 
and the life scientists were frustrated. 
Gerard’s report, while it was the first analysis that dealt specifically 
with Ames, was not singular in its revelations. The problems it defined were 
those of newness, growth, lack of leadership and direction, and gaps between 
expectations and realities. Time solved some of the problems with Headquar- 
ters, but those of conflicting jurisdiction remained. Over the following years, 
Harold Klein bridged many of the early differences between Ames manage- 
ment and life-sciences personnel. As the new director of life sciences at Ames 
saw it, he helped to open the center to a more flexible mode of operation, as 
well as to make the work atmosphere less frustrating for his staff. 
The latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s found life sciences pro- 
gressing in a much more organized fashion. The organization, after its early 
traumas, steadily established its reputation as an important segment of 
NASA’s research strength. During Apollo, Ames supported Houston in many 
of the biomedical areas and became heavily involved in the chemical and bio- 
logical analysis of lunar samples. During Project Viking, Klein headed the 
biology team which planned experiments on Mars and analyzed the resulting 
data. As valuable research began to  appear, the life-sciences directorate, by 
the end of 1965 housed in its own research facility, slowly came into its own 
part of the Ames community. 
LIFE SCIENCES ACCEPTED - MORE OR LESS 
For the young researchers who joined the life-sciences activity in the 
mid-1960s, many of the early problems were not particularly evident.28 The 
new laboratory helped to strengthen feelings of integration within the direc- 
torate itself and to establish life sciences as a permanent and tangible entity 
at Ames. In the halcyon years of relatively plush funding, Klein gathered 
equipment and facilities with an eye to the future. By the 1970s, Ames had 
an impressive array of sophisticated research tools, including human and 
animal centrifuges, electron microscopes, mass spectrometers, a variety of 
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well stocked laboratories, and’ a life-sciences library that could compete with 
those in academia. The equipment-buying policy, “loading us up wherever I 
could find a nickel,” Director Klein recalled,29 made it possible to continue 
to attract excellent staff, lured by research equipment better than that at 
most universities. The situation was similar to that of the prewar NACA, 
which had possessed the best assortment of aeronautical research tools in the 
country, and thereby attracted fine research talent. Dr. Harold Sandler of 
the Biomedical Research Division told a story familiar to Ames since its 
earliest years : 
I came from the University of Washington, trained in cardiovas- 
cular disease and physiology. I’d been drafted and sent to the 
Naval Air Development Center at Johnsville, Pennsylvania, which 
had the largest human centrifuge. I [used it to study] how the 
heart functions under gravitational loads. . . . After I went back to 
the University of Washington and research funding was hard to 
come by, I got a phone call from an [acquaintance] at Ames, who 
told me there were research opportunities here - there was a cen- 
trifuge here - would I be interested? I came down and took a 
look; they had all the elements I’d been working with at 
J~hnsvi l le .~ 
As the directorate built up its staff, it reorganized itself according to 
changing research needs and directions. Originally research had been organ- 
ized along the three lines of inquiry defined by the Kety Committee. Hence 
the original divisions were biotechnology, environmental biology, and 
exobiology. Because life sciences was a small directorate - at its largest it 
held approximately 180 people - organization within divisions remained 
relatively simple, focused around areas of study rather than facilities, in 
contrast to the early Ames divisions, which had been organized around wind 
tunnels. Over the years, the divisions and branches were rearranged a number 
of times. Though in many ways the same basic structure continued to exist, 
the new names and relationships reflected changing focuses within both 
Ames and NASA.31 During 1963-1976 the Life Sciences Directorate at 
Ames was under the authority, successively, of OART, OMSF, and OSS. The 
organizational changes at Ames reflect the differing interests and priorities of 
the three program offices. Though Ames learned to live with the somewhat 
tenuous organizational arrangements, the original problems present when the 
NASA life-sciences program was in its infancy in 1960-1962 remained fac- 
tors in the life of the Ames directorate. 
The arrival of life sciences at Ames was unfortunately timed. The old 
aeronautical laboratory was in the midst of other drastic changes - the shift 
to space research, the introduction of project work, the new presence of 
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large numbers of contract workers, and the growing complexity brought on 
by increased budgets and the necessity of political rationale.32 It is not sur- 
prising that white-coated biologists, chemists, and doctors caused tensions. 
A continuing problem, especially difficult to deal with during the 
Apollo years, was the division of duties between Ames and the Manned 
Spacecraft Center at Houston. The conflict began in 1960 when Randt 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to wrest the biomedical work associated with 
Project Mercury away from the Space Task Group. The complex issue, seen 
retrospectively, was really three-sided. The first was simply that of author- 
ity: the Space Task Group considered that its responsibility - manned space- 
flight - included all aspects of that job, including the biomedical ones. Life- 
sciences managers, both at the program office level and later under OART, 
contested this view. The problem was never really resolved over the years, 
despite the shifts in organization and attempts at bureaucratic solutions. 
The second aspect of the conflict was philosophical. Life-science man- 
agers at Ames saw their efforts in terms of the original Kety Committee’s 
plans for a strong in-house research facility. Though obviously life sciences 
would help solve problems related to humans in space, Ames researchers 
constituted a pool of talent involved in a variety of continuing quests relat- 
ing to space and the life sciences. In this view, Ames’s place under OART 
made sense. OMSF and Houston, however, tended to think of life sciences as 
a support team for Project Mercury or Apollo or whatever manned project 
demanded support. OMSF sometimes sponsored investigations in competi- 
tion with OART. As Klein remembered, “During the years Ames life sciences 
was under OART, OMSF was doing life-sciences research work too, but they 
weren’t calling it life sciences. They got into research OART was supposed to 
be doing, siphoned off research money from [other parts of their program] 
and did their own research.”33 
Eventually, a rough line was drawn and Ames concentrated mostly on 
animal research, leaving Houston the human research. Where Ames was also 
involved in human research, it was responsible for coordinating its efforts 
with Houston’s. Here was the third element of the conflict in the Ames- 
Houston relationship. The two life-science groups were very different in 
tone. Ames research was geared to long-term goals and general scientific 
curiosity; Houston was dominated by the overwhelming operational 
demands and frantic activity surrounding manned spaceflight. Driven by 
political pressures to accomplish well publicized goals, Houston was bound 
by time limits that Ames did not feel. A sense of urgency made the Texas 
center impatient and unwilling to leave the development and finished prod- 
ucts up to another center. Houston’s insistence on doing much of the bio- 
medical work was, from Ames’s perspective, insulting.34 
The organizational arrangement of life sciences at Headquarters was a 
continuing handicap to Ames. Klein thought it perhaps was the biggest 
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problem his directorate faced over the years. Interested in supporting that 
aspect of Ames’s work closest to their own fields, the program offices, as 
they took turns controlling Ames, kept the center struggling to offset what it 
perceived as an imbalance in research emphasis. Klein recalled, 
Working under OMSF, the problem was that they were inter- 
ested in manned spaceflight. They would listen attentively to us 
when we talked about our work in manned-spaceflight research 
and would tend to turn a deaf ear when we talked about aeronau- 
tics or exobiology. Now we’re in OSS. They don’t do any manned 
spaceflight, so when they go to Congress [for funding], they 
aren’t going to emphasize those  problem^.^ 
In spite of slow progress toward understanding and accommodation, 
the dealings of life sciences with the other two research groups at Ames 
remained in some ways as tenuous as its position within NASA as a whole. 
To this day there is a certain distance between the life sciences and aeronau- 
tical engineers. In many ways they go about their work differently. One 
example was publication. By training, aeronautical engineers did not publish 
technical reports until data had been checked and rechecked; life scientists, 
by contrast, published initial research results that might be rapidly outdated, 
adjusted, or even disproved.36 It was the difference between a “finished 
product’’ attitude and a “work in progress” approach to publication. 
For those engineers who had spent much or all of their careers working 
under the iron hand of De France, the life scientists must indeed have 
appeared to be a motley crew of revolutionaries. Perhaps the difference in 
tone between the engineers and life scientists was less a difference in their 
disciplines and more that between the university and the civil service. When 
the directorate was formed, the old NACA atmosphere fostered by 
De France was still very much present, and it is easy to imagine the mutually 
jarring effect the two groups had on each other. Under De France, for exam- 
ple, it had been forbidden for anyone under the rank of organizational 
director to sign an outgoing letter without approval.” Though De France was 
necessarily concerned with individuals making unapproved commitments or 
statements, the rule was ridiculous to the life scientists, many of them 
former members of university faculties. Klein claimed: 
We helped to make possible a more academic environment here. 
A lot of things we now take for granted at Ames we first punched 
*A concession had been won by Pioneer Project Manager Charles Hall earlier. Hall had received 
permission to sign all Pioneer outgoing mail and to receive incoming mail directly, “unheard of at 
Ames in 1962.” Hall interview, Dec. 1982. 
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through in life sciences, like . . . signing your own letters, having 
in-house research seminars. . . . We chipped away at a very closed, 
constrained ~ rgan iza t ion .~~  
Life scientists and their different research methods, organizational 
needs, and procedural expectations undoubtedly furthered the process of 
change at Ames, and in this were aided by other new influences. The growth 
of contracting, with contractor personnel at the center continuously, was 
one. Also important was De France’s retirement in 1965. Harvey Allen, the 
new director, had always been vigorously involved in research. Because his 
personal style was anything but bureaucratic, the new elements at the 
center found him approachable. 
In some areas, however, life sciences would never be in quite the same 
category as the rest of the research center. Where aeronautics and astronau- 
tics overlapped in facilities and funding, life sciences remained largely apart. 
Physically, life sciences also remained both small and separate, comprising 
less than a tenth of the center’s manpower and occupying only three build- 
ings. Perhaps, as the head of the Biomedical Research Division remarked, life 
sciences at Ames would always be an island, having little to do with the rest 
1962. Flight Research and Life Sciences combine efforts in experiments such as this one 
involving the 5-degrees-of-motion centrifuge, which studied pilot response to various 
motion patterns. 
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. 
1978. In this bed-rest study 
conducted by Life Science 
researchers, the female sub- 
ject is being tested on the 
effects of weightlessness and 
the ability to perform speci- 
fied tasks in space. 
of the center;38 but if that is true, the directorate also came to be accepted 
by Ames as being a valuable component of its research strength. 
As Ames gained its early reputation through crucial research, so did life 
sciences. Not only was the work proving essential to manned spaceflight, 
but aeronautical researchers also began to make use of the resident expertise 
to support aeronautical research. Interrelationships developed between life 
scientists and engineers involved in the human-factor aspect of aeronautics. 
Here, flight research questions and motion simulators dovetailed with the 
biotechnology division’s interests, and cooperative projects were born. 
During the Viking mission to Mars and the later Pioneer mission to Venus, 
exobiologists and researchers in astronautics collaborated to plan and imple- 
ment experiments. The growing involvement of life sciences with the aero- 
nautical and astronautical segments of Ames was demonstrated in 1973 by 
the creation of the Flight Experiments Office within the life-sciences 
directorate. 
In the biomedical research areas, outside connections with contractors 
and university research teams brought Ames into prominence outside the 
immediate NASA framework. The Biomedical Research Division at Ames 
tended to follow research directions that had potentially far-flung applica- 
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tions. Because of this, the research reached a wider audience than the more 
specific, applied research connected to space projects. Devices for measuring 
intercranial pressures, microcatheter developmental research, and bed-rest 
studies brought Ames into interaction with a whole new segment of the 
scientific community. 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System Office, within the Man-Vehicle 
Systems Research Division, proved to be another important avenue to the 
outside world. Heavily funded by the Federal Aviation Administration, the 
new office investigated reports of near-misses in flight. Attempting to iden- 
tify crucial elements in pilot stress and examining physical factors of acci- 
dents and near-accidents statistically, the office has developed an extensive 
bank of information. Because any participant or witness can anonymously 
submit information, the office has become well known as a neutral consul- 
tant, a case of a highly visible and obviously pragmatic application of 
research to benefit the public. 
The life sciences, especially biomedicine, touched more lives and 
excited more everyday interest than did aeronautics and astronautics. Some 
dramatic episodes - probably not representative of the directorate’s real 
strengths - brought Ames and NASA fascinating and positive publicity. One 
such episode occurred in 1968, when a holdup victim was shot in the head. 
Surgery was impossible; by subjecting the patient to  a 6-g force in the Ames 
centrifuge, however, a bullet fragment was shifted slightly, to a position 
where it would be less dangerous.40 At least twice, physicians at the local 
hospitals borrowed pressure suits from Ames - suits similar to those worn 
by the astronauts - to bring persistent hemorrhaging under contr01.~’ 
Such dramatic episodes, if ironic when viewed in the context of, Ames’s 
40-year history, also confirmed the wisdom of seeking new research mis- 
sions. Ames under De France, like the NACA under George Lewis and Hugh 
Dryden, had shunned publicity and had seen no need to seek approval or 
fame outside a narrow circle of professionals who were already convinced of 
Ames’s importance. Yet by 1960 Ames management had recognized the 
need to reach a wider audience, if only to keep pace with the colorful space 
activities that brought NASA overwhelming support in the 1960s. Life 
sciences brought the center out of its narrower environment and helped to 
modernize its personality. But the institution paid a price that may not have 
been foreseen: De France’s laboratory was radically transformed into a real 
research center. 
The difficult birth of the life-sciences program at Ames is significant in 
another way. Many of the problems that beset the directorate within Ames 
also beset Ames in the larger NASA context. Just as life sciences saw itself 
an “in-house research facility,” so Ames had enjoyed just that identification 
throughout the NACA years. Under NASA, both found themselves fre- 
quently cast in the role of problem-solvers for the space effort, a role that 
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both resented. Basic research is a slow process of fits and starts, wrong turns, 
and much rethinking of problems. It seeks understanding, before solutions, 
and generally does not respond well to the pressure of fixed deadlines. For 
both the life-sciences academics and the aeronautical engineers used to the 
NACA’s frugality, NASA’s commitment to fast problem-solving with big 
budgets, though admittedly necessary in the new age, was close to sacrilege. 
For some the transition was easier than for others, but for all it was a major 
change, and one that was only gradually accomplished. 
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6 
AMES DURING NASA’s GOLDEN YEARS, 
1958-1969 
As we have seen, the addition of the Life Sciences Directorate at Ames 
was a direct result of the transformation of the NACA into NASA, and one 
that was traumatic for Ames in a number of ways. As life sciences personnel 
brought new expertise to the center, they also weakened the community of 
interests that had been a source of strength. And the new directorate was 
only one of the radical changes occurring at Ames during NASA’s first 
decade. 
That NASA would bring great changes to the old laboratories was per- 
ceived from the first, and the NACA, whatever its shortcomings, had inspired 
great institutional loyalty; many employees had spent their entire careers 
working for the NACA. They were convinced that its conservative and 
thrifty qualities, as well as its committee form of organization, were far 
preferable to a large agency, where politics might replace solid profession- 
alism and feasibility studies might kill daring research schemes before they 
had a chance to be tried. Many NACA employees were leery of NASA at the 
beginning, even though they recognized that the NACA had been caught in 
an increasingly difficult situation, struggling between fixed appropriations 
and expanding requirements. 
NACA veterans, reminiscing years later about the old organization, con- 
tinued to stress the quality of the work done under its sponsorship and the 
quality of men hired. Clarence Syvertson, remembering his early years at 
Ames, recalled that Associate Director Parsons “looked over in detail every 
single man we hired in those days, so far as his record was concerned. I know 
if I proposed to hire someone he didn’t think was quite up to snuff, he let 
me know it right away.”’ The character of the NACA was seen as exemplify- 
ing that of its leaders, from Ames to Dryden. Old employees felt strongly 
about the institution, stressing the “basic honesty and integrity and the 
efficiency. ’72 As another veteran remembered, “Everything was honest and 
straightforward, or we didn’t do it. We never would have thought of any- 
thing except the most straightforward honest approach to all the contracts 
and to all the relations with industry, and everything we did.773 
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That the NACA was honest, straightforward, and nonpartisan was 
firmly believed by many of its employees. Yet another conviction was that 
the very structure of the old NACA had been decisive in creating an organi- 
zation in which there was no “hanky panky.” Vannevar Bush, describing the 
evolution of the National Science Foundation, had praised the NACA form 
of organization, in which the director was responsible to the Main 
Committee: 
We had an excellent organization in the old National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, a board made up of military officers 
and other government officials, plus citizens appointed by the 
President, which selected a director and reviewed his operations. 
When this was transformed into NASA it took the form [of a 
director appointed by and responsible to the President]. I think 
this was a mistake and said so at the time, for I have great sym- 
pathy for a director who stands alone before the public and 
Congress. But the men who organized it did not agree with me.4 
The same sentiment was echoed by others, including James Doolittle, 
the last chairman of the NACA.’ Manley Hood, who had been at the labora- 
tory since 1940, spoke for his colleagues many years later: 
A lot of us feel [that NASA should have been set up as the 
NACA had been]. We had as a Board of Directors, for free, the 
best brains we could find, and we had in addition to those. . . the 
technical committees and technical subcommittees, and member- 
ship on those committees was sought after by a lot of different 
people. A lot of the members.. . were industry people, and they 
brought the industry viewpoint to those of us in the research job 
and a lot of them were military and there was a good angle 
there.. . . we had good friends all around. Industry was our good 
friend because we supported them with the research results they 
needed. . . . during those years we were not their best customer, as 
NASA became later. We weren’t important as a customer, so the 
relationship was easy to maintain on a fair, honest, ethical level.6 
IMMEDIATE CHANGES 
Old NACA employees were immediately annoyed because Hugh 
Dryden had not been appointed head of the agency. Respect for Dryden was 
high, and his reputation as a scientist was renowned. He had never been a 
politicking promoter of the NACA, leaving that to Executive Secretary John 
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Victory, a master at the task. Dryden saw his job as directing research and 
development, and at that he had been highly efficient. His strongest sup- 
porters could not have called him an exciting leader, however; and Dryden 
had appeared stodgy to many of those planning the NASA organization. He 
had made only modest projections regarding what could be quickly accom- 
plished in space. Even worse, he had referred to Wernher von Braun’s pro- 
posal for a 250-kilometer manned space shot as akin to shooting a lady out 
of a cannon,’ an unfortunate remark since von Braun’s charisma had always 
found supporters on Capitol Hill. By personality and training incapable of 
promising more than he could deliver, Dryden was simply too low-key for 
the head NASA position. Dryden’s final failing, however, was that he was a 
Democrat. Since NASA had been set up with the administrator reporting 
directly to the President, it naturally followed that the new post was a politi- 
cal appointment, changing with presidential administrations. 
T. Keith Glennan, the new NASA administrator, was a staunch 
Republican. The political flavor of NASA was, from the beginning, a bitter 
pill for old NACA personnel, who had proudly believed that the NACA was 
above pol i t ia8 Many Ames employees saw the appointment of Glennan as a 
fair indication of the evils of political agencies, as opposed to nonpartisan 
committees. Before James Doolittle had become chairman of the NACA, 
academics had always headed the Committee; and Doolittle could claim a 
long and impressive association with aeronautics and an apprenticeship 
served on NACA committees. Glennan, a complete outsider, was sarcastically 
referred to by some as “that Hollywood man from the  movie^."^ The 
epithet was only partially true, but Glennan had absolutely no experience or 
technical training in anything remotely resembling aeronautics. 
With an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, Glennan had 
indeed worked for the motion picture industry, specializing in sound sys- 
tems. During World War 11, he had headed the Navy’s Underwater Sound 
Laboratories; after the war he had served on the Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion. As president of Case Institute of Technology, he had an excellent repu- 
tation for management and had vastly improved the reputation of the 
school. His supporters hoped he could provide the energy needed to launch a 
vigorous agency. He was hardly only “the man from Hollywood,” but to 
professionals whose careers had been molded by men like Ames, Lewis, and 
De France, he appeared suspect. For old-timers at Ames especially, far from 
Washington and not especially sympathetic to political realities, Glennan’s 
appointment seemed ludicrous.’ 
Glennan’s insistence on creating the post of associate administrator did 
nothing to dispel distrust at the laboratory. The new official would be a 
general manager for NASA, to coordinate programs and to relieve Deputy 
Administrator Dryden of some management pressure. The idea stemmed 
from Glennan’s experience on the Atomic Energy Commission, and against 
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almost unanimous opposition he succeeded in having the position established 
by early 1959, when NASA issued its first organization charts.” 
To critics at Ames, the new post seemed an unnecessary complication. 
Management under the NACA had been simple. Laboratories merely 
reported to Gus Crowley, Dryden’s subordinate. The decision-making pro- 
cess had been relatively straightforward; and the laboratories had been left 
a good deal of independence on many matters. This had been even more true 
of Ames than of the other laboratories, both because of the distance factor 
and because of the respect in which De France was held. The appearance of 
an associate administrator suggested that, in general, there would be much 
more management from Washington in the future. 
And specifically, the new post removed the laboratory one step further 
from the NASA administrator.12 Though Ames, Langley, and Lewis still 
reported directly to Crowley, now the director of aeronautical and space 
research, Crowley reported to the associate administrator. The laboratories 
no longer had as direct a line to the top as they once had, and bureaucracy 
took another step forward. Furthermore, the field installations that had been 
designated part of the space effort - Beltsville (later Goddard Space Flight 
Center), the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, von Braun’s Huntsville group, 
Wallops Pilotless Flight Station, and Cape Canaveral - reported to the direc- 
tor of spaceflight development. This administrative arrangement split the 
laboratories, making communication among them more difficult. The old 
simplicity of organization was disappearing, and in the first months of NASA 
the prospect must have been disquieting ai Ames. 
Two more developments over the next decade would change Ames sig- 
nificantly. Under the NACA, the laboratories had functioned primarily as 
research institutions. Though the development phase of research often fol- 
lowed almost automatically as work progressed, emphasis was on the investi- 
gative process, whether the research was basic or applied. When Ames 
scientists and engineers had done specific problem-solving for industry or the 
military, the developmental stage of the project was usually left to the 
organization that had requested help. The NACA had been knowledge- 
oriented, not goal-oriented. NASA was different, being charged with devel- 
oping, constructing, and operating space vehicles. NASA had the authority 
to contract out work to other government agencies, industry, or individ- 
u a l ~ . ~ ~  The agency had a goal, exploitation of the space frontier. A new 
vocabulary emphasized the change in orientation: research centers had “proj- 
ects,” “project responsibilities,” “missions”; new employees were welcomed 
“on board.” The specificity of NASA’s reason for existence immediately 
added a more urgent aspect to the developmental phase of research. As 
projects grew ever more sophisticated, the developmental aspects grew ever 
more complicated. 
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The second development was large-scale contracting. In the NACA, 
most work had been done in-house by civil servants. The goals of NASA 
made this impossible, because some tasks were one-time assignments not 
requiring permanent staff, and because NASA did not have within its organi- 
zation the specific capabilities needed to get certain jobs done. By 1962, 
90% of NASA’s work was done under ~ 0 n t r a c t . I ~  The same year, Ames 
awarded contracts totaling $14.4 million, only 2% of NASA’s total contract- 
ing commitments but still an impressive amount.” Over the next decade, 
Ames found its administrative burden greatly increased by contracting. The 
financial management, monitoring, and coordination of contracts involved 
even the researchers in administrative duties from which they had largely 
been free in the past.16 
The tendency toward more extensive contracting helped change the 
collective personality of Ames. In 1958, permanent employees numbered 
1406. By 1968, there were 2084 employees,“ along with a substantial 
increase in the number of contract employees working at Ames. By this 
process Ames was gradually divided between in-house and contractor 
employees, a split that mirrored the larger split Ames seems to have felt 
between itself and the headquarters organization full of new people. Those 
who were at Ames under contract could not feel the same sense of identifi- 
cation with the research renter that its permanent staff did. At the same 
time, the old Ames employees felt a strong distinction between themselves 
and outside contractors. The appearance of contractor personnel at Ames, 
“outsiders” to the old NACA staff, is one of the frequently mentioned 
changes brought by NASA.18 The feeling among Ames employees that they 
were part of a community with certain inbred standards of work and con- 
duct had been inspired by De France and further nourished by uncompli- 
cated lines of administration. Everyone knew everyone else and most of the 
staff seemed to have believed firmly in the excellence of the parent institu- 
tion. This feeling of community began to be undermined as the presence of 
contract employees became impossible to ignore. Seen as temporary, even 
though their employer’s contracts might be almost indefinite in length, 
contract employees were indeed aware that they were crashing uninvited 
into what had been a tightly knit organization. In the eyes of many of the 
older staff, the invasion of contractors effectively destroyed the personality 
of the old Ames.lg 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
The growing complexity of Ames and the need to regroup some proj- 
ects for the sake of efficiency led to a major reorganization at the end of 
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1959. The changes reflected the tendency toward classification by goal 
rather than by related research areas. This was to be the first of several major 
reorganizations in the next few years, as the place of Ames in the NASA 
hierarchy unfolded and the center’s major areas of commitment became 
clear. The 1959 changes, while extensive, were more a realigning than a 
major upheaval. A similar process was going on in all the old NACA labora- 
tories. Two years after NASA’s establishment, the changes were described 
and analyzed in one of the professional journals, using Lewis Research 
Center as an example.20 
At Lewis, one of the major factors in the ability to convert from aero- 
nautical concerns to space research was the flexibility of facilities. The 
changeover was accomplished in less than three years, with little extra spend- 
ing. The old altitude wind tunnel, for example, was converted into a giant 
vacuum chamber and used for reentry studies on the Project Mercury cap- 
sule. Another factor was foresight in planning research programs that 
allowed for elasticity. A program in missile propulsion that had been begun 
in 1956 was easily converted to additional space work as rocket develop- 
ment advanced. In this same period, Lewis also shuffled and reshuffled its 
research teams to meet the new needs. Old teams were in some cases broken 
up, and new teams were constructed to create new combinations of exper- 
tise. Individuals were retrained. Rather quickly, the old NACA laboratory 
converted itself to new tasks. Flexibility in facilities, research capabilities, 
and staff expertise made the transition possible. In 1956, 60% of Lewis’s 
work had been on airbreathing engines for manned aircraft; in 1960, the 
work was 73% space-re!ated.21 
A similar process was being accomplished at Ames. The 1959 reorgani- 
zation was the beginning of a transition in administrative lines of command 
designed to accommodate future demands on the center. Specifically, the 
distinction between research that was primarily aeronautical and that which 
was space-related became sharper. This had been tacitly true previously, in 
the distinction between the Full-scale and Flight Research Division and the 
High-speed Research Division, but the new organizational tendencies under- 
lined t h k 2  
Since 1954 one assistant director, Russell Robinson, had been aided by 
two technical assistants. With the 1959 changes, Harvey Allen, who had been 
in charge of the High-speed Research Division, was made an assistant direc- 
tor, and the two high-speed, space-oriented divisions were placed under his 
supervision. Thus the importance of space-related research was proclaimed 
and a greater distinction made between the  discipline^.^^ 
Allen’s old High-speed Research Division was recast as the Aero- 
Thermodynamics Division, with new branches organized more by task than 
by facility. The division included the supersonic free-flight wind tunnel 
branch, the heat transfer branch, the fluid mechanics branch with the 1- by 
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%foot supersonic tunnels and the 2- by 2-foot transonic tunnel attached, 
and the trisonic aerodynamics branch with the 6- by 6-foot supersonic 
tunnel attached. Space-connected pieces of the old high-speed division were 
recast as part of the Vehicle Environment Division under Al Eggers. This 
division, which reported to Allen, was composed of a physics branch, an 
entry simulation branch, a structural dynamics branch, the 3.5-foot hyper- 
sonic wind tunnel branch, and the hypervelocity ballistic range branch. Two 
of the old high-speed tunnels - the 14-foot transonic tunnel and the 10- by 
14-inch supersonic tunnel - were deactivated and their personnel reassigned. 
Assistant Director Russell Robinson now had three divisions under his 
supervision. The Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel Division was unchanged, but the 
Full-Scale and Flight Research Division was renamed the Full-scale and 
Systems Research Division, signifying another change in direction. The divi- 
sion had lost the heat-transfer branch to the Aero-Thermodynamics Division 
because of its space-related uses, but had gained a guidance and control 
branch. As regrouped, the division was composed of the following branches: 
40- by 80-foot wind tunnel, flight and systems simulation and operations, 
dynamics analysis, and guidance and control. Harry Goett, who had long 
headed the full-scale division, had by 1959 become head of the Goddard 
Space Flight Center in Maryland. The new division chief was Charles Harper, 
who had worked under Goett. 
Ames had suffered another loss in its low-speed division, reflected in 
the loss of “flight research” from the division’s title. In 1959 NASA Head- 
quarters had moved most of Ames’s flight research to its Flight Research 
Center at Edwards Air Force Base. Ames retained the V/STOL research, 
because the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel was necessary for the work. The 
decision was not happily received at Ames, where oldtimers saw their realms 
of research and reputation being blithely reassigned even as the center was 
being forced to embrace fields in which it had no previous experience. The 
loss of flight research must have been a particularly bitter pill, since the 
deicing work done in that branch had not only been Ames’s very first work, 
but had also gone far to establish the reputation of the young research insti- 
tution. Indeed, the transfer was a real handicap to Ames’s continuing 
involvement in areas requiring flight research support, including high-speed 
flight dynamics, variable-stability aircraft, and man-machine integration. 
The third division under Robinson, the Instrumentation Division, also 
reflected the growing need to coordinate and centralize activities to serve 
new research needs. Instrumentation had previously been organized sepa- 
rately from the research divisions, and had reported to either Parsons or 
De France. In the research divisions, a certain amount of instrumentation 
had been done ad hoc as the need arose. The organization of a separate 
instrumentation division was an attempt to coordinate this area of research 
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more efficiently. Years later one of Robinson’s technical assistants, Manley 
Hood, observed that the NACA had been 
slow in developing a group that could do real sophisticated instru- 
ment work. . . . We depended on the simple little instruments like 
I worked on in my first year down there. They served up to a 
point, but I think we were slow in getting to the real kind. . . . I 
think it was only when we got in NASA that we got real fine 
instrument groups.24 
From the beginning, the Instrumentation Division was well differentiated, 
with branches concentrating in vehicle instrumentation research, facilities 
instrumentation research, electronic machine computing, and mechanical 
and electronic instruments, another illustration of the growing need to 
define much more closely the boundaries of research. 
The administrative, technical services, and engineering services divisions 
still reported directly to the associate director or director, but this too would 
change over the next few years. As administration grew more complicated, 
the organization charts would reveal a greater differentiation among the non- 
research segments of the laboratory, a symptom of growing bureaucracy. 
Though Glennan was NASA administrator only a little over two years, 
Ames’s future was much affected during that time. The decision to place a 
life-sciences research group at Ames was made during his administration. In 
late 1958 a Manned Satellite Team was also appointed from among Ames 
personnel to consider design problems and propose a practical system for a 
satellite, at the same time recommending a suitable research program The 
team was headed by Alfred Eggers, who had already been working on lifting 
bodies for some time. Glennan later revealed that he had wanted to convert 
Ames into a manned spaceflight l a b ~ r a t o r y , ~ ~  and the manned satellite team, 
in all likelihood, was connected to the conversion. Nothing came of the 
scheme, but Eggers’s team, and later the Ames Manned Lunar Mission Team 
under Alvin Seiff, were influential in planning the Apollo program. 
Administrative flux was to continue at Ames for some time. The life- 
sciences group brought its own administrative problems as it attempted to 
build a solid research unit, and the established divisions of the laboratory 
were also rearranged over the next few years. The next important change 
came in August 1962, when a separate Space Sciences Division was estab- 
lished and placed under Harvey Allen. The new division had only one branch 
at first, theoretical studies. Staffing proceeded slowly, with much work con- 
tinuing to be contracted out because of the lack of personnel.26 The division 
was headed by Charles Sonett, who had been at NASA’s Office of Space 
Sciences. 
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Sonett was the second major Ames appointment from “outside ”; Webb 
Haymaker, appointed to head the Life Sciences Directorate, had been the 
first. As the laboratory expanded both in personnel and in research direc- 
tions, the trend was to continue, further weakening the homogeneity of the 
old NACA staff. The development was unavoidable, given the complexities 
of administration and the expanding fields into which Ames was moving, but 
it further diluted the personality of the laboratory even as it lessened the 
isolation that Ames had experienced during the NACA years. 
Dramatic organizational changes continued so that by January 1964 
Ames’s organization chart was barely recognizable when compared to one of 
the late NACA period. Three major developments are striking. 
First, the tacit division between conventional aeronautics and space- 
related studies had been made explicit - Harvey Allen had been named 
assistant director for astronautics. The new title only underlined the change 
made by the establishment of the Space Sciences Division. Allen’s colleague 
Russell Robinson, the assistant director for aeronautics and flight systems at 
the time, recalled that he had questioned the establishment of the Astronau- 
tics Directorate, feeling “it caused too much of a distinction to be made 
between the two aeronautical areas. Research areas are always overlapping; 
the creation of an Astronautics Directorate blurred this fact.”27 
Creation of the directorate was a logical progression of events that had 
begun a decade earlier with Allen’s blunt-body concept for nose cones. High- 
speed aeronautics had involved space research for years, as witnessed by the 
1956-1964 lifting-body work, the creation of the Vehicle Environment Divi- 
sion in 1959, and the simulation work begun in the late 1950s. Especially 
with the loss of a major portion of its flight research, Ames had to carve new 
research territories. Establishment of the life-sciences group and the formal 
differentiation between aeronautics and astronautics were conscious moves 
on the part of De France to maintain the position of the research center in a 
rapidly changing environment.28 In the case of life sciences, the departure 
from Ames’s past work was radical; the move into astronautics, while less 
drastic, indicated that Ames would be increasingly involved in development 
work. 
The 1958 Manned Satellite Team and the 1960 Manned Lunar Mission 
Team were precursors of later project work, the second major development 
of the 1958-1965 period. Immediately following the formation of NASA, 
Ames had tried to obtain responsibility for the Orbiting Astronomical Obser- 
vatory planned by  headquarter^.^' Top Ames leaders were split on the issue; 
De France and Allen had mixed feelings on the wisdom of getting involved in 
project work of any sort. Headquarters vetoed the proposal, but in 1960 
Ames again moved toward project management. Alfred Eggers, who had 
been one of the major researchers in the earlier lifting-body work - and who 
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by 1960 was head of the Vehicle-Environment Division under Allen - began 
investigating the possibility of an exploratory solar probe. 
The collaboration of Eggers, his Assistant Division Chief Charles Hall, 
and a few others produced a 1961 proposal for a solar probe project to be 
managed by Ames. NASA Headquarters was still lukewarm to the thought of 
Ames taking on major projects because of their lack of experience in project 
work, but after a study by an outside contractor on a smaller, interplanetary 
probe, De France and Associate Director Jack Parsons took the proposal to 
Washington to make a case for the Ames project. In November 1962 Ames 
received permission to proceed with what became known as Pioneer, a series 
of interplanetary probes. 
The Pioneer project, or series of projects, would reestablish Ames as a 
crucial part of NASA. Without considering here the technical history of the 
project (chap. lo),  a few observations are worthwhile. First, De France’s 
decision to campaign actively for the project in Washington marked a change 
from his earlier doubts about Ames as a manager of large space projects. He 
was probably responding to both outside pressure to make Ames more useful 
to NASA and inside pressure from younger staff members who recognized 
that the center must not only bend with events but actively seek new spheres 
of influence. It was a measure of De France’s excellence as an administrator 
that, after an entire career devoted to aeronautics and the administration of 
an aeronautical laboratory, he could embrace the new proposal and lend it 
the weight of his reputation. The mere concept of Pioneer was an interplane- 
tary distance removed from De France’s 139th Aero Squadron of 1918. 
Second, as originally conceived, Pioneer was a much more modest proj- 
ect than it eventually became. Not only was Headquarters seemingly reluc- 
tant to make a major commitment, but Ames itself still lacked the necessary 
manpower. The project was approved in 1962 with the stipulation that no 
more than 30 people be assigned to it, a measure of the limited commit- 
~nen t .~ ’  As time passed, Ames continued to promote the project in Washing- 
ton, successfully urging additions to the original undertaking - another 
major change from earlier years. With less money at stake and few political 
overtones, the NACA had granted research authorizations with much less 
fanfare, and they could often be expanded with no further formalities. 
Charles Hall, who had played a leading role in developing the proposals 
for Pioneer and became the project leader, was an example of the successful 
transition from aeronautics to astronautics made by many of the Ames staff. 
Employed at Ames since 1942, Hall’s early career had been in low-speed 
aeronautics. He had worked on the P-38 dive problem and on P-51 stability 
and control tests, both accomplished in the busy l6-foot wind tunnel. In the 
late 1940s he had been involved in research on wing planforms and had 
tackled the problem of submerged inlet design. In the mid-1950s he had 
been responsible for the development of conical camber on wings to reduce 
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drag due to lift. In 1957 Hall was branch chief of the 6- by 6-foot supersonic 
wind tunnel, and with the 1959 organizational changes became the assistant 
division chief, under Eggers, of the Vehicle Environment Division. 
Apart from his ability to move competently through a wide range of 
aeronautical research problems into what would become space research, Hall 
also displayed another talent that would be increasingly necessary to the 
research institution, that of planning and managing on a large scale. Over the 
18 years of Pioneer, Hall proved to be a highly effective manager. The talents 
necessary were far removed from those needed in research and involved a 
whole new set of problems, ranging from the coordination of the many con- 
tract proposals connected to Pioneer to the management of huge sums of 
money and the dovetailing of various research teams. 
Early in 1963 Ames also acquired a second major project, Biosatellite. 
The project grew out of a 1961-1962 study made at Ames, in which 
monkeys were to be tested for the effects of two weeks in orbit. As interest 
in biological experiments in space grew, a long-term project also grew around 
proposals submitted by a variety of research institutions and universities. 
When authorization was received, Carlton Bioletti was appointed project 
manager. More heavily funded than Pioneer, but beset from the start by con- 
ceptual and management problems, Biosatellite nevertheless was to perform 
many experiments for outside institutions over the years. Early in the proj- 
ect, Ames built a 50-foot-diameter centrifuge to aid in testing the monkey 
subjects, another piece of equipment that would in time be used for a variety 
of purposes. 
The two projects acquired by Ames within such a short period necessi- 
tated yet another reorganization of the center in 1963. Involving facilities, 
management problems, and research groups that differed from those asso- 
ciated with Ames’s existing research divisions, the new projects were placed 
under a new directorate, Development. To provide the new equipment 
needed, a Systems Engineering Division was organized under John Foster 
and attached to the Development Directorate. Forced to contract for much 
of its equipment and personnel, the directorate was from the beginning 
rather isolated from the research divisions. Because of the personnel shortage 
at Ames, there was a constant effort to keep civil servants out of project 
work and save them for the old research divisions; Biosatellite employed 
about 70 Ames personnel, Pioneer around 40. Though Robert Crane, the 
assistant director for development, hoped to create a symbiotic exchange of 
ideas and personnel between the research divisions and the Ames-managed 
projects, it would seem interdependence was less than it might have been. 
The result was another schism of the research center’s staff. 
Finally the 1964 organization chart revealed yet another contrast 
between the ways NASA and the NACA worked. Under the NACA, research 
was decided upon in a number of ways, but usually it was a natural progres- 
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sion stemming from ideas that promised to be exciting, like those of Harvey 
Allen, or from ongoing problems that needed solving, like those of transonic 
choking or heat transfer. NASA, however, had taken on the major task of 
putting a man on the Moon by the end of the decade, and this required not 
only large-scale centralized planning to accomplish the intermediate steps, 
but planning on the part of the research centers as well. Under NASA, 
advance planning became a conscious effort to generate research in specific 
directions that would fit into NASA’s larger plans and make the most effi- 
cient use of Ames’s facilities and personnel. 
To this end another new directorate was formed, Research and Devel- 
opment Analysis and Planning under Alfred Eggers. Eggers had been in 
charge of the 1958 Manned Satellite Team and had also been responsible for 
organizing the early solar probe proposals that resulted in the eventual 
assignment of the Pioneer project to Ames. The new directorate was short- 
lived. When Eggers was transferred to Washington, the Headquarters-inspired 
Mission Analysis Division absorbed the directorate’s functions. Under 
Clarence Syvertson, the new division undertook task analysis, while budge- 
tary planning was handled by a Programs and Resources Office. Despite the 
1963-1966 juggling of names and lines of authority, one thing was clear: the 
necessity for institutionalized planning and management represented further 
Ames involvement in the pre-research process, a distinct change from the 
years of low-budget, ad hoc feasibility studies, often with no paperwork 
at all. 
In the same vein the administrative duties that Arthur Freeman had 
handled since 1940 now had grown to a directorate with four divisions. 
Freeman was still in charge, but the differentiation of duties underneath him 
bespoke the growth in bureaucratic complexity. The financial details of the 
laboratory, for example, which Ferril Nickle had once handled on a scratch 
pad, were now divided between the Planning and Resources Office and the 
Fiscal Division. The increasing need for standardized procedures and com- 
puterized record-keeping did not necessarily make for financial clarity. Alan 
FayC, a technical assistant to Assistant Director Russell Robinson at the 
time, recalled that although “every penny came to be justified with volumi- 
nous paperwork [no one] knew for sure what funding had been spent, what 
was still available, or where additional funds might be found.”31 
The new organizational relationships tied Ames to NASA Headquarters 
with transcontinental red tape. The changes were necessary, given the variety 
of research being undertaken, the center’s supportive role in the space mis- 
sion, and the vast increase in funding. Whether unfortunate by definition or 
only by implication, increasing complexity in administrative processes was 
an unavoidable part of growth and diversity. Adjustment to  the new environ- 
ment was not easy, however. For an institution that had operated success- 
fully for decades with comparatively little complexity and bureaucracy, 
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unhampered by the political handicaps suffered by so many government- 
funded institutions, the 1960s were a difficult period. 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
A description of Ames prepared at NASA Headquarters in 1962 illus- 
trated the new role the center was to play as a research institution. Ames was 
moving steadily into goal-oriented research, and NASA’s primary goal was 
manned spaceflight and a lunar landing. Though aeronautics continued to 
hold its own with V/STOL studies and supersonic transport feasibility inves- 
tigations, astronautics was much more visible as a research field during the 
1961. One of the early reentry heating simulators. Ablation studies conducted here gave 
researchers new data on the behavior of various materials under reentry conditions. 
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1971. The gas dynamics laboratory during an experiment’s run. Researchers check condi- 
tions of the experiment and data being produced. 
period. The description illuminates the new alignment of research: “The 
principal mission. . . is basic and applied research on aerodynamics of 
re-entry vehicles, flight control of space vehicles and aircraft, and space envi- 
ronment physics. Ames conducts flight research into vertical and short 
takeoff aircraft problems, and landing problems of the supersonic trans- 
Estimates attributed 45% of Ames research to entry and environ- 
mental physics; 25% to aeronautics; 20% to guidance, control, and naviga- 
tion; 8% to life sciences; and 2% to space sciences.33 As the 1960s 
progressed, aeronautics would continue to play a secondary role in research, 
while space sciences would increase its toehold. 
128 
A fair measure of the changing directions at Ames can be seen in the 
frantic spurt of building in the early and mid-1960s. At NASA’s inception in 
1958, Ames was considered to be worth $80 million. By 1965 its research 
facilities were valued at $175 million. 
Building of new facilities paralleled new research directions, and one 
need was for facilities that could simulate reentry speeds and temperatures. 
In the early 1960s a hypervelocity research laboratory and shock tunnel 
were built. In 1965 the 3.5-foot tunnel, whose pebble-bed heater had never 
worked well enough to operate the wind tunnel at the speeds for which it 
had been desiped, was modified to operate using other gases, thereby simu- 
lating the Mars and Venus atmospheres. At the same time, a Mach 50 helium 
tunnel was completed, as was a hypervelocity free-flight facility that con- 
tained three separate testing devices. A new impact range was also built 
in the early 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  and in 1965 the speed of 11,300 m/sec was achieved in it. 
The impact range was used very successfully in meteoroid impact studies. 
Out of the need to reproduce the extreme heat to which a space vehicle 
would be subjected came research into efficient arc-jets and their subsequent 
construction. The arc-jet tunnel uses a powerful electric arc to heat pressur- 
ized air which, when released, flows through a supersonic throat and test 
section en route to an evacuated receiving chamber. Refinement produced 
higher and higher temperatures. In 1962, because of the success in attaining 
temperatures high enough to be useful in reentry research, a gasdynamics 
laboratory was built. By the late 1960s nine arc-jet tunnels were operational 
at A m e ~ . ~ ~  
Flight simulators, which had captured the interest of Harry Goett in the 
late 1950s and were now to prove as useful in space research as they had 
been in flight research, were also advanced during the 1960s. From the 
rather crude pitch-roll chair, which simulated motion cues to the pilot about 
two of the axes of an airplane, Ames advanced to the “five-degrees-of- 
freedom” motion simulator, In addition to pitch, roll, and yaw, there was 
motion along vertical and horizontal axes, the simulator cab being on the 
arm of a centrifuge. The simulator was constructed cheaply, in the old 
NACA tradition, out of bits and pieces of equipment from other projects. 
The 1961 simulator was further improved two years later, becoming a “six- 
degrees-of-freedom” simulator. Another inexpensive flight simulator was the 
vertical testing machine that was to prove useful in V/STOL and helicopter 
research. Ingeniously, the vertical testing machine was installed on the out- 
side of the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel, making use of both its height and its 
supporting framework. The apparatus cost $170,000, a pittance in compari- 
son to the amounts being spent on much of NASA’s test equipment, and 
NACA veterans continued to be proud of being able to use their imagination 
to get the most out of their money.35 
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Flight simulation was further enhanced by use of visual simulation. 
Using computers to program takeoff and landing characteristics of various 
aircraft made it possible to present a pilot with a screen upon which cockpit 
views were shown. The pilot could thereby go through the motions of con- 
trol using an instrument panel and the visual simulation picture, both con- 
nected to a computer. 
It was a safe and inexpensive way to create realistic conditions on the 
ground. A landing approach simulator, built in 1962, was to be used exten- 
sively in flight training during supersonic transport research. In the early 
1970s, when the Anglo-French Concorde was in its final test stages, the 
flight simulators were used in determining certification criteria. Ames pilots 
were exposed, via the simulators, to the Concorde’s handling characteristics. 
1965. Practicing landing approaches ‘yying” a double-delta-wing SST in a flight simula- 
tor. Such studies test the flight characteristics of  aircraft still in the design stage and also 
monitor pilot performance while making landings. 
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When an Ames pilot was given control of the airplane during one of the early 
flights, he was able to land it routinely with one engine dead. Simulator 
training had so conditioned the pilot that a potential emergency became 
routine, even though he had never flown the aircraft before.36 
Hypervelocity, arc-jet, and flight simulation facilities comprised the 
major portion of construction in the 1960s, but there were other important 
additions also. In 1965 a space environments research facility and a struc- 
tural dynamics laboratory were built to simulate conditions in space and the 
forces acting on spacecraft. In 1965 the Life Sciences Directorate gained a 
major research laboratory, and in 1966 a spaceflight guidance laboratory was 
built. Physically, the research center became much denser, as new buildings 
were inserted wherever there was room. 
The major problems connected to spaceflight focused on speed, the 
heat generated by speed, and control of the vehicle during flight. Ames’s 
facilities lent themselves to research in these areas in a number of ways. 
Early in the 1960s, for example, models of the Mercury and Gemini capsules 
were tested in the hypervelocity free-flight facility, where airflow patterns 
were studied and stability experiments were performed. In 1962 flight simu- 
lators and Apollo capsule models were used to test spacesuit designs. Under 
flight conditions, astronauts tested the suits’ mobility, efficiency, and com- 
fort, as well as the ease with which the instrument panel was operated. 
The center’s changed position within the parent organization was well 
illustrated in the case of the Apollo guidance system, development of which 
began in 1962. Responsibility was apportioned in a manner foreign to the 
NACA scheme of things, but necessary in the complexities of a lunar landing 
mission. Massachusetts Institute of Technology had been awarded a NASA 
contract for the design and development of a prototype guidance system. In 
supporting MIT, Ames was given the task of working on midcourse and 
Earth-entry guidance. In particular, Ames computers were used to work out 
trajectories and correction factors for speed, angle of descent, and shape of 
the reentry body. 
The problem of reentry heating of spacecraft presented a variety of 
related questions. An early realization was that the heating problem was two- 
fold: Not only would convective heating occur as the spacecraft reentered 
the Earth’s atmosphere, there was also a problem of radiative heating caused 
by the high temperature rise in the air disturbed by the vehicle’s shock wave. 
Radiative heat increased dramatically in the case of blunt bodies, which 
Allen had shown years before to be effective in controlling convective heat- 
ing.37 The research question lay in the trade-off between the two shapes to 
minimize undesirable effects, blunt body to control convective heat, missile- 
shaped to control radiative heat. 
Crucially connected to the heating problem was ablation, the process 
by which heat is absorbed through melting, evaporation, and sublimation. 
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By coating a surface with an ablative material, much heat can be dissipated 
before the primary structure is affected. The arc-jet facilities proved most 
useful in the study of how ablation proceeds and what materials work best, 
especially because of the relatively long test times they made possible. As 
with his blunt-body work of the early 1950s, Harvey Allen and his colleagues 
went far toward solving the heating problem for high-speed reentry space- 
craft by adopting a cone shape.38 Making the tip of the cone of a continually 
renewed ablation material solved much of the heat problem. 
The study of ablation led Ames to meteoroid studies in the 1960s. By 
studying the materials of which meteors were composed and by calculating 
flights and landing patterns of meteors, researchers hoped to learn more not 
only about high-speed heating but about the composition of other planets 
and the space environment in which meteors are produced. Work on ablation 
was to lead Dean Chzpman, later head of the Astronautics Directorate, to his 
long study of tektites, glass pellets that have been found at various places on 
the Earth’s surface. Bringing aerodynamic theories to the study of tektites, 
Chapman developed a hypothesis on their origin based on study of the heat- 
ing patterns displayed by the pellets’ shape and calculation of their flight 
speed. The origin of tektites, he suggested, was the Moon.39 The tektite 
hypothesis provided a new perspective on the materials composing the 
Moon, and the forces that produced its craters. The tektite research became 
a prominent example of the thin line between applied and basic research and 
a happy reminder that a scientist can, with imagination, move back and 
forth between the two. 
DEPARTURE OF DE FRANCE 
In the fall of 1965 Smith De France, who had built, molded, and 
directed Ames with a firm hand since 1940, retired. Those who arranged his 
retirement dinner seemed to recognize that it marked the real passing of an 
era. Old NACA colleagues and associates from industry and the military were 
invited; the group represented De France’s aeronautical connections of 
45 years. The dinner was well attended, the testimonials respectful and 
restrained, and De France’s remarks showed how touched he was by the 
efforts on his behalf.40 
De France had enjoyed many advantages in his direction of Ames. He 
had started with a small group of engineers, many of whom he had known 
for years. The new employees were young, Ames was typically their first 
position, and De France was able to influence and mold them along with the 
laboratory. The times were on his side also, as World War I1 and the postwar 
rush into jet propulsion and supersonic flight created an atmosphere of 
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urgency, even crisis, which kept morale and standards high. The tradition of 
NACA autonomy helped him maintain independence and keep bureaucracy 
to a minimum. By the mid-l950s, De France’s imprint on Ames was so 
firmly established that increasing numbers, complexity in research and 
bureaucracy, even the eventual absorption into NASA, had left the labora- 
tory with a personality that was distinctly his own. As an early Ames 
employee observed, “De France not only built Ames, he was A m e . ~ . ” ~ ~  
De France’s Ames had a sense of itself, its standards, and its ability to 
control its own affairs. Still largely staffed with former NACA employees, 
many of whom had been there for most of their careers, Ames remained in 
many ways a closed club of veterans attempting to retain their standards, 
independence, and sense of community against the press of the future. If 
De France had been conservative and straight-laced - and he was - he had a 
conscientious, tightly knit, and productive laboratory to show for it. 
The time was past, however, when De France could move happily with 
the future. He had not been active in aeronautical research since the 1930s, 
and since that time aeronautics had become an entirely different field. Even 
more important, however, was the difference in atmosphere and tone that 
came with NASA. Ames had been slowly growing in personnel, facilities, and 
research activities from the beginning, but with NASA came a leap in all 
these areas in a very short time, bringing all the problems and intricacies of 
large-scale budgets and management. Project work, mission support, and con- 
tracting were radical changes, and it is to De France’s credit that he actively 
campaigned for the Life Sciences Directorate and for project work like 
Pioneer. He left a laboratory that ran successfully for some years on momen- 
tum he created. 
De France’s successor was Harvey Allen, who was admittedly more 
happy as a researcher than as a center director. Where De France had been 
respected, Allen was loved. Where De France had been a rather stern figure, 
the bear-like Allen exuded good will, intellectual inspiration, a raucous sense 
of humor, and an unending interest in everything. He had been at Ames since 
1940, owned a vintage Dusenberg, was a gourmet cook, a lover and player of 
classical music, a Perry Mason fan, and an amateur archaeologist. He was also 
a documented genius, without a doubt one of the reasons Ames had enjoyed 
such success both in its research and in its congenial atmosphere. Allen in the 
Dusenberg picked up a new secretary who had asked for a ride to work, not 
knowing he was the director of the center; Allen, with his endless circle of 
friends, called a dentist in Palo Alto searching for something to use as a 
special epoxy for one of his experiments; Allen could be found at home on 
weekends recoppering teakettles while conducting a Beethoven symphony 
on the record player. 
Ames under Harvey Allen ran much as it had under De France, both 
because De France’s personality had been strong and because devotion to 
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Allen kept morale intact. Many colleagues attested that Allen had not partic- 
ularly wanted the job, but had taken it to keep the directorship from going 
to an “outsideryYy someone from NASA Headquarters who did not have a 
sense of the place.42 There was evidently a strong feeling on the part of 
many that Ames needed a sympathetic member of the family at its head, 
someone who wouldn’t introduce changes too traumatically and who would 
help preserve the character of the institution. 
Allen did just that, and with a strong administrative staff, Ames almost 
ran itself under his directorship. He spent much of his time in research and 
took as little part in management as he could, always threatening to quit 
when the red tape became too entangling. His well-known distaste for the 
1966. Harvey Allen as Director of Ames explains the all-axis flight simulator. Wind tunnel 
testing, flight sirnulator tests, and actual aircraft flight tests complemented each other in 
providing various routes to needed research information. Eventually, computational fluid 
dynamics would simulate wind tunnel tests, reenforcing tunnel test results and providing 
another avenue of information. 
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necessities of administration and reluctance to interrupt research for trips to 
NASA Headquarters were very likely factors in the displeasure felt toward 
Ames by Wa~h ing ton .~~  He retired early in 1969, unwilling to tolerate 
increasingly complex management demands or to confront the unavoidable 
reduction-in-force choices everyone knew were approaching. The early 
deaths of three of his close friends at Ames - Bob Crane, Jackson Stalder, 
and Ralph Huntsberger - had also contributed to his unhappiness. Following 
his retirement, Ames’s future was bleak for a time; there was even talk of 
closing the center, an idea that never got beyond sober speculation (see 
chap. 7). Some saw the possibility of the closing as a direct reaction by 
Headquarters to Allen’s benign neglect of management. Whether this was 
true or not, both the rumor and the reaction to it at Ames underlined the 
rift between the center and NASA Headquarters. Like De France, Harvey 
Allen recognized that the new directions Ames needed to proceed were 
better followed under different talents. His retirement was a further sever- 
ance with the past. 
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7 
AMES AFTER APOLLO, 1969-1976 
Harvey Allen was director of Ames barely three years. During that brief 
period, the demands placed upon the center had continued to grow. Though 
ApoZZo 11 would not land on the Moonuntil July 1969 - the climax of the 
Apollo program - NASA’s in-house personnel had peaked in 1967. Since 
then civil servants had been encouraged to retire early, and programs had 
been cut back as budgets were trimmed. Ames personnel had peaked at 
2,310 in 1966. By mid-1968, the number was 2,197 and the downward 
trend showed every sign of continuing. Similarly, though the Ames budget 
for 1968 was a comforting $103.53 million, there was no reason to be partic- 
ularly optimistic on that score either. Further examination of budget figures 
reveals that though the 1968 program plan at Ames had been allotted 
$3.2 million, none of that money had been immediately committed for 
FY 1968.l The years of easy funding obviously were over, and the entire 
agency was involved not only in fiscal retrenching, but also in redefining its 
missions. Ames had not been in the forefront among NASA installations 
during the Apollo years; the waning of that program might offer the center a 
new opportunity to improve its position in NASA’s total scheme of things. 
Retrenchment after a period of rapid expansion brought a second set 
of dramatic changes to the research center in a decade. In mid-1958 Ames 
had employed 1,413 people. By mid-1966 that number had increased by 
over 60%. Even more dramatic was the operating budget, which had 
increased from the FY 1959 figure of $20.05 million to the FY 1968 peak 
of $103.53.’ The growth, both in personnel and in money, had changed the 
character of the institution, and the change was the more dramatic because 
of the former personality of the center. 
Under the NACA, Ames had grown slowly. New personnel had been 
absorbed easily. The Ames family was grounded in shared college expe- 
riences, in-house marriages, and closely related fields of expertise. With aero- 
nautics the principal - almost sole - activity at the laboratory, professional 
research interests were clustered in a narrow range. Intercommunication had 
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been easy. There had been only the distinction between low-speed and high- 
speed aeronautics. Though the two fields indeed presented different research 
problems, the same aerodynamic principles applied in both areas. It  was 
symbolic that Harvey Allen, the wizard of high-speed aerodynamics, had 
helped to design the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel, the classic monument to 
low-speed wind-tunnel research. 
DIVERSE ACTIVITIES 
Under NASA, with life sciences, space probes, and manned spaceflight, 
aeronautical research quickly became only one activity among many. By 
1968 only 17% of Ames personnel worked in aircraft technology; 45% were 
involved in space research and technology. The impersonal atmosphere, 
blamed by many veterans on the increasing numbers of contract personnel, 
was also a result of the increasing diversity of research. 
Another major change for Ames had been the tangible and psychologi- 
cal effects of geometrically increased budgets. At first glance larger budgets 
might appear to be an unqualified blessing, but they brought with them 
much more paperwork. The NACA, with its small budgets and low profile, 
had received yearly appropriations from Congress with a minimum of fuss. 
Though in many years the NACA felt underfunded, the process by which 
funds were obtained and allotted was at least relatively simple. Under NASA, 
competition for funding took much more time and demanded a lengthy 
bureaucratic process. This change turned many researchers into administra- 
tive money-managers and program ~alesmen.~ 
Psychologically, the effect of big budgets had been equally dramatic. 
The NACA, and Ames under De France, had been scrimpers and savers. They 
did so partly from principle. (NACA officials had been proud to return 
money to  the Treasury, something that is considered a mark of poor manage- 
ment today.) They also saved because in the days of minimal bureaucracy 
laboratory directors could easily transfer funds from one area to another. It  
was possible to save enough, for example, to append another relatively inex- 
pensive test section to the 12-foot pressure wind tunnel.’ For those in 
charge during the NACA period, people like George Lewis, Hugh Dryden, 
and Smith De France, conservative funding and relative freedom in managing 
money once it had been appropriated were highly suited to their own man- 
agement styles. 
De France had especially enjoyed administrative freedom with a mini- 
mum of Washington interference. That freedom, however, disappeared as 
research projects became more complicated, as contracting increased, and as 
NASA, very much in the public eye, met congressional demands to account 
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for its huge budgets. The Ames budget in 1940 had been approximately 
$5 million; in 1950, $7.5 million. In 1958 it was $26.5 million, and when 
De France retired in 1965, it was $91.7 million.6 
In many respects De France and Allen, his successor, had coped with 
change quite successfully. De France had taken an active role in obtaining 
the Biosatellite and Pioneer projects for Ames. He had increased the Center’s 
involvement in flight research using motion simulators, which proved impor- 
tant in Ames’s institutional future. He had obtained the life-sciences research 
facility, and he had bent with the times as the new directorate began to 
change the character of Ames. In the last five years of his career, De France 
had made decisions that perhaps seemed revolutionary in light of his man- 
agerial conservatism, but he had accomplished what every founder of an 
institution hopes to - he had ensured that the laboratory he built had a 
viable future, even if that future entailed major change. A1 Eggers, whose 
constant stream of new ideas helped to push Ames into new areas of 
research, retrospectively saw De France’s ability to recognize the necessity 
for change and his determination to leave Ames as strong as possible as the 
explanation behind his 1957-1965 decisions. In addition, De France had had 
the support of Harry Goett, a strong proponent of space research, and of 
Jack Parsons, who in the early 1960s became convinced that Ames needed 
to develop project-management skills to meet the new era.7 
Allen, younger and more open to new ways of doing things than 
De France, had nevertheless been unwilling to modernize center administra- 
tion, although much of its mode of operation was outdated. Procurement 
methods were inefficient, research organization was sometimes too loose, 
and some staff changes needed to be made.’ Allen, committed to his own 
research and perhaps myopic from long involvement with Ames, left much 
of the daily administrative details to his staff. Not as enthusiastic about 
project work as some, Allen was less inclined to push for new directions in 
project areas and remained more interested in things that intrigued him from 
a research angle, rather than responding to a need for long-term planning. In 
a time when increasing cooperation and communication between the center 
and Headquarters, and among centers involved in combined projects, was 
necessary, Allen’s unwillingness to spend all his time on administration hurt 
Ames in Washington. At the center, however, he was a genial and approach- 
able director, with an inspiring professional reputation and the unfailing 
ability to excite others to imaginative research. “Harvey had a fabulously 
creative mind; he just understood air,” as Eggers put it.9 If, as Ames direc- 
tor, Allen wore the cloak of management reluctantly, he served as an actively 
involved mentor for many young engineers, while at the same time he must 
have been a reassuring link with the past for the older employees. 
Allen resigned in 1968, having reached the point where the burden of 
administrative responsibilities was more than he chose to accept. As his 
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administrative assistant recalled years later, Allen had recognized the need 
for new approaches in the administration of Ames and felt a new director 
could better accomplish those changes.” During the search for a new 
director, Jack Parsons stepped in briefly as acting director. 
The choice was a natural one, as Parsons had been both De France’s and 
Allen’s associate director since 1952. One of the first Langley people at 
Ames, Parsons had been De France’s liaison at Ames while De France was 
still at Langley and his construction director afterward. Quiet and perhaps 
somewhat eclipsed by the stronger personalities around him, Parsons had 
been crucial to both De France and Allen as a source of information regard- 
ing the center, and at times as a mediator. Parsons’s ill health, however, 
forced his retirement almost immediately. He died barely five months later, 
leaving a large gap in the Ames administrative hierarchy. Allen returned 
briefly as acting director. In February 1969 NASA announced a new director 
at Ames: Dr. Hans Mark, professor of nuclear engineering at the University 
of California at Berkeley and head of Berkeley’s research reactor at 
Livermore. 
The research center that Hans Mark inherited had an array of enviable 
facilities being used for many research and development projects. Spread 
over 366 acres, Ames in 1969 operated 18 wind tunnels, 2 sets of ballistic 
ranges, and 10 flight simulators. There were 11 arc-jet facilities in operation 
and 8 laboratories. Major buildings numbered 55, soon to be increased by 
the completion of the Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft (FSAA) built 
for testing the characteristics of jumbo jets and supersonic transports. 
Costing $2.6 million and six stories high, the huge simulator capped the 
range of research tools available at Ames in the flight-simulation field, John 
Dusterberry, the engineer responsible for much of the development of the 
FSAA, described its advantages: 
The unique things about the simulators at Ames are the motion 
system associated with them. As far as computers and visual sys- 
tems, the outfitting of the cockpit and so on, every major aircraft 
manufacturer does the same thing. The motion system moves [the 
pilot] around in space so that he gets the motion cues, whether 
he’s leading forward or backward, . . . all the motion cues he’d feel 
if he were in the aircraft. . . . The motion systems that move the 
cockpit around with a great amount of travel define the time you 
can sustain the acceleration cue. The longer the travel in the fore 
and aft direction, the longer you can sustain that cue. The FSAA 
has [ 30 meters] of lateral travel so you can put side force cues on 
and leave them on for a long time. This requirement really came 
from [supersonic transport] work. Work could be done on the 
SST most completely [at Ames] . Now the FSAA is being used for 
some shuttle landing work.” 
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In January 1969, just before Mark was appointed director, Ames also 
announced the beginning of construction on a Space Sciences Research 
Laboratory; it was to include a vertical gun for impact-cratering studies and 
a large vacuum chamber with an ion beam for plasma-instrumentation 
work.” As had been true of the life-science groups, until the new laboratory 
was ready, the staff of the Space Sciences Division was housed in nooks and 
crannies around the center. In addition to the earthbound facilities at Ames, 
the center also boasted a growing contingent of research aircraft, among 
them a twin-engine Learjet, a Convair 990 research laboratory, a Convair 340 
flying laboratory, and also a de Havilland C-8A Buffalo, soon to be con- 
verted into an augmentor-wing jet STOL aircraft. 
The transfer of the Ames flight-research aircraft to the Flight Research 
Center at Edwards Air Force Base in 1959 had been a psychological blow to 
Ames, but over the next decade the center slowly regained its aircraft, espe- 
cially those involved in V/STOL research. As one flight research engineer 
recalled, “Centering all activities [like flight research] in one place looks 
good on paper, but it doesn’t necessarily turn out to be the most expeditious 
way to do research.” As was soon discovered, the climate of the Mojave 
Desert - hot temperatures, high winds, and high altitude - were “all the 
things you don’t want for doing flight testing” on V/STOL.13 Not only was 
the low altitude and denser air of the Bay Area exactly what was wanted, 
but for flight research, as opposed to flight testing, Ames really was unique 
in its facilities, with the 40- by 80-foot tunnel and the flight simulators 
providing a variety of ways to obtain, check, a i d  expand V/STOL data. 
FRC, having no wind tunnels and only limited simulation capability, could 
not compete. In the next few years, research aircraft would become more 
and more essential to Ames’s activities. 
Another source of strength for Ames in the late 1960s was its relation- 
ship with the Army Aeronautical Research Laboratory, which had been 
established at Ames. The product of a February 1965 agreement between 
NASA and the Army that recognized the agencies’ mutual interests in avia- 
tion technology, the collaboration sought to “achieve tangible economies 
and promote efficiency with respect to continuing research and development 
of aeronautical  vehicle^."'^ The Army had agreed to staff and operate cer- 
tain Ames facilities, while Ames supplied technical and personnel support. 
The immediate result was that the Army refurbished and modernized one of 
the two old 7- by 10-foot wind tunnels, the “war horses” of low-speed wind- 
tunnel research of World War 11, and assigned 45 people to help in research. 
Ames could therefore continue to use the tunnel at little cost. Joint research 
projects were soon under way in that tunnel, as well as in other facilities in 
the flight research branch. The association was to become even more impor- 
tant in the following years under Mark’s sponsorship. 
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The list of 1968 achievements that Ames found noteworthy shows both 
the range of activities at the center and the public image that Ames sought to 
display.” Pioneer 8, which had been launched in August 1966, continued to 
transmit useful data from the outer solar system, as had each of the previous 
Pioneer flights. In June, NASA announced that Pioneer 8’s data suggested 
that the Earth’s magnetic tail might be shorter, by millions of kilometers, 
than had previously been calculated. The steady production of data by the 
probe kept both the project and Ames in the news. Later in the year, 
Pioneer 9 was launched. The Biosatellite Project, acquired in October 1962, 
was engaged in preflight testing of primate behavior in the capsule that 
would carry a monkey on a month-long spaceflight in 1969. Typical of proj- 
ect management work, the testing involved not only Ames, but experimen- 
ters at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and the General 
Electric Company. 
In astronautics, sounding rockets launched from the White Sands 
Missile Range carried Ames payloads. Test flights designed both to check the 
rocket’s control system and to map the magnetic field of the flightpath were 
successful. In cooperation with the Air Force, the X-24 lifting body had 
undergone full-scale wind-tunnel testing at Ames. Perhaps most newsworthy, 
with the Apollo mission still uppermost on NASA’s activity schedule, Ames 
scientists developcd a method of calculating lunar soil depths using measure- 
ments taken from Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor photos. A few months later, a 
group of scientists conferring at Ames announced that they had selected a 
combination of electromagnetic systems to gather data on the Moon’s 
interior . 
In life sciences, exobiology was at the forefront of publicized Ames 
activity as Dr. Cyril Ponnamperuma, one of the center’s most active 
researchers, announced two fascinating hypotheses - that Jupiter’s giant red 
spot might be red organic dye, millions of kilometers wide, and that the 
original sequence of chlorophyll syntheses on Earth had possibly been 
recreated in the laboratory. 
On slightly more familiar levels, in 1967-1968 Ames developed blood- 
pressure sensors small enough to pass through a canine artery into the heart 
itself. The device would be developed as a human diagnostic monitoring 
device over the next few years. The research behind the sensors provides a 
fascinating example of the way interaction between research areas develops, 
sometimes in unlikely ways. The designer of the sensor, Grant Coon, far 
from being a member of the biomedical research division, as one might 
expect, was an engineer in the electro-mechanical research branch. The 
sensor was an elaboration on a pressure cell that he had previously designed 
for use in wind-tunnel tests where small size, high sensitivity, and high fre- 
quency were required. The reduced size of the new sensor made possible 
much more accurate measurement of blood flow. But the story is even more 
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complicated, for the sensor development had originally been requested by 
researchers in the environmental biology division who were not directly 
interested in blood pressure, but in investigating the transmission of artificial 
and heart-pulse waves through blood vessels. The research came full circle 
as the aeronautical researchers also discovered that they could make use of 
the tiny sensor in their work.’ 
Finally, in aeronautical research, two future strengths of Ames research 
were evident in 1968. One was the developing Convair 990 program of flying 
aeronautical laboratories. Operated as a national facility for scientists, the 
first 990 was about to be equipped for a variety of research tasks, among 
them infrared photography, meteorological testing, and fire spotting. 
Second, a new V/STOL aircraft, the Ryan Vertifan, underwent flight tests 
before delivery to Ames. The aircraft was equipped with counterrotating 
propellers submerged in the wings and driven by jet exhaust. These provided 
lift for vertical takeoff, hovering, and vertical landing. Last, but in many 
ways more directly connected to day-to-day aeronautics, Ames, Langley, and 
the short-lived Electronics Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
became involved in a five-year program to improve light-aircraft technology 
and devise a workable collision-avoidance system. The three NASA installa- 
tions each had $500,000 to spend on different aspects of the program. 
Ames’s role was to flight-test six or more general-aviation aircraft, as well as 
to perform a series of wind-tunnel tests on its Learjet. 
The variety of important research being conducted at Ames in the late 
1960s is evident from the highlights above. One of the problems Ames faced, 
however, was that in the NASA family of research installations, Ames did a 
little bit of almost everything, which made it easy for NASA Headquarters to 
question, as it faced continued budget cuts, whether Ames was essential to 
the rest of NASA operations. Ames had excellent, even unique, facilities; but 
could not most of the work being done there potentially be done elsewhere? 
The need for a new outlook, or at least a new image, was evident at the 
time to many. Some of the Ames staff felt that the center had been passed 
by in the excitement of the space program. The old feeling of geographical 
separation was still present, despite the shrinking of distances through faster 
travel. This was often expressed as a suspicion that Langley would use its 
proximity to Headquarters to advance its own interests (a suspicion that was 
perfectly correct): “Langley always had a little advantage in . . . certain areas 
because they were so close to Headquarters. They were continuously up 
there - could shuttle up in an hour or so - to get the upper hand in any pro- 
gram that was coming along. We were isolated.”” 
Another aspect to Ames’s isolation is important to mention for this 
period, if only in contrast to what was to come. Since its beginning, Ames 
had had institutional and personal ties with academia, industry, and the mili- 
tary. Ties with industry and the military were formalized in traditional ways. 
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With academia, the ties existed on a more personal level of collaboration 
among colleagues in similar fields. In the local community, Ames had few 
real ties at a working level. Local officials were invited to annual inspections, 
but Ames as a working research center took little part in local life, and when 
it did, it did so quietly. Public relations, in the contemporary sense of the 
term, did not exist under De France, who felt that quality work would pro- 
duce all the recognition that was needed without calculated flagwaving. The 
low-profile, nose-to-the-grindstone approach, admirable in many ways, was 
suitable in its day, but it too created a certain isolation among researchers, as 
felt by the newcomers from academia who comprised the life-sciences group. 
Perhaps even more detrimental, the policy of understatement created a 
public image Ames could no longer afford in the late 1960s. What was 
needed was a clear-headed assessment of Ames’s strengths and weaknesses, 
and a practical program for eliminating weaknesses and ensuring recognition 
of Ames’s strengths by NASA Headquarters. 
THE NEW APPROACH 
Hans Mark came to Ames at a turning point in its history. His creden- 
tials were impressive. His family had fled Hitler’s Germany in 1940, when 
Mark was 11. He was educated at Berkeley and MIT; his 15-year teaching 
career was a steady stream of accomplishments. He had held administrative 
positions in academia, carried taxing teaching loads, and served in various 
capacities as a consultant to the Army, Air Force, National Science Founda- 
tion, and Institute for Defense Analysis. His published articles made an 
imposing bibliography in nuclear engineering. As a scientist who had main- 
tained a research career while also holding high administrative positions, 
Mark promised to take a much more active role in the details of administra- 
tion than Allen had. Also completely committed to continuing his own work 
in nuclear-engineering research, however, Mark could be expected to have 
empathy with the problems of researchers and understanding of the research 
process, a quality that De France probably had partially lost. 
In strong contrast to his predecessors, Mark was new to  Ames and 
NASA. He would view the institution with the perspective of a stranger. 
While a disadvantage in certain respects, his lack of old ties and habits would 
make it easier for him to see the need for changes - and to implement them. 
Mark was also an academic, not a civil servant, and he brought with him 
a set of work habits and associations that differed from those of De France 
and Allen. These differences, combined with Mark’s professional record and 
energetic personality, meant that the center, which a veteran manager would 
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later characterize as having become "stodgy," was destined to change, 
whether gradually or forcibly. 
With his strong views on solutions to Ames's problems, Mark perhaps 
managed the center, both internally and externally, less diplomatically than 
an insider would have. As an aggressive leader, he chose directions for Ames 
to which some objected. However one evaluates the wisdom and effective- 
ness of his management, the atmosphere certainly changed under his direc- 
tion. Some viewed the differences as a transfusion, bringing fresh air into the 
old institution." Others criticized both his goals and his methods, accusing 
him, at least privately, of destroying the last vestiges of the old pre-NASA 
intimacy. Decisiveness is always controversial, because almost by definition 
it steps on toes. The end question is, were drastic measures imperative to 
keep the center viable in a changing environment of shifting research needs 
and less generous funding? Evidence suggests that they were. 
Hans Mark, Director of Ames 1969-1977. Mark brought to  the Center an outsider's view 
of Ames's strengths and weaknesses, and an energetic management approach that created 
an effective variety of research options for  the Center. 
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In 1969-1970 the question of Ames’s continued existence as a NASA 
installation was a topic of conversation at Headquarters, Though the threat 
of closure never came close to reality, the possibility was rumored around 
the center. NASA Deputy Administrator George Low discussed it with both 
Mark and Deputy Director Clarence Syvertson, former head of the Astronau- 
tics Directorate.1g He and Mark felt at the time that the possibility of closing 
was “fairly valid.”20 Had NASA pulled out, the center probably would have 
been put to use by another federal agency, very likely the Air Force. At the 
time, the Ames administrators convinced Low that they needed time to 
make changes and improvements. Though the center still faced reduced man- 
power, budgets, and programs, closure possibilities went no further than 
those conversations with Low. In a way, however, the circulating rumors 
aided Mark, who had to decide where reductions should be made. “We really 
took advantage of :he fact that Ames closure stories were going around. It 
made our job much easier, because people listened to you. . . .”21 
The new director changed the working atmosphere almost immediately. 
Creating an aura of urgency through his own work habits, Mark involved 
himself in every aspect of running Ames. Often working 12-hour days and 
expecting his staff to do the same, he quickly became noted for his produc- 
tion of “Hans-o-grams,” detailed memos that were fired from his office with 
alarming rapidity. They struck at every level and quickly alerted all person- 
nel to the fact that they had a director who missed little in the way of detail. 
His monthly correspondence file was often 3 cm thick. Staff, both admin- 
istrative and research, were likely to be summoned for weekend meet- 
ings and brainstorming sessions, a logical practice for someone with a seven- 
day work week, but an unpopular intrusion to many of those involved.22 
The Strategy and Tactics Committee, a floating group of Ames personnel, 
was instituted by Mark as a way of involving key researchers in institutional 
planning for the center. “We’d ask them to put together various game plans,” 
Mark recalled, “and then we’d modify them. A lot of people got involved in 
the management of the center.”23 According to one of the members, the 
committee meetings often featured fierce debates, during which various 
future projects and facilities were hashed 
Another practice Mark instituted, both to remain abreast of current 
research and to sort out the Ames talent, was the research review. Every 
section head with an active research project was called upon to give an 
account of his work before the director and the entire chain of command in 
the section-head’s directorate. If sometimes traumatic for those making the 
presentations, the practice institutionalized a periodic self-examination by 
the researchers t hem~e lves .~~  Under De France and Allen, a researcher had 
had to use his own initiative to get a hearing with top management. Though 
this had always been possible, it had probably occurred only sporadically. 
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In April 1972 Mark also began frequent project reviews at Ames, both 
to aid in preparing the Ames reviews for Headquarters and to keep the center 
staff alert to potential problems. As Mark once observed, “the project man- 
agement task is of major importance, [and] much of the future of the center 
depends on how well our projects are managed.”26 Identified by Mark for 
periodic review were current and future projects - Venus Pioneer, Tilt- 
Rotor, Pioneer F and G, Illiac, and the 91.5-cm airborne infrared telescope. 
Mark continued Allen’s practice of using technical research assistants. 
Whereas jack Boyd had freed Allen from management details, Mark relied on 
Boyd and the succeeding technical assistants for technical expertise as well as 
management assistance. These long-term Ames employees, experts in their 
fields, greatly eased Mark’s adjustment period by educating him on aeronau- 
tical technology. Eventually the research assistantships were also seen as 
training positions for younger persons who might someday be in manage- 
ment positions, giving them a broader view of the whole center. Similarly, 
staff-assistant positions were created for the deputy director on the same 
principle. The arrangement provided the director with firsthand ties to the 
research activities of the center and gave valuable management perspective to 
the technical assistants. A division chief later remembered his three years as 
a research assistant as a practical education that someone moving up from 
research into management by normal advancement (researcher to section 
head to branch chief. etc.) would have rni~sed.~’ 
Other changes followed. During the next few years, Mark made new 
appointments in the administrative staff, shifting personnel into new posi- 
tions where greater effectiveness might be obtained. Some organizational 
procedures were changed. One example was the procurement system, which 
previously had served the whole center without differentiation by research 
area. The new director of administration, Louis Brennwald, who had a back- 
ground in industrial management gained from years with the Northrop air- 
craft company, reorganized the system by creating separate procurement 
branches for each major research area. In this way responsibility was clearly 
apportioned and procurement procedures became more responsive and 
efficient. 
Mark’s first year saw the creation of a new directorate, that of research 
support. Headed by Loren Bright, it contained computer operations, 
research facilities and equipment, and technical-services divisions. Eventually 
it would also contain the Institute for Advanced Computation, built around 
the Illiac IV computer that Ames acquired a few years later. 
Though the visible shifts Mark had made in the way the center operated 
seemed dramatic enough, he created even more stir as the major Ames 
emissary to Headquarters and other agencies. Where Washington had seldom 
seen De France and had had to summon a reluctant Allen when needed, 
Mark descended on Washington both frequently and persuasively. In an early 
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1970s OMB-NASA meeting, where the question of closing a research center 
was to be discussed, Mark appeared uninvited and presented such a favorable 
picture of Ames that OMB was noticeably impressed.28 
It was not uncommon for the Ames director to make two trips to 
Washington in a week, promoting center projects and establishing ties that 
would lessen the transcontinental isolation from which the center still suf- 
fered. Riding the late-night “red-eye special” to be in Washington early in 
the morning, Mark planned tightly scheduled itineraries and announced his 
presence by dawn deliveries of San Francisco’s sourdough bread left on 
many NASA desks. After a day of meetings, he would return to Ames on the 
late flight, to be at his desk the next morning. 
In addition to changing the Headquarters image of Ames, Mark also 
embarked on what became a three-part plan to make the center indispens- 
able to NASA. First, he sought to obtain even more unique facilities for 
Ames, facilities that would draw to them important research projects, much 
as the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel had drawn the V/STOL work. Astronau- 
tics Director Dean Chapman described Mark’s attitude: “[He] had a funda- 
mental sense of property. . . that many Europeans have. . . . He has always 
been more willing than many to consider the possibility of collapse. The 
whole thing may collapse,. . . so you get as much steel and concrete set in 
dirt as you can.”29 Second, he fostered as many outside associations and 
joint research projects as possible, both to increase Ames’s value outside 
NASA and to make it more difficult for NASA Headquarters to control and 
cut back the center’s 
The third aspect of the plan, and the last to appear chronologically, was 
to introduce the concept, first at Ames itself and then at Headquarters, of 
very specific areas of expertise for each center. By gradually carving out a 
research niche for Ames that would be unique, the center’s existence could 
not then be challenged with the argument that other centers could duplicate 
its work. Fascinated with the implications of technological interrelation- 
s h i p ~ , ~ ~  Mark planned to expand the range of facilities and then to ensure 
that those facilities were used by a much wider variety of research groups, 
who would then become added justification for continued support by 
NASA. Years later, Mark described the train of thought involved in his 
planning: 
In the NASA system, Ames competes with Langley. Langley is 
somewhat bigger than Ames; it’s older, better established, closer to 
Washington. We recognized early that we could not compete with 
Langley across the board, that we had to establish strong areas and 
put all our marbles on those, and then become the best. . . . Ames 
was the first to make projections for the future about long-term 
trends. By 1973 we knew we were on the right track; if we simply 
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did our own thing, established ourselves as being excellent in the 
areas we had chosen, the agency would have no choice but to give 
us those areas.32 
NEW FACILITIES 
A major resource at Ames was its assortment of motion simulators. 
Though approved back in 1965, the Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft 
was not put into operation until Mark’s first year. The event was made much 
of both at the center and outside it. The facility guaranteed that important 
flight testing of the supersonic transport and the space shuttle would take 
place at Ames. The simulator was to form an important part of Mark’s argu- 
ment that Ames had, as was indeed true, the best flight simulators in the 
world. The Vertical Motion Simulator, planned during the early 1970s, was 
submitted as part of the projected facilities building program for 1974. It 
was eventually approved in 1975, a result of steady efforts on the part of 
Ames to convince Headquarters that it was essential for both VTOL and 
helicopter research. 
Simulator workloads reflected their changing role at Ames. Originally 
simulators had been used mostly in support of NASA’s own in-house 
research. Simulation studies had validated wind-tunnel work and airborne 
research. Eventually, however, both industry and the armed services came to 
recognize the simulators as essential tools for testing specific models while 
still in the prototype stage. Outside users like the military often used the 
simulators instead of the wind tunnels for testing, providing strong support 
for continued expansion of simulation facilities. 
Another facility acquired in the early 19 70s greatly strengthened Ames 
for work in theoretical fluid mechanics, as well as concentrating superior 
computer strength at the center (see chap. 8). In 1971 Ames entered into an 
agreement with the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), part of 
DOD, to house and manage the Illiac IV computer complex, which would be 
the largest and most sophisticated in the world. Obtaining Illiac XV was a 
coup for the center, and though some time was needed for the problems in 
the system to be ironed out, by early 1973 it was in use. The association 
with ARPA was a step toward the entangling alliances that Mark desired. In 
1974 the High Reynolds Number Channel was brought into operation, a 
facility built to evaluate computer codes for the numerical simulation of 
viscous turbulent flows. In combination with the computer system, the High 
Reynolds Number Channel, using real airflow, gave Ames further means to 
check and expand acquired data. 
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The 40- by 8O-foot wind tunnel, which had been in continual use since 
its June 1944 dedication, continued to be one of Ames’s most important 
facilities. As low-speed V/STOL work gained in importance, the huge tunnel 
was operated round the clock to accommodate the many demands on it. In 
1973 it was refurbished, and a few years later an extension would be added 
to create a second test section, an 80- by 120-foot offshoot attached to the 
original tunnel. Increasing the versatility of the tunnel, the addition would 
greatly strengthen the unique facilities argument. 
Research aircraft, while not facilities in the usual definition, play a 
similar role in the life of a research institution. In 1969-1976 Ames acquired 
several aircraft or the programs that would in turn bring such aircraft to the 
center. In 1970 the C-141 that was to be fitted with the 91.5-centimeter 
telescope was acquired, becoming operational in 1974. In the same year 
Ames, in cooperaticln with the Canadian government, began plans for a jet- 
powered, augmentor-wing STOL research aircraft. A converted C-8A 
de Havilland Buffalo was delivered to Ames in the summer of 1972, the first 
of a new line of experimental short-haul research aircraft. That same year, in 
cooperation with the Army, a tilt-rotor research vehicle was planned, 
another example of major V/STOL work that involved a NASA commitment 
to an “outside” customer. 
The Convair 990 Galileo had become one of the major programs at 
Ames, proving invaluable in a variety of cooperative research ventures with 
other agencies. A medium-altitude research airplane, Galileo had undertaken 
a number of weather and resources surveys. Tragically, in April 1973 it col- 
lided over Moffett Field with a Navy P-3 while both were making landing 
approaches. The loss of the entire crew of Galileo was a real blow for Ames, 
but plans were immediately laid to acquire another Convair 990, which was 
delivered near the end of the year. In 1974 Galileo II resumed the work of 
its predecessor. 
Another major addition to Ames was to be the Quiet Short-Haul 
Research Aircraft, for which design plans were completed in 1974. When 
operational, the graceful aircraft was to prove an exciting research tool, its 
remarkably short touchdowns approaching avian competence. 
NEW ASSOCIATIONS 
Mark’s firm belief that Ames stood to benefit from ties that extended 
beyond NASA was pursued through a series of short- and long-term collab- 
orations. Not only did Ames benefit from pooling research efforts and fund- 
ing, but the new ties gave the center much greater visibility than it had 
previously enjoyed, a necessity in the most competitive post-Apollo years. 
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1976. Mid-altitude Convair 990 research aircraft over Lake Tahoe. The aircraft has under- 
taken research projects ranging f r o m  studying wildlife migration patterns and ice-floe 
movements to  making archaeological surveys of Mayan ruins and studying monsoon 
behavior in the Indian Ocean area. The Convair 990 represents another direction in 
Ames’s aeronautical research, that of  using an aircraft itself as a research tool. 
As already observed (see chap. 5), the Life Sciences Directorate had 
formed a variety of associations with other groups and institutions. These 
projects had made new professional contacts for Ames, with noticeable 
results in the world of public relations. Similar efforts in aeronautical proj- 
ects produced much the same kind of public exposure in the 1970s. In 1973 
a joint NASA-Soviet study undertook to analyze ice flow, meteorological 
data, and wildlife migration patterns in the Bering Sea; for this study Ames 
provided the Convair 990. Also in 1973 Ames earth-resources survey aircraft, 
two high-altitude U-2s, cooperated with the Department of the Interior and 
the State of Arizona to produce the first accurate land-usage maps €or the 
whole state. The next year the same aircraft assisted Oregon and Washington 
in surveying tussock-moth damage and also measured flood damage along the 
Mississippi and in California’s Sacramento and Feather River basins. In 1976 
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One of the new directions for Ames resulted in a NASA-Army partnership on rotorcraft 
research, which produced in 1977 the XV-15  Tilt Rotor. The aircraft, with an engine- 
prop rotor assembly, has the properties of helicopter flight when its rotors are shifted t o  
a horizontal position and conventional flight when its rotors are oriented forward. I t  
represents one of the more exciting varieties of V/STOL aircraft. 
the U-2s supported several state agencies by following uncontrolled forest 
fires in northern California. 
Even more useful to Ames, however, was the development of long-term 
cooperative projects with other powerful government agencies. The Ames- 
ARPA Illiac IV project has already been noted, but in three other areas, 
Ames committed itself to associations that proved valuable both for imme- 
diate research and, over the longer term, in strengthening Ames as an 
institution. 
Cooperation with the Army for joint research in VTOL studies, dating 
from 1965 (p. 143), was greatly expanded in 1969. Army personnel at Ames 
doubled. In 1970 the Army consolidated its flight research and development 
as the Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, with head- 
quarters at Ames. Cooperative work in VTOL and V/STOL studies led into 
additional exploratory and advanced research, with the Tilt-Rotor Research 
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Aircraft and the Rotor System Research Aircraft programs coming out of 
the first joint successes.33 Eventually the Army’s endorsement of Ames 
would help the center gain the lead role in NASA’s helicopter research. 
In 1973 a similar agreement for jointly developing new experimental 
aircraft was reached with the Air Force. In February both agencies agreed to 
cooperate on the development of both the Air Force’s Advanced Medium 
STOL Transport Prototype and the NASA Quiet Propulsive Lift Flight 
Research program. Later in the year, an Air Force office was established at 
Ames to administer joint programs, with Air Force personnel permanently 
assigned. Thus another link was established to the armed services. 34 
Ames also concluded a valuable agreement with the Federal Aviation 
Administration and the Department of Transportation in September 197 1. 
The agreement made Ames simulators available for qualifying checks on new 
commercial aircraft. By 1976 cooperation with the FAA had expanded to 
include joint research using the Augmentor Wing C-8A Buffalo and estab- 
lishment of the Air Safety Reporting Systems Office, which sought to con- 
duct continuing analyses of air-safety factors. 
NEW PHILOSOPHIES 
Not by chance did the Army, Air Force, and Federal Aviation Admin- 
istration start cooperative work with Ames on V/STOL aircraft and helicop- 
ters. A new perspective on the center’s place within the NASA network was 
slowly emerging, taking advantage of changing national priorities and con- 
sciously guided by Hans Mark. 
In late 1968 the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences 
had announced that a new commitment was to be made in federally sup- 
ported aeronautical research.35 Clearly this would affect Ames, since its 
research strengths within NASA had always tended toward aeronautics 
rather than toward space. Indeed, Mark’s annual report to the center in 1970 
mentioned the strong possibility that Ames would play a leading role in 
future short-haul aeronautical research, including V/STOL aircraft.36 Two 
years later he was able to announce that the national budget for research and 
development in aeronautics had increased from a little over 4 100 million in 
1969 to $161 million.37 Meanwhile, Mark campaigned to establish wide 
public recognition of Ames’s strengths in short-haul and V/STOL research. 
Speaking to the House Subcommittee on Advanced Research and Technol- 
ogy in 1971, he underlined his center’s capability by “illustrating how our 
organization works in aeronautical research” as he discussed both STOL and 
simulator research.38 
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In 1972 and 1973 Mark began to develop and publicize the concept of 
areas of aeronautical emphasis for Ames. In developing presentations for 
OMB, the Ames staff constructed budgets and research programs that 
emphasized research tools unique to Ames: low-speed, short-haul aviation 
research tools like the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel and the flight simulators. 
Ames was already involved in just such research; future planning built on a 
solid framework. 
Early in 1973 NASA’s Office of Advanced Space Technology (OAST) 
appointed Clarence Syvertson to prepare an institutional planning document, 
forecasting future research undertakings at the OAST centers. When asked to 
comment, Mark emphasized the developing philosophical trend at Ames: 
concentration in areas where Ames already had clear research talents and 
facilities to support future programs.39 At the end of the year, the OAST 
institutional plan produced a list of areas of focus for Ames that were 
defined along the lines Mark had verbalized earlier. 
Six areas of emphasis were listed: short-haul aircraft research, flight 
simulation, theoretical fluid mechanics, planetary atmospheres, airborne 
sciences and applications, and life sciences, In recent years Ames had under- 
taken highly visible activity in each of these areas. Further, there was rela- 
tively little overlap between Ames and other centers; Ames already had most 
of NASA’s competence in all of them. Though there was some reluctance at 
Headquarters to adopt the concept of areas of emphasis,40 within a year 
NASA had officially accepted it, including the list of specialties Ames was to 
m o n ~ p o l i z e . ~ ~  
The emphasis on short-haul aircraft research forms a fitting climax to 
the present history of the research center. When Ames became the center for 
short-haul aircraft research, it appeared logical to go even further in the same 
direction. Consequently, after a campaign waged by Mark on his frequent 
trips to Washington, NASA Headquarters transferred the helicopter research 
being done at Langley to Ames. The result was clearly defined control by 
Ames of all NASA’s short-haul areas, both V/STOL and rotorcraft pro- 
grams, and the equally visible support of that role by the Army, Air Force, 
and the Federal Aviation Administration. Mark’s comments on the transfer 
underlined the claims Ames was able to make for its case: 
By the time we got the Langley helicopter research, we’d made 
the first modification to the 40- by 80-foot tunnel, had the second 
one approved, built the vertical-motion simulator. We had all the 
facilities for helicopter work, and most important, we had per- 
suaded the Army to put its rotor-craft research laboratory at 
Ames. So we had the Army in our corner. So with all those things, 
the rationale for moving it here was absolutely unanswerable. All 
Langley had on its side was tradition.42 
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The decision to  transfer helicopter research from Langley has remained, 
at least in some quarters, controversial. At Ames, some researchers felt they 
‘Awere being sold something that didn’t originate here, and Langley was 
already doing it. It was a whole new field, and we had to reeducate a lot of 
people.”43 Langley had been involved in helicopter research since the 1930s, 
and supporters of that center were understandably upset at losing that ele- 
ment of its research. Resentment focused both on Mark for perpetrating the 
transfer by his “area of emphasis” concept, and upon Ames in general for 
“stealing” Langley’s research program, some of their personnel, and their 
research rotor aircraft. For Leonard Roberts, Ames director of aeronautics 
and flight systems, the subject was particularly delicate. Roberts was respon- 
sible for arranging the details of the transfer, and as a former Langley 
researcher, he was faced with an awkward task.44 After the decision was 
announced, NASA Administrator James Fletcher, seeking to sweeten 
Langley’s bitter pill, pointed out that the transfer was logical in terms of 
Ames’s short-haul center designation, and in view of the relationship that 
1976. Three directors of Ames gather. Hans Mark, left, and Harvey Allen, right, congratu- 
late Smith De France on his 80th birthday. The three men represent facets of 
aeronauticallastronautical research and its management stretching from World War I into 
the space age. 
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Ames had established with the Army Air Mobility Research and Develop- 
ment L a b ~ r a t o r y . ~ ~  The helicopter research provided tangible proof of the 
significance of the alliances Ames had built and the ability of the center’s 
management to use them for Ames’s benefit. 
The 1976 shuffle was not all to Ames’s benefit, however; the Pioneer 
project and future planetary missions went to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
at Pasadena. The loss of Pioneer, managed from the outset by Ames, was a 
blow for which the expansion of research strength in short-haul aircraft 
might compensate. Thus Ames once more faced major changes that would 
test its managers’ ability to realign priorities and to establish a new sense of 
mission within NASA. As we have seen, Ames’s fortunate history, flexible 
leaders, depth and breadth of facilities and personnel - all these strengths 
augered well for the future. 
The remaining chapters will investigate more closely three aspects of 
Ames during recent years: the working of a research directorate, the center’s 
changing role in the community, and an assessment of changes in the institu- 
tion over its first 38 years. 
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HOW A RESEARCH DIRECTORATE WORKS 
Over the years the organization of a research institution continually 
evolves; identifiable, perhaps even dominant, organizational entities change 
shape and may even disappear. The directions of research also change; some 
investigations are completed satisfactorily, some are abandoned, others are 
modified. It is relatively easy to trace the organizational changes from pub- 
lished charts and changes in research activities by statements about projects 
and their progress, but understanding the motivation behind those changes is 
much more difficult. Yet it is in precisely this area that one may grasp the 
essence of the research and development process - what that process is and 
what factors can be identified as crucial. Anyone who has been a part of a 
research institution will recognize some common factors in the story, but 
others may find some interesting surprises. 
Perhaps most surprising is the role of fortuitous circumstance. Chance 
seems an odd ingredient in research and development; one assumes that 
scientists and engineers know where they’re going, or at least where they 
intend to go. However, though external needs and researchers’ areas bf 
interest define general trends in research, chance often provides an opportun- 
ity calling for an institutional response. That response may result in a new 
set of opportunities requiring further decisions. The process, we learn, is 
more a series of responses to evolving influences, rather than a predefined 
plan to which research adheres over long periods of time. Broad master plans 
may well exist, but they are themselves subject to the whims of circum- 
stance, personality, and unforeseen developments. The research process, in 
other words, defies generalization and remains stubbornly recalcitrant when 
we try to pin it down to pat analytical formulas. For each research story, 
successful or unsuccessful, different factors combine, and often success rides 
on serendipity as well as intelligent planning and diligent research. 
Each research directorate at Ames has experienced evolutionary 
changes in both structure and areas of research. We have seen examples in 
the evolution of the Life Sciences Directorate. This chapter will examine 
more closely the Astronautics Directorate, seeking to answer such questions 
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as: How did the directorate change over a period of years? What were the 
reasons for those changes? What were the factors in some of its research 
decisions? How did those factors interact to affect the directorate and, 
eventually, Ames as a whole? The directorate changed substantially from 
1969 to 1976. From that period we will examine three areas of research 
evolution. The details behind the origin and progression of research in each 
area underline the singularity of each research story. That, perhaps, is the 
crucial point to be made as we try to understand Ames as a working research 
organization: there are no general models for research success, but there are 
fortuitous combinations of forces and events that have led to success. Not all 
research progresses as successfully as the examples chosen, but all research 
has its own interesting life story - different origins, rhythm of progress, and 
different factors and personalities affecting its success or failure. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN THE 
ASTRONAUTICS DIRECTORATE 
The Astronautics Directorate of 1969 (fig. 1) would be strikingly differ- 
ent by 1976 (fig. 2). The modifications over the seven-year period illustrate 
a number of forces that are typical of those affecting any research organiza- 
tion governed by changing research demands, finances, and opportunities for 
changing research priorities. 
In 1969 the directorate had consisted of three research divisions and an 
office that reported directly to the director. The most dramatic of the 
changes that occurred by 1976 were the addition of the Pioneer project and 
a support division for space projects, which was charged with advanced plan- 
ning for future space projects and their developmental needs. In addition, 
significant alterations had occurred below the division level. Some branches 
no longer existed; some had been renamed; and some had been shuffled, 
more or less intact, to other locations. What combinations of factors had 
produced these changes? 
In very general terms, the changes made in the organization of the 
Astronautics Directorate revealed the major influences affecting Ames in the 
years after Apollo. 
During 1969-1971, Ames faced the threat of closure. BegiRning his 
tenure as director under this cloud, Hans Mark made a point of emphasizing 
areas in which research activity was both visibly healthy and obviously 
salable. Activities that were not so easily justified were either redefined or 
dropped. Though some of the amputations seem drastic on paper, often 
what was involved was redefinition of major research directions, relocation 
of key research teams to different organizational elements where they could 
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continue their work, or reassignment of individuals to new tasks as their pre- 
vious jobs ceased to exist. 
While faced with the threat of possible closure, Ames also faced the 
reality of reductions in force ordered by Headquarters. The result of 
beleaguered budgets and changing government priorities, RIFs theoretically 
affect positions and not personnel; but the connectionh between a con- 
demned position and its incumbent is undeniably real. Therefore, a standard 
reaction to RIFs or expected RIFs is to find new positions for the potential 
victims before the RIFs occur, or to redefine the positions so that RIFs are 
less likely to affect them. Some of the changes in the Astronautics Director- 
ate represented management response to continuing RIFs that threatened 
research positions. The most dramatic of these was the abolition of the 
Vehicle-Environment Division, which Mark believed to be vulnerable. In 
1971 he abolished a branch and a section of the division, and the next year 
he abolished the division altogether, relocating its personnel to other posi- 
tions. The addition of Project Pioneer and the Space Projects Division 
resulted from less threatening factors. Originally located under the separate 
Development Directorate, both Project Pioneer and Project Biosatellite had 
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Figure 1.- Astronautics Directorate in 1969. From Ames Organization Chart, July 1969. 
163 
DIRECTOR OF ASTRONAUTICS 
Chemical Research Projects Office 
Stratospheric Projects Office 
-AIRBORNE MISSIONS AND APPLICATIONS DIVISION 
Applications Aircraft and Future Programs Office 
High Altitude Missions Branch 
Medium Altitude Missions Branch 
User Application Branch 
--SPACE PROJECTS DIVISION 
Project Development Branch t Project Technology Branch 
E 
-SPACE SCIENCES DIVISION 
Astrophysical Experiments Branch 
Atmospheric Experiments Branch L Theoretical and Planetary Studies Branch 
-THERMO- AND GAS-DYNAMICS DIVISION 
LPROJECT PIONEER
Experiment Systems Branch 
Mission Operations Systems Branch 
Spacecraft Systems Branch 
Figure 2.- Astronautics Directorate in 1976. From Ames Organization Chart, Sept. 1976. 
been managed as separate entities, unattached to existing research divisions. 
By 1975 Biosatellite was completed and Pioneer had completed the most 
difficult stages of its mission. When the director retired in 1975, the Devel- 
opment Directorate was abolished. The Systems Engineering Division, which 
supported both projects, was absorbed into the Space Projects Division. The 
Astronautics Directorate was the logical place for both Pioneer and the 
Space Projects Division, although the problems of the research divisions and 
the problems of project management, being quite different, would compli- 
cate the job of the astronautics director. 
New research directions and capabilities in the form of new facilities 
were responsible for some of the organizational changes, the most dramatic 
of which was creation of the Airborne Missions and Applications Division. 
While this change can now be seen as recognition that airborne science had 
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become of major significance to the center, at the time it seemed merely the 
culmination of a series of organizational shifts that gradually grouped the 
C-141 Starlifter, the Convair 990, the Learjets, and the U-2s under one 
programmatic umbrella. As the aircraft were acquired and their research pro- 
grams grew more extended, the need for a separate division became appar- 
ent. The C-141 and the Convair 990 were organized into the Medium Alti- 
tude Missions Branch and the U-2s were assigned to the High Altitude 
Missions Branch. (Branches in the Space Sciences Division were responsible 
for experimental planning to take advantage of the unique capabilities of the 
C-141 and the two U-2s.) The User Application Branch provided liaison 
between the developing technology and potential users of satellite and air- 
craft data. The importance of Ames’s role in expanding uses for Earth- 
observation aircraft was underlined in 1972, when an Ames proposal to 
become the lead center was accepted by NASA Headquarters. With the later 
establishment of the Applications Aircraft and Future Programs Office, 
Ames assumed the coordination of not only its own Earth-observation air- 
craft, but also those at Johnson Space Center. This inter-center coup illus- 
trates the effectiveness of Mark’s plan to establish clear areas of excellence 
at Ames. 
On the branch level, shifts within the three 1969 research divisions of 
the Astronautics Directorate illustrate how organizational changes accommo- 
dated the declining NASA budget, lower personnel ceilings, and the new 
research requirements of the post-Apollo period. Research areas that had 
been crucial to Apollo were not necessarily rendered superfluous, but priori- 
ties shifted. As old research tasks reached their maximum exploitation, they 
often exposed new problems and opportunities, thereby creating a new focus 
of investigation which in turn led to organizational changes. This process, 
common in any field of research, was especially striking in astronautics in 
the post-Apollo period. 
The Space Sciences Division was transformed during 1969-1976 by two 
major forces: completion of the Apollo mission ended major activity in some 
of the division’s areas, but acquisition of new research facilities opened 
opportunities in other fields. By 1976 the Electrodynamics Branch, the 
Planetology Branch, and the Space Technology Branch had been abolished, 
largely because of Apollo’s running down. Researchers in electrodynamics 
and space technology were absorbed into other research groups, whereas the 
Planetology Branch was combined with the Theoretical Studies Branch. 
Planetologists had been concerned with hypervelocity impact phenomena, 
the origins of craters, and the study of meteoritic materials. With the cul- 
mination of their work in the lunar landing and the extensive datareturned 
by the later Apollo missions, emphasis on planetology studies decreased, and 
many researchers left Ames. The rest were absorbed by the creation of a new 
branch, Theoretical and Planetary Studies. 
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In contrast, the acquisition of two new and unique research tools led to 
the expansion of the Atmospheres and Astrophysics Branch. In the early 
1970s Ames researcher Michel Bader and his colleagues developed the idea of 
mounting a large telescope in a flying laboratory and using it for astrophysi- 
cal and astronomical research. The idea found support; in 1972 a Lockheed 
C-141 Starlifter arrived at Ames. When a 0.97-meter telescope was fitted, a 
new field of infrared astronomy was opened. So much work was generated 
around the C-141 that the Atmospheres and Astrophysics Branch was split 
into two branches; the new Astrophysical Experiments Branch used the 
Likewise, the field of infrared photography from high altitudes grew 
from the acquisition of two Air Force U-2s, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. As possibilities for using the U-2s expanded, the Atmospheric 
Experiments Branch was created. In both cases, initial research proposals had 
resulted in unique facilities that in turn inspired the expansion of the original 
research areas. By 1976, therefore, the Space Sciences Division had changed 
substantially. From Apollo-support work, the division had shifted to an 
emphasis on infrared research, and indeed had proposed to NASA and the 
IRAS Telescope Project, an infrared astronomical satellite to carry the work 
of the C-141 a step further into space. 
In the Thermo- and Gas-Dynamics Division, similar forces had produced 
changes in organization. In 1969 the Theoretical Branch was dealing with a 
variety of research subjects, some of which had declined in importance after 
Apollo. Information concerning high-temperature radiation characteristics 
had been crucial to the lunar-landing mission; thereafter, that field had 
faded. In 1970 Division Chief Dean Chapman restructured the Theoretical 
Branch into the Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch, dedicating it to 
purely numerical work and redirecting its research into new fields. The 
Magnetoplasmadynamics Branch, which studied the behavior of high- 
temperature gases in magnetic fields, was gradually abolished. Because it was 
a difficult area of study and an arcane one, Ames Director Hans Mark 
believed it was vulnerable to potential RIFs. In 1971 Chapman diverted all 
researchers in the branch into work on the newly approved large arc-jet 
facilities. By renaming the branch the High-Enthalpy Research Branch and 
restructuring its research, Ames responded both to the threat of reduced 
manpower and to the challenge of organizing an efficient work force to 
develop the additional arc-jet facility. When the new arc-jets were finished a 
year later, the branch was disbanded and its members reassigned to the 
Thermal Protection Branch, which used the new facilities. By this time, as 
Chapman recalled, the Thermal Protection Branch - renamed the Entry 
Technology Branch in 1976 - had become RIF-proof, since its research was 
connected with the Shuttle.2 In much the same manner, the Fluid Mechan- 
ics Branch was converted into the Physical and Gas Dynamics Lasers Branch, 
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C-141. 
eventually combining with the Materials Science Branch to become the 
Materials and Physical Sciences Branch. 
The Hypersonic Aerodynamics Branch was also hardy, since its 3.5-foot 
hypersonic wind tunnel was NASA’s largest such facility and much of its 
work in the 1970s was Shuttle-connected. To balance the new Computa- 
tional Fluid Dynamics Branch, however, it was renamed the Experimental 
Fluid Dynamics Branch. The two branches represented the old and the new 
in aerodynamic research. While experimental wind-tunnel work sought data 
through actual tests on models, the computational approach attempted to 
duplicate wind-tunnel conditions numerically without actually running tests 
to acquire data. Finally, in 1976, the Thermophysics Facilities Branch was 
created to develop and operate division facilities. 
The Thermo- and Gas-Dynamics Division had undergone radical changes 
during the 1969-1976 period because it had been so closely connected to 
Apollo during the 1960s. Apollo had also been the main concern of the 
Vehicle Environment Division, but it was perhaps less amenable to transfor- 
mation than was Chapman’s division. In 1972 Mark abolished the Vehicle 
Environment Division, moving Materials Research into the Materials and 
Physical Sciences Branch of the Thermo- and Gas-Dynamics Division. In con- 
trast, the Structural Dynamics Branch was abolished, because Langley had 
always been strong in structural research, while Ames had had only a foot- 
hold in that specialty. Many members of the Physics Branch moved to 
Computational Fluid Dynamics, a field that Chapman was continuing to 
build, but the Hypersonic Free-Flight Branch was abolished and its personnel 
relocated. Some were assigned to the Development Directorate, at the time 
planning the Pioneer-Venus project; others were divided among the Research 
Support Directorate, the Aeronautics and Flight Systems Directorate, and 
the Airborne Sciences O f f i ~ e . ~  Somewhat atypically, the division chief of 
the Vehicle Environments Division, Alvin Seiff, returned to active research 
after being in management for some years, a move most scientists find diffi- 
cult to make. 
Generally, the organizational changes within the Astronautics Director- 
ate during 1969-1976 were caused by conditions that were new to Ames. 
In earlier years the occasional organizational alterations had resulted from 
more or less straight-line growth, such as larger facilities and increased 
bureaucratic complexity. In the post-Apollo period, however, organizational 
change reflected changed research directions and, sometimes, retrenchment. 
Strengths were consolidated, vulnerable areas abandoned or redirected. In 
most instances, management was anticipating problem areas and attempting 
to present alternatives to RIFs, as well as to establish visibly unique areas to 
ensure the center’s future. Rather than a simple organizational shuffling to 
provide better management, the changes represented varying methods of 
dealing with shifting circumstances. 
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The restructuring of the directorate was sound strategy. It was perhaps 
equally sound, tactically, to present an active and aggressive stance, initiated 
within Ames to deal with the future on its own terms. As Smith De France 
had changed Ames by adding a new research area in life sciences and a new 
project-management role with Pioneer, the Astronautics Directorate provides 
a good example of change within an existing research unit to provide for the 
future. As individual researchers shifted their careers to meet new research 
needs, the center’s organization mirrored those changes on a larger scale. 
Within a research organization, the routes by which research evolves 
vary just as widely as do the motivations behind organizational change. In an 
institution with the history, personnel strengths, and facilities of Ames, the 
means by which ideas grow into major undertakings differ dramatically. 
Such work is sometimes generated at the branch level and pursued for a time 
with a good deal of freedom from superiors. In some cases the decision to 
press ahead in a new research direction spurs the acquisition of new facilities 
that, in turn, influence the choice of future research projects. Lucky circum- 
stances can have much to do with the selection of profitable research. The 
balance of this chapter will investigate three major research endeavors that 
originated in different ways. 
REUSABLE SURFACE INSULATION - BRANCH-LEVEL INITIATIVE 
A major problem facing the designer of a high-speed, high-altitude 
vehicle is the heating caused by reentry into the atmosphere. Harvey Allen’s 
studies of missile nose cones and manned spacecraft ablation in the early 
1950s had led to further exploration of the phenomenon. One field of study 
that grew out of interest in the ablation process was investigation of the sur- 
face of tektites - curious, button-like pieces of dark glass found in various 
places around the world. By reproducing the ablation process on synthetic 
tektites in a hypervelocity wind tunnel, not only was the process itself better 
understood, but the terrestrial origin of tektites was called into question. In 
the early 1960s, Dean Chapman and Howard Larson used the ablation pat- 
terns on natural tektites to calculate their trajectories. The researchers 
deduced that tektites were of lunar origin.4 In 1963 Larson was named chief 
of the Hypersonic Aerodynamics Branch and became involved in the abla- 
tion patterns of ICBMs and how ablation affected their flight behavior. In 
1968, as chief of the Thermal Protection Branch, he continued his work on 
missiles and returned to the field of ceramic materials, a natural extension of 
the tektite work he had undertaken with Chapman. 
During the late 1960s the initial planning that eventually led to  the 
Shuttle prototype was also taking place. Obviously one important issue 
168 
was the reentry heating problem on a vehicle that was expected to be 
reusable. Unless an ablation shield was replaceable, the ablation process 
could not be used. An alternative presented itself in the idea of a heat shield 
that would not ablate, but would instead reradiate heat and insulate the 
~ e h i c l e . ~  
The idea was not new; similar plans had been a part of the Dynasoar 
project of the mid-l950s, though the shield envisioned for that spacecraft 
would have been metallic. In the late 1950s a beryllium heat-sink heat shield 
had been proposed for the Project Mercury capsule. Difficulties in producing 
acceptably pure beryllium in adequate quantity, as well as concern over the 
safety of a heat-sink heat shield on a manned spacecraft, resulted in the abla- 
tion shield being chosen instead.6 In the mid-1960s the Lockheed Missiles 
and Space Company began working on reusable surface insulation, eventu- 
ally convincing Max Faget, the principal engineer and spacecraft designer at 
Johnson Space Center, that a reusable insulation system was preferable to a 
replaceable ablation system. The reusable system would be more economical 
in the long term and would reduce turnaround time between Shuttle flights. 
By the late 1960s the concept of reusable surface insulation was beingpur- 
sued by a number of contractors besides Lockheed, among them General 
Electric, McDonnell-Douglas, Martin, and Gmmman. 
While Larson had become involved in the field originally by studying 
the ablation of meteorites, tektites, missiles, and laser targets, Howard 
Goldstein had spent much of his career working on heat shields for missiles 
and spacecraft. By 1968 he was working for a small contractor doing mate- 
rials testing at Ames. A year later he became an Ames employee and was 
assigned to Howard Larson’s branch. Thus two of the principal researchers 
who were to investigate possible reusable insulation materials began working 
together. 
who were developing possible insulation materials. Two things had become 
clear. First, facilities were inadequate for accurate testing at high tempera- 
tures using a large enough test section. The available arc-jets at Ames, while 
producing the necessary temperatures, were inadequately powered for sus- 
tained high temperatures in a test section sized to accommodate large 
samples of the heat-shield materials that needed to be tested. Second, 
Larson’s branch realized that the results of tests could not be analyzed satis- 
factorily. Apparently not enough was known about the properties of the 
materials being tested. Both discoveries were crucial to later developments. 
In 1970, as Thermal Protection Branch personnel were wrestling with 
these questions, the viability of the Shuttle was by no means universally 
accepted. It was known throughout the center that Director Hans Mark had 
personal doubts about the concept. The testing of insulation materials that 
the branch was undertaking in support of industrial contractors was, there- 
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By 1970 Ames was conducting tests for the various NASA contractors 7 
fore, of relatively low priority at the center. But Larson - an accomplished 
researcher and effective branch chief - enjoyed the support of the astronau- 
tics director and ran the branch with little interference from Ames manage- 
ment. Larson’s team needed larger facilities for testing and more work by 
Ames researchers so they could understand the heating phenomenon they 
were dealing with. 
Facilities acquisition was, as we have seen, one of Mark’s major goals 
for Ames, so two proposals for new testing facilities won his support in 
1971. One plan, developed by Larson, called for a gas-combustion facility 
using carbon or methane as fuel to produce a hot airstream that could be 
directed through a nozzle into a test section. The other proposal, put forth 
by Dean Chapman, was for an arc-jet facility with a 60-megawatt power 
source, three times as powerful as existing facilities. A combustion facility 
was less expensive, but Ames had the largest DC power source in NASA, 
which made a good argument for a large arc-jet. If larger arc-jets were 
needed, Ames was the logical place to build them. Both facilities were given 
preliminary approval by OAST in mid-197 1. 
Competition between Langley and Ames became highly visible over the 
following months. Ames was attempting to consolidate its position as a lead 
center for reentry materials testing, as well as to improve its general status by 
acquiring new and potentially important facilities. Langley management 
objected to the Ames proposals. On the grounds that any gas-combustion 
facility was really a structures facility and that Langley was the research 
center for structures work, Langley Director Edgar Cortwright argued that 
the gas-combustion facility should be built at his center. In due course the 
gas-combustion proposal was transferred to Langley. Ames was given 
approval to build arc-jet pilot facilities and, eventually, the 60-megawatt 
arc-j et. 
With better testing equipment assured, Ames became more heavily 
involved in developing, as well as testing, new materials for the Shuttle’s 
reusable surface insulation. What had been a sideline pursued without fanfare 
and without top management support expanded steadily. By 1972 Ames 
research in thermal protection materials had progressed to  the point where 
in-house investigations were aiding the contractors in their work. As Larson’s 
division chief, Dean Chapman, later observed, 
The contractors can’t admit that the technology [knowledge] 
isn’t there. They have to [maintain that it’s] just a question of 
developing the system, But the research workers often realized 
that there were going to be problems with the existing design, and 
with their technical understanding they started to develop solu- 
tions before [Johnson Space Center] said they had problems to 
the budgeting p e ~ p l e . ~  
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1976. Space Shuttle tile being tested in the 60-megawatt interaction heating facility. 
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A year later, when Lockheed had become the principal contractor for 
the surface insulation tiles on the Shuttle, Ames was able to use its accumu- 
lated knowledge to aid their development. By then the material that had 
proved most satisfactory was made of silica fibers, and Lockheed had sub- 
contracted with another firm for their production. Those fibers had not 
worked well, and Lockheed was considering buying more expensive fibers 
abroad. Ames research showed that the American-made fibers could be made 
usable, and the Shuttle project was saved sizable amounts of money. By 
March 1975 the 60-megawatt arc-jet facility was operational, and Ames had 
become heavily and visibly involved in Shuttle tile research. 
Subsequently, new and better thermal protection materials were devel- 
oped for the orbiter. In 1975 the branch developed a reaction-cured glass 
coating for the high-temperature tiles, which increased stability and resis- 
tance to cracking. Another Ames contribution was a second generation of 
basic tile material - the LI-2200 tile - which was to replace much of the 
original LI-900 tile developed by Lockheed. Over the next few years, Ames 
contributions substantially changed the whole thermal protection system for 
REACTION-CURED GLASS COATING 
Improved emittance, stability, crack resistance 
Used for al l  high-temperature reusable surface insulation t i le  
and for 70% of reusable surface insulation tile 
Developed in 1974, adopted in 1976 
LI-2200 TI LE 
Higher strength and temperature capability than LI-900, the 
t i le developed earlier by Lockheed 
Used in over 10% of reusable surface insulation 
Developed in 1974-1975, adopted in 1977 
GAP FILLER MATERIAL 
Protected structure from plasma flow in gaps between tiles 
Over 4,000 used on STS-I (Columbia's first operational flight), 
4,700 on STS-2 (Columbia's second flight) 
Developed and adopted in 1978 
ADVANCED, FLEXIBLE REUSABLE SURFACE INSULATION 
Improved toughness, lower cost, and lighter weight 
Replaced 2 square meters of earlier flexible insulation in elevon 
cove for STS-2 to solve overtemperature problem L Developed in 1975-1976, adopted in 1978 
Source: Entry Technology Branch, Jan. 1982 
Figure 3.- Ames Materials adopted for Orbiter 102 (Columbia). 
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the Shuttle orbiter, and what had been a branch-inspired research task 
evolved into a major contribution of the center (see fig. 3, p. 172). It  was a 
unique situation: the branch manufactured, tested, and evaluated the new 
materials, a complete process of research and development, which is not 
typical of a research laboratory.8 Equally important, the research project 
had evolved from a sideline based on curiosity into a major effort, a result of 
the happy combination of interested researchers, specialized facilities, and 
the freedom that allowed Larson and Goldstein to pursue their work over a 
long period of time.’ 
COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS - MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
The process by which Ames developed competence in the field of com- 
puterized aerodynamic research provides an interesting contrast to the 
Thermal Protection Branch’s entrance into orbiter insulation. In 1969, when 
Hans Mark became director and Dean Chapman became chief of the Thermo- 
and Gas-Dynamics Division, Ames had the poorest computer facilities within 
NASA, an IBM 7094 machine that had been built in 1960. Despite that 
handicap, however, Harvard Lomax in the Theoretical Branch had been cal- 
culating supersonic flow over blunt-nosed bodies for some years. In the 
Hypersonic Free-Flight Branch, located within the Vehicle-Environment 
Division, Robert MacCormack was doing much the same type of computa- 
tional work on viscous flow. Though tackling different problems, Lomax and 
MacCormack were working in the same new field that used equations of 
fluid motion to calculate the effects of high-speed airflow over various 
bodies under varying conditions. Their analytical approach contrasted 
sharply to the traditional use of wind tunnels to derive similar information. 
Both Mark and Chapman were anxious for Ames to enter the new 
research field. As Chapman recalled, 
I’d been out of fluid mechanics for eight or nine years when I 
took over the division in 1969. When I reviewed the field and saw 
what computers were doing even then, it became clear to me that 
they could do a lot of things that I as an experimentalist never 
dreamed about, so I decided to press into that area. Mark was a 
vigorous enthusiast of the same thing, for a different reason. As 
head of the experimental branch at Livermore, he [had seen] the 
computer take over. We both had the same idea as to what should 
be done. 
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In 1970, after chairing a committee to define the future computer needs at 
Ames, Chapman created the Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch, using 
as a core the old Theoretical Branch. Harvard Lomax became chief, assisted 
by Robert MacCormack. Those two, plus two graduate students, had been 
the only researchers who could claim to be involved in computational fluid 
dynamics. Chapman’s immediate task was to enlarge this cadre. “What we 
did,” Chapman later recalled, “was to convert everybody in the branch 
whom we judged to be convertible to numerical work on the computer. I t  
was also clear to me that since Hans was religiously enthusiastic about it . . . 
it would be a good haven for any bright employee who was willing to change 
his career around.”” He had to find other niches for Theoretical Branch 
personnel whom he judged could not make the transition. 
As Chapman was gathering personnel for the new branch, Ames man- 
agement was also investigating various computers and how they might be 
procured. Upgrading the computational facilities was crucial, and Mark - 
not to mention the new branch’s researchers - meant to replace the old IBM 
machine as quickly as possible. 
Mark once admitted that he had “sticky fingers for airplanes,” losing no 
opportunity to acquire research aircraft for Ames. He might have said the 
same thing about computers. As he later remembered, “Government regula- 
tions for computer procurement would have taken forever, so we very early 
decided on avoiding normal channels in getting them.” The first opportunity 
came when Mark learned that an IBM 360-67 system was about to be 
declared surplus. It belonged to the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
program and was almost literally next door, in Sunnyvale. Seeing opportun- 
ity and responding in a typically decisive manner, Mark moved quickly: 
“The day the MOL program shut down, we had our people over there with a 
truck, moving that computer out. I knew it would be declared surplus and 
moved into the [General Service’s Administration] system, so I thought 
we’d better get it and install it fast.”ll 
Acquisition of the 360-67 opened the door for an aggressive research 
program by the new Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch. At the same 
time, it taught Ames management an effective method for improving their 
computer facilities. The early 1970s saw the retrenchment of many programs 
throughout the government, and Ames managers remained alert for other 
computer facilities that might be orphaned. They intended to “be there with 
a truck and lift them,” as Mark put it, before the computers became offi- 
cially caught up in government bureaucracy.12 The next Ames computer, an 
IBM 7600, was also from the Air Force, obtained by Director of Research 
Support Loren Bright, who found out that it was about to be declared sur- 
plus. The 7600 became the main Ames computer until 1976, when the 
Illiac IV became reliably operational. 
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Ames acquired the Illiac IV under different circumstances. During its 
prime the Illiac was the largest computer in any aeronautical establishment 
and one of the most sophisticated in the United States. Three hundred times 
faster than the old 7094, its presence at Ames gained the center recognized 
preeminence in the field of computational fluid dynamics and practically 
guaranteed that when NASA bought better computer facilities, they would 
be placed at Ames.13 Even if the Illiac had never performed successfully, 
both Mark and Chapman saw its acquisition as the deciding factor in estab- 
lishing Ames as the center for computational fluid dynamics.I4 
Computational fluid dynamics makes possible this simulated schlieren, reproducing the 
same type of information resultingfiom wind tunnel tests. 
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The Illiac’s arrival was the culmination of a series of lucky coincidences. 
Dr. Edward Teller, Mark’s longtime friend and colleague, knew he wanted to 
improve computer facilities at Ames. In 1970 Teller alerted Mark to a devel- 
oping situation that involved the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA), the University of Illinois, and the Illiac, at that time in the concep- 
tual stage. Planned as an ARPA research facility, the Illiac was being 
designed by the University of Illinois and would be located there and oper- 
ated under contract with ARPA. As student unrest grew during the late 
i960s, ARPA became increasingly nervous about the Illiac at the university. 
Mark was happy to promise adequate protection for the Illiac if ARPA 
would place it at Ames. Again, Mark’s widespread circle of acquaintances 
proved useful: “I’d gone to high school with Dan Slotkin, the Illiac’s devel- 
oper,” recalled Mark.15 After a period of negotiations, ARPA agreed to 
place the Illiac at Ames, and in December 1970 NASA Deputy Administra- 
tor George Low approved the plan. Formal announcement of acquisition of 
the Illiac was made in January 1971.16 
The Illiac arrived in the summer of 1972, and though initially trouble- 
some, it eventually became one of Ames’s great research strengths. By 1975 
computational fluid dynamics had made such impressive strides that Mark, 
Chapman, and Melvin Pirtle, head of the Illiac program, argued in an Astro- 
nautics and Aeronautics artic!e that the relationship between wind-tunnel 
testing and computational fluid dynamics was shifting. While wind-tunnel 
research would always be necessary, the three authors believed that compu- 
tational fluid dynamics would play an increasingly important role. in the 
future.’ Expectedly, the article produced some howls of indignation from 
the experimentalists, who accused the authors of endangering the future of 
the wind tunnel. Though the alarmists had misread the article, the furor it 
caused was indicative of the influence computational fluid dynamics was 
beginning to have. 
Creation of the Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch and the uncon- 
ventional procurement policies followed in obtaining improved facilities for 
computational research illustrate another variation of the research evolution 
story. In this case, upper management at Ames had clearly grasped the 
potential of a new field for the center and had moved aggressively in that 
direction. New and better facilities being essential, they were procured. This 
differed from Mark’s motives in supporting the proposal for gas-combustion 
and arc-jet facilities. These had been procured in line with his general prin- 
ciple of acquiring as many unique research tools as possible. While Ames 
grew into its role in NASA-wide thermal protection research through branch- 
level decisions, in computational fluid dynamics, higher management made a 
clear decision to proceed in a new direction and organized a strategy to sup- 
port that decision. Facility acquisition followed a research decision, and 
both facilities and research grew together through mutual support. 
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U-2 RESEARCH - FACILITIES LEAD TO NEW RESEARCH 
High-altitude photography and remote sensing for Earth-resources 
investigations were not, originally, research directions that Ames had clearly 
defined. In 1970, however, the Air Force announced to other federal 
agencies that it was ready to make available two of its high-altitude U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft for research purposes.I8 Agencies, and even private 
industry, were invited to submit proposals for the use of the aircraft. 
NASA was in the final planning stages of the Earth Resources Technol- 
ogy Satellite (ERTS) program, with the first launch planned for 1972.” 
Researchers were becoming concerned that they would have trouble analyz- 
ing the data, since all available high-altitude visual-spectral-band and infrared 
photography came from altitudes where atmospheric distortion was minimal. 
The ERTS satellites would be recording radiation that had passed through 
the entire atmosphere, and distortion would certainly be greater. The possi- 
bility that NASA might acquire the U-2s as research aircraft added inspira- 
tion to a developing idea. 
If photographs from above the densest part of the Earth’s atmosphere 
could be obtained, the data should be similar to the data ERTS would pro- 
duce. With U-2 photography, analysts should be able to prepare themselves 
to analyze the data the satellite would later produce. With this use for the 
high-flying U-2s in mind, NASA asked the Air Force to transfer the aircraft 
to them. Using infrared cameras, the aircraft, like the satellite, could measure 
the chlorophyll content of vegetation - a major feature of ERTS data. In 
infrared, the reddest portions of a photograph indicate high chlorophyll 
levels. 
Anyone seeing a Lockheed U-2 might have immediately understood. 
why an agency devoted to aeronautical research would have wanted one. 
Sleek and fragile looking despite its size, the single-seat aircraft had extra- 
ordinarily long, narrow wings attached to an equally streamlined fuselage. 
Even to the untutored eye it was the epitome of refined grace, a plane one 
might imagine would require a subtle touch. Designed by De France’s old 
Lockheed colleague Clarence L. (“Kelly”) Johnson in the mid-l950s, the 
U-2 remained, despite its age, a thoroughbred among aircraft, capable of 
reaching 21,000 meters in altitude. 
The U-2, however, required almost a separate education in flying and 
maintenance. Carelessly flown, it would “crumple into a ball of aluminum 
foil.”2o Carelessly maintained, it would quickly become a hazard to fly. The 
Air Force, though impressed by NASA’s proposed use of the aircraft, was 
convinced that NASA was completely naive about the complexity and sensi- 
tivity of the U-2s and was therefore reluctant to decide in NASA’s favor 
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until it was certain that the aircraft would be suitably provided for with both 
expert flight personnel and careful maintenance. 
After prolonged discussion between NASA and the Air Force, Martin 
Knutson, one of the first U-2 test pilots, was dispatched to NASA to tutor 
the agency on the intricacies of the U-2. With his help, the Office of Space 
Science and Applications devised a utilization plan that was acceptable to 
the Air Force, including strict requirements for flight crew selection and 
maintenance provided by crews from the Lockheed division that had devel- 
oped and manufactured the U-2s. 
While negotiations were progressing, NASA deliberated on where the 
aircraft should be based. Ames made a strong case for acquiring them. Long- 
lived rumors at Ames have it that Johnson Space Center, already operating 
high-altitude B-57Fs, maintained that the U-2s were too dangerous for rou- 
tine work and should not be accepted. Whatever the JSC position, the result 
was that NASA Headquarters decided to place the aircraft at Ames. 
Knutson, ready to retire from the USAF, reconsidered a NASA offer and 
agreed to take charge of the U-2 project at Ames.21 
In June 1971 the U-2s arrived at Ames, with a minimal maintenance 
crew and one other test pilot besides Knutson. The sensor system for the air- 
craft was still under development. A short two months later, however, a U-2 
flew its first satellite simulation flight. Knutson’s operation, under the Air- 
borne Sciences Office, became the Earth Resources Aircraft Project (ERAP). 
At that time the plan for the U-2s went no further than ERTS simulation, 
with the expectation that once ERTS-A was in orbit, simulation flights 
would no longer be needed. 
As circumstance would have it, the future of the U-2 project at Ames 
became assured through bad luck in another NASA quarter. ERTS-A was 
due to be launched in spring 1972; but developmental problems arose, 
threatening postponement of the launch date. In the case of ERTS-A, this 
delay was catastrophic, since the satellite was to be short-lived and had been 
earmarked for a crop survey during the spring growing season. Those data 
were to delineate the benchmark against which later observations would be 
compared. Goddard Space Flight Center, managing the ERTS project, called 
Ames. 
The ERAP staff, after hurried consideration, produced a plan that 
answered Goddard’s dilemma. The Pre-ERTS Investigator Support program 
took the planned satellite survey and restructured it for the two U-2s. The 
data could subsequently be compared with information obtained by the 
tardily launched satellite. With a great deal of midnight oil and a certain 
amount of luck, over a three-month period the two U-2s made hundreds of 
flights and accomplished the mission originally assigned to ERTS-A. “After 
that,” Knutson recalled, “research branched like a many-limbed tree in every 
different direction.’y22 Not only did the U-2s continue to support satellite 
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1980. A U-2 image of Mt.  S t .  Helens after its eruption helps researchers understand aero- 
sol particle behavior and ash dispersal. The picture is cropped closely f o r  detail. 
data for ERTS and later Landsat and Skylab, they also provided information 
in other resource surveys and were used extensively in disaster assessment. 
Using U-ZS, NASA, cooperating with other federal agencies, provided, at a 
surprisingly low cost, information sometimes unobtainable by any other 
method. 
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In 1974, for example, a U-2 surveyed the Dudaim melon infestation in 
the Imperial Valley at a fraction of what a ground survey would have cost. 
The melon, an alarmingly vigorous weed, was smothering the California 
asparagus crop. The melon was not only difficult to detect, but ground 
surveying was made even worse by dreadful heat, the rough vegetation, and 
rattlesnakes. By the time the Ames aircraft were employed, the melon had 
been indicted in federal court! The survey was not only successful in locating 
infestations; but it also cost little more than $3,000, where a ground-based 
investigation had been estimated at $64,000.23 
The U-2s provide another variety of research pattern: their uses became 
apparent after they had been acquired. Contrary to the acquisition approach 
of the large arc-jets and the series of increasingly powerful computers, Ames 
obtained the U-2s in an opportunity that presented itself. There was no 
existing program in high-altitude work and no plan to form one. Hans Mark 
indeed had sticky fingers for airplanes; but in this case he only responded to 
a set of fortuitous circumstances, to the definite benefit of the center. 
This consideration of some activities in the history of the Astronautics 
Directorate has provided some insight into the workings of a research institu- 
tion. Structural organization, as we have seen, reflects the ebb and flow both 
of larger agency goals and of the center’s own research priorities. Econom- 
ics and directives from Headquarters play an important role in the restructur- 
ing of research units. The examples of thermal protection materials, compu- 
tational fluid dynamics, and the U-2s reveal the variation of research patterns 
and the different levels at which crucial decisions are made. Just as research 
decisions can originate at a higher management level, so they can also begin 
at a branch or section level. As often as conscious plans are developed, luck 
can provide a research route without a plan. The secret, then, seems to lie in 
meeting opportunity head-on. 
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9 
AMES IN A LARGER CONTEXT 
Although NASA was built upon the foundations of the NACA, absorb- 
ing its personnel and facilities, the new agency soon differed radically from 
the old in many ways - and nowhere more than in the practice of public 
relations. The NACA had been a quiet agency in a very specialized line of 
work. To those connected with aeronautics, it had been highly respected 
and well known; but to the general public, it was one of the less familiar 
government agencies. In the early years of Ames, its managers made little 
effort to conduct a public relations program, which was considered neither 
desirable nor necessary. 
Not that Ames lacked ties with the local community, especially the 
academic community; but those ties were very conservative and usually 
ad hoc, There were professional ties among colleagues in the same fields; 
there were arrangements whereby Ames personnel could study or teach at 
Stanford, or graduate students could work part-time at Ames; there were the 
important ties resulting from Professor Durand’s eminence in the NACA. But 
there was little institutionalized joint research, little formalized, continuing 
collaboration. The results of Ames research did not reach beyond the aero- 
nautic community because of the nature of the NACA’s work. What would 
later be called spinoff technology did not exist. 
These three areas of public involvement - public relations, academic 
ties, and technological spinoff - changed greatly after 1958. NASA started 
with a completely different outlook on life, owing its very existence to 
public awareness of the implications of Sputnik. The need for an immediate, 
major financial commitment dictated a new approach to the public. The 
range of research increased dramatically as NASA became involved in space 
technology and life support, while continuing the aeronautical research that 
had gained the NACA its reputation. The increased scope of investigation 
changed NASA’s relationship with academia and created technology that 
could be adapted to subsidiary uses. This chapter considers changes in these 
areas at Ames in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
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COMMUNITY TIES 
As one Ames veteran remarked, 
In the old days, we did very little in public relations. Every 
three years, we invited congressmen and local mayors to what was 
mostly a technical open house. We didn’t feel it necessary to make 
a big effort to improve public relations, though. Now, public rela- 
tions activities are more important, in part, because of the 
increased emphasis on space research.’ 
NASA brought a whole new approach to public relations. Under De France, 
public relations were restrained in tone and limited to infrequent gestures on 
a local basis. Undoubtedly, De France felt that public salesmanship was 
inappropriate. Gestures that would have been considered routine public rela- 
tions by any business he saw as potential conflicts of interest, and he dis- 
couraged Ames personnel from placing themselves in public situations that 
could be seen to have the remotest connection with their position at Ames.2 
The public, therefore, was not encouraged to much interaction with Ames. 
The triennial open house, where congressmen, representatives of industry, 
and local dignitaries were given a tour of the laboratory and informed of 
research accomplishments, was not open to the public. It was left to the 
Washington office to keep up political contacts and to create a respected 
image for the NACA; as Ames managers perceived things, the task of the 
laboratories was research, not diplomacy. 
NASA, dependent on public support for its large appropriations and 
born in the full glare of political limelight, took an active approach to public 
relations from the very beginning. The research centers followed suit, and 
after 1958 the local newspapers seemed to carry more publicity about Ames. 
It also seems that De France was still reluctant to plunge into such outside 
a~t ivi t ies .~ By the late 1960s, however, Ames was taking an active role in 
community affairs, in decided contrast to its first two decades of existence. 
Evidence of the change is ~ i d e s p r e a d . ~  
On a community level, much of the new public exposure was the result 
of efforts to act as a mentor for both students and teachers. The 1963-1968 
period saw increased participation in activities sponsored by the National 
Science Teachers Association; Ames hosted prize-winning high-school 
students and served as an audience for the presentation of their research 
projects. In 1965 Ames began to take part in President Johnson’s Youth 
Opportunity Campaign, designed to offset high unemployment among teen- 
agers by creating new jobs in federal agencies. The first year Ames hired 
25 young people aged 16-21 for summer empl~ymen t .~  The numbers grew 
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each summer. The practice not only benefited the students by providing 
them with work; it also served as another means of integrating the center 
into the surrounding community in a very practical manner. During the same 
period, Ames became involved in teacher education with an annual lecture 
series for science teachers of Santa Clara County. 
In the mid-1960s Ames began to place exhibits at county fairs, and 
both NASA as a whole and Ames in particular received a good deal of pub- 
licity through this exposure. In 1966 Idaho sponsored an Aerospace Week, 
and Ames provided the major exhibits and educational programs. That same 
year Ames staff members taught a course in atomic energy to a local boy- 
scout troop. 
Some of the publicity that Ames enjoyed during NASA’s first decade 
resulted from the public’s fascination with space rather than any effort made 
by the center. In the mid 1960s news of Ames was featured on some pres- 
tigious television programs, emphasizing the range of research done at the 
center. In 1963 a documentary depicted the center’s work on the supersonic 
transport. The next year Ames test pilots involved with the X-14A were 
interviewed, and the following year two members of the Ames life-science 
staff discussed the effects of space on the human body. While perhaps minor 
exposure on a national level, the growing mention of Ames in the media 
served to remind the local public that interesting things were taking place 
there and, indeed, had been for years. When Smith De France retired in 
September 1965, the Palo Alto Times devoted an editorial to a finely 
worded appreciation of the man and the institution he had been so influen- 
tial in molding.6 
The trend toward major efforts in public relations throughout the 
agency was emphasized in 1966 when NASA instituted a “communications 
improvement” campaign. Public information officers were charged with 
maximizing their center’s positive image in the local community.’ The 
timing suggests that the first flush of enthusiasm for space inspired by the 
formation of the agency and the Mercury and Gemini projects had faded and 
needed bolstering by a conscious effort at salesmanship. Another element in 
Ames’s growing involvement in outside activities undoubtedly stemmed from 
gregarious Harvey Allen’s influence as the new director. He was irrepressibly 
eclectic in his interests and acquaintances. Under Allen, the Ames bias 
toward isolationism began to fade; the director’s natural sociability was 
matched by his commitment as a researcher to a less limited field of profes- 
sional and public dialogue. 
Over the next few years, the scope of the Ames public affairs office 
increased as the center became ever more involved with the public. Tours of 
the research center, unlike the highly formalized affairs of the NACA period, 
grew into routine offerings to an assortment of groups, from elementary 
school classes to visiting scientists from other countries. Ames activities were 
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mentioned with increasing frequency in the local papers. In 1970, when 
NASA closed its Western Operations Office at Pasadena, Ames assumed the 
duties of conducting NASA’s public affairs in the 11 western states. This 
widened the Ames public affairs office’s duties to include distribution of 
educational films and publications, management of NASA exhibits, and 
response to public and press inquiries.’ 
In 1971 Hans Mark reassigned Arthur Freeman, who had been the 
director of administration since 1940, to a new role. As Freeman put it later, 
his job was “to explain as carefully and as thoroughly as possible what we 
are doing and why we are doing it - not only what we are achieving from a 
scientific standpoint, but also how it impacts on and contributes to both the 
local economy and the future of mankind.” His task was over and above that 
of the public affairs office. Freeman was to stay in “contact with appro- 
priate representatives of state and local governments, local businesses, labor 
organizations, and business and professional associations, the purpose being 
to determine how we, as a Government research activity, can materially 
increase our contributions to and improve our relations with our ‘area of 
responsibility. ’ ”9 
Freeman’s summary, prepared for Headquarters, gives a good indication 
of how widely Ames had extended itself into the public sphere since 1958. 
For example, by 1971 the center had a “small-business specialist” whose 
task was to educate small firms on how to do business with Ames or other 
federal agencies. He specifically sought out small local businesses to supply 
some of Ames’s needs, and with a reasonable amount of success: of 
109 research and development contracts issued in a two-year period, 32 went 
to small businesses.” In a similar manner, the Contracts Compliance Office 
was instrumental in implementing a Small Business Minority Entrepreneur 
program, under which service contracts were negotiated with minority- 
owned small businesses. The hope was that the experience would increase 
their success in gaining other contracts. 
Cooperation with the Neighborhood Youth Corps of Santa Clara 
County, which began in 1967 with summer employment opportunities for 
local students, grew by 1971 into a program by which Ames employed over 
50 high-school dropouts, with the purpose of teaching job skills that would 
enable them to gain jobs within the community. By 1971 almost 400 had 
participated in the program. 
On the high-school and college level, Ames’s cooperation had pro- 
gressed past occasional interaction to a number of continuing relationships. 
From one high-school district, 40 students were bused to Ames five after- 
noons a week as part of a credited work-study program. The same was true 
for Foothill and De Anza Community Colleges; Ames provided part-time 
employment for nearly 20 students annually, as part of the colleges’ finan- 
cial aid programs. In 1970 a separate special training program was begun 
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with the Foothill Community College District. Students received classroom 
instruction on campus and practical work experience in the Ames shops and 
facilities. 
As a source of employment and job training Ames was becoming more 
of a force in the local community; but in addition to  that, the center was 
beginning to stretch its facilities and personnel resources outward into the 
community. Besides organizing and staffing teacher workshops for college- 
credit coursework, Ames began offering more specialized programs. In 1970 
an Ames craftsman gave a three-day foruni for high-school shop teachers 
interested in developing courses in plastics. Various one-day institutes for 
college classes were given some 10 times a year, and a teacher resource center 
was developed. This provided local teachers with the chance to preview 
audio and visual aids for classroom use, to reproduce visual material, and to 
use the Ames library. In addition, local colleges were invited to participate in 
the seminars that Ames conducted for its own staff, a tradition that had 
begun to develop under Allen's directorship. 
By 1971 Ames had also become involved in mutual research projects 
with students, high-school teachers, and university professors. During the 
school year, between 20 and 30 high-school students studied with an Ames 
researcher one day a week, working on a research project of mutual interest. 
As part of the program, members of the life-sciences staff taught a course in 
space biology; at the year's end, Ames awarded fellowships to the most 
promising students for the continuation of their research. For high-school 
teachers, similar opportunities were present; the National Science Founda- 
tion sponsored 30 summer fellowships for teachers interested in research- 
oriented courses. Like the students, they were given the chance to pursue a 
summer research project with an Ames staff member. 
One of the most interesting programs in which Ames became involved 
was the Faculty Fellowship Program jointly sponsored by NASA and the 
American Society for Engineering Education. Begun in 1964, the 10-week 
summer program was constructed to give experience in space research and 
engineering systems design to college faculty who were outstanding in 
related fields. In the cooperative study and research program, Stanford 
shared with Ames the combination of research and coursework responsibili- 
ties; 50-60 professors worked with the Ames senior staff and attended 
classes and seminars at Stanford. The program was a two-year one; most 
researchers returned for a second summer to continue their projects. In 
1968, for example, 20 of the participants produced a system design of a 
manned lunar scientific observatory. NASA received the benefits of a useful 
study, and the researchers gained experience in designing multidisciplinary 
engineering systems." 
As an aid to those earlier along in their careers, Ames also took part in 
the National Research Council's Resident Research Associateship program. 
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The Fellows were funded by money allocated to the Council by NASA 
Headquarters and chosen by a panel appointed by the President of the 
National Academy of Sciences. The researchers could work in any fields that 
were of interest to Ames; the Fellows were often renewed to continue their 
work over several years. The program began in 1961 with one post-doctoral 
associate and grew steadily; by the end of 1976, participants numbered 38, 
half new appointments and half renewals.I2 
On a less technical level than the NASA-ASEE program, Ames had also 
developed educational ties in ways that increased the center’s visibility and 
rapport with the community and bridged the gap between highly specialized 
technology and the Bayshore Freeway commuter who occasionally looked at 
the collection of wind tunnels and idly wondered what happened there. 
In the adult community, the center had begun participating in local 
adult education programs, offering instructors for courses on aeronautics and 
space sciences. In addition, members of the staff served on high-school and 
college curriculum councils, evaluating course offerings and recommending 
alternatives. In cooperation with local industry, a number of center person- 
nel were members of a science and mathematics council, which also included 
local high schools and colleges, that attempted to coordinate educational 
needs with local resources.’ 
By the late 1960s Ames had developed a conscientious program of 
classroom visits to local elementary and high schools. By Freeman’s estimate, 
center personnel visited over 300 elementary schools over a five-year period. 
Over 10,000 students visited Ames, with the staff providing both tours and 
classroom 1e~tures . l~  Two Explorer Scout posts in aeronautics and astronau- 
tics were sponsored at Ames, to provide experience in various research fields 
and to aid career planning. 
RESEARCH TIES WITH ACADEMIA 
NASA, and Ames, needed the resources of the academic community in 
a way that the NACA had not. Not only did the increased scope of research 
demand outside assistance, but the sheer volume of that research necessi- 
tated, in many instances, combining efforts. Collaboration was attractive to 
the universities, for NASA was a welcome source of funding and had many 
facilities that the universities could not match. Throughout the agency, 
offices were established to administer the various relationships between 
academia and NASA. At Ames, the University Affairs Office was established 
in 1965; 1967 saw the beginning of a separate and innovative Ames- 
university understanding. All NASA centers had university affairs offices, 
but the office at Ames was run somewhat differently from those at the other 
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centers. The variety and number of relationships between Ames and aca- 
demic institutions probably exceeded that of any other NASA installation.' 
The University Affairs Office evolved slowly. In 1965 a Grants and 
Research Contracts Officer was named within the Programs and Resources 
Office to process academic proposals and administer grants to universities. 
Grants, through which NASA financed research in hopes of productive 
results, went through the Procurement Division for processing, after having 
been approved by Headquarters. In 197 1 Headquarters began to decentralize 
control of activities dealing with academia. The move was one of several 
steps taken to cut costs in the face of shrinking resources. As Hans Mark 
retrospectively observed, Ames, because of the various methods it had 
already established for dealing with academia, was in a position to benefit 
from the decision because it already had the machinery to perform the 
task.16 Headquarters transferred to Ames the responsibility for awarding 
grants as well as administering them. At that time, however, the Procurement 
Division was still responsible for grants; the Ames University Affairs Office 
was made a part of that division a year later to expedite processing. 
In 1976 Mark made the University Affairs Office a separate entity, 
reporting to the Administration Directorate. In addition, the office obtained 
authority to administer the financial details of grants, without having to go 
through the Procurement Division. Most individuals who dealt with the uni- 
versities were thereby freed from the time-consuming procurement regula- 
tions. Contracts, by which Ames purchased specified products, remained 
with the Procurement Division, but contracts accounted for only a small 
part of the Ames-university relationships. 
By 1976 Ames had a budget of $8.2 million a year for awarding 
grants." It had entered into twice as many university agreements as any 
other NASA center. Knapp A. Tomberlin, who took over the University 
Affairs Office in 1976, saw two factors that contributed to the success of the 
office: management support for working with universities was strong, and 
the administrative process utilized by the University Affairs Office bypassed 
both NASA Headquarters and the procurement process. That simplification, 
in Tomberlin's opinion, existed only at Ames.18 
After 1967 Ames increased its ties with academia dramatically by 
means of another unique innovation. Growing from an arrangement with the 
University of Santa Clara Law School, the NASA-Ames University Consor- 
tium provided a relatively simple means of establishing collaborative relation- 
ships with universities without going through procurement processes. The 
idea that eventually resulted in the consortium grew out of frustration. Jack 
Glazer came to Ames as chief counsel in 1966. At that time, space law was a 
new and exotic field, and extensive legal research was badly needed. Indeed, 
the unplowed area provided such research opportunities as every law student 
dreams about. Glazer, without colleagues, quickly found himself over- 
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whelmed with both awareness of the research need and excitement over 
research opportunities. 
Shortly after Glazer’s arrival, he fell into conversation with Cyril 
Ponnamperuma of the Life Sciences Directorate, who told a sorry tale of his 
attempt to obtain the research talents of a visiting colleague at Stanford 
University. By the time the necessary paperwork had been processed, only a 
month or so had been left for research, and the visiting professor had shortly 
thereafter returned to his home university in Europe. Unfortunately, because 
the relationship had been formalized, he was still responsible, even after leav- 
ing Stanford, for his share of the task. A simple desire for professional col- 
laboration had turned into a nightmare for both researchers, and Ponnam- 
peruma, needless to say, was loath to enter any more such arrangements. 
Glazer needed research assistance. The logical place to find that assis- 
tance was any of the nearby law schools, where students needed research 
experience. Wondering how to bring the solution and the problem together, 
the Ames lawyer perused the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 
which had founded NASA. Glazer discovered that Congress, “in a sunburst 
of enthusiasm . . . had given the agency certain powers.”” Besides contracts 
and grants, NASA also had the authority to enter into less formal arrange- 
ments that were exempted from the procurement process. Sec. 203c(5) 
authorized the agency to enter into “contracts, leases, cooperative agree- 
ments, and other transactions”; (6) permitted NASA “to use, with their con- 
sent, the services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of Federal and other 
agencies with or without reimbursement: and on a similar basis to cooperate 
with other public and private agencies.” These provisions gave NASA surpris- 
ing latitude in pursuing joint ventures. The only limitation was that the type 
of business relationship envisioned must differ from those associated with 
the formal procurement or grant process. Since Glazer was contemplating a 
partnership with a law school, a collaboration to which each party contrib- 
uted, this requirement was met, as neither grants nor contracts established 
partnerships. 
Ames thereupon entered into a joint venture with the University of 
Santa Clara Law School in 1967 to produce basic research in space law. Two 
years later the first results were published, the beginning of a continuing 
stream of space-law research. Santa Clara’s students gained valuable experi- 
ence and were paid modestly for their services; for $5,000 Ames had the 
benefit of the students as researchers and gained another academic friend in 
the local community. In contrast to a grant agreement, the university had 
shared substantially in the cost of the research, and Ames had also remained 
very much a part of the research process. In contrast to an R&D contract, 
where research is bought for NASA’s benefit, the partnership was mutually 
beneficial; Santa Clara’s students gained apprenticeship experience as they 
contributed to a NASA need. Moreover, Ames’s services, rather than money 
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alone, were of value to the university. In another agreement Glazer taught 
space law at the university as part of NASA’s share of the partnership, while 
the university in return did research in the life sciences. The arrangement 
worked; the cost was probably 25% of what it would have been under a 
formal grant or an R&D contract.20 
Other managers at Ames were quick to notice what Glazer had accom- 
plished. He had, under the special authority of the Space Act, acquired assis- 
tants while at the same time establishing a research relationship with a local 
law school. In 1968 and 1969 Ames entered agreements with the University 
of Iowa and the University of New Mexico. In 1969 a standard consortium 
agreement was drafted to provide for the reciprocal use of services, person- 
nel, facilities, and equipment. Thereafter negotiation with an individual 
school had to cover only specific activities. 
The consortium was unusual in two ways. The partnership between 
Ames and the universities was designed to be a real, working relationship, 
whereby Ames added tangibly to the joint venture, providing professional 
expertise, facilities, teaching time - not just funding. Further, when reim- 
bursement was involved, only direct costs were considered. This meant that 
Ames’s financial contributions were kept low. The limit to  a consortium 
agreement was $30,000 per year, not to exceed two years. But that money, 
as Glazer observed, was “manna from heaven” to some less prosperous 
colleges and universities, which were seldom chosen for the larger grants.21 
This result, as Glazer saw it, was only good; it spread money to additional 
institutions, where unexpected excellence was often discovered. It also 
extended Ames’s ties with the academic community much further than they 
had spread under contracts and grants. Mark’s “octopus principle”22 was at 
work again: the more tentacles an institution spreads, the harder it is to 
dislodge it. 
The appeal of the consortium is evident in the statistics. In 1971, 
13 universities were part of the arrangement; five years later the consortium 
had 70 members and awards totaled over $1 million.23 The larger universities 
had also seen the advantages of the partnership with Ames, and by 1976 the 
membership list contained several of the more prestigious schools. With grant 
money becoming less available, consortium agreements gained in favor. 
In 1971, four years after the first agreement with the Santa Clara Law 
School, the Ames-University Consortium held a plenary conference to assess 
the program. Glazer underlined clauses in the consortium agreement that 
permitted flexible relationships. Ames, for example, undertook to put at the 
university’s disposal any requested personnel for meetings or consultations. 
Facilities of the center, including libraries and laboratories, were available 
without users’ fees; the center was also able to utilize the talents of qualified 
students without regard to civil-service laws. In addition, Ames employees 
could audit courses within assenting universities at no charge. 
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That the consortium was welcomed by Ames was also evident by the 
presence of two of the research directorate heads, Glen Goodwin of the 
Astronautics Directorate and Harold Klein of the Life Sciences Directorate. 
Klein, in his down-to-earth manner, described what the consortium agree- 
ments had meant to  his directorate: 
In 1967, we in the life sciences at Ames were very, very new . . . 
and most of our people . . . had not come from space-related insti- 
tutions [but] from universities. [We] saw in this opportunity a 
way of continuing to do research more or less [as we] had been 
accustomed to. . . . We saw that these agreements could bring a 
certain measurement of this university style into our own labora- 
tories. So we quickly climbed on the bandwagon. 
By Klein’s count, 17 faculty members, 14 graduate students, and 35 under- 
graduates had already worked at Ames and 17 papers had been published at 
a cost of less than $8,000 apiece.24 As Klein saw it, his directorate had cer- 
tainly gotten its money’s worth. 
The consortium agreements, as they increased in number over the years, 
also tended to  act as screening devices for potential grants. During a two-year 
consortium agreement for a specific research purpose, Ames could evaluate 
what could be expected from a larger, longer investment. Often, one result 
of a consortium agreement was a later grant for a larger amount, after the 
university had successfully demonstrated its potential. Thus, both as an end 
in itself and as a step toward a larger undertaking, the consortium played an 
important role in extending Ames as a national resource beyond the bounds 
of the local community. The ease with which agreements could be reached 
made informal collaboration more feasible. A method of formal procure- 
ment “avoidance, not evasion,” as Glazer in~is ted ,~  s the consortium made it 
possible to conclude a short-term, small-budget research agreement quickly, 
often within three weeks. Normal procurement procedures, especially in 
1967 when the consortium was conceived, often took many months. The 
consortium was a happy example of a creative way in which bureaucracy 
can be conquered and horizons widened. 
SPINOFF TECHNOLOGY 
Public relations attempted to advertise Ames and its achievements. 
Academic ties also accomplished this, while benefiting both parties. Spinoff 
technology, which transferred research accomplishments into the public 
sector, often performed a public relations task as well. 
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Much Ames research contributed to spinoff technology, and as a result 
of a NASA-wide effort to identify civic needs that might be satisfied with 
federal research, more and more NASA research reached the public. In the 
early 1970s six NASA regional dissemination centers throughout the country 
began to provide industry with information concerning possible spinoff 
technology, using a computerized data base. Easy access to technological 
answers helped to widen NASA’s technology audience. 
In 1972 Daniel j. Harnett, head of NASA’s Office of Industry Affairs 
and Technology Utilization, testifying before the Senate Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, mentioned a recent study by the Denver 
Research Institute that had investigated NASA contributions to industrial 
technology.26 The study, which became an annual review, identified exam- 
ples of successful technology transfer throughout NASA. In many instances, 
Ames research was cited as the basis for the advances. The center’s contri- 
butions ranged from the exotic to the mundane, but the very assortment 
underlines the wealth of applications Ames research embraced. 
In the early 1970s, for example, Ames research on spacecraft insulation 
led to development of fire-retardant insulation foam. What made the foam 
unique were just those fire-retardant aspects so necessary in spacecraft, for 
most commercial foams at the time were highly flammable. Used as core 
material in furniture and wall panels, fire-retardant foam had obvious 
advantages. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) became 
interested in the problem of flammable foam in housing. A data search by 
one of the NASA Technology Application Teams led to the discovery of the 
Ames work on foams, and HUD arranged for the spacecraft insulation to be 
tested for both fire retardation and ease of manufacture. Even while the 
foam was in the testing stage, the Port of New York Authority expressed 
interest in it. A fire at Kennedy Airport had drawn attention to the hazards 
of flammable foam in furniture; the fire had leapt eight meters between 
groups of chairs filled with flammable foam and caused more than $1 million 
in darn age^.'^ 
In another sector, techniques for stress analysis in aeronautics were 
modified for use in civil engineering. One of the primary applications of the 
computerized method of analysis was forecasting material fatigue in bridges. 
The strength of structural materials is decreased by various influences, and 
the changes are not always visible, so that visual inspection can be only par- 
tially effective. In 19 72-1973, using the Ames-developed analytical system 
called Randomdec, the Federal Highway Administration analyzed steel 
girders to determine the minimum size of a detectable flaw. To test 
Randomdec in another way a highway overpass near Moffett Field was fitted 
with a vibration sensor to monitor the effects that traffic and the weather 
had on the structure. Comparison of the data with earlier tests on the same 
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bridge showed that degradation of the structural elements could be measured 
efficiently.2 
In biomedicine, an Ames-developed battery-operated ultrasonic electro- 
cardioscope was tested and enthusiastically endorsed by Stanford Univer- 
sity's School of Medicine. The instrument was much smaller than existing 
equipment, which meant that it could be used under conditions where the 
bulkier machines would be impractical or impossible. Being battery powered 
was even more important. In many situations where a patient's heart must be 
constantly monitored, it is desirable to limit the use of electrical equipment. 
The new machine cut down on the electrical hazards of continuous monitor- 
ing, which could be especially crucial in the case of newborn infants on addi- 
tional life-support electronic equipment. The Ames electrocardioscope also 
had the advantage of being simpler to operate and potentially available for 
use by the patient at home.29 During 1974, as testing produced optimal 
results, marketing studies were begun by two major manufacturing com- 
panies that were interested in the possibilities of producing the electrocardio- 
scope on a commercial basis. 
The bedrest studies that Ames began in the early 1970s led to another 
somewhat exotic piece of biomedical equipment. A major problem for 
bedridden patients, especially those who cannot be moved, is keeping clean 
and comfortable. For hospital staff, bathing a bedridden patient is exhaust- 
ing, time-consuming, and often only partially satisfactory. In connection 
with the bedrest studies, Ames developed the idea of a horizontal shower. 
The patient, lying on a box-like gurney that collected water and channeled it 
to a drain, was wheeled into a curtained frame that supported a ring of 
inwardly directed shower heads. The recumbent patient could thereby enjoy 
a complete shower without extensive eq~ipment .~ '  
Some spinoff technology originated with Ames contractors. This was 
the case with the Optacon device, developed under contract by the Stanford 
Research Institute in Palo Alto. The Optacon made any printed page avail- 
able to a blind person. The reader moved a small camera over each line of 
print in turn. The machine converted the photo-image of the printed page 
into a vibrating image of the letters that could be interpreted when the 
reader placed his or her other hand in a small receiver box. Other govern- 
ment agencies sponsored additional research on the device, and at the end of 
1976 a California company was investigating its p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  
On a less dramatic level, but important in its own right, was a hand tool 
developed and patented by an Ames employee. A coaxial cable stripper 
rapidly cut both shielding and insulation from a cable so that connectors 
could be attached. The tool was put into production in 1976.32 
Finally, Ames and the California Division of Forestry developed an 
automatic system for sending fire prediction information to central sites via 
satellite. A tiny weather station measured and transmitted wind velocity and 
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direction, solar radiation, humidity, and the moisture content of the ground 
cover in the immediate area. Weighing only 91 kilograms, it could be trans- 
ported into remote areas and was easily installed. At the end of 1976 the 
system was being tested in a limited area in C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~  
The impressive thing about any technology utilization progress report is 
that it is soon outdated. Thus, these products of Ames research may well be 
in routine use in a few years, and not seem unique at all. As examples of 
ways in which Ames has entered the larger context of daily life, however, 
they will continue to be an imposing assortment of achievements. 
In the widest sense, the product of any research institution is the con- 
stant advancement of understanding in its areas of investigation. Coupled 
with that understanding comes expanding use of the knowledge gained. 
Ames, as we have seen, has done a creditable job of spreading its research 
brainpower and facilities outward into the local community and the 
academic community. Imagination has carried Ames ideas into new contexts 
with practical applications in a variety of areas, enriching both the benefi- 
ciaries and the research center itself. 
Locally, the center has grown into a role of local activism that comple- 
ments its more arcane academic contributions and its spinoff technology. 
Over the years, Ames learned to use its resources to enrich the surrounding 
community and to foster an awareness of the center’s research mission. 
Needless to say, Ames’s more visible presence and its positive and practical 
help in community education have done a lot to win support for both the 
research center and for NASA. In the same way, collaboration with the aca- 
demic community and spinoff technology have underlined the range of 
NASA’s interests and helped to establish it as an agency which does indeed 
touch large elements of the population. The very recognition of the need to 
identify this connection is another measure of the distance Ames has come 
since 1940. 
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10 
RESEARCH CENTER INSTEAD OF 
AERONAUTICAL LABORATORY 
The words aeronautical laboratory evoke images of a bygone era. Ames 
Research Center today bears little resemblance to  the institution that was 
built so hurriedly on the eve of World War 11. The changes that together 
worked such a transformation were separately no more than gradual and 
rational accommodations to the changing world. The center’s leaders actively 
sought some of the changes; others came unavoidably from increasing size, 
complexity, and diversity. For the most part, managers made change work in 
the center’s favor. Such an ability is obviously essential in the long term for a 
successful research institution. The Ames that Smith De France built, out- 
standing as it was, could not have prospered indefinitely with its original 
characteristics. Though the body of this book has dealt with many of those 
changes as they occurred over almost 40 years, a comparison of Ames in 
1976 with the Ames of the 1940s might be useful as a summary. Because the 
introduction of project management was perhaps the most significant single 
change of all, that topic will also be discussed in this final chapter. 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In 1945, after five years of frantic construction, Ames remained unfin- 
ished. Indeed, it still bore the appearance of any large-scale construction job. 
Landscaping was nonexistent. The newly finished 40- by 8O-foot wind 
tunnel loomed at the northwestern boundary, dominating. the scene and 
highly visible from the Bayshore Highway. Much empty space remained; it 
would gradually be filled up as more and more facilities were built. In 1945 
there were 16 buildings on the 0.4 km2 of the laboratory.’ 
By 1976 the land area had tripled and more than 50 buildings were in 
use, not counting additions to earlier facilities and temporary accommoda- 
tions provided by trailers. To the wind tunnels and laboratories had been 
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added ballistic ranges, flight simulators, two libraries, a separate cafeteria, a 
building to  house computer facilities, helium storage tanks, a holding facility 
for life-sciences animals - an array never dreamed of when the first wind 
tunnels were constructed. Mud had long since been supplanted by lawns, 
evergreens, and a maze of sidewalks and roads. 
In 1945 the main research tools were wind tunnels, supported by a few 
research aircraft. Wind-tunnel speeds ranged from 425 km/hr in the 40- by 
80-foot wind tunnel to Mach 3.4 in the 1- by %foot supersonic tunnel. 
Facilities looked much like those at Langley or Lewis - which was only to 
be expected, as all three laboratories dealt strictly with aeronautical research. 
By 1976 the divergence of research-had made each research center 
unique. Wind-tunnel speeds now reached Mach 15. Aircraft had long since 
achieved speeds unimagined in 1945, and research was no longer particularly 
dedicated to achieving higher speed. Instead, take-off and landing character- 
istics distinguished some of the research aircraft; others had unusual altitude 
potential or stability characteristics. Heat had become a crucial issue in 
research. High-speed aeronautics, merging into astronautics, had encountered 
and resolved reentry heating problems, and arc-jet facilities made possible 
high-temperature testing of aerodynamic shapes and materials. Supporting 
the wind tunnels, ballistic ranges, and simulators in flight research were not 
only a selection of aircraft, but also computational facilities for the mathe- 
matical attack on aerodynamic problems. 
In addition to aircraft that supported aeronautical research in tradi- 
tional ways, Ames also possessed aircraft that were used as laboratories, or 
platforms from which to conduct experiments. The Convair 990 was used in 
photographic surveys, as were the high-altitude U-2s. The C-141 Starlifter 
was an astronomical observatory, bearing a 92-cm telescope. As well as being 
an object of research, flight had become a tool of research. In addition to the 
increase in range and sophistication of aeronautical and astronautical 
research tools, the biological and chemical laboratories used by the Life 
Sciences Directorate made Ames unique among NASA’s research centers. By 
1976 Ames could not possibly have been described as an aeronautical 
laboratory. 
PERSONNEL 
As with facilities, Ames personnel had become much more diversified as 
years passed. Originally, researchers had all worked either in wind-tunnel 
research, flight research, or theoretical aerodynamics. In the shops, machin- 
ists and woodworkers made wind-tunnel models to researchers’ specifications 
and test equipment for use in the tunnels and aircraft. A small management 
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staff and a few clerks kept the ratio of “direct labor” to “support labor” 
high. There were no contractors, hence no contractor personnel, at Ames in 
1945. The work force approximated 800, with an operating budget of 
$8 million.2 As all veterans would attest, everyone knew everyone else. 
In 1976, with approximately 1600 civil servants plus 1200 contractor 
personnel at AmesY3 the situation had changed completely. The diversity of 
research facilities was matched by a diversity in research personnel. To the 
aeronautical engineers had been added physicists, biologists, chemists, 
astronomers, geologists, mathematicians, medical doctors, and planetologists. 
Most of the work done originally by in-house machinists and model builders 
was now contracted out, to be done off the premises. Contractors had also 
become responsible for the maintenance of much equipment. 
During World War 11, Ames had been hard pressed to keep an adequate 
staff. The personnel shortage was not a question of budgets, but of locating 
and retaining qualified persons. In the early years most of the Ames staff was 
drawn from relatively few sources. Some engineers had transferred from 
Langley while Ames was being built, but many of the research staff had been 
hired out of graduating university classes, largely from schools west of the 
Rockies. By the 1970s, however, Ames was more cosmopolitan. Researchers 
were still hired directly out of school, but the school was as likely to be in 
the East as the West. Both research and management personnel were hired 
from other NASA centers; they were also likely to leave Ames for jobs at 
other NASA installations. In addition to the greater movement of employees 
within NASA, Ames now gained personnel from industry, university facul- 
ties, and the military. The possible sources of personnel had increased 
immensely, along with the scope of research. If the researchers were no 
longer as tightly knit professionally as they had once been, that advantage 
was offset by a wider outlook and a new cosmopolitanism within the 
organization. 
A similar change occurred within management. In 1945 Ames managers 
came from only one source - Langley. The three top administrators - 
De France, Jack Parsons, and Arthur Freeman, the administrative officer - 
had a common background, having spent their whole careers in the NACA. 
The research division heads - Don Wood, Harvey Allen, and Jack Parsons - 
were still largely exempted from administrative duties and worked almost 
full time in research. By 1976 managers came from a variety of sources and 
brought with them a much wider range of experience. The director had been 
in management positions in academia and at another national research labo- 
ratory. The head of one research directorate had been born and educated in 
Great Britain; another was a former academic who had built a new univer- 
sity’s biology department; a third, while spending almost his entire career at 
Ames, had nevertheless done research all over the world. The director of 
administration had had a long and wide-ranging career in industry. Many in 
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management positions had held Sloan fellowships, which gave business and 
financial training to promising young managers. Reflecting the new career 
flexibility, management changed greatly over short intervals of time, as some 
individuals moved on to other government positions, both in NASA and 
with other agencies. Some retired in mid-career to take up teaching posi- 
tions. In 1976, though 20-year veterans were not rare in research and man- 
agement, many of the staff had been at Ames only a few years. The flow of 
personnel through Ames had increased from a trickle to a stream, widening 
the center’s frame of reference with each arrival and departure. 
MANAGEMENT METHODS AND ORGANIZATION 
By 1976 Ames had a variety of facilities and personnel because research 
was no longer conducted within a single discipline. Through the 1950s the 
center had been concerned only with high-speed and low-speed aeronautics. 
The problems within the field remained recognizable to anyone working any- 
where in aeronautics. In 1943 Harvey Allen, who was to become one of the 
foremost researchers in high-speed aeronautics, was a major contributor to 
the design of the 40- by 8O-foot wind tunnel that was used only for low- 
speed work. By 1976, however, even an engineering genius of Allen’s compe- 
tence could not participate technically in all the Ames work. That increase 
in research range was accompanied by many changes: large budgets, con- 
tracting out, intricate relationships with outside organizations, and project 
management. A long-term Ames researcher and administrator observed, “We 
not only changed our business totally, but our way of doing it.yy4 
Management had remained relatively simple through the middle 195 Os. 
In 1945 De France, with the aid of Jack Parsons, had almost complete 
autonomy over the laboratory. The posts of assistant director did not yet 
exist. There were three research divisions. A financial officer was in charge of 
the accounting records, but De France controlled the budget and decided 
where the yearly monetary allotment was spent. Because all Ames personnel 
were civil servants, personnel problems were straightforward. There was a 
clearly visible line between management and research and an equally clear 
boundary drawn around Ames -Washington was far away, and management 
carried on without much interaction with NACA Headquarters. The general 
philosophy was “Give us the money and leave us a l ~ n e . ” ~  If funds were 
available, Ames usually got its requested financing and was pretty much left 
alone to use the funds in its own manner. 
Financial management presented a very different picture by 1976: 
more money, more management, more institutional structure. Ames no 
longer controlled its own budget. Flexibility in the use of available funds had 
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greatly diminished. As Dean Chapman noted in 1982, “In De France’s day, 
he would get some money for [Ames] and the freedom to use it. Today, 
money doesn’t even really come to the center; it comes through program 
offices for a specific program or project.”6 Bookkeeping had become compli- 
cated in the extreme, and by the late 1960s financial management had 
become a cross that even directorate heads had to bear. Jack Boyd had lived 
through the slow growth of financial complexity within the research direc- 
torates. In the early 1960s, working under assistant director Russell 
Robinson, Boyd’s job had been reasonably straightforward, because direc- 
torates were still uninvolved with financial details. In the late 1960s and 
1970s, this situation changed dramatically. As a research assistant to Allen 
during his center directorship and as a technical assistant to Leonard Roberts 
in the Aeronautics and Flight Systems Directorate, Boyd handled many of 
the myriad details of financing with which the center and its research direc- 
torates had become entangled.7 
Management also faced several other new duties. One concerned con- 
tracts and contractors. Not only did decisions have to be made at various 
levels in selecting contractors, but their work then had to be monitored, and 
disagreements and deadlines had to be dealt with. Contractors had to be kept 
aware of the larger research picture. The Procurement Division was respon- 
sible for many of the routine and legal aspects, a function it had not had in 
1945. Another consideration was dealing with Headquarters and the other 
NASA installations on a daily basis. As only one element in an agency that 
addressed a huge assortment of research and development needs, Ames had 
become interdependent with the other installations, and with Headquarters, 
in ways that had not existed previously. 
In the old days Ames personnel seldom went to Washington to fight for 
threatened programs. Decision processes had not involved researchers. By the 
early 1970s, though, Ames Director Hans Mark depended on physical pres- 
ence to aid campaigns for programs and funds, and the “red-eye special” 
flight from San Francisco to Washington was familiar not only to Mark and 
his directorate heads, but also to researchers who were often called upon to 
take their causes to the top NASA hierarchy. 
That Ames was no longer insular in its affairs was also reflected in the 
managerial side of new relationships between Ames and numerous other 
organizations. Project management, as exemplified by the Biosatellite and 
Pioneer, demanded a new type of management (see below). In addition, 
however, there were the relationships with the Federal Aviation Administra- 
tion, the Army Air Mobility Laboratory, and the Advanced Research Proj- 
ects Agency. On a more individual level were collaborations between Ames 
researchers and their colleagues in universities and other state and federal 
agencies. Separate offices sometimes managed these interrelationships, but 
others were dealt with on lower levels within the directorates themselves. 
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New research and management demands were reflected, naturally, in 
the organizational framework of Ames. Comparing the 1945 and 1976 
organization charts (app. A) shows only one new research directorate, 
though the range of research had increased significantly. Most of the change 
was in the administrative and bureaucratic hierarchy that became unrecog- 
nizable by 1945 standards. Not only was there a separate directorate for 
research support, but the administration directorate had also grown to 
encompass five divisions. As already observed, new offices that dealt with 
other agencies, Headquarters, and various elements of the outside world had 
appeared. Where there had once been only one formalized link - 
De France - outward to the NACA Washington office, there was, by 1976, 
an intricate set of relationships extending to other government agencies, 
industry, the military, and universities. 
WORKING CONDITIONS 
As the physical aspects of Ames changed over the years, so too did the 
working atmosphere and the research process. Many long-term Ames 
employees commented on the changes, the cumulative effects of which were 
dramatic, though perhaps unlikely to be noted by outside observers. 
For example, safety practices became more stringent. In the 1940s and 
1950s, Seth Anderson was a flight-resezrch engineer studying stability and 
control characteristics of various aircraft. In those days, and especially 
during World War 11, problems were attacked more directly, with less regard 
for formal procedures. Solutions were suggested and tested, and the reports 
were written up promptly. Sometimes the whole process took only two or 
three months. Today, similar work might take two years. Though an 
engineer-observer, not a test pilot, Anderson flew some of the 60 to 70 types 
of aircraft tested at Ames during the war. 
We didn’t have enough pilots, so it was a chance for me to help 
fly some of these vehicles. It  was a more hurried type of testing 
that today would be considered unsafe; in the early days we went 
along as observers and engineers to run the test equipment. When 
[duct] tests were conducted on the P-51 wing in the l6-foot wind 
tunnel, the actual airplane was mounted in the tunnel with the 
wing tips cut off. . . . It was tested with one of the engineers in the 
cockpit at speeds up to 500 mph. [Duct rumble was both an 
acoustic and a structural problem. Its onset and intensity were 
most accurately sensed by a person in the cockpit.] We never do 
that now. . . because of the safety aspects.* 
204 
The circumstances of Ames’s birth indeed influenced its early atmosphere, 
and conservative testing procedures may have been occasionally sacrificed 
during World War 11. Other Ames veterans, commenting on wartime flight 
testing, noted that urgency was underlined by heavy battle casualites. Risks 
were r e l a t i~e .~  
Another interesting change, perhaps more a reflection of personality 
differences than anything else, was the shift in the day-to-day relationships 
between researchers and Ames management. Researchers had little contact 
with De France, who relied on either Parsons or his assistant directors 
Robinson and Bioletti (after 1950) to keep him in touch with what was 
going on in the wind tunnels. Though De France was certainly available if 
one needed to see him, the line of communication from researchers to 
administration generally did not extend all the way to the director of Ames. 
This situation changed under Harvey Allen. Having spent most of his 
career in research, Allen refused to give it up as director of the center. 
Because his interests and talents were so diverse, he involved himself in tech- 
nical discussions in a way De France and Mark did not. Veterans recalled, 
You never used to see De France as a researcher. Harvey used to 
have areas that he was really interested in, because he did some of 
it himself [and] never really got out of the research game, so you 
tended to see Harvey a bit more. [It was] on a peer level though, 
less of a supervis0r.l’ 
. . . . .  
Allen spent a sizable fraction of his time just wandering around, 
sitting down and talking to people about their research, how it was 
coming along, etc. You’d see him do that in the afternoons when 
he finished his other w0rk.l’ 
With Hans Mark, managerial involvement in the research life of Ames was a 
conscious policy by which he informed himself of the technical details of 
work in progress and evaluated researchers and their achievements. It was, as 
one scientist recalled drily, a far cry from the “kind old founders of Ames. If 
you were good, you looked forward to the reviews. If you weren’t you 
dreaded them. They were not unlike oral reviews for the Ph.D.”12 
The difference in managerial practice among the three Ames directors 
illustrates another process that began in the late 1950s and gained momen- 
tum over the next 20 years. For better or worse, researchers before 1960 had 
been successfully insulated from the realities of life. Financial, bureaucratic, 
and competitive elements of the center’s work were of no direct concern to 
them. Ames veterans varied greatly in their explanations for the shift, as they 
did when attempting to pin down the change chronologically. All agreed, 
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however, that their jobs had become more complicated and all attributed 
those changes to financial factors, either growing or shrinking funding. It 
seems apparent that both the boom of the early 1960s and the subsequent 
retrenchment after Apollo influenced the Ames mode of operation, making 
life more difficult for researchers. 
Some saw the growth of the NASA budget as the crucial element: 
In the early days, when the total NACA budget was $40 mil- 
lion, there was little scrutiny of how the money was spent, in part 
because there weren’t engineering specialists at Headquarters, We 
didn’t have serious problems in dealing with Headquarters because 
the research funds were relatively small. When large funding 
became available for special projects, a much closer rein was 
needed to justify  expenditure^.^ 
Another researcher added: 
Early in my career [the 1960~1 there was more bureaucracy 
than later. Progress reports were required by NASA Headquarters, 
[and we spent a lot of time] giving research talks to Headquarters 
visitors. That [later] relaxed, and perhaps part of the reason it 
relaxed was that travel money got scarce.14 
Contrastingly, some Ames researchers saw the bureaucratic detail and 
finance problems stemming from cutbacks, rather than from the growth of 
funds and programs. Interconnected to financing complexity was a gradual 
shifting of control to NASA Headquarters. As Dean Chapman remembered, 
One of the changes took place beginning in the late 1960s. 
There was so much money in the Apollo years - there was money 
to do anything that it was important to do. When the money 
began to get tight [things changed] . 
I can remember starting to do something without [a Research 
Authorization] , without [a Research and Technology Objective 
and Plan]. You’d just do it, then write a report. The only discus- 
sion you had as a research worker was with your supervisors. Now 
you have to work with Headquarters directly, to persuade them to 
divide the money for this or that project, to specifically earmark 
the money, etc.15 
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Robert Nysmith, later an administrator at NASA Headquarters, recalled 
Mark’s reviews as pivotal in making the researcher aware of both budget 
restraints and competitive elements: 
I .  . . can’t remember worrying about such things under 
De France and Allen [when I was a researcher]. I figured that 
those guys knew what they were doing. If I needed a piece of 
equipment I’d go and cry and beg to my branch chief, and if he 
[couldn’t] get it, [I’d] jury-rig something that would get the job 
done. I’d worry about a paper I was going to present, or something 
I [was] trying to figure out, but [not the funding details]. I’m 
afraid the system now requires the researcher to  be more worldly. 
I get that feeling when I talk to researchers - they’re worrying 
about things I never used to know existed.“ 
Large-scale, time-limited project management with precisely defined 
goals (such as Pioneer, to be discussed below) did not exist when Ames was 
founded; but the process by which even the more traditional research was 
carried on changed in the interval covered by this book. The new complexi- 
ties - relations with external agencies, cooperation with external researchers, 
reliance on contract support services, participation of more academic disci- 
plines, additional controls on money, elaborate decision-making methods - 
changed significantly the way researchers went about their daily activities. 
One common effect of many of the changes was to decrease the center’s 
self-sufficiency, as a 40-year veteran noted in 1982: 
The center used to be self-contained. If you wanted something 
made in a shop, we had a shop where you could go get it made. 
Now, there are large numbers of support service contractors, and 
shop work is sent out to get done. There are lots of things where it 
seems to me the center simply can’t respond the way it used t0.l’ 
The use of contractors has changed the relationships Ames has with 
other organizations and the mode of operation within the center itself. 
There are two underlying reasons behind the development of contracting at 
Ames. First, the increased scope of research made it impossible for Ames to 
produce all the components or to employ permanently all the specialists it 
needed. Second, financial considerations made contracting necessary. A con- 
tractor might - or might not - be able to do a given job cheaper than civil 
servants could. But contracts are of fixed duration, whereas civil servants are 
hired indefinitely. Further, Congress usually was more willing to provide 
money for contracting than to raise civil-service ceilings. The whole question 
has ramifications that merit reflection. 
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In much the same vein as Dusterberry, Robert Nysmith described the 
changed research scene at Ames in terms of the development of shop con- 
tracting. His perspective illuminates a series of changed relationships: 
We started undergoing manpower reductions [in the late 
1960~1. A conscious decision was made to take the cuts in the 
support areas and protect the professional positions. As a result 
the character of research started to change. 
One of the fond memories I had as a researcher was that of 
encountering a problem in my task and seeing the need for a piece 
of equipment. I’d sit down with a sketch, make up a work order, 
and take it to the branch chief. He’d sign it, and I’d go off to 
the.  . . head of the machine shop. He’d say, “Yeah, go talk to 
Joe,” and Joe would say, “OK, you want to wait?” or “I’ll have 
it tomorrow mcrning,” or “Why do you want to do that?’’ Maybe 
right then and there we’d change the sketch. He’d understand 
what I wanted it for, and what it was supposed to be used on, and 
in fact when I went and used it, half the time [the men in the 
shop] would come over to watch it. [The shop machinists] were 
an integral part of the research project. 
Now . . . the researcher makes up a job order [which is let] out 
on contract to a job shop. It may take two weeks to a month to 
get it back, and then it may not be right. 
Such delays meant that a researcher had to have several tasks under way at 
once. Then, when one was stopped by the lack of equipment, the researcher 
could work on another.” 
On a larger scale, contracting a great deal of work, especially on major 
research projects, turned some researchers into contract managers, some- 
times costing them their research roles. Dean Chapman noted, “It’s in many 
cases an irreversible process. You can’t go back, there’s too much to catch 
up with in research.” Research capability in aeronautics was frequently 
traded for project-management capability, with many of the best researchers 
becoming space-oriented managers. “Aeronautics was left without a full dis- 
tribution of good researchers, and though that’s shifting now, we still don’t 
have the capability that existed pre-Sputnik, in that there were specialists in 
aeronautics, men who knew their fields better than the people in industry.lg 
Harry Goett, speaking from his experience both at Ames and at Goddard, 
said much the same thing: 
If you get more money, you also get more people from the out- 
side. You may still be doing good research, but your researchers 
become program managers, supervisors. And any good researcher, 
after three years of being a program manager, is out of the 
research business and is a program manager.20 
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As contracting caused the researcher to proceed more often piecemeal, 
so too did the scope of the research that was undertaken. For the typical job 
at Ames in 1945, all the workers involved with it were at the laboratory. 
Even when Ames and Langley were pursuing similar studies, they worked 
independently, with researchers periodically comparing their respective 
advances. (An example is the transonic research of 1946-1948, described in 
chapter 2.) By 1976, however, researchers typically were interacting with 
colleagues all around the countryY2l and often a research project was a col- 
laborative undertaking with other NASA centers, industry, and the military. 
The effects were obvious: while professional ties were strengthened and hori- 
zons widened, while the range of research involvement was extended, it was 
also possible for one’s own research to be lost in the larger effort. The 
change almost certainly affected the researcher’s perception of his work, 
though exactly how can scarcely be described precisely. But older Ames 
personnel noticed: 
There was no question whatsoever that under the NACA, aero- 
dynamics and in-house work done by NACA people was top dog. 
Then NASA came along, and [Ames] became part of a [much 
larger] organization. . . and the prestigious stuff moved away 
from those traditional NACA laboratories and over to the 
Goddards and Marshalls and Johnsons, who had the money.22 
The shift to big programs, where the prestige was, also shifted the rela- 
tionships between Ames and industry and the military. Goett said the NACA 
had a doctor-patient relationship with industry. [If] North Ameri- 
can won a contract with the Air Force, within a very short time 
North American would be up here [asking advice. As we now con- 
tract with industry] , the situation is reversed. Industry is not 
going to admit what [it] doesn’t know. It  becomes a situation of 
“Give me $10 million and I’ll do it.” 
What happened was that NASA evolved into a developmental agency as 
much as a research organization. 
When NASA started out, it was the Air Force that had the 
trucks - the Atlas, the Titan - that we used to launch our pay- 
loads. Now NASA is building trucks for the Air Force,23 
Goett observed drily as he considered the Space Shuttle and its implications. 
NASA became, instead of a seller of advice, a buyer of goods and services 
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from the very industries it had once advised. Many Ames personnel viewed 
the change as unfortunate: 
The thing that bothered me [was that] when NASA started you 
could tell immediately . . . that we were different. . . because we 
had an operational role instead of just a research role. The minute 
we [assumed] an operational role, somebody was trying to sell us 
something, and instead of coming in and telling us what their 
problems were, they came in arid told us what their solutions to 
[our problems were] .24 
All these changes at Ames - from small to large budgets, administrative 
simplicity to complexity, self-sufficiency to large-scale interdependence, 
research to developmmt and operations - are illustrated in the advent of 
project management. Project management, in a way, is as representative of 
NASA as basic research was of the NACA. Ames’s striking triumph in project 
management, Pioneer, illustrates many of the contrasts between old and 
new. 
THE PIONEER PROJECTS 
Strictly speaking, Pioneer was four separate projects, of which Ames 
was responsible for all but the first. The process by which Ames acquired the 
management of Pioneer, the problems involved in project management, and 
the ways in which Ames successfully directed the missions indicate the 
different issues that the center faced under NASA. 
The first Pioneer project (five vehicles launched between 1958 and 
1960) had been planned for the International Geophysical Year by the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. Both the Air Force Ballistic Missile 
Division and the Army Ballistic Missile Agency were assigned execution of 
the launchings. When NASA was formed, it inherited the probes, which were 
then launched by the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (Pioneer 1, 2, 
and 5 )  and the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (Pioneer 3 and 4). Those 
launched by the Air Force were developed by Space Technology Laborator- 
ies, Inc., the company that eventually became TRW Systems Group, the 
prime contractor for most of the later Pioneers. Pioneer 3 and 4 were devel- 
oped by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory as a NASA contractor and launched 
by the Army. 
The first little Pioneers were quite successful. Pioneer 1, launched in 
October 1958, returned data on the Earth’s magnetic field and micrometeo- 
rites for 48 hours, which was a good record at the time. Pioneer 3 in Decem- 
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ber confirmed the existence of the Van Allen radiation belts. Pioneer 4, 
launched in March 1959, and Pioneer 5, launched a year later, were NASA’s 
first solar satellites. Both sent back invaluable information on radiation and 
magnetic fields. 
Pioneer 6-9, managed by Ames, were identical spacecraft designed to 
explore the interplanetary medium, charting the characteristics of the mag- 
netic fields, cosmic rays, high-energy particles, electron density, electric 
fields, and cosmic dust. Approved in November 1962, the spacecraft were 
launched between December 1965 and November 1968. TRW Systems 
Group was the prime contractor. Launched by Thor-Deltas from Kennedy 
Space Center and tracked by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory with the Deep 
Space Network, the four vehicles provided Ames with the experience to 
continue the Pioneer series when interest mounted to explore Jupiter. 
Pioneer 10 and 11 were also relatively low-budget interplanetary 
vehicles. Approved in 1969, these two spacecraft became one of NASA’s 
most interesting and visible projects, conducting investigations of the inter- 
planetary medium beyond Mars, crossing the asteroid belt, and studying the 
environment and atmosphere of Jupiter. Pioneer 11 was designed with the 
flexibility to continue on to Saturn, as it indeed did. TRW Systems Group 
was again the prime contractor. JPL provided tracking support, while Lewis 
Research Center and Kennedy Space Center were responsible for launch- 
vehicle and launch-site support. 
Pioneer Venus was approved in 1974 and launched in 1978 to investi- 
gate that planet and its environment. Pioneer Venus is outside the chrono- 
logical scope of this narrative, but it too was a logical follow-on mission for 
Ames and within the tradition of small, relatively inexpensive spacecraft 
that characterized the previous Pioneers. Goddard Space Flight Center did 
preliminary studies for the mission, but the mission was reassigned to Ames. 
Hughes Aircraft Company was the prime contractor. 
The process by which Ames became involved in project management 
illustrates the growth and development of research ideas, the NASA decision- 
making process, and far-reaching changes in Ames. The narrative of events, 
once Ames won approval for Pioneer 6-9, furnishes a fascinating glimpse of 
the maze of considerations that constitute project management. It was a 
world very different from that of a small research laboratory.25 
In 1958-1959, soon after NASA’s inception, Al Eggers, chief of the 
Vehicle-Environment Division, became interested in the idea of a solar 
probe. One of Ames’s most imaginative researchers, he had also been 
involved in the lifting-body work of 1956-1957. Eggers, like Harvey Allen, 
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had so many ideas that it was impossible to follow up many of them, but the 
probe was to be pursued. Charles Hall, then Eggers’s assistant, recalled: 
A1 was very interested in broadening the research of the group 
he had. He had no doubt that there would be a solar probe and 
[wanted to investigate what we] would need to do it. He had 
people in all the little branches working on various aspects of a 
solar probe, not just [within] his division, either.26 
Asking Hall to organize the paper details and to coordinate efforts, 
Eggers started an informal study group to  consider the idea. People from 
various Ames divisions worked on elements of the problem: 
R. T. Jones, Charles Hermach, John Dimeff, Michel Bader - it was 
easy to get people from other divisions. We laid out an outline of 
what we thought the study should be. We finished the study in 
early 1961, it worked out pretty well and we had had a lot of fun 
doing it. 
At Eggers’s suggestion, De France turned the study group into the Solar 
Probe Committee. At this point, Hall began to push for an attempt to inter- 
est NASA in the idea. Though Eggers wondered if refinements to the study 
were needed, Hall wanted to “see if anyone would let us build this thing. It’s 
one thing to say you can build something on paper, and another to actually 
go out and build it.” The committee, led by Hall, presented its findings to 
the NASA Headquarters Particles and Fields Committee, which was then 
meeting at Stanford. That group seemed interested, and Hall and Eggers were 
urged to take the idea to another Headquarters committee. At this point, as 
Hall remembered it later, he was aware that Ames was flirting with project 
management. “When I told AI we should put up or shut up, I think I knew 
what we were into. When we went to Washington, though, I think De France 
still thought it was a research deal. ” 
In Washington, after initial committee interest, Hall was able to see 
Edgar Cortwright, then deputy director of the Office of Space Sciences. 
Cortwright, while impressed with the preliminary study, said he didn’t feel 
Ames had the management experience to do a solar probe, but suggested a 
small spacecraft interplanetary project, something the Particles and Fields 
committee had also been interested in. “He told me Ames was the last place 
he thought would be interested in project management work,” Hall 
observed, “but asked if we’d be interested in the interplanetary project.” 
While still in Washington, Hall met with Cortwright’s staff to draft possibili- 
ties, assuming Ames approval was forthcoming. Back at Ames, Hall and 
Eggers received De France’s approval to proceed with the interplanetary 
project. 
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Over the next few months, a preliminary study was done by Space 
Technology Laboratories (later TRW Systems Group). The management of 
the study was informal. “In those days,” as Hall recalled, “it wasn’t any big 
deal; you could almost write the contract requirements in a letter.” The 
eventual result was a study document produced by TRW, and the next step 
was approval to go ahead from NASA Headquarters. 
De France heartily endorsed Pioneer, which is somewhat surprising 
given his conservative outlook. He himself had been out of research for a 
long period and was of a generation that had never heard of project manage- 
ment. His assistant directors, Harvey Allen and Russell Robinson, feared that 
project work would rob the rest of the center of manpower and were hesi- 
tant about proceeding. De France’s approval was crucial. “People are always 
surprised; they ask me, ‘How did you get Pioneer when De France was 
against it?’ He wasn’t against it, he was for it!” Hall recalled. About to 
depart for Washington to seek final Headquarters approval, the group met to 
discuss plans. Associate Director Jack Parsons was there, assuming he’d be 
standing in for De France, when to everyone’s surprise De France announced 
his intent to go by train and meet the rest of the group there. Hall saw, in 
retrospect, De France’s presence as probably decisive: 
Bob Seamans asked De France, “How does Ames feel about 
this, Smitty?” and De France said, “Ames is behind it loo%.” You 
know, he was so well respected at Headquarters . . . that when he 
said loo%, that just about sold the program. So we did get 
approval based on that meeting. 
Ames received tentative approval for Pioneer in June 1962, and final, 
formal approval in November. Hall was put in charge of the project and set 
about establishing a project office. In January 1963, to provide more institu- 
tional structure to the Pioneer and Biosatellite projects (Ames had acquired 
the second project also) the Development Directorate was formed under 
Robert Crane. Within it, both project offices and a new division, Systems 
Engineering, were established. With an eye to advance planning, Eggers was 
made the head of another new directorate, that of R&D Analysis and 
Planning. These new organizational arrangements, as well as the later crea- 
tion of the Mission Analysis Division under Clarence Syvertson, were effec- 
tive evidence that Ames was looking to its future in a new way, and that 
formal advance planning was becoming more and more essential. 
The technical and scientific achievements of the Pioneer spacecraft are 
well documented elsewhere. More pertinent to this study are the manage- 
ment aspects of the project. At first, the Pioneer project office was com- 
pletely out of the mainstream of activity at Ames. Hall’s small group occu- 
pied some cubicles in what was then the cafeteria. But Hall insisted that 
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continuous close communication among the project elements, both at Ames 
and on contract sites, was essential, and one way he accomplished this was 
by physical proximity. As he recalled, “I had a hard time convincing the 
Ames contracts people they ought to be in the same building; they didn’t 
want any part of that.” 
Another initial problem was assembling a staff. Ames researchers, it 
appeared, had been happy and excited doing feasibility studies for Pioneer, 
but when it came to becoming part of the formal project, they were less 
certain they wanted to participate. Hall later explained, 
You know, . . . there was so much enthusiasm during the study, 
I figured that when we got the go-ahead for the project, people at 
the lab would beat down the doors. . . . The project was approved, 
and by God, I didn’t hear from anyone! So I started calling up 
some of these people, and most of them turned me down. They 
didn’t want to do project work. Ames in those days had a very 
university atmosphere; they didn’t want to have their research 
sullied by the outside world. 
Eventually, however, with the support of Bob Crane as assistant director of 
development, Hali formed a staff, many hired from the outside, and Pioneer 
became a bona fide project in search of contractors. 
It is generally recognized that one of Hall’s outstanding characteristics 
as a project manager was his ability to make a close and constant assessment 
of contractors and their performance throughout the project. Crane’s succes- 
sor found Hall “extremely thorough and technically knowledgeable on the 
project; he didn’t let things slip through him. . . . He didn’t ignore problems, 
and he kept close tabs on the contractors at all  stage^."^' 
Before the prime contractor was chosen, Hall and his group had demon- 
strated that alert pragmatism. While trying to decide among the four main 
competitors, Hall’s team visited the companies on a whirlwind tour from 
Los Angeles to Ann Arbor and Philadelphia and back. The trip’s findings 
changed the competition order and convinced Hall of the importance of 
actually visiting potential contractors to observe their operations. One of the 
competitors 
had top-notch equipment and no one who knew how to work it. 
Their group was small and very inexperienced, trying to get into 
the business. I don’t really know how you get into the business, 
[but] it would have been a disaster if we’d picked them. 
No matter what the contracting method, or who the contractor was, 
there were bound to be difficulties at some stage of the relationship. For 
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Pioneer 6-9, proposals were recieved, and after competition the spacecraft 
contract was awarded to TRW. For Pioneer 10 and 11, TRW was selected 
without competition, using sole-source justification. Both methods have 
drawbacks in producing accurate cost proposals. Competitive-contract pro- 
posals tend to be lower, sole-source contractors may be more realistic in 
their estimates. On Pioneer 6-9, for example, the original proposals based on 
the preliminary study resulted in a sizable spread between TRW and Hughes 
Aircraft Company, the principal competitors. Later, added technical details 
and further refinements in the bidding narrowed the margin and the pro- 
posals became almost identical in cost. The initial difference, as Hall 
observed, was partially a product of the different accounting methods used 
by the two companies, which made it difficult to assess who had made the 
more realistic bid. It taught him a valuable lesson. 
[Since] TRW and Hughes had different accounting systems, it 
was impossible to get figures [based on our] system, since they 
had their own. You have to go along with the contractor’s organi- 
zation to get real data. . . . It’s easier to adjust your own thinking 
than to adjust theirs. 
TRW received cost-plus-incentive contracts for Pioneer 6-9 and 
Pioneer 10 and 11. Costs were $64.3 million for the first four and $94.7 mil- 
lion for the latter two.28 Overruns were kept to a minimum through a 
system that provided automatic checks on the various interacting compo- 
nents of the project; but even so, numerous contract changes drove costs up 
from the original estimates. Still, the two series are examples of economical 
project management, with controlled costs and sensible trimming of non- 
essentials that kept a technically sound project relatively inexpensive for 
what it accomplished. 
Like any large NASA pro-ject, Pioneer relied on many interdependent 
elements, including the Deep Space Network, which would track and com- 
municate with the spacecraft around the world via stations from California 
to Australia. In addition, there were the components of the spacecraft itself, 
the experimenters’ instruments, the launch vehicle, and launch operations. 
The Pioneer project office sought to participate in all interactions between 
the various elements and to give close attention to all problem areas. Weekly 
staff meetings among the organizational elements and periodic reviews by 
Ames and by NASA Headquarters assured that difficulties were spotted 
promptly. Spacecraft were reviewed and checked out by the project office 
at the Redondo Beach, California, factory to eliminate later possible prob- 
lems at the launch site. Even more important, the project office kept 
personnel at the spacecraft contractor’s facility to stay on top of problems. 
Because of the constant surveillance, and because of a team of technically 
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May 1973. Pioneer 17 being unloaded at Cape Kennedy (now Cape Canaveral) prior t o  
launch. (Pioneer 10  had been launched in March 1972.) Note the relatively smallsize of 
the Pioneer spacecraft and the reusable packaging protecting it, both typical of Pioneer’s 
thrifty budgeting. 
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alert monitors from the Pioneer office, many potential disasters were 
averted. 
Even so, there were tense periods. On Pioneer 10, a potential calamity 
was discovered when the four radioisotope thermoelectric generators, the 
sole power source, were tested. Pioneer 10 was to be the first spacecraft 
powered solely by these devices, and they were essential to the mission. 
During the tests, the power source degenerated much more rapidly than 
anticipated. Hall insisted on a complete investigation, and after a sophisti- 
cated series of tests, Teledyne Isotopes, the contractor for the generators, 
discovered that moisture trapped inside the capsule containing the radioiso- 
tope material was affecting the nuclear reaction. Even more serious, the com- 
plicated chemical process was causing the protective casing surrounding the 
radioactive material to become brittle, so that it would shatter under mini- 
mal strain. Teledyne, working against time, changed the moisture-absorbing 
1972. An artist’s rendition of Pioneer 10 spacecraft flying over Jupiter’s surface. 
Pioneer 10 reached Jupiter in December 1973 after aflight lasting over 20 months. 
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insulation material, and the crisis was over. As Hall observed, however, such 
a crisis five months before the scheduled launch date was too close for 
comfort. 
The 50-odd personnel of the Pioneer project office were aided in their 
task by another element new to Ames. As already noted, because of the 
technical unknowns and the scope of the project, as well as the financial 
commitment, much advance planning and selling had to occur. With the 
first Ames-managed Pioneer series, the task was made somewhat easier 
because NASA Headquarters, though interested in a solar-probe project, also 
had interplanetary exploration ideas. Work continued on the planning for 
the solar probe, with Howard Matthews and others doing advanced studies 
on possibilities, until the U S .  and Germany agreed to a joint solar mission. 
Meanwhile, through the efforts of Robert Crane, at the time head of the 
Development Directorate, Ames acquired the Pioneer Jupiter project. Initial 
studies had been conducted by Goddard Space Flight Center, but because 
Goddard was already overcommitted, and because Pioneer 6-9 were about 
completed, Ames was assigned the Jupiter project, which would become 
Pioneer 10 and 11. While Hall’s office dealt with the demands of that 
immense undertaking, the Development Directorate, by now under John 
Foster, planned for the future as it fought to sell Pioneer Venus to both 
Ames management and NASA Headquarters. The system worked well, but in 
the case of Pioneer Venus, obtaining final approval for the project was a 
lengthy and frustrating process. For Ames, it was another new aspect of 
large-scale and long-range programs that contrasted strongly to the more tra- 
ditional mode of funding it was accustomed to. Project management, like 
increased bureaucracy, brought worldliness into the center.29 
Even though Pioneer did not interact much with the more traditional 
research at Ames, the example of project planning, as well as management, 
forced many outside of Pioneer to become aware of a world where aggressive 
salesmanship was necessary. In 1975, when Foster retired, the Development 
Directorate was abolished. Biosatellite no longer existed, and no further 
large-scale planetary project was envisioned. Pioneer was placed under the 
Astronautics Directorate, where research and project management rubbed 
shoulders to the dismay of Astronautics Director Dean Chapman, who esti- 
mated that Pioneer and the other projects took SO-90% of his time.30 The 
amounts of money involved and the complexity of the interacting elements 
made project management out of place in the research directorate. 
Assessing the Pioneer projects, participants identified many crucial ele- 
ments in their success. Characteristically, Hall called attention to the techni- 
cal strengths of the contractors, the project personnel, and the researchers, 
as well as to the “luck” that produced scheduling miracles and eleventh-hour 
solutions to near-disasters. Perhaps, too, there was a realistic awareness of 
the limitations of the project that kept goals and estimates sensible. 
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December 1973. Hans Mark, Director of Ames (left), and James Fletcher, NASA Admini- 
strator (right), brief the media and visiting scientists during Pioneer 10’s encounter with 
Jupiter. 
Foster, naming what he considered the crucial factors for Pioneer’s 
success, added that the science experiments were well planned, that Head- 
quarters support was excellent, and that the contractors were reliable. 
Assessing Hall’s role, Foster, who had urged that Ames enter space research, 
paid him an observant colleague’s compliment: “We used to have a saying, 
‘We can’t give Charlie any more people to help him, because he doesn’t have 
time to do their work!’ He knew every system on that thing; his deputies 
were just extensions of him~elf.”~’ 
For some reason, Pioneer seemed to catch the imagination of the 
country. Perhaps it was the idea of the small spacecraft - and all the 
Pioneers were relatively small vehicles - being guided and controlled from 
Earth on a move-to-move basis, instead of being preprogrammed. Perhaps it 
had to do with the distances Pioneer 10 and 11 traveled to Jupiter and 
Saturn, or the suspense of crossing the asteroid belt. Perhpas the media 
caught the camaraderie of the Pioneer 10 and 11 team, as a result of Hall’s 
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December 1973. Charlie Hall (in striped shirt), Pioneer project manager, and Ames, TRW, 
and academic members of the Pioneer team reflect their mission’s success during 
Pioneer 10’s Jupiter f l y  by. 
stand-up meetings, where a first-thing-in-the-morning exchange of informa- 
tion kept everyone informed during the periods when planetary encounters 
were imminent. Whatever the reasons, the Pioneer projects added a visibility 
to Ames that contrasted dramatically to the center’s earlier profile as an 
aeronautical laboratory. 
Charlie Hall, remembering his own career as a research engineer, com- 
pared research with project management: 
Research is more relaxed, more of an individual activity. You 
have more control. . . . There is not as much outside pressure. . . . 
[In project management] there are [frequently] influences over 
which you have no control but [which] are having very strong 
influences on your project. You run up and down the wall trying 
to find out what you have to do to  circumvent these influences. 
. . . Project management is a team effort, so you have to organize 
the thing so you do work as a team. . . . In research, if you don’t 
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plan right, you just veer off a little to one side or another, it’s no 
big deal. In the project I always felt I was working six months 
from now; I might not know what was happening today, but I 
knew what would be happening six months from today, because I 
had to plan it so I knew we would get there. 
. . . you don’t see that type of thinking necessary in research.. . . 
In research you don’t even have to worry about tomorrow if 
today’s going all right, because whatever happens good today is 
going io lead you in the right direction tomorrow. In project 
management you have to stay far ahead, to make sure the [things] 
you’re doing today will get the work done in time. . . . 
In both the technical sense and in terms of the interested public, the 
Pioneer series was a project of which Ames could be proud. Hall, however, 
perhaps characterized a new Ames, as well as Pioneer, when he reflected on 
the differences between the older basic research and the newer project man- 
agement, for the center faced the influences, challenges, and deadlines of the 
outside in ways unimagined in 1940. 
Looking at the institution over a forty-year span, what is striking are 
the many outward changes that have occurred - physical expansion; 
research diversity and sophistication; complexity of management; daily 
intrusion of bureaucracy; desired involvement with other institutions, 
groups, and agencies; and cooperative projects and programs requiring 
closely coordinated responsibilities shared among a number of agencies and 
institutions. Initially, one might suspect that these adaptations to a changing 
context are what have kept Ames as healthy as it is. Further consideration 
produces an equally striking observation - in what is perhaps the most essen- 
tial area, Ames has not changed greatly. From the beginning, the laboratory/ 
research center has had a very strong sense of itself that was supported by 
the intellectual capability and imagination of its personnel. That, in the final 
analysis, is the crucial ingredient in the health and productivity of the center, 
and an ingredient that must be conscientiously protected and encouraged. 
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APPENDIX A 
ORGANIZATION CHARTS, 1940-1976 
The major reorganizations of Ames have been discussed in the text and 
are illustrated in the organizational charts that follow, but neither the text 
nor the charts give a complete organizational history. Rather, organizational 
change has been used to chart other evolutions at Ames: division of author- 
ity, new research directions, increasing bureaucracy, and growing interaction 
with outside agencies. 
The first six charts are for the entire laboratory or center. In the early 
years research was organized around the wind tunnel that a unit used, and 
the unit was typically named for that facility, e.g., the 16-Foot Tunnel Sec- 
tion. When research became more diversified, units were named for the area 
of investigation, e.g., the Flight Dynamics and Control Branch. Most of the 
charts do not go below the directorate or division level. The first five are 
from Hartman, Adventures in Research, pp. 33, 41, 180, 3 19, and 402. The 
sixth is taken from a copy of the official chart dated Sept. 1976 in the 
NASA History Office Archives. 
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The last five charts show the Life Sciences Directorate during its first 
14 turbulent years The major shifts in research can be easily followed. 
Human-machine integration in its various aspects was a strong element from 
the beginning. Over the years exobiology lost ground as biomedical research 
grew. These charts are taken from the historical files of the Life Sciences 
Directorate. 
-ENVIRONMENTAL BIOLOGY DIVISION 
Neurobiology Branch 
Experimental Pathology Branch 
Physiology Branch 
Biochemical Endocrinology Branch 
- B I OTECHNO LOGY D I V IS1 ON 
Environmental Control Research Branch 
Man-Machine Integration Branch 
Human Performance Branch 
B iomedical Research Branch 
1 
.~ 
-EXOBIOLOGY DIVISION 
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October 1962 
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LIFE SCIENCES DIRECTORATE 
January 1964 
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LIFE SCIENCE DIRECTORATE 
October 1972 
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Biochemical Endocrinology Branch 
Environmental Physiology Branch 
~ Humen Studies Branch 
BIOTECHNOLOGY DIVISION 
1 Neurosciences Branch 
PLAN ETA RY B IO LOGY D IV IS I ON 
Environmental Control Research Branch 
Man-Machine Integration Branch 
Biological Adaptation Branch 
Chemical Evolution Branch 
Life Detection Systems Branch 
I
LIFE SCIENCES DIRECTORATE 
September 1376 
DIRECTOR OF LIFE SCIENCES 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH DIVISION 
BI OSYSTEMS DIVISION 
L Advanced Life Support Project Office 
EXTRATERRESTRIAL BIOLOGY DIVISION 
Planetary Exploration Office 
Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) Office 
MAN-VEHICLE SYSTEMS RESEARCH DIVISION 
L Aviation Safety Research Office 
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APPENDIX D 
SUPPORT CONTRACT WORKERS, 1966-1976 
In its early years, Ames had a few contractual arrangements with 
universities for specific research projects, but contracting was not important 
to the NACA. With the establishment of NASA, however, contract work 
grew rapidly, if not so fast as at the manned spaceflight centers. 
YEAR 
Source: Ames Resources Management Office. 
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APPENDIX E 
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE TEXT 
1915 
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) founded. 
1918 
Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory, the NACA’s first research 
establishment, founded at Langley Field, near Hampton, Virginia. 
1936 
Oct. Special Committee on the Relation of the NACA to National 
Defense in Time of War recommended a second laboratory be built. 
1938 
Dec. Successor committee on future research needs in the NACA repeated 
the recommendation for a second laboratory. 
1939 
Aug. President signed bill providing for second laboratory. 
Sept. Moffett Field site at Sunnyvale, California, approved for second 
laboratory. 
Dec. Ground was broken for the new laboratory and first construction 
began. 
1940 
Apr. The new laboratory named after Dr. Joseph Ames, the former chair- 
man of the NACA. 
June Smith J. De France named engineer-in-charge at Ames, though 
remaining at Langley planning facilities for both Ames and the new 
engine-research laboratory to be built near Cleveland. Construction 
at Ames continued, and staff arrived from Langley. Additional aero- 
nautical engineers hired from among recent university graduates. 
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Aug. Construction of 7- by 10-foot and l6-foot wind tunnels started. 
De France arrived at Ames with remainder of Langley transferees. 
1941 
Oct. 
Dec. 
Additional appropriations of $6 million approved for Ames. 
After U.S. entry into World War 11, activity at Ames became almost 
entirely devoted to war-related aeronautical problems. 
1942 
Mar. Construction of the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel began. 
Apr. The Navy took possession of Moffett Field, replacing the Army. 
1944 
June The 40- by 80-foot tunnel began operation. 
1945 
Feb. Construction began on two 1- by %foot supersonic wind tunnels. 
Mar. Sweptback wing, designed to overcome high-speed compressibility 
effects, tested in Langley wind tunnel. 
May 
July 
Construction began on 6- by 6-foot supersonic wind tunnel at Ames. 
High-speed Research Division formed under H. Julian Allen. 
1947 
George Lewis, director of aeronautical research for the NACA, 
retired. Hugh Dryden succeeded him. 
1947 
Oct. Capt. Charles Yeager piloted the Bell X-1 to supersonic flight at 
Muroc. 
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Oct. 
3 an. 
Feb. 
Apr . 
July 
Oct. 
July 
1950 
“Unitary Plan” for national research facilities in aeronautics 
approved; Ames to build a complex linking one transonic and two 
supersonic tunnels at a cost of over $27 million. 
1952 
Harvey Allen proposed blunt-body theory to solve problem of aero- 
dynamic heating of reentry bodies, a major aeronautical research 
breakthrough. 
1957 
The International 6eophysical Year proclaimed for 1957-1958; it 
would feature international competition to orbit an artificial 
satellite. 
Sputnik 1 orbited by U.S.S.R., beginning the space race. 
1958 
US. Army launched Explorer 1, the first American satellite. 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency established within DoD. 
Legislation initiated to create NASA. 
National Aeronautics and Space Act passed. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration established; Ames 
Aeronautical Laboratory became Ames Research Center. 
1959 
Dr. Clark Randt appointed adviser for life sciences by NASA Admin- 
istrator T. Keith Glennan. 
1960 
Nov. Ames named the life-sciences research facility location. 
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1961 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Feb. 
Oct. 
Dec. 
June 
Dec. 
July 
Sept. 
Dr. Webb Haymaker named head of the life-sciences research facility. 
1962 
Ames gained Biosatellite Project; Carlton Bioletti named project 
manager. 
Ames gained Pioneer project; Charles Hall named project manager. 
1965 
Ames-US. Army agreement established Army Aeronautical Research 
Laboratory at Ames. Ames to furnish facilities and personnel sup- 
port; Army to furnish personnel to operate one of the 7- by 10-foot 
wind tunnels. 
Smith De France retired as director of Ames Research Center, suc- 
ceeded by Harvey Allen. 
Pioneer 6, the first of the Ames-managed Pioneers, launched. 
1966 
Ames’s civil service personnel peaked at 2310. 
Biosatellite 1 launched. 
1967 
Ames entered into first consortium agreement with the University of 
Santa Clara Law School. 
Biosatellite 2 launched. 
1968 
Oct. Harvey Allen announced his intention to retire. 
1969 
Feb. 
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Hans Mark named director of Ames. 
1969 
June 
Mar. 
Dec. 
Sept. 
Jan. 
Mar. 
Feb. 
Apr . 
July 
Nov. 
June 
Biosatellite 3 launched. 
1970 
A C-141 Starlifter, to be fitted with a 91.5-cm telescope, acquired by 
Ames as a flying astronomical observatory. 
Ames acquisition of ARPA’s Illiac IV computer system approved. 
1971 
Ames-FAA-DOT agreement provided for use of Ames simulators in 
qualifying checks of new commercial aircraft. 
1972 
Pioneer Venus project transferred from Goddard Space Flight Center 
to Ames. 
Pioneer 10 to Jupiter launched. 
1973 
Ames became lead center for Earth-observation aircraft; Applications 
Aircraft and Future Planning Office established. 
Ames-Air Force agreement for development of STOL aircraft. 
Pioneer 11 to Jupiter launched. 
Refurbishment of the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel began. 
1974 
Design plans for the Quiet Short Haul Research Aircraft completed. 
1976 
Ames named lead center for helicopter research. 
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APPENDIX F 
CHRONOLOGY, 1977-1980 
This appendix is a chronology of events in the history of the Ames 
Research Center subsequent to the period covered in the text and is included 
to bring the coverage of the volume closer to the date of publication. Events 
have been selected because of their pertinence to themes and topics devel- 
oped in the text. Some entries relating to NASA have been included because 
they would affect Ames in time. 
Because these events are not dealt with in the text, considerably more 
detail is included than was the case for the previous chronology (app. E), 
and the source is given at the end of each item. 
1977 
10 Jan. An engineering test model of Pioneer IO, the first spacecraft to 
reach Jupiter, was put on display in the National Air and Space 
Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. 
Launched on 3 Mar. 1972, the Ames-managed spacecraft 
reached Jupiter in Dec. 1973, returning the first close-up 
views of the planet, which was discovered to be a spinning 
ball of liquid hydrogen with no perceptible surface. Returning 
a wealth of information about Jupiter’s magnetic field, radia- 
tion belts, and weather, the spacecraft was then programmed on 
an escape trajectory out of the solar system. In Feb. 1976 
it crossed Saturn’s orbit, traveling away from the sun at a speed 
of 59,200 km/hr. It  was expected to reach Pluto’s orbit in 
1987. (Ames release 77-1;Astrogrurn, 13 Jan. 1977) 
14 Jan. Deputy Director Clarence Syvertson was named a fellow of the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Joining 
Ames in 1948, Syvertson did pioneering theoretical research on 
hypersonic aerodynamics in the early 1950s and on hypersonic 
vehicles in the late 1950s. He played an important role in the 
development of the wingless M-2, a manned lifting body that 
was a precursor to manned maneuverable space vehicles. Head 
of the Mission Analysis Division at Ames in the early 1960s, 
Syvertson also headed the Dept. of Transportation-NASA team 
that produced the Civil Aeronautics Research and Development 
Study, a foundation for current U.S. aviation R&D. (Ames 
release 77-3;Astrogrurn, 27 Jan. 1977) 
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29 Jan. H. Julian “Harvey” Allen died of a heart attack. A major figure 
in modern aerospace technology, Allen came to the center as 
one of the original group of research personnel. He headed the 
Theoretical Aerodynamics Research Section from 1940 to 
1945, when that section evolved into the High-speed Aerody- 
namics Division. In the 1940s, Allen developed a general theory 
of subsonic airfoils that made it possible to calculate accurately 
the ideal airfoil shape for specified conditions. Low-drag air- 
foils, such as those used on the Mustang fighter, were much 
improved with Allen’s general theory. His most outstanding 
accomplishment was the concept of bluntness to reduce the 
heating of spacecraft reentering the Earth’s atmosphere. The 
discovery resulted in the blunt shapes of ICBM warheads and 
NASA’s space capsules. When the Astronautics Directorate was 
created from the High-speed Division, Allen became its first 
head. From Sept. 1965 to Jan. 1969, he served as Ames’s 
second director. Throughout his years at Ames, he was a friend 
and mentor to a continuing succession of Ames researchers and 
other colleagues in the aeronautics profession. (Ames release 
77-06; Director’s memorandum 77-15; Astrogrum, 10 Feb. 
1977) 
3 Feb. Ames announced that a developmental Spacelab payload typify- 
ing payloads planned for Space Shuttle missions in the 1980s 
was being tested at the research center. Equipment was being 
readied for a final 7-day simulation of a typical Spacelab mis- 
sion planned for May 1977 at Johnson Space Center. The pay- 
load consisted of 22 experiments to investigate effects of the 
space environment on humans, frogs, rats, mice, monkeys, and 
fruit flies. Functions of the heart, red-blood-cell lifetimes, bone 
and muscle metabolism, body temperature, hormones, and 
other biomedical factors were to be studied. (Ames release 
77-07) 
The first Space Shuttle Orbiter Enterprise made its first flight 
atop a Boeing 747. A prototype of the Orbiter had been tested 
in the Ames 40- by 8O-foot wind tunnel; the craft’s thermal 
protection system was largely a product of research done at 
Ames. (Astrogram, 24 Feb. 1977) 
18 Feb. 
2 Mar. Ames announced that its Lear Jet equipped with a 30-cm infra- 
red telescope would participate in an international study (Proj- 
ect Porcupine, directed by the Max Planck Institut fur Physik 
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und Astrophysik) to study the coupling between the magneto- 
sphere and ionosphere. An Aries sounding rocket equipped with 
11 experiments was to be launched in Sweden. At 450 km alti- 
tude, a barium shaped-charge would be ejected. Ionized by sun- 
light, the visible charge would travel along the Earth’s magnetic 
lines of force, reentering the atmosphere in the Antarctic. The 
barium trail would be followed by the Lear Jet, equipped with 
instruments furnished by the University of Alaska. Its flightpath 
would allow continuous optical coverage of the barium trail 
against a star background for the first 1,000 seconds after 
release. The project was to be completed by the end of March. 
(Ames release 77-14) 
3 Mar. The Ames C-141 Kuiper Airborne Observatory left on its first 
international expedition. From bases in Australia, the C-141 
was to observe the planet Uranus during unique astronomical 
conditions. On 10-11 Mar. Uranus would move between Earth 
and a star. The resulting occultation, or blacking out, of star- 
light would enable the international team of scientists to learn 
more about Uranus’s atmosphere, composition, shape, and size. 
Investigators included researchers from American and 
Australian universities. (Ames release 77-13) 
10 Mar. Scientists aboard the Kuiper Airborne Observatory discovered 
that Uranus possesses equatorial rings, which are apparently 
composed of rock and ice. Tracking Uranus as it passed in front 
of a star in the constellation Libra, the telescope lost sight of 
the star for periods of about 8 seconds at 10 different times. 
“I think we were looking through a very faint ring system simi- 
lar to the rings of Saturn,” said the leader of the investigation 
team. “The fact that there were 5 blackouts on either side of 
the planet suggests rings and not moons, since moons would 
have been placed around the planet in a more random way.” 
One theory was that the rings are composed of material present 
during the formation of the solar system that never coalesced 
into moons; another was that the rings are remnants of a dis- 
integrated moon or moons. (Ames release 77-17; Astrograrn, 
24 Mar. 1977) 
14 Mar. Director Hans Mark announced organizational changes to 
accommodate Ames’s new role as lead center in helicopter 
research and technology. Created within the Aeronautics and 
Flight Systems Directorate were the Helicopter Systems Office, 
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responsible for integrating the various activities in helicopter 
systems technology; the Helicopter Technology Division, serv- 
ing as the focal point for helicopter technology development 
within NASA; and the V/STOL Aircraft Technology Division, 
restructured from the Research Aircraft Projects Office. The 
organizational changes reflected the NASA decision of last 
summer to establish Ames as the lead center for NASA’s heli- 
copter activities. By specifying a lead center, NASA hoped to 
increase research output and to reduce costs. Langley Research 
Center and Lewis Research Center were to continue to be 
responsible for key segments of the helicopter activities. Ames 
would conduct helicopter research using its unique aeronautical 
facilities: its 40- by 8O-foot wind tunnel and flight simulation 
facilities. Ames would also conduct flight tests with research 
rotorcraft such as the Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft and Rotor 
Systems Research Aircraft. Over the next three years 72 posi- 
tions were to be added to the Ames staff. While Langley’s 
activity in helicopters would be phased down, that center’s 
expected growth in long-haul aircraft technology should mini- 
mize any impact on manpower and the local economy. (Ames 
release 77-19; Director’s memorandum 77-20) 
24 Mar. The international Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS) Project 
was approved. IRAS was a cooperative U.S.-Netherlands-U.K. 
project whose purpose was an infrared survey of the entire 
celestial sphere. The satellite would consist of a spacecraft to be 
built by the Netherlands and a large infrared telescope to be 
built by the U.S. Ames was responsible for the IRAS telescope 
system, while the overall management of the U.S. part of the 
project was provided by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The 
Telescope System Project Office was contained within the 
Space Projects Division of the Astronautics Directorate. (Astro- 
grurn, 24 Mar. 1977) 
14Apr. NASA awarded two $350,000 contracts to the McDonnell 
Douglas Gorp. and the team of Hughes Aircraft and General 
Electric for design studies of a vehicle to plunge into Jupiter’s 
atmosphere. The Jupiter Orbiter with Probe mission, requested 
in NASA’s FY 1978 budget, would offer the first opportunity 
to make in situ as well as remote measurements of the planet, 
its environment, and its satellites. Ames was to manage the 
probe system. (Ames release 77-20) 
246 
16May Galileo 11, Ames’s Convair 990 flying laboratory, under the 
joint management of NASA and the European Space Agency 
(ESA), began a 10-day simulation of a Spacelab mission. A mis- 
sion specialist and two payload specialists each from NASA and 
ESA would participate. Spacelab, a major element in the Space 
Shuttle System, would be located in the cargo bay of the 
Orbiter and carry facilities and equipment similar to labora- 
tories on the ground. Objectives of the simulation included 
evaluation of management of payload and mission operations to 
develop low-cost concepts for Spacelab, studies of interactions 
between Spacelab personnel and principal investigators on the 
ground, and the development of minimum training require- 
ments. Another prime concern was to involve the ESA and 
NASA Spacelab managers in the same roles they would have 
during an actual Spacelab flight. Galileo I1 was to make six-hour 
flights on each day of the simulation, and the payload and mis- 
sion specialists would remain confined throughout the 1 O-day 
period to work on the experiment payload and sleep in adjacent 
living quarters. (Ames release 77-21) 
19 May A critical segment of the Pioneer-Venus mission was success- 
fully tested by dropping the entry probe from an Air Force 
balloon 27 km above White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. 
The test duplicated events just before descent into the planet’s 
dense, hot lower atmosphere, demonstrating deployment of the 
probe parachute, separation of its heat shield, and separation of 
the parachute for the final phase of flight down to the surface. 
The objective of the mission would be to characterize Venus’s 
atmosphere and weather. (Ames release 7 7-30; Astrogram, 
16 June 1977) 
27 May Ames Director Hans Mark, nominated for the post of undersec- 
retary of the Air Force, announced that Dep. Dir. Clarence 
Syvertson was acting director until further notice. Mark was to 
take up his new post in August. (Director’s memorandum 
77-66) 
10 June President Carter nominated Dr. Robert A. Frosch to become 
NASA administrator, succeeding Dr. James C. Fletcher, who 
resigned 1 May. Frosch was associate director for applied 
oceanography at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 
(Astrogram, 16 June 1977) 
247 
5 July The new visitor-reception building opened. (Director’s memo- 
randum 77-80) 
19 July Congress approved $17.7 million for the Jupiter Orbiter and 
Probe mission in FY 1978. The joint JPL-Ames project was to 
be the first NASA planetary project undertaken by the Office 
of Space Science since initiation of the Ames Pioneer-Venus 
Project in 1972. (Astrogram, 28 July 1977) 
July-Aug. Two Ames research aircraft, a U-2 and a Lear Jet, were based in 
the Panama Canal Zone for three weeks conducting studies of 
atmospheric pollution. Several governmental agencies and uni- 
versities cooperated in the study, gathering information on how 
atmospheric pollutants such as halocarbons are carried from low 
altitudes into the stratosphere, where they may influence the 
ozone balance. The study, sponsored and planned by Ames, was 
carried out over a 16-day period with both aircraft making daily 
flights. Heavily instrumented with sensing and sampling equip- 
ment, the aircraft measured atmospheric pollutants at multiple 
altitudes. The Lear Jet covered altitudes up to 14,000 m, while 
the U-2 carried the coverage well into the stratosphere at alti- 
tudes of 21,300 m. (Astrogrum, 8 Sept. 1977) 
30 Aug. The name of the U.S. Army Air Mobility Research and Develop- 
ment Laboratory was changed to the U.S. Army Research and 
Technology Laboratories, the directorate at Ames becoming the 
Aeromechanics Laboratory. The mission of the laboratories 
remained the same: to plan, develop, manage, and execute R&D 
programs to provide a firm technical base for superior airmobile 
systems. Major projects include: (1) The XV-15 Tilt Rotor 
Research Aircraft, now being flight tested. The aircraft incor- 
porates wingtip-mounted engines, transmissions, and 7.6-m 
propellers that tilt from a helicopter position for takeoffs, land- 
ings, and hovering, to a horizontal position for forward flight. 
(2) The XH-59A Advancing Blade Concept (ABC), a coaxial, 
hingeless rotor research helicopter that features stiff, counter- 
rotating rotor blades rigidly attached to the hubs. The ABC 
uses only its rotor blade system throughout its entire speed 
range; no tail rotor is required. (3) The Rotor Systems Research 
Aircraft, a test vehicle used by the Army and NASA to evaluate 
a wide variety of existing and future systems. (Astropum, 
6 Oct. 1977) 
248 
7 Sept. NASA Headquarters announced civil service manpower adjust- 
ments. In spite of overall reductions of 500 positions, Ames was 
to gain 45 positions for FY 1978. This was a result of the accel- 
eration of the helicopter transfer from Langley Research Center 
to Ames. (NASA Hq. announcement, 7 Sept. 1977) 
14 Sept. The Space Projects Division was to be reorganized to accommo- 
date its recently assigned responsibility for managing major por- 
tions of the infrared telescope for the IRAS project and the 
atmospheric entry probe of the Jupiter Orbiter Probe mission. 
Subsequently, the division would consist of the Division Office, 
the Project Technology Branch, the Jupiter Probe Project 
Office, and the IRAS Telescope Project Office. The Project 
Development Brdnch was abolished. (Director’s memorandum 
7 7-1 24) 
12 Oct. Ames was awarded the Columbus Gold Medal by the city of 
Genoa, Italy, for the two multibillion-mile Pioneer flights. 
Acting Director Clarence Syvertson accepted the medal in Italy. 
(Astrogmm, 20 Oct. 1977) 
14 Oct. A team of Ames researchers made what may become a major 
break-through in explaining the origin of life. “Building blocks 
of life” apparently were collected and organized on the shores 
of the primordial oceans by “natural catalysts” found widely on 
Earth. This could be a step in the chemical evolution of the 
first living organisms. The experiments demonstrated how two 
basic types of organic molecules (amino acids, the building 
blocks of proteins, and nucleotides, the building blocks of the 
DNA molecule) may have been concentrated in the primitive 
oceans. The work also seemed to show how life-related amino 
acids were linked together into the chain needed to make living 
cells, while other amino acids were selectively destroyed. Team 
leader for the work was Ames’s Dr. James Lawless. Also partici- 
pating was Dr. Nissim Levi, a National Research Council Fellow 
from Israel, working at Ames. (Ames release 77-43; Astrogrum, 
20 Oct. 1977) 
25 Oct. NASA Hq. announced a reorganization to be effective 8 Nov. 
The major change affecting Ames was that the center director 
would report directly to the Administrator. (Director’s memo- 
randum 77-144) 
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25 Oct. Galileo II, Ames’s Convair 990 research aircraft, surveyed 
archaeological sites in Guatemala in an effort to learn more 
about the Mayan civilization that flourished there centuries ago. 
Three different types of radar were used to  penetrate the dense 
tropical foliage to different depths, allowing identification of 
features not readily distinguishable by other means. Signs of 
roads, stone walls, agricultural terraces, and other man-made 
structures were sought. The aircraft also carried a scanning 
infrared sensor to detect differences in vegetation, seeking clues 
to the extent and type of farming done by the Mayans. The 
flight was a cooperative effort among Ames, JPL, and 
researchers at the University of Texas at San Antonio. (Astro- 
gram, 1 7  Nov. 1977) 
17 Nov. Ames announced that measurements made by researchers using 
a U-2 aircraft suggested that the cosmos may have started 
serenely, with a powerful but tightly controlled and completely 
uniform expansion. Using ultrasensitive radio equipment, the 
research team measured the cosmic microwave background - 
the radiation left over from the Big Bang, the initial, universe- 
forming event - and concluded that that event was a smooth 
process, with matter and energy uniformly distributed and 
expanding at an equal rate in all directions. Researchers from 
the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and the University of 
California at Berkeley declared, “The big bang, the most cata- 
clysmic event we can imagine, on closer inspection appears 
finely orchestrated.” (Ames release 7 7-45; Astrogram, 1 Dec. 
1977) 
1978 
Jan. Ames announced the formation of the Stanford-NASA Joint 
Institute for Surface and Microstructural Research. Manpower 
and advanced laboratory equipment would be shared by Ames’s 
Materials and Physical Sciences Branch and Stanford’s depart- 
ments of materials science, chemical engineering, and electrical 
engineering. The agreement formalized and expanded a collabo- 
ration that had existed since 1968. Research would continue at 
both locations, and some Ames equipment was to be transferred 
to Stanford. (Astrogrum, 26 Jan. 1978) 
Feb. The Jupiter Orbiter and Probe mission, scheduled for 1982, was 
formally designated Project Galileo. Scheduled to become the 
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first planetary spacecraft to be carried aboard the Space 
Shuttle, Galileo was to conduct the most detailed scientific 
investigation yet of Jupiter and its environment. Ames had proj- 
ect responsibility for the entry probe. (Astrog~um, 9 Feb. 1978) 
To facilitate the transfer of NASA technology to other poten- 
tial users, organizational changes were made in the Airborne 
Missions and Applications Division. The User Applications 
Branch was renamed the Technology Applications Branch, and 
the Western Regional Applications Office was established. The 
new office extended the concept of user-driven transfer of 
Landsat technology to agencies in 14 western states, including 
Alaska and Hawaii. (Director’s memorandum 79-25) 
24 Feb. 
Mal-. The first XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft arrived at Ames. 
Two aircraft were built under a joint program for Ames and the 
U.S. Army’s Research and Technology Laboratories by Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Fort Worth, Texas. The aircraft now at 
Ames had been modified for remote control operation and was 
to be tested for six weeks in the 40- by 8O-foot wind tunnel. 
Flight testing of the second aircraft would then follow in Texas. 
Both aircraft would eventually be based at Ames for compre- 
hensive evaluation of the tilt rotor concept, to provide data for 
terminal area navigation, and to support vertical and short take- 
off and landing programs. (Astrogram, 6 Apr. 1978) 
A project office was established to modify the 40- by 8O-foot 
wind tunnel. Over the past four years, plans had been drawn to 
increase the speed of the tunnel to 550 km/hr and to add an 
80- by 120-foot test section. The first funding of $19.5 million 
was received. With growth in size of the project team imminent, 
a project office to manage the many activities became neces- 
sary. Charles A. Hermach was appointed project manager. 
(Director’s memorandum 78-27) 
29 Mar. 
10 Apr. The Army-NASA-Sikorsky Rotor Systems Research Aircraft 
(RSRA) made its first flight as a compound helicopter-fixed 
wing aircraft, taking off from a Wallops Island runway and 
climbing to 460 my using both wings and rotor systems for lift. 
Under contract to NASA and the U.S. Army Research and 
Technology Laboratories, Sikorsky built two prototypes that 
were to be tested in 1978. The RSRA had a 14-m wingspan and 
a five-blade S-61 rotor system powered by two T-58 turboshaft 
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engines. Two auxiliary TF34 turbofan engines were mounted 
below the rotor system. (Astrogram, 10 Aug. 1978) 
Clarence A. Syvertson, acting director since the resignation of 
Dr. Hans Mark in August 1977, was named director of the 
center. Syvertson had been at Ames since 1948, beginning as a 
research scientist and assistant branch chief. He became chief of 
the 3.5-Foot Hypersonic Wind Tunnel Branch in 1959, and in 
1963 director of the Mission Analysis Division, doing advanced 
planning for all of NASA. In 1966 he was appointed director of 
astronautics, and in 1969 deputy director of Ames. He also 
served as executive director of the Joint DOT-NASA Civil Avia- 
tion Research and Development Policy Study to identify future 
directions for civil aviation development. His work in hyper- 
sonic aerodynamics helped to produce the series of prototype 
lifting bodies that culminated in the M-2. (Ames release 78-16; 
Palo Alto Times, 27 Apr. 1978) 
20 May Pioneer-Venus 1, the orbiter, was launched from Kennedy 
Space Center. The spacecraft was expected to reach Venus in 
early December, going into an eccentric 24-hr orbit around the 
planet. The orbiter carried 11 scientific experiments designed to 
return data about Venus, plus 1 to help pinpoint the sources of 
gamma-ray bursts from space. The orbiter’s S-band telemetry 
system and X-band beacon would be used for 6 radio-science 
experiments. Pioneer- Venus 2, the probe, with missions comple- 
mentary to those of the orbiter, was to be launched in early 
August. The two vehicles were to converge near the planet in 
early December. (Astrogam, 1 June 1978; Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, 27 Feb. 1978) 
Pioneer Venus 1 was on course toward its orbit around Venus, 
with most engineering systems checked out and operating 
normally. Controllers at Ames deployed the craft’s 4.3-m 
magnetometer boom and “despun” the high-data-rate, 1.2-m- 
diameter dish antenna to center it continuously on Earth. They 
took pictures of Earth, turned on five of the six interplanetary 
experiments, made a star map, and checked out power, naviga- 
tion, and propulsion systems. Pioneer- Venus 1 measured Earth’s 
protective magnetic envelope, the magnetosphere, as it passed 
beyond it, as well as charting the solar wind. The next was a 
first midcourse correction. Launch trajectory was so accurate 
that a second correction might not be needed. (Astrogram, 
1 June 1978) 
30 Apr. 
1 June 
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15 June Pioneer-Venus 1, on the first leg of its journey toward Venus, 
detected an extremely powerful burst of gamma rays from 
somewhere in the universe. Unknown until 19 73, gamma-ray 
bursts have enormous energies and occur about once a month, 
seemingly from random points in our galaxy or beyond. The 
spacecraft carried six interplanetary instruments, including a 
gamma-ray-burst detector, which sensed a two-second pulse of 
these very high-energy photons just 33 hours after lift-off and 
585,000 km from Earth. (Astrogrum, 15 June 1978) 
Also in 
June 
Researchers working at Ames apparently discovered a way to 
account for the formation on Earth four billion years ago of 
nucleic acids, one of the two most essential components of life. 
The discovery sGpplemented earlier work in which the same 
investigators discovered a mechanism to explain the other criti- 
cal component of life, protein (see 14 Oct. 1977, above). Their 
new discovery involved metal clays that would have been com- 
mon on the shores of primitive bodies of water. When low- 
concentration solutions of DNA-forming nucleotides are mixed 
with commonplace metal clays, most clays attract the nucleo- 
tides. Furthermore, a clay containing zinc preferentially attracts 
all six of them. The team consisted of Dr. James Lawless of 
Ames; Dr. Edward Edelson, a National Research Council Asso- 
ciate; and Lewis Manring, a student at the University of Santa 
Clara. (Astrogam, 29 June 1978) 
6 July The Quiet Short-Haul Research Aircraft (QSRA), built by 
Boeing under contract to NASA, made its maiden flight in 
Seattle. The QSRA was a rebuilt de Havilland C-SA Buffalo. 
With a new wing, tail, and avionics, and four overwing jet 
engines to provide “upper surface blowing” for high lift, the 
QSRA was built to develop the technology for future commer- 
cial airliners with short take-off and landing capabilities. Ames 
pilot Jim Martin noted that the aircraft’s behavior had been 
accurately predicted by preflight simulation studies. “I didn’t 
see any surprises. The QSRA simulation at Ames was one of the 
most accurate simulations I’ve flown.” After more flight testing 
at Boeing, the aircraft was to be flown to Ames for two years of 
additional tests. (Astrogrum, 27 July 1978; The Boeing News, 
13 July 1978) 
The Life Sciences Directorate was reorganized. The Extraterres- 
trial Biology Division was renamed the Extraterrestrial Research 
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1 7  July 
Division, to reflect an expanded role in the development of 
advanced life-support systems for future space missions. The 
Advanced Life Support Project Office became the Advanced 
Life Support Office, with added functions of conducting 
research into biologically based life support techniques. (Direc- 
tor’s memorandum 78-94) 
17 July Ames acquired approximately five acres of land from the Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company in exchange for an equal parcel of 
NASA property. The exchange, necessary to accommodate the 
modifications being made to the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel, 
was effected through the General Services Administration. 
Another parcel was made available to NASA by the Navy 
through an agreement with the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command of San Bruno. (Astrogram, 10 Aug. 1978) 
3 Aug. With initial flight testing completed at Boeing Field, the new 
QSRA was flown to Ames for additional testing before begin- 
ning a research program for a short-haul transportation system. 
High performance of the aircraft was due to  the upper-surface- 
blowing propulsive-lift concept, in which four jet engines were 
mounted on top of the wing so fan air was directed across the 
upper surface of the wing and flaps. This significantly increased 
lift, particularly at lower speeds. In addition, compressed air 
from the engines was fed through an ejector system to provide 
boundary layer control blowing at the wing leading edges and 
ailerons, further enhancing lift and control. Project officials 
believed the technology could have important ramifications. A 
QSRA-type aircraft the size of a Boeing 727 transport could 
carry the same payload at the same speeds as the 727, but could 
operate from small airports so quietly that it would not be 
heard in the surrounding community. (Ames release 78-3 7; 
Astrogram, 24 Aug. 1978) 
8 Aug. Pioneer- Venus 2 was launched from Kennedy Space Center. The 
spacecraft was to reach Venus in conjunction with Pioneer- 
Venus 1, an orbiter, in early December. In mid-November 
Pioneer- Venus 2 would split into five atmospheric entry craft - 
four probes and a transporter bus. On 9 Dec., the four probes 
would begin descent through the planet’s dense atmosphere. 
The transporter bus would burn up in the planet’s dense atmo- 
sphere, after measuring the composition of the upper atmo- 
sphere. (Ames release 78-40; Astrogram, 24 Aug. 1978) 
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17 Aug. Mission controllers completed a critical course change for 
Pioneer-Venus 2, putting it right on target for encounter with 
Venus on 9 Dec. 1978. A series of carefully timed rocket 
thrusts increased the spacecraft’s speed by 2.25 m/sec (Ames 
release 78-40; Astrogram, 24 Aug. 1978) 
21 Sept. Final course adjustments for Pioneer 11’s encounter with 
Saturn on 1 Sept. 1979 were made by mission controllers at 
Ames. Its trajectory would bring it to within 30,000 km of 
Saturn’s outer ring. The spacecraft would then swing under the 
plane of the rings to  25,000 km from the planet’s surface. 
“We’re going as close as we dare,” said Jack Dyer, chief of mis- 
sion analysis at Ames. Getting any closer to the ring would risk 
impact with orbiting fragments. Pioneer 11 would take the first 
close-up color pictures of Saturn and its rings and make other 
first-time measurements of the planet’s magnetic field, atmo- 
sphere, and other features. (Astrogram, 21 Sept. 1978) 
25 Sept. The Life Sciences Experiments Project Office was established 
within the Biosystems Division of the Life Sciences Directorate. 
Beginning in 1982, Spacelab missions entirely devoted to life 
sciences were to be flown under the management of program 
offices at Headquarters and Johnson Space Center. Project 
management responsibilities for experiments not involving 
humans as test subjects were assigned to the new Ames office. 
(Director’s memorandum 78-1 17) 
25 Sept. Beginning in FY 1979, NASA would provide funds to each 
center director for new programs not included in the center’s 
budget. The purpose of the Center Director’s Discretionary 
Fund was to stimulate innovative ideas in R&D. The new pro- 
grams would not be subject to Headquarters approval, though 
progress was to be reported yearly. No program was to be 
funded from this source for more than three years; after that 
time it should be complete or would have to compete for fund- 
ing in the regular budget. (Director’s memorandum 78-145) 
26 Sept. R. T. Jones was awarded the Prandtl Ring Award by the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Luft- und Raumfahrt in Darmstadt, 
Germany. Considered the highest honor in the field of fluid 
dynamics, the award was presented for Jones’s “outstanding 
contributions in the field of aerodynamics.” Over almost 
50 years of research, he was responsible for some of the most 
255 
far-reaching discoveries made in the field. Most of Jones’s work 
involved the application of abstract mathematics, learned as he 
went along, to practical flight problems. In the early 1930s, he 
gained most of his formal education from Max Munk, consid- 
ered one of the country’s most brilliant theorists. In 1934, 
Jones went to work at Langley Aeronautical Laboratory and 
remained there until 1946, when he moved to Ames. Jones is 
most noted for developing the theory of sweepback in this 
country, the method by which smooth flight at high speeds is 
made possible. Met with skepticism when Jones first presented 
the idea in 1944, the sweptback wing became conventional. 
Not limited to work in aerodynamics, in 1963 Jones left Ames 
to join Avco Everett Research Laboratory, where he worked on 
cardiac assist devices and problems of blood flow. He rejoined 
Ames as a staff scientist in 1970. (Astrogrum, 8 Apr. 1976, 
30 Nov. 1978) 
1 Oct. The Applied Computational Aerodynamics Branch was created 
within the Thermo- and Gas-Dynamics Division of the Astro- 
nautics Directorate. The new branch was to develop user- 
oriented computer codes for solving practical problems in aero- 
dynamic design. The intent was to bridge the gap between the 
more basic work in computational technology being done by 
the Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch and the design codes 
required by the aerospace industry. (Director’s memorandum 
78-146) 
9 Oct. Ames announced that the two Pioneer-Venus spacecraft had 
passed major operational tests. On Pioneer- Venus 2, timing and 
separation systems had been tested for the split-second release 
of three probes to spread them over Venus’s Earth-facing hemi- 
sphere 9600 km apart. On Pioneer-Venus 1, systems for the 
essential retrofire and injection-into-orbit maneuver, which 
takes place behind the planet and out of communication with 
Earth, had been operated. The spacecraft was to be put into 
orbit on 4 Dec.; Pioneer-Venus 2 would enter the atmosphere 
on 9 Dec. (Ames release 78-48; Astrogrum, 19 Oct. 1978) 
2 Nov. A brief ceremony marked the start of construction of the 
80- by 120-foot wind tunnel. Former Center Director Smith J. 
De France was present, as was Russell G. Robinson, former 
director of aeronautics and flight systems, who broke ground 
for the first construction at Ames in Dec. 1939. The new 
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addition to the 40- by 8O-foot wind tunnel would result in the 
largest facility of its kind in the world. (Director’s memoran- 
dum 78-156) 
19 Nov. Final course and attitude corrections were made in the flight of 
Pioneer-Venus 2 earlier in the month. The small probes were 
released on 19 Nov., and final descent was to occur 9 Dec. 
(Astrogram, 14 Dec. 1978) 
4 Dec. Pioneer-Venus 1 was inserted into orbit around Venus and 
began radar-mapping Venus’s surface. The mapper took one 
radar scan of the planet each Earth day and would map a belt 
completely around Venus in 243 days, during which Venus 
rotates once on its axis. (Astrogrum, 14 Dec. 1978) 
9 Dec. The four probes of Pioneer-Venus 2 descended to the surface of 
the planet, transmitting data as they descended. Unexpectedly, 
the day probe survived the landing impact and continued to 
transmit data for 67 minutes. (Astrogram, 14 Dec. 1978) 
14 Dec. Ames held a public briefing on the early scientific results of the 
first phase of the Pioneer-Venus mission. Experimenters 
revealed that the inert gas argon was found by both orbiter and 
probe instruments. The unexpected presence of the isotope 
Argon 36, relatively rare on Earth and Mars, might lead to a 
total revision of planet-formation theories. The findings could 
indicate that Venus was formed from very different materials 
than were Earth and Mars. Data from the four probes indicated 
that the cloud layer that enshrouds the planet disappears at 
about 55 km altitude. An immaculately clean atmosphere was 
found below that level, but the atmosphere was so dense that 
visibility would be very limited. At 27 km altitude, the large 
probe’s gas chromatograph identified seven substances: neon, 
nitrogen, oxygen, argon, water, sulphur dioxide, and carbon 
dioxide. The presence of 97% carbon dioxide and 0.1% water 
vapor supported the theory that Venus’s intense heat results 
from a greenhouse effect trapping heat from the sun. (Astro- 
gram, 14 Dec. 1978) 
1979 
1 Jan. John W. Boyd, deputy director of aeronautics and flight sys- 
tems, was named deputy director of Dryden Flight Research 
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Center. At Ames since 1947, Boyd had been involved in a 
variety of research fields. He played an important role in devel- 
oping and verifying the concept of conical camber for subsonic 
and supersonic aircraft, theoretical verification of canards as 
control surfaces for aircraft, experimental verification of the 
relations between vehicle shapes and problems of entry into 
planetary atmospheres, and management of aeronautical pro- 
grams for VTOL and rotorcraft technology studies. (Director’s 
memorandum 78-159; Astrogram, 16 Nov. 1978) 
19 Jan. The Pioneer Project Office was reorganized to manage the 
remaining seven active Pioneer spacecraft. A major responsibil- 
ity was planning and executing Pioneer 11’s flyby past Saturn 
in Sept. 1979. The Experiment Systems Branch, Mission Opera- 
tions Systems Branch, and Spacecraft Systems Branch were 
abolished, with their remaining functions vested in the Pioneer 
Project Office. (Director’s memorandum 79-15) 
1 Feb. A. Thomas Young became deputy director of Ames. Young was 
formerly director of the Planetary Program in the Office of 
Space Science at NASA Headquarters. (Director’s memorandum 
78-167;Astrogram, 16 NOV. 1978) 
13 Feb. A Small Transport Aircraft Technology Project Team was estab- 
lished at Ames to plan, advocate, and implement an advanced 
technology project for small transport aircraft. Until recently 
air service to small communities and on low-density routes was 
severely constrained by the economic burdens of existing regu- 
lations. Deregulation created a rapid growth in this type of 
service and a strong demand for modern aircraft. The team was 
created to fill this need. (Director’s memorandum 79-30) 
Also in Major findings from Pioneer-Venus 1 and 2 included the follow- 
Feb. ing: (1)  The planet’s searing atmosphere and surface heat 
seemed quite certainly to be due to a runaway greenhouse 
effect. (2) Venus’s clouds were in three well defined and dis- 
tinct layers, and seemed to result from vigorous sulfur- 
hydrogen-oxygen reactions. (3) Data from the orbiter’s first 
radar map suggested that Venus’s topography could be similar 
to Earth’s, with high mountain-like features and extensive areas 
of relative flatness. The dayside probe found fine dust on the 
surface at its landing site in the southern hemisphere. (4) Start- 
ing at 13 km altitude, the two nightside probes detected a glow 
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that increased as the probes descended. Mass spectrometer evi- 
dence for various sulfur compounds near the surface suggested 
that the mysterious glow could come from chemical fires on the 
surface or in the very hot and dense lower atmosphere near the 
surface. (5) The solar wind was interacting with the Venusian 
atmosphere several times more strongly than expected. (6) The 
spacecraft had so far identified 10 chemical constituents of the 
atmosphere and 10 ions in the ionosphere of Venus. (Astro- 
gram, 22 Feb. 1979) 
Feb.-Mar. From 22 Feb. to 9 Mar., one of Ames’s U-2 high-altitude 
research aircraft flew several astronomy missions over Peru. The 
payload was an upward-looking differential microwave radiom- 
eter for measuring the sky’s background microwave radiation at 
extremely low temperatures. The measurements obtained were 
to be used to determine the movement and speed of Earth and 
our galaxy, the Milky Way, with respect to far distant bodies of 
the universe. Similar measurements made by the same aircraft in 
1976-1977 supported the theory that the Milky Way and Earth 
are traveling through space at 1.6 billion km/hr. The mission, 
though accomplished successfully, was not without traumatic 
moments. Engine trouble with supporting C-130 aircraft, tem- 
porarily lost equipment, and the highjacking of the aircraft on 
which the crew traveled to Peru made the mission a close-run 
thing. On the return flight, the U-2 was granted an emergency 
waiver to fly without rescue support aircraft because of more 
trouble with the second C-130 pressed into service. (Astrogram, 
22 Mar., 5 Apr. 1979) 
30 Mar. The Pioneer-Venus Team and Project Manager Charles Hall were 
honored by the National Space Club for outstanding contribu- 
tions to space science. The Nelson P. Jackson Award, given to 
the year’s most outstanding contributor in the missile, aircraft, 
and space fields, was given jointly to the NASA Ames Research 
Center for management of Pioneer-Venus and to Hughes Air- 
craft Company, which built both spacecraft. Hall, who had 
managed the Pioneer Projects since their inception in 1962, was 
awarded the Annual Astronautics Engineer Award. (Ames 
release 79-13; Astrogrum, 5 Apr. 1979) 
Also in 
Mar. 
One of the two Rotor Systems Research Aircraft (RSRA) was 
delivered to Ames from Wallops Island after initial flight testing 
there. The RSRA could be configured to fly as a helicopter or 
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with fixed wings and auxiliary jet engines. It could also be fitted 
with a variety of experimental and developmental rotor systems 
for research purposes. The RSRA joined the growing body of 
short-haul research aircraft based at Ames, including the X-14 
jet-powered VTOL aircraft, the Augmentor Wing Jet STOL Air- 
craft, the Tilt-Rotor Research Aircraft, and the Quiet Short- 
Haul Research Aircraft. (Astrogrum, 8 Mar. 1979) 
NASA and Soviet life scientists were to cooperate in studying 
physio!ogical changes in humans resulting from simulated 
weightlessness. Objectives of the joint study were to improve 
bedrest test procedures, to standardize physiological measure- 
ments and analysis techniques performed on astronauts and 
cosmonauts, and to reduce test duplication and increase the 
flow of information between the two groups. Dr. Harold 
Sandler of Ames was project scientist and Dr. Carter Alexander 
of JSC was project manager. A five-week study was to be 
conducted at the Institute of Biomedical Problems in Moscow, 
beginning in mid-May; a second would follow at Ames in 
mid-July. (Ames release 79-17;Astrogrum, 3 May 1979) 
The Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation Facility Project Office 
was established at Ames to pursue the design of a significant 
advancement in computational capability as part of the NASA 
FY 1980 program. Ames had previously carried out studies to 
assess the feasibility of a facility capable of one billion floating 
point operations per second. On the basis of positive results 
from those feasibility studies, Ames’s proposal to continue 
work in this field was accepted by NASA Headquarters. 
(Director’s memorandum 79-73) 
The Convair 990 research aircraft, Galileo 11, was to participate 
in a summer-long international study of the summer monsoon, 
which annually brings torrential rains to the Asian subconti- 
nent. MONEX (monsoon experiment) was to explore the origin 
of the monsoon winds in order to improve short-range predic- 
tion and understanding of the monsoon’s role in global weather 
patterns. Galileo II would operate from bases in Saudi Arabia 
and elsewhere in the region, in coordination with several other 
aircraft, ships, and a variety of ground-based facilities. The mis- 
sion was part of a large-scale atmospheric research program 
being conducted by the World Meteorological Organization of 
the United Nations. (Ames release 79-18; Astrogram, 31 May 
1979) 
13 Apr. 
23 Apr. 
2 May 
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7 May The infrared instrument aboard the Pioneer- Venus orbiter had 
been returning downgraded data since 14 Feb. Efforts to 
correct the problem did not succeed, although the instrument 
functioned successfully long enough to make a thorough infra- 
red survey of Venus. The regulated voltages that powered the 
instrument were registering 6 to 7 volts instead of the required 
10. (Ames release 79-19) 
4 June The Material Science and Applications Office was established 
within the Thermo- and Gas-Dynamics Division of the Astro- 
nautics Directorate. The office would conduct research on the 
fatigue and fracture mechanics of metal and composite mate- 
rials subjected to corrosion, while developing accelerated life- 
testing techniques for such materials. (Director’s memorandum 
79-95) 
11 July Pioneer 10 crossed the orbit of Uranus. The seventh planet out, 
Uranus is 2.9 billion km from the Sun and about 2.7 billion 
km from Earth. Launched on 3 Mar. 1972 for the first flight 
beyond Mars and through the asteroid belt, Pioneer 10 dis- 
pelled theories about an asteroid barrier to outer planet explora- 
tion. Mission planners used Jupiter’s gravity to hurl the space- 
craft on an escape trajectory out of the solar system. The space- 
craft would next head for Neptune, and then on to the 
expected limit of radio communications after crossing Pluto’s 
orbit in 1987. (Astrogrum, 14 June 1979) 
15 July The Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft Project Office was abolished, 
and the Tilt Rotor Aircraft Office was established. The new 
office would be responsible for all tilt rotor technology develop- 
ment and demonstration programs, including completion of 
the XV-15 research aircraft, proof-of-concept flight demonstra- 
tion and concept evaluation, management of advanced flight 
experiments, and conduct of the Tilt Rotor Systems Technol- 
ogy Program. David Few was appointed manager of the new 
office. (Director’s memorandum, 30 July 1979) 
19 July Two Soviet medical doctors arrived at Ames to participate in 
the second phase of the space-medicine study that began 
in May in Moscow. They were the project manager for the 
Soviet phase of the study, Valeriy Mikhailov, and one of the 
principal researchers, Anatole Grigoriev. Previously, Dr. Harold 
Sandler of Ames and Dr. Carter Alexander of Johnson traveled 
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to the Soviet Union for the first phase of the study. (Ames 
release 79-27; Astrogram, 28 June 1979) 
The Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft, one of Ames’s new acquisi- 
tions, demonstrated in-flight conversion from the helicopter 
mode to the airplane mode. The flight was made in Texas at 
Bell Helicopter’s Flight Research Center. Bell designed and 
built the airplane under a joint research program for Ames and 
the U.S. Army’s Research and Technology Laboratories. This is 
the secoild tilt rotor aircraft built for the project; the first was 
flight tested in 1977 and then shipped to Ames for wind-tunnel 
testing to define the initial flight envelope for flight tests with 
the second aircraft. (Astrogrum, 9 Aug. 1979) 
The Helicopter-VTOL Human Factors Office was established 
within the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Division to study 
pilot-system performance problems, particularly those dealing 
with the transfer of information. The office was staffed by both 
NASA and Army Aeromechanics Laboratory research per- 
sonnel. (Director’s memorandum 79-100) 
A CH-47B Chinook, the Army’s medium-lift helicopter, arrived 
at Ames from Langley. This modified version had one set of 
conventional flight controls on the left side and a fly-by-wire, 
variable-stability control system on the right. A research console 
was mounted in the cargo compartment for in-flight changes in 
flight-control response. For the next several months the 
Chinook was to be used to study sideslip performance. (Astro- 
grum, 20 Sept. 1979) 
Pioneer 11 was reoriented to keep the spin axis and antenna 
pointed toward Earth as it hurtled toward Saturn. With the 
spacecraft 945 million miles from Earth, controllers at Ames 
fired two one-second burns of Pioneer’s two thrusters, moving 
the spacecraft 1.1 degree to the left. The spacecraft would soon 
be maneuvered again to allow the ultraviolet instrument to 
begin measuring Saturn. Pioneer 11 had begun to experience the 
tremendous gravity of Saturn. The planet would pull the space- 
craft toward it with increasing speed until at closest approach 
on 1 Sept., Pioneer would speed past Saturn at 125,000 km/hr. 
Pioneer 11 had returned 10 pictures of the planet; as the 
spacecraft moved closer to the planet, the images would grow 
larger and clearer, and by 30 Aug., the images should be twice 
as good as Earth-based photos. (Astrogrum, 23 Aug. 1979) 
24 July 
1 Aug. 
22 Aug. 
Also in 
Aug. 
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1 Sept. Pioneer’s encounter with Saturn was completed exactly as antic- 
ipated. Traveling at 85,000 km/hr, the spacecraft passed 
through the ring plane in less than a second. The crossing was 
dangerous because any impact with debris could have destroyed 
the spacecraft. One minute after its closest approach, Pioneer 
disappeared behind Saturn for over an hour, out of radio con- 
tact with Earth. After the spacecraft’s reappearance, it made 
another shallow-angle, hazardous ring-plane crossing on its out- 
ward journey on the afternoon of 1 Sept. The spacecraft 
then headed out of the solar system, traveling roughly in the 
same direction as the solar system is moving through the galaxy. 
(Director’s memorandum 79-161; Astrogrum, 6 Sept. 1979) 
25 Sept. An unmanned Cosmos biosatellite containing experiments from 
the USSR, the United States, and other countries was launched 
in the Soviet Union. Over 40 American scientists from 18 uni- 
versities and research institutes were involved in the 14 U.S. 
experiments managed by the Cosmos Project within Ames’s 
Life Sciences Directorate. The major part of the payload con- 
sisted of 38 white rats and 60 fertile Japanese quail eggs. They 
would be in orbit for about three weeks; upon return, data 
would be shared with other participating countries. The studies 
were to determine the effects of weightlessness on various 
physiological processes. This was the first mission by any coun- 
try to attempt a mammalian breeding experiment. (Astrogrum, 
6 Sept. 1979) 
25 Sept. John Dusterberry was appointed systems integration manager of 
the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel modification project. (Director’s 
memorandum 79-15 7)  
Also in 
Sept. 
After a series of workshops at Ames chaired by Dr. Philip 
Morrison of MIT, scientists recommended an organized program 
to Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Accordingly, a SET1 
Project Development Office was formed at Ames. The staff was 
composed of scientists from Ames and JPL; the project manager 
was John Billingham of Ames. (Astrogrum, 20 Sept. 1979) 
4 Oct. Director Clarence Syvertson announced changes in the program 
planning and review process at Ames. Twice a year organiza- 
tional directors would present their program plans in five con- 
secutive meetings; each meeting was to be devoted to one 
directorate. In addition, each Monday morning Syvertson would 
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review one division’s activities. Each division would therefore be 
reviewed twice a year. (Director’s memorandum 79-173) 
The Pioneer Project Office was to be gradually phased out over 
the next three months. The Pioneer-Saturn mission and the 
Pioneer-Venus missions had been completed, and no future 
Pioneer projects were planned. A new Space Missions Branch in 
the Space Projects Division took control of the seven opera- 
tional Pioneer spacecraft. (Director’s memorandum 79-1 78) 
10 Oct. 
17 Oct. A two-day conference aponsored by the Western Regional 
Applications Program at Ames met to discuss progress in apply- 
ing Landsat technology to natural-resource management. The 
Regional Remote Sensing Conference included over 300 repre- 
sentatives of state and federal agencies, universities, national 
associations, and private industry. Goddard Space Flight Center 
and the Earth Resources Laboratory cooperated with Ames in 
the national test to see if the satellite system could provide 
more immediate and economical resource information than 
conventional methods of data collection. (Ames release 79-40; 
Astrogram, 18 Oct. 1979) 
24 Oct. Ames announced further findings from Pioneer 11’s encounter 
with Saturn on 1 Sept.: (1) Saturn has an 11th moon, dis- 
covered in a photo of the outer edge of Saturn’s rings and by 
instrumentation on the spacecraft. Its estimated diameter is 
400 km. (2) Saturn has a magnetic field, magnetosphere, and 
magnetic belts. (3) Low temperatures mean that life on the 
planet’s satellite Titan is unlikely, though still possible. (4) Two 
new rings were identified. One, named the F ring, is separated 
from the A ring by a 3,600-km gap called the Pioneer Division. 
A second ring, the G ring, lies between the orbits of the satel- 
lites Rhea and Titan. ( 5 )  A feature called the French Division, 
between the middle and inner visible rings (B and C rings) was 
seen in Pioneer pictures of the shadow of the rings on Saturn’s 
surface. It was named after French astronomers who first 
suggested its presence. (6) Substantial particle material was seen 
in Cassini’s Division and in the outer and inner portions of the 
A ring. The Cassini Division looks empty when viewed from 
Earth. (7) Preliminary measurements of the ring mass indicated 
they have a low density and probably are made up largely of 
ice. (8) Pioneer sustained two micro-meteoroid hits above the 
rings and three more hits below the rings. (9) Gravity field mea- 
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surements indicated that Saturn is flattened about 10% at the 
poles by its rapid rotation. (10) Gravity field analysis and tem- 
perature profile measurements suggested that the planet’s core 
is about twice the size of Earth, but is so compressed by 
Saturn’s huge mass that it contains about 11 Earth masses of 
material, largely iron and rock. (11) Above the core, the planet 
apparently consists of liquid metallic hydrogen, which does not 
exist on Earth. (12) More than twice as much heat is radiated 
into space by Saturn than it absorbs from the Sun. (13) Saturn’s 
magnetic field is 1,000 times stronger than Earth’s and 20 times 
weaker than Jupiter’s. (14) Saturn has radiation belts made up 
of high-energy electrons and protons that are comparable in 
intensity to those of Earth, but they are completely eliminated 
by Saturn’s rings. The high-energy particles bounce back and 
forth between Saturn’s poles about once a second, until 
absorbed by ring material. This produces the most radiation-free 
sector of space yet found in the solar system. (15) Ultraviolet 
instrumentation may have detected a generalized hydrogen glow 
or the presence of auroras on Saturn. (Director’s memorandum 
79-161; Ames release 79-42;Astrogram, 15 Nov. 1979) 
21 Nov. A University of Iowa team led by Dr. James Van Allen 
announced more discoveries based on data returned from 
Pioneer 11. A 12th moon of Saturn, a new ring around the 
planet, and a possible 13th moon had been found. The 12th 
moon is about 170 km in diameter and lies within the region 
occupied by Saturn’s outer F ring. The moon’s period of 
revolution around Saturn is about 15 hr. The new ring, 
8000 km wide, directly adjoins the outer F ring and could be 
considered an outward extension of it, though it is composed 
of more tenuous material than the F ring. The discoveries were 
made by what Van Allen calls “particle-beam astronomy.” This 
means that as high-speed subatomic particles oscillate between 
Saturn’s poles, traveling known paths through the planet’s sym- 
metrical magnetic field, they form particle beams much as in a 
particle accelerator. As the particles are absorbed by moons and 
ring material, the beam is cut off. Shadows in the beams indi- 
cate moons and rings, the size of which can be measured. A 
13th moon was suggested by particle-beam measurements, but 
Van Allen’s team was uncertain whether the information indi- 
cated another moon or only the changing character of the 
particles at that location. (Ames release 79-45; Astrogram, 
29 Nov. 1979) 
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20 Dec. Ames celebrated its 40th anniversary with the unveiling of a 
plaque at the original construction site. Russell Robinson, from 
the NACA's Washington office, had been at Moffett Field to 
oversee the initial construction efforts in December 1939 and 
broke ground for the first building - a construction shack that 
also provided temporary office space. For the anniversary cere- 
mony Robinson helped Ames Director Clarence Syvertson 
unveil the commemorative plaque. (Astrogrum, 27 Dec. 1979) 
21  Dec. The AD-1 oblique-wing research aircraft made its maiden flight 
at Dryden Flight Research Center. In a 38-min flight the craft 
reached an altitude of 300 m and a speed of 140 knots. The 
wing of the craft, which could be moved back as much as 60" 
while the opposite wing moves forward an equal amount, 
remained fixed during the flight. After several more flights to 
demonstrate airworthiness and to gain familiarity with the 
craft's basic flight behavior, NASA was to use the aircraft to 
investigate the handling qualities and control characteristics 
generic to oblique-wing aircraft. The concept, originally devel- 
oped by R. T. Jones to provide more efficient transonic flight, 
had undergone extensive wind-tunnel testing at Ames, culminat- 
ing in the joint Ames-Dryden AD-1 flight research project. 
(Astrogrum, 24 Jan. 1980) 
1980 
1 Jan. John W. Boyd returned to Ames as associate director after serv- 
ing as deputy director of Dryden Flight Research Center for a 
year. He had formerly been deputy director of the Aeronautics 
and Flight Systems Directorate. (Director's memorandum 
79-210;Astrog-fam, 13 Dec. 1979) 
31 Jan. The Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility study team was estab- 
lished within the Space Projects Division in the Astronautics 
Directorate. After eight years of preliminary work, the start of 
design definition studies made a formal team desirable. The 
work would complement and extend the capability of the 
Gerard P. Kuiper Observatory and the IRAS project currently 
under way. The shuttle telescope was to have an aperture of 
nearly one meter and would be cryogenically cooled. (Director's 
memorandum 80-15) 
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Also in 
Jan. 
The Galileo orbiter-probe mission to Jupiter, scheduled for 
launch in January 1982, had to be revised. The Space Shuttle 
was not going to be able to lift a payload as heavy as Gailieo so 
early in Shuttle’s operational history. Therefore the Galileo 
mission would be flown on two spacecraft and launched sepa- 
rately. The Galileo Project Office at Ames would be responsible 
for development of a new carrier for the probe. Overall manage- 
ment of the mission remained the responsibility of the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, which was also developing the orbiter. 
(Astrogram, 3 Apr. 1980) 
1 Feb. A. Thomas Young, deputy director of Ames, was named direc- 
tor of Goddard Space Flight Center. Jack Boyd became acting 
deputy director of Ames, as well as retaining his position of 
associate director. (Director’s memorandum 79-196; Astropum, 
13 Dec. 1979) 
10 Feb. Following the retirement of Dean Chapman, William Ballhaus 
was named director of astronautics, moving up from chief of 
the Applied Computational Aerodynamics Branch. He won the 
prestigious Lawrence Sperry Award in 1980. (Director’s memo- 
randum 80-27 and 79-154; Astrogrum, 22 Feb. 1980) 
12 Feb. The QSRA resumed its flight program after a 4-month stand- 
down for extensive modification, which included installation of 
underwing fairings, a speed-hold system, revised spoiler gearing, 
a new antiskid brake system, and alteration of the horizontal 
tail. A joint program with the Navy was to begin in April. 
(Astrogrum, 22 Feb. 1979) 
28 Feb. The Pioneer Project received special Honor Awards for the suc- 
cessful completion of the Pioneer-Saturn and Pioneer-Venus 
missions. Deputy Administrator Alan Lovelace was at Ames to 
help celebrate the event. (Astrogrum, 24 Jan, 7 Mar. 1980) 
29 Feb. The Pioneer Project Office was closed after 16 years of develop- 
ing and flying spacecraft to study the Sun and various planets. 
Responsibility for the continued operation of the active space- 
craft, Pioneer 6-1 1 and Pioneer- Venus Orbiter, was transferred 
to the Space Missions Branch of the Space Projects Division. 
Charles F. Hall had been Pioneer project manager since 1963. 
(Ames release 80-4; Director’s memorandum 80-36) 
26 7 
Also in 
Feb. 
Feb. 
21 Mar. 
Also in 
Mar. 
28 Apr. 
29 Apr. 
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The Biomedical Research Division within the Life Sciences 
Directorate was planning a study to determine if humans aged 
55 to 65 could safely ride the Space Shuttle. First briefings 
were held for the prospective subjects; of the 44 who reported 
for physicals, 25 were found fit enough to participate in pre- 
liminary testing. Final selectees would enter Ames’s Human 
Research Facility for 9 days of controlled observations, 10 days 
of bedrest, and 5 days of recovery and tests. Dr. Harold Sandler 
was project scientist. (Ames release 80-7; Astrogrum, 1 May 
1980) 
An 1 l-m satellite communications antenna was installed to 
bring Ames real-time test data from research aircraft flying at 
Dry den Flight Research Center. The communications path 
would be from the aircraft to Dryden, to an RCA Satcom, to 
the new antenna, and to Ames computers almost instan- 
taneously. Flight testing of the Army-NASA Tilt Rotor 
Research Aircraft later this spring was to provide the first use of 
the new system. (Astrogrum, 7 Mar. 1980) 
With the resignation of Loren Bright, Sam White was named 
director of research support. White had been chief of the Heli- 
copter Technology Division since 1977. (Director’s memoran- 
dum 80-52; Astrogrum, 3 Apr. 1980) 
In the first of a series of investigations, the Vertical Motion 
Simulator was used to evaluate changes planned for the Shuttle 
orbiter control system. The modifications concerned the con- 
trol characteristics of the spacecraft in the atmospheric reentry 
phase and during landing. The simulator had a greater motion- 
range capability than any other facility and could therefore 
more accurately reproduce the motion an astronaut at the con- 
trols of the Shuttle would feel on approach, flare, and landing. 
(Astrogrum, 3 Apr. 1980) 
The IRAS Project was moved from the Space Projects Division 
to the Astronautics Directorate. R. R. Nunamaker, who had 
been temporary manager, returned to his permanent position as 
chief of the Space Projects Division; D. L. Compton became 
IRAS Project manager. (Director’s memorandum 80-80) 
Richard Peterson, chief of the Ames Aerodynamics Division, 
was named deputy director of Langley Research Center. (Ames 
release 80-31; Astrogrum, 15 May 1980) 
Apr. The Army Aeromechanics Laboratory sponsored a flight- 
simulator visual-systems workshop in April at Ames to exchange 
ideas on the psychophysical and engineering aspects of visual 
simulation systems. The discussions were expected to benefit 
the design of a ground-based facility to simulate rotorcraft mis- 
sions, a joint project of the laboratory and Axles. (Astrogram, 
12 June 1980) 
8 May The shore-based phase of the joint Navy-NASA QSRA flight 
program was completed. The first objective was to determine 
the best method of landing a large propulsive-lift aircraft on an 
aircraft carrier. Repeated landings under various conditions 
generated data on specific aspects of approach and landing, such 
as touchdown dispersion and sink rate. If approved, the next 
phase of the program would involve unarrested landings aboard 
an aircraft carrier at sea. (Astrogrum, 29 May 1980) 
May Through data returned by Pioneer-Venus spacecraft, researchers 
identified major features on the planet. By 18 May the orbiting 
spacecraft had radar-mapped a belt extending completely 
around the planet, from 75 degrees North to 63 degrees South 
latitude, some 93% of Venus’s surface. Two huge continent-like 
features were identified. One, centered at 65 degrees North 
latitude, is the size of Australia and contains mountains as high 
as Everest. The other, centered about 5 degrees South, has 
somewhat lower terrain and is half as large as Africa. The data 
also show deep rift valleys, rolling plains, high plateaus, and 
other mountains. Scientists proposed that the northern highland 
mass be named Ishtar Terra, for Ishtar, the Babylonian goddess 
of love and war. Aphrodite Terra was proposed as a name for 
the equatorial upland mass, after the Greek goddess of love, 
known to the Romans as Venus. (Ames releases 80-47, 80-48; 
Astrogrum, 10 July 1980) 
May Ames psychophysiologist Patricia Cowings presented research 
which she believed might result in a cure for “space sickness,” 
motion sickness in the weightless environment of spaceflight. 
Working in the Biomedical Research Division, Cowing and 
associates taught about 50 volunteers how to suppress illness 
when subjected to an ever-faster-spinning chair. 65% of the 
volunteers became able to suppress illness symptoms at all 
speeds; another 20% learned to tolerate significantly higher 
speeds before becoming sick. By monitoring respiration and 
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heart rate, the subjects learned to recognize when their bodies 
were operating best. In addition to biofeedback, subjects were 
taught mental exercises to speed up the learning process. (Ames 
release 80-32; Astrogram, 29 May 1980) 
15-28 June A NASA delegation of aeronautics R&D officials visited China 
in an exchange that would bring members of the Chinese aero- 
nautical establishment to the US. in the fall. Each group hoped 
to become familiar with the other’s civil aeronautics program in 
preparation for exploring prospects for US.-Chinese coopera- 
tion in this field. The group met Chinese officials in Beijing and 
toured aeronautical facilities. Ames Director of Astronautics 
William Ballhaus was among the delegation. (Astrogram, 
26 June, 24July 1980) 
26 June 
June 
Also in 
May-June 
A project team was established to plan a new flight simulator, 
the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility. Its purpose would 
be to minimize pilot and ground-control errors in commercial 
aviation, both present and future, and in air-traffic-control 
systems. The new facility was expected to cost $8 million and 
be completed in Dec. 1983. (Director’s memorandum 80-60) 
The tie-down test facility for the XV-15 tilt rotor research 
aircraft, which would permit ground operation of the rotors in 
all flight configurations, was completed. The helicopter-sized 
blades were so large that the craft had to be raised before being 
ground-tested in the airplane mode. The facility used the 
hydraulic lift of the existing V/STOL hover-test stand with 
two tie-down towers that were moved into place after the air- 
craft was elevated. (Astrogrum, 26 June 1980) 
An Ames U-2 took part in a NASA study to find out how vol- 
canic eruptions affect Earth’s weather and climate by studying 
the plumes emitted from Mt. St. Helens, which erupted on 
18 May. Data collected for the Aerosol Climate Effects (ACE) 
program at Ames is the most complete set of observations made 
of volcanic aerosols in the stratosphere. Aerosols are fine par- 
ticles, either solid or liquid, suspended in gas; the ACE study 
began over a year ago to assess the climatic effect of aerosols 
in the Earth’s atmosphere. Five missions were flown in the 
St. Helens area; preliminary data analysis indicates the volcanic 
plumes contained a mixture of solid ash particles and sulfuric 
. acid, with proportions varying in different samples. The amount 
270 
of sulfuric acid found in the stratosphere was several hundred 
times greater than that found prior to the eruptions; large 
increases in gaseous sulfur dioxide were also detected. 
In addition to the aerosol sampling missions, the U-2 pho- 
tographed Mt. St. Helens on June 19 at the request of the 
Washington State Office of Emergency Services. The flight was 
the result of a month of weather map observations for predic- 
tions of skies clear enough to allow the U-2 to photograph the 
volcanic damage from an altitude of 19,800 m. The photog- 
raphy gave the state the first comprehensive coverage of the 
damaged area. (Astrogram, 24 July 1980, 7 Aug. 1980) 
10-13 July The QSRA made several flights from and landed on the USS 
Kittyhawk at sea - the first time that a four-engine jet trans- 
port had operated aboard an aircraft carrier. Both touch-and-go 
and full-stop landings were made by a team consisting of one 
Navy pilot and two NASA research pilots. This was the second 
phase of ajoint Navy-NASA program that started inMarch 1980; 
data obtained would provide the Navy with a basis for planning 
airplane and ship procurement. (Astrogram, 24 July 1980) 
Bell Helicopter completed the first phase of the XV-15 tilt rotor 
research aircraft flight-test program in Texas. Subsequent flights 
at Dryden Flight Research Center would expand the maneuver- 
ing envelope and investigate operational aspects of the tilt rotor 
for military and civil applications. The second XV-15 was being 
tested at the Ames tie-down facility, with flight testing planned 
for late fall 1980. (Astrogram, 21 Aug. 1980) 
July 
27 Aug. Ames selected two firms to do system design studies for its 
Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator, a specialized supercomputer 
to assist in developing and testing new flight vehicles, as well as 
doing fluid-flow research in meteorology, gas dynamics, and 
computational chemistry. The studies were expected to result 
in a new data processor 40 times faster than existing supercom- 
puters, with a high-speed memory 60 times larger than the cur- 
rent generation of supercomputers. The two contractors were 
Burroughs Corporation of Paoli, Pennsylvania, and Control Data 
Corporation of Arden Hills, Minnesota. (Ames release 80-7 1; 
Astrogram, 11 Sept. 1980) 
11 Sept. Vice Premier Bo Yibo of China visited Ames with 16 other 
Chinese delegates who were on a month-long visit to the United 
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States. He had been invited to visit a NASA center by Deputy 
Administrator Alan Lovelace, who headed the NASA delegation 
to China in June. The Vice Premier was touring the United 
States to observe the operations of major high-technology firms 
as part of the reorganization and modernization of China’s 
machine-building industry. (Astrogram, 3 Oct. 1980) 
The Augmentor Wing Jet STOL Research Aircraft completed its 
last research flight at Ames after over eight years of STOL flight 
research. The joint program between NASA and the Canadian 
Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce began in the 
mid-1960s with a series of model tests in the Ames 40- by 
8O-foot wind tunnel. The present aircraft was designed around a 
de Havilland of Canada Buffalo (C-8A) donated to NASA by 
the USAF. The Boeing Company modified the aircraft, and 
Rolls Royce and de Havilland designed the propulsion system. 
A powered elevator, antiskid brakes, and a comprehensive digi- 
tal avionics research system (called STOLAND) were installed. 
In 1974 the aircraft was transferred to the Avionics Research 
Branch, and over the next three years utilized the broad range 
of capabilities provided by STOLAND to investigate the opera- 
tional characteristics of powered-lift transports. The first fully 
automatic landing was made in 1975; later research investigated 
flightpath tracking and flare-control laws. The aircraft was to be 
returned to Canada for further exploration of the augmentor 
concept. (Astrogrum, 31 Oct. 1980) 
The Ames Basic Research Council was established to evaluate 
and recommend proposals for the Director’s Discretionary 
Fund, Funds for Independent Research, and to represent Ames 
on the OAST Research Council at NASA Headquarters. (Direc- 
tor’s memorandum 80-172) 
17 Sept. The Aeronautics and Flight Systems Directorate was reor- 
ganized to accommodate new program responsibilities, facilities, 
and research aircraft. The reorganization would permit Ames to 
be more responsive to the needs of the helicopter program and 
to give added emphasis to disciplinary research. The Helicopter 
Technology Division and the V/STOL Aircraft Technology Divi- 
sion were combined to form the Helicopter and Powered Lift 
Division; the Simulation Sciences Division and the Flight Sys- 
tems Research Division were combined to form the Flight Sys- 
tems and Simulation Research Division. (Ames release 80-74; 
Director’s memorandum 80-176) 
1 2  Sept. 
16 Sept. 
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Sept. Ames announced that the 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel would 
close in July 1981 for approximately one year to complete an 
$85 million modification project. The power system was to be 
enlarged and a new 80- by 120-foot test section added. (Astro- 
gram, 18 Sept. 1982) 
NASA and Army officials of the Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft 
Project accepted the first XV-15 aircraft in ceremonies at 
Dryden Flight Research Center. Government flight testing, to 
be conducted by NASA, Army, and Navy, and Bell Helicopter 
Textron, would follow to demonstrate and evaluate the tilt- 
rotor concept. A second aircraft was undergoing ground testing 
at Ames. (Ames release 80-76; Astrogram, 26 Dec. 1980) 
30 Oct. 
31 Oct. Angelo Guastaferro was named deputy director of Ames. He 
had been director of the Planetary Division, Office of Space 
Science, NASA Headquarters. He began his NASA career at 
Langley Research Center in 1963. (Director’s memorandum 
80-205; Astrogram, 14 Nov. 1980) 
4 Nov. Following the resignation of Leonard Roberts as director of 
aeronautics and flight systems in September, Thomas Snyder 
was appointed to the position. Snyder had been chief of the 
Flight Systems Research Division. (Director’s memorandum 
80-194; Astrograrn, 28 Nov. 1980) 
18 Nov. Hughes Aircraft Company was chosen for the negotiation of a 
contract for the Galileo Probe Carrier Spacecraft; the estimated 
contract value was $40 million. The spacecraft was scheduled to 
be launched from the Space Shuttle in Mar. 1984. Upon reach- 
ing Jupiter in July 1987, the carrier would release the probe, 
which would then enter the planet’s atmosphere. (Ames release 
80-79) 
30 Nov. The Technology Utilization Office was abolished, and its func- 
tions were transferred to the Western Regional Applications 
Office within the Airborne Missions and Applications Division 
of the Astronautics Directorate. The office was renamed the 
Western Regional Applications and Technology Utilization 
Office. (Director’s memorandum 80-2 15) 
4 Dec. Pioneer-Venus 2 completed two years in orbit. Its data led to 
explanations of the planet-wide circulation of Venus’s atmo- 
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sphere, greenhouse effect, and long-term patterns of cloud 
circulation, as well as new measurements of atmospheric ele- 
ments. (Ames releases 80-84, 80-88) 
9 Dec. The parachute system for the Galileo Jupiter atmosphere probe 
was flight tested at the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake. It 
was the third and last test of the system; improvements had 
been made in the parachute after previous tests. (Ames release 
80-81) 
16 Dec. Pioneer 6 completed 16 years of circling the Sun and returning 
useful data - the longest operating life ever attained by an 
interplanetary spacecraft. The original specifications called for 
an operating life of six months; Pioneer 7, 8, and 9 were also 
years beyond their six-month design lives. Together, they made 
up a network of solar weather stations. (Ames release 80-9 1) 
18 Dec. Ames researcher Dr. David White proposed a new way of think- 
ing about the origin of life on Earth. He suggested that simple 
self-replicating chemical systems, rather than complex ones, 
could have served as the precursors of living cells more than 
3.5 billion years ago. The first chemical systems, which were 
“alive” only in the sense that they could reproduce themselves, 
may have been far simpler than previously thought. The ques- 
tion raised by the theory was whether some combination of 
these simple molecules would have the necessary properties to 
reproduce themselves. (Ames release 80-52) 
Dec. The QSRA completed a comprehensive flight program in which 
each of 20 experimental test pilots, representing 15 different 
organizations, made two flights. (Astrogrum, 12 Dec. 1980) 
Dec. Steelwork for the new test section on the 40- by 8O-foot wind 
tunnel began. The 183-m addition was to culminate in a bell- 
shaped air intake 110 m wide and 40 m high. (Astrogrum, 
26 Dec. 1980) 
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APPENDIX G 
MAJOR PROFESSIONAL AWARDS WON BY AMES PERSONNEL 
1940-1 980" 
1943 
William H. McAvoy 
Octave Chanute Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
1946 
Robert T. Jones 
Sylvanus Albert Reed Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
Lewis A. Rodert 
Collier Trophy (National Aeronautical Association) 
1947 
Laurence A. Clousing 
Octave Chanute Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
1948 
Smith J. De France 
Presidential Medal of Merit 
Vice President, Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences 
Walter G. Vincenti 
Gold Medal Award (Pi Tau Sigma) 
*The listed awards reveal only a partial recognition of the many honors achieved by 
Ames personnel over the years. Because of space constrictions, I have omitted in-house 
awards from NASA and Ames, which represent perhaps even greater honors, recognition 
by colleagues for research excellence. 
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1951 
Smith J. De France 
Vice President, Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences 
1952 
Dean R. Chapman 
Lawrence B. Sperry Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
Smith J. De France 
Honorary Doctor of Law Degree, University of California, Los Angeles 
1953 
Smith J. De France 
Honorary Doctor of Engineering Degree, The University of Michigan 
1954 
George C. Cooper 
Octave Chanute Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
Arthur S. Flemming Award (Junior Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.) 
Milton D. Van Dyke 
Fulbright Award for Research 
John Simon Guggenheim Award 
1955 
H. Julian Allen 
Sylvanus Albert Reed Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
Robert T. Jones 
Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
William F. Kauffman 
Arthur S. Flemming Award (Junior Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.) 
Walter G. Vincenti 
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Rockefeller Public Service Award 
1956 
Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. 
Arthur S. Flemming Award ('Junior Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.) 
1957 
C. A. Syvl -rtson 
Lawrence B. Sperry Award (Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences) 
1958 
H. Julian Allen 
Science Trophy (Air Force Association) 
Wright Brothers Lecture Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. 
Outstanding Alumni Award, University of Omaha 
1959 
Dean R. Chapman 
Rockefeller Public Service Award 
Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. 
Arthur S. Flemming Award (Junior Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.) 
1961 
Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. 
Sylvanus Albert Reed Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
1962 
Merrill H. Mead 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (M.I.T.) 
Walter C. Williams 
Sylvanus Albert Reed Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
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Astronautics) 
1963 
John S. White and Rodney C. Wingrove 
Samuel Burka Award (Institute of Navigation) 
1964 
Evelyn Anderson 
Fourth Annual Federal Women’s Award 
Smith J. De France 
Career Service Award (National Civil Service League) 
Fred J. Drinkwater, 111, and Robert C. Innis 
Octave Chanute Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
1965 
John W. Boyd 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Carr H. Nee1 
The Award of Excellence (Instrument Society of America) 
Rodney C. Wingrove 
Astronautics) 
Lawrence B. Sperry Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
1966 
George E. Cooper 
Admiral Luis de Florez Flight Safety Award (19th Annual International 
Air Safety Seminar, Madrid) 
Smith J. De France 
Elder Statesman of Aviation Award (National Aeronautic Association) 
Fred J. Drinkwater, I11 
Richard Hansford Burroughs Award (Flight Safety Foundation) 
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1967 
Loren 6. Bright 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Woodrow Cook 
American Helicopter Society Honorary Fellowship Award 
1968 
Robert E. Eddy 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Charles W. Harper 
Wright Brothers Lecture (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
Kenneth K. Yoshikawa 
Japanese Government Research Award for Foreign Specialists 
(Research Fellowship, National Aerospace Laboratory, Tokyo) 
1969 
Jerry P. Barrack and Jerry V. Kirk 
Arch T. Colwell Merit Award (Society of Automotive Engineers) 
Leonard Roberts 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
1970 
Angelo Giovannetti, Jr. 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Ronald F. Reinisch 
Fellow of the American Institute of Chemists 
Ray T. Reynolds 
Fellow, Meteoritical Society 
Paul R. Swan 
Congressional Operations Fellowship 
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1971 
George E. Cooper 
Richard Hansford Burroughs Award (Flight Safety Foundation) 
Wallace H. Deckert 
Hugh L. Dryden Fellowship (National Space Club) 
Alan E. Fayk, Jr. 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Donald E. Gault 
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship at Max 
Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics, Heidelberg, Germany 
Harold Hornby 
Woodrow Wilson Fellowship (Princeton) 
Robert T. Jones 
Honorary Ph.D. - Science, University of Colorado 
1972 
Charles C. Kubokawa 
Japanese Government Research Award for Foreign Specialists 
(Research Fellowship, National Aerospace Laboratory, Tokyo) 
Richard H. Peterson 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Victor L. Peterson 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (M.I.T.) 
Thomas Snyder 
Hugh L. Dry den Memorial Fellowship (Stanford) 
1973 
Wallace H. Deckert 
Hugh L. Dryden Memorial Fellowship (M.I.T.) 
David L. Fisher 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
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Robert T. Jones 
Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
Member, National Academy of Engineering 
John H. Wolfe 
AIAA Space Science Award 
1974 
Dale E. Compton 
Alfred P. Sloari Fellowship (M.I.T.) 
Palmer Dyal 
Hugh L. Dry den Memorial Fellowship (University of California, 
Berkeley) 
Q. Marion Hansen 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Hans Mark 
Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
NASA/Ames Pioneer 10 Team and TRW Systems Group 
Nelson P. Jackson Aerospace Award (National Space Club) 
John H. Wolfe 
Space Science Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
1975 
Dean R. Chapman 
Elected to National Academy of Engineers 
John C. Dusterberry 
De Florez Training Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
Robert T. Jones 
W. Rupert Turnbull Lecture (Canadian Aeronautics and Space 
Institute) 
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. 
Robert L. Pike 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
Bruce F. Smith 
Hugh L. Dry den Memorial Fellowship (University of California, 
Berkeley) 
1976 
Jana M. Coleman 
Education for Public Management Fellowship (Cornell) 
Charles F. Hall 
Special Achievement Award (National Civil Service League) 
Lado Muhlstein, Jr. 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Berkeley) 
C. A. Syvertson 
Advanced Management Program (Harvard Business School) 
1977 
Ames Research Center 
Columbus Medal (Genoa, Italy) 
Alan B. Chambers 
Professional Management Development Fellowship (Harvard Business 
School) 
Dennis Cunningham 
Education for Public Management Fellowship (Cornell) 
Ray Hicks 
SAE Wright Brothers Award 
Harvard Lomax 
Fluid and Plasmadynamics Award (American Institute of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics) 
James B. Pollack 
Arthur S. Flemming Award (Junior Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.) 
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1978 
David Chappell 
Robert L. Lichten Award, American Helicopter Society 
Phyllis A. Hayes 
Education for Public Management Fellowship (University of 
Washington) 
Robert T. Jones 
Prandtl Ring Award (Dutsche Gesellschaft fur Luft- und Raumfahrt) 
Paul Kutler 
Lawrence Sperry Award 
George T. Lenehan 
Congressional Operations Fellowship 
Harvard Lomax 
Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
James B. Pollack 
Space Science Award (American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics) 
Terrill V. Putnam 
Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship (Stanford) 
1979 
Ames Research Center and Hughes Aircraft 
Nelson P. Jackson Aerospace Award 
Charles F. Billings 
Distinguished Service Award (Aviation Week and Space Technology) 
Patrick M. Cassen , 
Newcombe-Cleveland Award (American Association for Advancement 
of Science) 
Dean R. Chapman 
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 
FEDERAL RECORD CENTER DOCUMENTS 
As all federal historians know, there is no lack of documentation 
within the bureaucracy. Indeed, the problem lies at the other extreme: 
archival material in federal record centers is overwhelming in quantity, at 
times also bafflingly difficult to pinpoint in specificity. While I found it rela- 
tively easy to locate files on programs, records that were often more help- 
ful - specific offices and divisions, financial records, facilities, personnel - 
were more difficult to uncover. 
Records pertaining to Ames fall into two categories: those that date 
from the NACA period, from 1938 to 1958, and those that pertain to Ames 
as part of NASA, from 1958 to the present. The NACA records belong to 
the National Archives and Records Service; NASA records remain the prop- 
erty of the agency. Both groups of records, however, are found in the 
San Bruno Federal Record Center, about 24 km south of San Francisco. The 
records are for the most pzrt open to authorized scholars. The bulk of docu- 
mentary material used in this book comes from this collection. A useful 
guide to the Ames records for the NACA period is William H. Cunliffe and 
Herman G. Goldbeck, “Special Study on the Records of the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,” July 1973, “-572-13. 
Ames Research Center maintains a current and well organized file on all 
records retired to San Bruno. By consulting a shelf list at Ames, boxes that 
looked potentially valuable were requested from the Sar~  Bruno Federal 
Record Center. I found it more efficient to have boxes sent down to Ames 
itself, since retrieval from the archives sometimes resulted in long waits in its 
reading room. At Ames, boxes could be examined and those that proved 
useful could be retained for further work. From over 60 file cartons, I 
retained about 30 that proved to have useful material. In the early period 
especially, files that contained useful material were quite clearly differen- 
tiated by file-folder title; thus, “General Correspondence, Ames, 
1939-1941” and “Construction of Facilities, Ames, 1940-1945,” etc., 
immediately caught my eye. For the NASA period, the proliferation of 
material seems to have resulted in a shelf list that is more difficult to inter- 
pret. One is not sure, when ordering “Jet Propulsion Lab, 1973,” exactly 
what one will receive - will the file document Ames’s relations with JPL; 
will it deal only with JPL’s activities; will it document any problems arising 
in the AmesgPL relationship, or must one track such issues through corre- 
spondence files? These questions, of course, are faced by any historian doing 
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work in any field. For recent federal history, however, the mystery element 
seems especially acute. 
Ames has retired much of its research information and its administra- 
tive paperwork. For the most part, these files were not useful for my pur- 
poses. I searched instead through files pertaining to policy, organization, 
relations with Headquarters, personnel regulations, and various technical 
committees and planning groups. Correspondence files of administrators 
identified many of the major concerns at Ames during various periods, often 
providing complete exchanges of correspondence on a particular issue over a 
period of months or years. Boxes in the NACA series 70-A-1261, 74-A-1624, 
75-A-1324, and 76-A-1382 were especially useful. For the NASA period, 
accession series 255-77-0020, containing 60 cartons, was most useful. The 
Records Management Office at Ames was extremely helpful in aiding my 
search and in speeding record retrieval from San Bruno. 
RECORDS AT AMES 
I was greatly aided in my work by the fact that Ames, with an eye to its 
recent history, had already collected much information on the 1965-1977 
period. Gathered and categorized by Edie Watson Kuhr, an Ames veteran 
who had been at the center since its early years, the four file drawers of 
information plus additional publications was a very valuable source that 
eased my task immensely. Mrs. Kuhr was extremely helpful in pointing me in 
the right direction. 
The Ames Research Center Library contains a number of important 
holdings pertinent to this study, among them a complete set of NACA 
Annual Reports, containing both financial and administrative information 
and reports completed during the year. Equally important are a complete set 
of Technical Notes, Memoranda, and Reports, the research products for 
which the NACA existed. NASA continued these series. 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES MATERIAL 
The National Archives has a small collection of NACA material in the 
Center for Polar and Scientific Archives, which is in the Main Building. In 
this collection there were several pertinent files, including transcripts of 
speeches. In addition, there is an extremely useful biography file (series 3), 
containing substantial material on William Durand, Smith De France, George 
Lewis, William Moffett, and Jerome Hunsaker, among others. The material 
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varies widely in quality and quantity; the files on Hunsaker, for example, fill 
almost 20 correspondence boxes. A useful guide is Sara Powell, “A Prelimi- 
nary Inventory of the Textual Records of the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics,” June 1967, NM-86. The inventory was not distributed, but 
can be consulted at either the National Archives or the NASA History Office 
Archives. 
NASA HISTORY OFFICE ARCHIVES 
Material in the NASA History Office Archives varies in substance and 
completeness. There is much that is valuable in the small archives, and the 
material dates from the NACA’s earliest years to the present. The NASA 
History Office archivist is extremely knowledgeable and helpful. 
There is much information on the various NASA offices and field ten- 
ters, as well as unexpected collections of personal correspondence among 
key NACA figures. For the early period of Ames’s history, I made much use 
of personal correspondence files. An extensive biography section contains 
material not only on NACA and NASA personnel, but on others important 
in aeronautics and astronautics. Interspersed within the biography files are a 
wealth of photos, in some cases, I am sure, located more easily here than in 
a larger archive. Some biography files contain the transcripts of interviews 
obtained by previous historians. These were sometimes invaluable. 
ORAL, HISTORY INTERVIEWS 
If an institution has a distinct atmosphere or personality of its own, and 
Ames does, that atmosphere comes from its leaders and its personnel. Since I 
attempted to identify those qualities that distinguish Ames and to analyze 
their origins, I found one of my most valuable sources to be interviews with 
past and present members of the Ames staff. In some cases the interview was 
conducted over several sessions. I usually taped the interviews; if this was not 
possible I made extensive notes during and after the interview. By talking to 
many people who were influential in the center’s history, I was able to 
expand the documentation I already had and, in some cases, to fill in gaps of 
knowledge the documents did not provide. When carefully balanced, docu- 
mentary evidence and oral history interviews complement each other, 
providing a blending of perspective between that of the historian and that of 
the historical participant. Talking with my interviewees gave me a depth of 
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understanding not possible by relying solely on documentary evidence. The 
interview tapes are now located in the NASA History Office. 
GENERAL SOURCES 
More general sources used included newspapers, professional journals, 
and secondary monographic sources. The San Francisco Chronicle, the Palo 
Alto Times, and the San Jose Mercury proved useful, though in the early 
years they proved by their omissions that the NACA’s profile was indeed 
low. Aeronautics and Astronautics, the journal of the American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, was valuable for its technical information, as 
was Aviation Week ccnd Space Technology for a more general perspective on 
the field. The annual NASA chronologies, Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
are valuable as references for NASA history; their indexes are both thorough 
and well organized. Robert L. Rosholt’s An Administrative History of 
NASA,  1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (Washington, 1966) provided good 
guidance through the maze of early NASA administrative evolutions. 
Finally, mention must be made of Edwin P. Hartman’s book Adven- 
tures in Research: A History of  Ames Research Center, 1940-1965. 
Although the present monograph differs in intent and style from Hartman’s 
study, his original research and perspective on Ames was invaluable, provid- 
ing a firm foundation for later work. Hartman’s book, more technically 
focused than this study, gives a detailed treatment of the major areas of 
Ames’s research during its first 25 years. In many ways, the books comple- 
ment each other, the present book carrying the narrative past NASA’s first 
years into the present context of research directions and management 
concerns. 
A number of other monographs proved useful. Though not separately 
discussed here, they are cited in the source notes. 
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